Getting the right Rights right.

Jon, we've been over this before. The only answer you are willing to emotionally accept is that unwanted babies have an intrinsic right, and the moral justification for respecting those rights can't be based on self-interest. Given the criteria you demand, an intrinsic value, there's no point in debating it. Every reason grounded in self-interest and life will not live up to your demands. You can only accept that we have some duty that is unconnected to our own interests.

But you have mischaracterized my position, so let me point that out at least.

First, the value calculation I referred to earlier did not determine whether a person had rights, but whether we should respect them. I don't claim, for instance, that a human shield has no rights. I simply claim that we can't be obligated to respect those rights.

The second problem is that you misunderstand the value calculation. Let me give you an example. Two men meet one day. Mr. X decides that Mr. Y probably won't be a direct benefit to his life. He isn't going to learn anything. He isn't going to trade with him. There's no possibility of a friendship. And Mr. Y has $100 in his wallet. Should Mr. X decide to kill him?

By your notion of a value calculation, he would be pulling the trigger already. But this is a complete denial of the moral principle. We don't refrain from killing someone simply because we find they will serve us better in life. We refrain from killing them because we want the principle of rights consistently respected. If we could kill someone on a whim, other people could do the same. We recognize that our own freedoms, our own rights, are intertwined with everyone else's. We don't violate these rights because to do so would be to abandon our own. And our freedom is critical to our lives. It's a fundamental requirement.

The value of respecting rights is not simply the value of the specific individual to our lives. It is the value of our freedom itself. It's the value of being able to live among other human beings, with all of the enormous benefits that provides. This is not something to discard easily.

And that's why the cases where we suggest it's okay to ignore others rights, like the human shields example, have life or death consequences. The only thing that could justify violating a value that important to our lives is a threat to our lives themselves.

Post 101

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 1:22pm

Robert:

The answer is emotionally harder in the case of abandoned or neglected children

To add to that, it's hard to imagine a free society like ours would not be charitable enough to come forth and take care of abandoned children. Unless I am mistaken, I believe empirically the United States is one of the freeist nations on this planet and its citizens donate more money per capita to charity than any other nation.

Post 102

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 1:30pm

There are several senses, and contexts, of the term "wrong" that are being conflated here.

There is a sense of "wrong" in which we mean "mistaken" or "contrary to fact." If I make a mathematical error in balancing my checkbook, the answer is "wrong" in the sense of "mistaken." I didn't mean to come to the mistaken conclusion; I just goofed.

There is a further sense of "a wrong" that means "a harm." Harms may be intentional or unintentional. I think my downstairs neighbor is gone for the weekend, so I turn up my TV late on Saturday night, waking him from a sound sleep. I have done him a "wrong." Did I mean to do so? No. It was a mistake, an error of knowledge. Still, I did him a harm (in this case, very minor), i.e., a "wrong," in the colloquial sense of the term; but it was not an immoral action -- an evil -- because it was done without knowledge or intention of harm.

But suppose I knew he was home and probably asleep at 2 a.m., and I just didn't care about the harmful consequences to him when I turned up the TV full blast. Then I've done him a "wrong" by intention -- a wrong in the moral sense. This is the kind of wrong in which, understanding what I am doing, or actively evading available knowledge of the consequences, I do something that flies in the face of reality and results in harm. It is not just "wrong" in terms of an innocent error or mistake; it is "wrong" morally -- and it says something about my moral character.

What distinguishes these two kinds of "wrongs" -- an innocent mistake/error versus an immoral/evil act? Context of knowledge. The harms (or "wrongs") to someone are real and factual. However, the moral status of the person causing those harms, and the moral status of the actions themselves, depend on the actor's knowledge and intention.

If I know and intend the consequences of a harmful action, and do it anyway, I am morally responsible for those consequences, and I may be characterized as "immoral" or (depending on how serious or chronic those actions are) evil.

If I do NOT know and intend the harmful consequences of some action that I take, I am still responsible (causally) for those consequences, but I am not "immoral" in character; nor should the actions themselves be regarded as "immoral" or "evil." (Any more than we characterize the unintended, destructive consequences of a storm or earthquake as "immoral" or "evil.")

If I know the harmful consequences of an action, but if I am forced to commit the action against my will, I am not morally responsible for the consequences -- hence, I am not immoral or evil.

Now, suppose I know that someone else's ideas (say, environmentalism) will, if acted upon, lead to harm and destruction. From my context of knowledge, I can characterize environmentalism as "wrong" in both the "mistaken" and the "morally evil" senses of the term. But if the other person does not share my context of knowledge -- if he believes environmentalism will lead to a safer, healthier world -- then he is not immoral or evil for holding those views.

How does all this apply to the issues at hand?

Racism, from our context of knowledge, is "wrong" and "evil," in every sense of the word. And, given modern communication and education, it is very, very difficult to conceive of anyone living today who could accept that viewpoint and still be regarded as morally innocent. It is conceivable, however, that people in the past may have thought they had justifiable reasons for believing in the relative inferiority or superiority of various races, and in the different treatment of various races on those grounds. Does their mistaken belief make racism, as a viewpoint and practice, any less objectively harmful, wrong, and evil? No. However, are past believers in racism necessarily "immoral" or "evil"? No, not necessarily: that depends on their context of (presumed) knowledge, and whether their viewpoint depended upon evasions and rationalizations rather than simple errors of knowledge.

The same goes with slavery. We, from our context of knowledge, know it to be a destructive, repugnant, and evil
practice, in terms of the harm it does to people. There is certainly no moral excuse for that practice in today's world; everyone knows it is both cruel and unnecessary. Thus, today's practitioners or proponents of slavery should be morally condemned. However, even though, objectively speaking, the practice was always destructive and evