Getting the right Rights right.

Sherman wrote,

Apparently, by your understanding, economic induction is simply "observing human action in an economic context and...formulating a general principle."

Hmmm. You admit econometrics isn't up to the task of evaluating "the effects of a minimum-wage law, because, as a form of induction, it isn't fundamental enough...By its nature, it is incapable of isolating all the variables. It does not show what would have happened if the minimum-wage laws had not been implemented.

Well then, kindly describe a form of induction that is fundamental enough so that it is capable of isolating all the variables and it does show what would have happened if the minimum-wage laws had not been implemented. I don't think you can do it. Even though you clearly state in the first quote above from Post #228 that a "proper application of induction would already have shown that a minimum-wage law causes employment...," I don't think you can describe such a "proper application of induction." I am especially curious about how you isolate all variables in your fundamental inductive process and how, by studying reality, you are able to induce that which would have happened from that which didn't happen!

I would do it by identifying the Law of Demand, which is itself arrived at inductively. As George Reisman notes:

This law states that, other things being equal, the higher is the price of any good or service, the smaller is the quantity of it demanded, i.e., the quantity that buyers purchase, and that, by the same token, the lower is the price of any good or service, the larger is the quantity of it demanded, i.e., the quantity that buyers purchase. Since wages are merely the price of labor services, the Law of Demand implies that all government and labor-union interference that forcibly raises wage rates above the height at which they would otherwise have been reduces the quantity of labor employers seek to employ in comparison with what it would otherwise have been. It thus implies that the government�s or labor unions� interference causes unemployment.

One major reason for the existence of the Law of Demand is that while people would like to buy more goods and services, their ability to spend is always limited by the funds at their disposal. Lower prices enable the same funds to buy more, while higher prices prevent any given amount of funds from buying as much. In order to overthrow the Law of Demand, one of the things Card and Krueger would need to be able to do would be to show how the division of a given-sized numerator (i.e., the funds people have available to spend) by a larger-sized denominator (i.e., the prices and wages they must pay) does not result in a reduced quotient (i.e., ability to buy goods and labor services). It should be obvious that this is simply impossible and that insofar as the Law of Demand rests on the laws of arithmetic, no statistical data can ever overthrow it. Rather, the statistical data must be interpreted in a way that is logically consistent with the laws of arithmetic and their derivative, the Law of Demand.

Now you will no doubt claim that this is merely an example of deduction, not induction. But I would disagree. Ultimately, the Law of Demand is arrived at inductively, just as the laws of arithmetic are. I know you don't agree with this, which is why you need to read Peikoff's article on the Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy as well as Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. Insofar as you are unwilling to do this, you will continue to disagree with me, because you won't understand my underlying epistemology.

In Post #237 you failed to respond to this paragraph of questions, which I wrote in Post #235:
The question is: How do you know this? How can you know prior to the econometrician's research what the correct conclusion of that research must be? Or what the correct parameters of his research must be? Or if such parameters are even possible to achieve in the real world? How do you know with certainty that "Card and Krueger" are "academic frauds" who engage in "statistical shenanigans?" Why throw out the results of their empirical research and accept the results of econometricians whose findings correspond to the findings you think are correct? Indeed, how do you know prior to any empirical research at all that "a minimum-wage law reduce[s] the demand for labor ceteris paribus?"!!!!!! How do you know that the economic principle you quote is a "fact?"!!!!!!!

A curious omission, don't you think? I think the day you're able to describe the precise, most fundamental form of inductive reasoning that answers all these questions and my criteria above them, I'll be forced to eat my hat.

I "omitted" that paragraph, because I felt that I had addressed its basic point elsewhere. But the quotation from Reisman addresses it in spades. Besides, I think it's a bit lame for you to accuse me of "omissions," when I've scrupulously replied to virtually every point you've made, while you've taken the liberty of ignoring most of my replies, including two entire posts, which you promised to address but never did. Don't you think that you should apply the same standards to yourself as you demand of me?

You've displayed this kind of double-standard ever since you started debating me, and I've overlooked it. But I'm not going to overlook it any longer. Stick a fork in me. I'm done.

- Bill

Post 241

Sunday, December 16, 2007 - 12:20pm

Expecting that Bill is done with Sherman, I'd like to add a minor, somewhat inconsequential, point on the original subject of this thread: Ron Merrill, in his book: Ideas of Ayn Rand, referred to Rand's view of rights as "plain vanilla natural rights theory ..." (see: "rights" in the index; there's only one page listed).

Now I understand that an idea's truth-value has no necessary association with the number of folks subscribing to it. I also understand that it would be an Appeal to Authority fallacy to rest my case solely on Merrill's interpretation of Rand. I merely found this as a tertiary point which supports, albeit very weakly, my contention regarding the consonance of Rand's view with Natural Rights theory.

Ed

Post 242

Saturday, June 7, 2008 - 10:10am

In the: �Randula, the Altruist Slayer� thread (in the Article Discussions forum), there was a question of whether a criminal (a rapist) has the right to life against his victim�s right to life � should his victim unexpectedly wield lethal force against him. Being such an extreme case, it �tests the waters� of various conceptions of individual rights. I tried to make a case for one conception, and Bill and Joe made a differing case.

In post 154 Bill said:

If I have a right against your coercing me, then you have an obligation to abstain from coercing me. (If P, then Q).

Therefore, if you have no obligation to abstain from coercing me (which you wouldn't, if during an emergency it's in your interest to coerce me), then I have no right against your coercing me. (If not-P, then not-Q).

And in response to this line of reasoning, in post 160 I said:

� rights are metaphysical conditions for man's proper survival. ... it's proper for innocent victims to hold rights against criminals.

And in post 170 I said:

You're saying that folks couldn't have rights against criminals (read: rights violators) when the criminals' lives are on the line. Why? Well, because you've already pre-ordained that criminals are justified in murdering folks who engage in lethal self-defense against them �

And in post 173 I said:

Folks who adopt criminal lifestyles are -- as long as they continue -- lower on a moral totem pole (morally subhuman). They become disqualified for "equal" moral judgment. On this view, it couldn't ever be moral for a criminal to sacrifice a victim's life for the purpose of self-preservation.

And that's because morality isn't about mere death avoidance (i.e., vulgar survivalism), the very concept of morality is specifically human -- and 'guaranteeing your own continued breathing' (or anything on that subhuman level) doesn't qualify as being moral �

� Innocents always have rights -- to be respected or infringed.

And in post 177 I said:

(1) Irrational brutes don�t have the �right� to be selfish (because objective ethics requires first buying-in to the correct morality, before you take action).

(2) Acting with the intention to benefit yourself is not, de facto, �moral� (in its own right).

So, there�s a unifying theme about rights here. The line of reasoning that I�m championing � that while �rules� might be things that are meant-to-be-broken, our individual �rights� aren�t � is also found in Rand�s writing ( http://www.aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/individualrights.html ):

Since Man has inalienable individual rights, this means that the same rights are held, individually, by every man, by all men, at all times. Therefore, the rights of one man cannot and must not violate the rights of another.

For instance: a man has the right to live, but he has no right to take the life of another. �

The telling phrase above is: �by all men, at all times.� Contrary to this universal notion of �inalienable individual rights� is an argument that Joe put forth in post 203:

A different argument comes from the view that rights are metaphysical "things" that people have. If I have a "right", you can't morally hurt me. It's like a moral repulser beam. It emits immoraltrons (undetectable subatomic particles) around you, and anyone who gets too close gets stripped of their morality.

This view of rights upholds other people's rights as some form of intrinsic value, that you must respect or you're "immoral". Instead of not hurting them because it violates your own interests, you're not supposed to hurt them because you'll be metaphysically labeled "immoral". Instead of grounding your moral choices in your own life and happiness, you accept a set of rules you must obey or you don't get the status of being moral.

In summary, putting all 3 arguments into syllogisms yields the following:

Argument 1

Rights are metaphysical necessities for human living (just like water or food or shelter or truth or beauty).

Necessities aren�t ever wrong.
==============
Therefore, rights aren�t ever wrong (they�re universal and inalienable).

Argument 2

Rights imply obligations (on others, not to infringe them).

Rights violators (criminals) don�t have these moral obligations.
=============
Therefore, you get to have rights until a criminal violates them to the point that it endangers his life (and then you don�t have rights anymore, because he�s no longer obliged).

Argument 3

Rights exist only when they further your own life and happiness.

While it can be demonstrated that criminal life doesn�t further your own life and happiness in the broadest sense, killing victims who defend themselves can further your own life and happiness in the narrowest sense.
==============
Therefore, a victim�s �right� to life is not some �thing� that they just have, but ceases to exist when their own self-defense threatens a criminal�s life (because the criminal�s life and happiness are at stake).

I find fault with arguments 2 and 3 but � out of respect � before I address these I am compelled to ask: are these generous interpretations of the quotes from Bill and Joe � or are they misrepresentations (i.e., a Straw Man fallacy)?

Post 243

Saturday, June 7, 2008 - 11:27am

I wrote, "If I have a right against your coercing me, then you have an obligation to abstain from coercing me. (If P, then Q). Therefore, if you have no obligation to abstain from coercing me (which you wouldn't, if during an emergency it's in your interest to coerce me), then I have no right against your coercing me. (If not-P, then not-Q)."

Since you disagree with this argument, Ed, please tell me where you think the argument is mistaken. There only two ways in which the argument could be mistaken: 1) The premises are false, or 2) the logic is invalid.

1) Are you saying that the logic is invalid -- that it is not the case that if P implies Q, then not-Q implies not-P?

2) Or are you saying that the premises are false. If the latter, which premise: (a) the premise that if I have a right against your coercing me, then you have an obligation to abstain from coercing me? or (b) the premise that in an emergency it could be in your interest to coerce me?

Please tell which of these alternatives -- 1) or 2) you take issue with? And if 2), which premise (a) or (b)?

Thanks.

- Bill

Post 244

Saturday, June 7, 2008 - 1:30pm

Bill,

Thank you for clarifying how your syllogism should read (by stating the 2 premises, a and b, explicitly). Here is an attempt to put it in standard format. Simply respond with corrections if I have failed to represent it clearly or accurately:

(a) if I have a right against your coercing me, then you have an obligation to abstain from coercing me
(b) in an emergency it could be in your interest to coerce me
=========
Therefore, during such emergencies, I lose my "otherwise-inalienable" rights, wholesale -- rather than merely the normally-free exercise of my truly-inalienable rights (because there's no dichotomy between one's interests and one's obligations).

My 1st issue with this syllogism is the 1st premise. A "right" is right because of the primary potential of humans, not because of the consequential (read: secondary) obligations involved in the free exercise of rights in the world. Putting the obligation first is putting the cart before the horse (or, in this case, the criminal before the victim). Rights aren't "derived" from the obligations required when we put them into general practice. They're derived from something more basic than that.

My 2nd issue with this syllogism is the 2nd premise. There is some omniscience (isn't some omniscience an oxymoron?), there is some omniscience required in order to figure out when -- in a given emergency -- it will be to an individual's actual best-interest to coerce another individual. What's merely taken-to-be -- or interpreted to be (from some 3rd-party view) -- to be in one's self-interest is not necessarily in one's actual self-interest. For instance, in this case, where there's been some rights violations leading up to the "emergency" -- more (rights violations) is not necessarily better. So it's controversial to just assume it's "in your interest to coerce me."

My 3rd issue with this syllogism is the conclusion, which conflates rights with their exercise. When that's done, then you get the absurd notion that we take criminal's rights away when we incarcerate them. But we don't do that. We take away some of the exercise of their inalienable rights. When they go free, we don't give them their rights back -- as if we were mystical beings in charge of something like that. We allow them the social freedom to exercise their rights.

The opposite of rights is the permission handed to a slave. Convicted criminals aren't slaves. They don't need permission before choosing how to spend their time, by reading a book, or by taking a nap -- for examples. Slaves do, though. Slaves can't even read a book without their master's permission. Slaves are (mis-)treated as if they don't have rights. In fact, all humans are mistreated when they are treated as if they don't have rights. Our goal is a social structure (i.e., Capitalism) where the free exercise of rights is unimpeded. If there's a situation where it's temporarily-impeded (an "emergency"), our new ultimate goal is to get right back to that right social structure (where we flourish).

There is no dichotomy between objective law and inalienable rights, but the conclusion to the syllogism above implies just that. This is because objective law doesn't ever infringe on rights. Its purpose is the opposite (to uphold them). Proper punishment (i.e., justice) doesn't violate rights, either. Saying that a criminal should be able to avoid punishment because no "victim's rights" were violated -- because criminals weren't necessarily "obligated" -- is wrong. In certain emergencies and using legal terms, we'd say that certain rights were violated with an explanation.

In such cases, there might be much less punishment -- perhaps no punishment! -- for violating rights in those very-special situations. However, there might be just as much reparation, or compensation, for the rights violations which someone chooses to commit during an emergency.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 6/07, 1:48pm)

Post 245

Saturday, June 7, 2008 - 5:05pm

Ed asked if the following arguments correctly represent my view:

Rights imply obligations (on others, not to infringe them).

Rights violators (criminals) don�t have these moral obligations.
=============
Therefore, you get to have rights until a criminal violates them to the point that it endangers his life (and then you don�t have rights anymore, because he�s no longer obliged).

This is not an argument that I would make. For one thing, the premises are mutually exclusive. If rights imply obligations, which they do, then it follows that rights-violators have these moral obligations. If they didn't, then they wouldn't be rights-violators. Nor does the conclusion follow from the premises.

As for the truth of the conclusion, I would say that it could be true, if in order to sustain his life, the criminal finds that he must initiate force against you. But all that would imply is that you had no right against his initiating force against you under these circumstances, not that you had no right against others doing so whose lives were not in danger. Nor would it follow that you no longer had any rights. You would certainly have rights against anyone who was not in a life-threatening emergency.

Argument 3
Rights exist only when they further your own life and happiness.

While it can be demonstrated that criminal life doesn�t further your own life and happiness in the broadest sense, killing victims who defend themselves can further your own life and happiness in the narrowest sense.
==============
Therefore, a victim�s �right� to life is not some �thing� that they just have, but ceases to exist when their own self-defense threatens a criminal�s life (because the criminal�s life and happiness are at stake).

I wouldn't use phrases like "in the broadest sense" and "in the narrowest sense," which are too vague. If you simply meant that being a criminal doesn't further your life and happiness, except in an emergency, fine. That's my position.

- Bill

Post 246

Saturday, June 7, 2008 - 6:52pm

Ed wrote,

Thank you for clarifying how your syllogism should read (by stating the 2 premises, a and b, explicitly). Here is an attempt to put it in standard format. Simply respond with corrections if I have failed to represent it clearly or accurately:
(a) if I have a right against your coercing me, then you have an obligation to abstain from coercing me
(b) in an emergency it could be in your interest to coerce me
=========
Therefore, during such emergencies, I lose my "otherwise-inalienable" rights, wholesale -- rather than merely the normally-free exercise of my truly-inalienable rights (because there's no dichotomy between one's interests and one's obligations).

My 1st issue with this syllogism is the 1st premise. A "right" is right because of the primary potential of humans, not because of the consequential (read: secondary) obligations involved in the free exercise of rights in the world. Putting the obligation first is putting the cart before the horse (or, in this case, the criminal before the victim). Rights aren't "derived" from the obligations required when we put them into general practice. They're derived from something more basic than that.

Of course, but the point I was making is that rights imply obligations -- the obligation to respect them. If you have a right against my initiating force against you, then it follows that I am obligated not to do so. (If P, then Q.) Therefore, if I am not obligated to abstain from initiating force against you, then you don't have a right against my doing so. (If not-Q, then not-P.) This is a strictly logical point. It holds by the law of modus tollens: (P --> Q) --> (not-P --> not-Q), which in turn is justified by the law of identity. Somehow, I have a feeling that you're not getting this. Do you see how once you grant the premise that a right implies an obligation, it follows that if the obligation doesn't exist, the right doesn't either? Or are you denying the premise that a right implies an obligation?

My 2nd issue with this syllogism is the 2nd premise. There is some omniscience (isn't some omniscience an oxymoron?), there is some omniscience required in order to figure out when -- in a given emergency -- it will be to an individual's actual best-interest to coerce another individual.

Granted, you have to make a decision here. It could turn out to be wrong, but since you're not omniscient, you have to act on the knowledge you have available, and go with your own best judgment. We do this in many other aspects of life. A jury isn't omniscient, but it must decide whether or not the defendant is guilty. It cannot abstain from rendering a guilty verdict and putting the defendant behind bars, because it is lacks omniscience.

My 3rd issue with this syllogism is the conclusion, which conflates rights with their exercise. When that's done, then you get the absurd notion that we take criminal's rights away when we incarcerate them. But we don't do that. We take away some of the exercise of their inalienable rights. When they go free, we don't give them their rights back -- as if we were mystical beings in charge of something like that. We allow them the social freedom to exercise their rights.

First of all, we don't take away the criminal's right to freedom when we incarcerate him. We take away his freedom. His right to freedom is something he forfeited when he violated the rights of others. Secondly, you can't take away the exercise of someone's rights without violating those selfsame rights. A right is the right to its exercise. If I have a right to freedom, then I also have a right to exercise that freedom. Finally, when the criminal serves his sentence (assuming its appropriate), he restores his right to freedom. Since he no longer deserves to be incarcerated or to have his freedom interfered with, he once again has a right to freedom. His right to freedom is not something that the state took away and then reinstated; it is something that he forfeited and subsequently restored by serving his sentence. A criminal who is on the lam can be free without having a right to freedom (since he deserves to be incarcerated), and a political prisoner can have a right to freedom without being free (since he does not deserve to be incarcerated).

The opposite of rights is the permission handed to a slave. Convicted criminals aren't slaves. They don't need permission before choosing how to spend their time, by reading a book, or by taking a nap -- for examples.

You're saying they have some limited rights, consistent with the limits of their punishment. True, but they don't have a right to complete freedom of action. If they did, you'd be violating it by incarcerating them.

There is no dichotomy between objective law and inalienable rights, but the conclusion to the syllogism above implies just that.

No, it doesn't.

This is because objective law doesn't ever infringe on rights. Its purpose is the opposite (to uphold them). Proper punishment (i.e., justice) doesn't violate rights, either. Saying that a criminal should be able to avoid punishment because no "victim's rights" were violated -- because criminals weren't necessarily "obligated" -- is wrong.

But I'm not saying that; in fact, I've said precisely the opposite in my previous posts. I've said that the police are justified in arresting someone who commits a crime against another person, even if it's in the criminal's interest to do so.

In certain emergencies and using legal terms, we'd say that certain rights were violated with an explanation.

Yes, his legal rights were violated under extenuating circumstances, but not his moral rights. In such a case, the law must side with the victim, because the sole purpose of a government is to protect its citizens against the initiation of force.

I get the impression that, in your view, an emergency could justify violating someone's rights -- that the victim could have a right against the violation without the violator's being obligated to abstain from the violation. In my view, this makes no sense. If I have a right against your action, then you have a moral obligation to abstain from taking the action.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 6/07, 6:56pm)

(Edited by William Dwyer on 6/07, 6:59pm)

Post 247

Saturday, June 7, 2008 - 8:29pm

Bill, in post 245 you say:

If rights imply obligations, which they do, then it follows that rights-violators have these moral obligations.

Agreed, but this statement contradicts the 2nd of the following quotes (below).

... it could be true, if in order to sustain his life, the criminal finds that he must initiate force against you. But all that would imply is that you had no right against his initiating force against you under these circumstances ...

If I had no such right, then I'd have no claim to restitution after the emergency ends -- which is not the case.

If you simply meant that being a criminal [i.e., a rights violator] doesn't further your life and happiness, except in an emergency, fine. That's my position.

But, as noted above, this contradicts the idea that rights-violators -- a synonym for "criminals" -- have these moral obligations. What would your response be to a critic challenging you with such a contradiction?

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 6/07, 9:24pm)

Post 248

Saturday, June 7, 2008 - 9:23pm

Bill, in post 246 you ask:

Do you see how once you grant the premise that a right implies an obligation, it follows that if the obligation doesn't exist, the right doesn't either? Or are you denying the premise that a right implies an obligation?

As I implied when I said that there's a conflation of rights with their exercise here, I'm denying the premise that a right (in the sense of which you're speaking), implies an obligation (in the sense of which you're speaking). I would say that a right always involves the obligation of eventual restitution (if you should infringe on it, or restrict its exercise), but not that it always involves the obligation not to ever infringe on it (or not to ever restrict its exercise).

It could turn out to be wrong, but since you're not omniscient, you have to act on the knowledge you have available, and go with your own best judgment.

Good point, Bill.

... we don't take away the criminal's right to freedom when we incarcerate him. We take away his freedom. His right to freedom is something he forfeited when he violated the rights of others.

Not the freedom to read a book. Sticking to my guns like a truly broken record, I'd say that the criminal isn't in an existential position to gain or lose rights by his individual action -- only the exercise of those rights he has in virtue of being born human.

Secondly, you can't take away the exercise of someone's rights without violating those selfsame rights. A right is the right to its exercise. If I have a right to freedom, then I also have a right to exercise that freedom.

But you're forced to say that (on pain of contradiction) -- because of the conflation I've mentioned. You have Freedom of Speech but you can't yell "fire" in a crowed auditorium. You can't "fully" exercise that freedom of speech that you have as a human being in that context -- just as criminals can't exercise their freedoms as fully as us (in the context of them serving their time for their crimes).

Finally, when the criminal serves his sentence (assuming its appropriate), he restores his right to freedom. Since he no longer deserves to be incarcerated or to have his freedom interfered with, he once again has a right to freedom.

I'm glad to see you using the word "deserves" here, which is tied to objective justice (rather than other concepts of justice). But when you say that he had "his freedom" interfered with -- then this can be re-worded, without contradiction, to the notion that he had the exercise of his inherent right to freedom interfered with (partially and transiently). Saying that, after serving his time, that he no longer deserves to have his freedom interfered with -- doesn't bring one's mind closer to the notion that he "lost" a right that he later "restored." The idea of a differing exercise of a right which he never lost is just as justifiable here (if not, moreso).

A criminal who is on the lam can be free without having a right to freedom ...

And -- you can probably sense what's coming here -- I'd change that to the full and contemporary exercise of the inalienable right to freedom that humans have.

... and a political prisoner can have a right to freedom without being free ...

Right. But this is a case of the violation of a right that was never lost (which supports my point, not yours).

You're saying they have some limited rights, consistent with the limits of their punishment. True, but they don't have a right to complete freedom of action. If they did, you'd be violating it by incarcerating them.

No one has the right to "complete freedom of action" -- like the freedom to yell "fire" in a theater -- in the sense in which these words which you have written would make the most sense.

There is no dichotomy between objective law and inalienable rights, but the conclusion to the syllogism above implies just that.
No, it doesn't.

Yes, it does. If, when you can't exercise rights -- or can't "fully" exercise rights) -- if that means that you lose your rights wholesale (as is written in that conclusion); then objective law and justice, which involves restricting the exercise of the rights of criminals, would involve contradicting inalienable rights.

I've said that the police are justified in arresting someone who commits a crime against another person, even if it's in the criminal's interest to do so.

That's mind-bending and it makes my brain hurt. I don't have a response to that ... yet.

I get the impression that, in your view, an emergency could justify violating someone's rights -- that the victim could have a right against the violation without the violator's being obligated to abstain from the violation.

Your impression is correct. If victims "lost" their rights during emergencies, then the idea of post-emergency retribution -- something which Rand championed -- becomes just a floating abstraction or contradiction.

A true retribution for infringing on someone's "non-rights" would be absurd.

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 6/07, 9:26pm)

Post 249

Saturday, June 7, 2008 - 9:25pm

I wrote, "If rights imply obligations, which they do, then it follows that rights-violators have these moral obligations." Ed replied,

Agreed, but this statement contradicts the [following quote] viz., "... it could be true, if in order to sustain his life, the criminal finds that he must initiate force against you. But all that would imply is that you had no right against his initiating force against you under these circumstances ... If you had no such right, then you'd no claim to restitution after the emergency ends -- which is not the case.

Doesn't follow. You had no right against his taking your property in the emergency situation, but once the emergency is over, he no longer needs your property in order to survive, so he is obligated to make restitution.

I wrote, "If you simply meant that being a criminal [i.e., a rights violator] doesn't further your life and happiness, except in an emergency, fine. That's my position."

But, as noted above, this contradicts the idea that rights-violators -- a synonym for "criminals" -- have these moral obligations. What would your response be to a critic challenging you with such a contradiction?

It's not a contradiction, because initiating force in an emergency situation isn't a rights violation, even if it is a crime. If it were a rights violation, then the criminal would be obligated not to do it. But he isn't so obligated; therefore, it's not a rights violation.

Post 250

Saturday, June 7, 2008 - 9:36pm

Bill,

You had no right against his taking your property in the emergency situation ...

That's a potentially-scary idea to champion. It rings of altruism. That doesn't make it wrong, necessarily; just scary.

... but once the emergency is over, he no longer needs your property in order to survive, so he is obligated to make restitution.

Does that include fines or interest? You seem to be saying that the restitution is merely returning the "used" property to the rightful owner. I'd put the obligation for restitution at something higher than simply returning used property back to her (because you no longer "need" her property in order to survive).

... initiating force in an emergency situation isn't a rights violation, even if it is a crime.

My brain is starting to hurt again. Aaagh!

;-)

Ed

Post 251

Saturday, June 7, 2008 - 10:54pm

Ed,

It makes no sense to say that I have a right against your action, but that you are nevertheless justified in taking the action. If you were justified in taking it, then what could it possibly mean to say that I have a right against your taking it? If I have a right against your taking it, then that means that you ought not to take the action. A right implies an obligation on the part of others to respect it.

I wrote, "... we don't take away the criminal's right to freedom when we incarcerate him. We take away his freedom. His right to freedom is something he forfeited when he violated the rights of others."

Not the freedom to read a book.

Of course, not the freedom to read a book! I already said that what he forfeited was his right to complete freedom. If he deserves to be in jail, then he doesn't have the right to full freedom of action, even if he does have certain limited rights, including the right to read a book.

I wrote, "Secondly, you can't take away the exercise of someone's rights without violating those selfsame rights. A right is the right to its exercise. If I have a right to freedom, then I also have a right to exercise that freedom."

But you're forced to say that (on pain of contradiction) -- because of the conflation I've mentioned. You have Freedom of Speech but you can't yell "fire" in a crowed auditorium.

Yelling "fire" in a crowded auditorium is not an expression of the right to freedom of speech. The right to freedom of speech doesn't allow you to shout "fire" in a crowded auditorium, any more than the right to freedom of action allows you to trespass on other people's property.

I wrote, "Finally, when the criminal serves his sentence (assuming its appropriate), he restores his right to freedom. Since he no longer deserves to be incarcerated or to have his freedom interfered with, he once again has a right to freedom."

I'm glad to see you using the word "deserves" here, which is tied to objective justice (rather than other concepts of justice). But when you say that he had "his freedom" interfered with -- then this can be re-worded, without contradiction, to the notion that he had the exercise of his inherent right to freedom interfered with (partially and transiently). Saying that, after serving his time, that he no longer deserves to have his freedom interfered with -- doesn't bring one's mind closer to the notion that he "lost" a right that he later "restored."

No, your rewording is wrong. When I said that he had his freedom interfered with, I didn't mean his RIGHT to freedom; I meant his freedom. He didn't HAVE a right to (full) freedom of action when he was serving his sentence. That right was restored only upon completion of his sentence.

I wrote, "You're saying [criminals] have some limited rights, consistent with the limits of their punishment. True, but they don't have a right to complete freedom of action. If they did, you'd be violating it by incarcerating them."

No one has the right to "complete freedom of action" -- like the freedom to yell "fire" in a theater -- in the sense in which these words which you have written would make the most sense.

Not true. People have "a right to complete freedom of action" consistent with the equal rights of others. Shouting "fire" in a crowded theater violates other people's right to freedom of action. You don't have a right to violate the rights of others.

If, when you can't exercise rights -- or can't "fully" exercise rights) -- if that means that you lose your rights wholesale (as is written in that conclusion) . . ."

But it doesn't mean that at all. If you can't fully exercise your rights, it means that your rights are being violated. If your rights are not being violated, then it means that you can fully exercise them.

. . . then objective law and justice, which involves restricting the exercise of the rights of criminals, would involve contradicting inalienable rights.

No, it wouldn't. You don't have an inalienable right to violate the rights of others. If you do, then at the very least you forfeit certain of your own rights. If, for example, someone is trying to murder me, and the only way I can stop him is by killing him, then he does not, under those circumstances, continue to possess an inalienable right to life. If he did, then I wouldn't have a right to kill him, because I would be violating his right to life. He has an inalienable right to life only under certain conditions. Once again, rights are contextual, and are inalienable only within the proper context.

I wrote, "I've said that the police are justified in arresting someone who commits a crime against another person, even if it's in the criminal's interest to do so."

That's mind-bending and it makes my brain hurt. I don't have a response to that ... yet.

Why is it mind-bending? What exists in this case is a genuine conflict of interest. The interests of the criminal and the interests of the victim are in conflict. It is the proper function of government to side with the interests of the victim and to arrest the criminal.

I wrote, "I get the impression that, in your view, an emergency could justify violating someone's rights -- that the victim could have a right against the violation without the violator's being obligated to abstain from the violation."

Your impression is correct. If victims "lost" their rights during emergencies, then the idea of post-emergency retribution -- something which Rand championed -- becomes just a floating abstraction or contradiction.

No, it doesn't. As I indicated in a previous post, once the emergency is past, the perpetrator no longer needs the victim's property and has a moral obligation to return it or make some other kind of restitution. The emergency entitles him only to whatever is necessary to survive the emergency; nothing more. When he is able, he is therefore morally obligated to refund the "borrowed" property with interest. In other words, he has an obligation to make the victim whole, because he is not entitled to the victim's property once the emergency has past.

A true retribution for infringing on someone's "non-rights" would be absurd.

But he is not making "retribution" for violating the victim's rights. He is making restitution, i.e., giving the victim back his property (with interest) which he, the thief, has no right to once the emergency has past. If he were to fail to return the victim's property or to make restitution after the emergency has passed, he would, in effect, be stealing the victim's property in a non-emergency situation, which he is not justified in doing.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 6/07, 10:59pm)

Post 252

Sunday, June 8, 2008 - 5:17pm

Bill,

=========
It makes no sense to say that I have a right against your action, but that you are nevertheless justified in taking the action.
=========
But it makes even less sense to say that inalienable rights are situationally (contextually) alienable.

=========
Of course, not the freedom to read a book! I already said that what he forfeited was his right to complete freedom. If he deserves to be in jail, then he doesn't have the right to full freedom of action, even if he does have certain limited rights, including the right to read a book.
=========
But your conflation of rights with their exercise has bad consequences when put into action. In this case, it leads to the inflation of rights (rights to read books, rights to take naps, etc) -- instead of speaking of basic rights, differentially exercised; by the successful differentiation of inalienable rights from their alienable exercise.

=========
... you can't take away the exercise of someone's rights without violating those selfsame rights.
=========
Allow me to backpedal on this one. You are calling incarceration a rights violation, and that is inaccurate enough to cause a severe misunderstanding. While incarceration "restricts" the exercise of rights (of convicts), it's improper to refer to that as a rights "violation." The violator is the criminal, NOT the justice system. Your way of describing the issue fails to differentiate between rights and objective law and justice (as I had warned you about before).

=========
He didn't HAVE a right to (full) freedom of action when he was serving his sentence.
=========
If he didn't have a right to freedom when he was serving his sentence (i.e., if he had been magically turned into a rightless "slave" during that time), then his sentence wasn't a punishment -- because it wasn't a restriction of the exercise of his rights (because that means that he diddn't have rights to restrict in the first place).

=========
"You're saying [criminals] have some limited rights, consistent with the limits of their punishment. True, but they don't have a right to complete freedom of action. If they did, you'd be violating it by incarcerating them."
=========
Allow me to backpedal on this one, too. You are calling incarceration a rights violation, and that is inaccurate enough to cause a severe misunderstanding.

=========
If you can't fully exercise your rights, it means that your rights are being violated.
=========
See above.

=========
You don't have an inalienable right to violate the rights of others.
=========
That's not what I meant when referring to the syllogism conclusion, which conflates rights with their exercise. If you read that conclusion carefully enough, then you will see that a transiently restricted or eliminated exercise of someone's rights -- such as occurs with jail time -- is mistakenly assumed to be a loss of inalienable rights (which is a contradiction).

=========
If you do, then at the very least you forfeit certain of your own rights.
=========
See above.

Ed

Post 253

Sunday, June 8, 2008 - 5:37pm

Bill,

I wrote, "I've said that the police are justified in arresting someone who commits a crime against another person, even if it's in the criminal's interest to do so."
That's mind-bending and it makes my brain hurt. I don't have a response to that ... yet.
Why is it mind-bending? What exists in this case is a genuine conflict of interest. The interests of the criminal and the interests of the victim are in conflict. It is the proper function of government to side with the interests of the victim and to arrest the criminal.

What's mind-bending about it is the merely partially-warranted (at best) presumption that it's in the criminal's moral interest to commit a crime against another person in the first place.

I'd like to think that situations could be so morally tidy that there are no genuine conflicts of interest regarding basic moral issues -- only a right side and a wrong side. Rand seemed to say that that was true. Either this isn't a basic moral issue, or I'm giving too much weight to her statements on the matter.

The emergency entitles him ...

There's that scary-toned type of wording again!

In other words, he has an obligation to make the victim whole, because he is not entitled to the victim's property once the emergency has past.

But what if I take you ... literally. What if -- to get out on the fringes here -- what if a plane had crashed in the snowy mountains and a man with a higher metabolism chose to survive by eating some of the flesh or limbs of other living passengers (against their will)? How could he discharge his moral obligation to make them "whole" again? From what you are saying, it seems that for the rest of his life, he would have to be in servitude to them (and even that wouldn't be enough objective restitution).

Ed

Post 254

Monday, June 9, 2008 - 10:54am

I wrote, "Of course, not the freedom to read a book! I already said that what [the criminal] forfeited was his right to complete freedom. If he deserves to be in jail, then he doesn't have the right to full freedom of action, even if he does have certain limited rights, including the right to read a book.

Ed replied,

But your conflation of rights with their exercise has bad consequences when put into action. In this case, it leads to the inflation of rights (rights to read books, rights to take naps, etc) -- instead of speaking of basic rights, differentially exercised; by the successful differentiation of inalienable rights from their alienable exercise.

Look, we're talking about the rights of criminals here, not about the rights of innocent human beings. Of course, a non-criminal has these basic rights (to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness). However, you cannot say that a murderer who deserves to be executed has the right to life but not the right to its exercise. In other words, you cannot say that he has right to life but not the right to sustain his life. If he has the right to life, then he has the right to sustain it, in which case, you have no right to execute him. Similarly, if a criminal has the right to full freedom of action, then he has the right to exercise that freedom, in which case, you have no right to incarcerate him. If you have the right to incarcerate him, then he has no right to full freedom of action. The only right a criminal has is the right to be treated humanely in accordance with the scope and limits of his punishment.

I wrote, "... you can't take away the exercise of someone's rights without violating those selfsame rights." Ed replied,

Allow me to backpedal on this one. You are calling incarceration a rights violation, and that is inaccurate enough to cause a severe misunderstanding.

No, I'm not! I have never said it was a "rights violation." Nor would I. My position is that (proper) incarceration does not take away the exercise of someone's rights and therefore does not violate his rights. If he was properly incarcerated, he doesn't have a right to full freedom of action.

I wrote, "He didn't HAVE a right to (full) freedom of action when he was serving his sentence."

If he didn't have a right to freedom when he was serving his sentence (i.e., if he had been magically turned into a rightless "slave" during that time) . . .

Ed, please pay attention to what I am saying. Again, you're misrepresenting me. I said that he didn't have a right to "full" freedom of action. I didn't say he was a rightless slave. Why is it so hard to represent my views accurately when the words are right there in front of you?!

... then his sentence wasn't a punishment -- because it wasn't a restriction of the exercise of his rights (because that means that he didn't have rights to restrict in the first place).

It was a punishment because it restricted his freedom, not because it restricted the exercise of his right to freedom. As a criminal, he doesn't HAVE a right to full freedom of action.

I wrote, "You're saying [criminals] have some limited rights, consistent with the limits of their punishment. True, but they don't have a right to complete freedom of action. If they did, you'd be violating it by incarcerating them."

Allow me to backpedal on this one, too. You are calling incarceration a rights violation, and that is inaccurate enough to cause a severe misunderstanding.

I am not calling incarceration a "rights violation." I am saying that it would be a rights violation, if what you're saying is true, namely, that by incarcerating him, one is restricting the exercise of his rights, because to restrict the exercise of his rights is to violate them. If you have a right to freedom of speech, for example, and I restrict the exercise of that right by preventing you from expressing your opinions, then I am violating your right to freedom of speech. The right to liberty means the right to its exercise. It means the right to make your own choices. The right to the pursuit of happiness means to the right to its exercise. It means the right pursue your own happiness. The right to life means the right to its exercise. It means the right to sustain your own life.

- Bill

Post 255

Monday, June 9, 2008 - 11:40am

I wrote, "I've said that the police are justified in arresting someone who commits a crime against another person, even if it's in the criminal's interest to do so."

Ed replied, "That's mind-bending and it makes my brain hurt. I don't have a response to that ... yet."

I responded, "Why is it mind-bending? What exists in this case is a genuine conflict of interest. The interests of the criminal and the interests of the victim are in conflict. It is the proper function of government to side with the interests of the victim and to arrest the criminal."

What's mind-bending about it is the merely partially-warranted (at best) presumption that it's in the criminal's moral interest to commit a crime against another person in the first place.

I thought you had already agreed that in a life-threatening emergency, it could be in someone's interest to commit a crime. In any case, there are eminently plausible scenarios in which it clearly is. Even Rand herself acknowledges this.

I'd like to think that situations could be so morally tidy that there are no genuine conflicts of interest regarding basic moral issues -- only a right side and a wrong side. Rand seemed to say that that was true.

As I understand it, her position is that there are no genuine conflicts of interest in non-emergencies. Of course, there is only a right side and a wrong side in moral issues, but that principle is not contradicted by conflicts of interest. You could say that in a genuine conflict of interest, it is "right" for each party to try to sacrifice the interests of the other, and "wrong" for him not to.

I wrote, "The emergency entitles him ..."

There's that scary-toned type of wording again!

Why is it scary? Just to be clear, by "entitled" I meant morally entitled. I'm not saying that the victim must allow his interests to be sacrificed. He is just as entitled to defend himself.

I wrote, "In other words, [the perpetrator] has an obligation to make the victim whole, because he is not entitled to the victim's property once the emergency has past."

But what if I take you ... literally. What if -- to get out on the fringes here -- what if a plane had crashed in the snowy mountains and a man with a higher metabolism chose to survive by eating some of the flesh or limbs of other living passengers (against their will)? How could he discharge his moral obligation to make them "whole" again? From what you are saying, it seems that for the rest of his life, he would have to be in servitude to them (and even that wouldn't be enough objective restitution).

What a bizarre example! Why would he eat the flesh of living victims? If he's going to eat their flesh in order to prevent starvation, why wouldn't he kill them first? To make this grisly example more plausible (in light of the point I think you're trying to illustrate), why not assume that it's in his interest to kill them first? In that case, he couldn't possibly make restitution. Does that mean that he shouldn't kill them, even if it's in his interest to do so? Why? Granted, he should make reasonable restitution if he can. But if the victim is dead, that's no longer possible. As for a situation in which restitution would involve life-long servitude, that too is not something that would be in his interest. I certainly wouldn't consent to something like that. Would you?

- Bill

Post 256

Monday, June 9, 2008 - 1:26pm

Bill,

All of this double-post, double-response stuff is wearing down my mental batteries. From now on, let's agree to try to keep it to one post/one response if we can, okay?

Ed

Post 257

Monday, June 9, 2008 - 1:29pm

Bill,

The reason why I think that we should keep it to one post/one response (the "Tennis Ball method") is because it is not only easier for us to follow along, but also for those 3rd-party viewers who may indeed be interested in what it is that we might have to say about the subject -- but who just get lost or frustrated with the whole double-post phenomenon.

Thanks.

Ed

Post 258

Monday, June 9, 2008 - 1:33pm

Bill,

Would you agree to the multiple-posting thing? Just let me know. If I don't hear from you soon, I'll post again to remind you about it.

Ed

Post 259

Monday, June 9, 2008 - 7:02pm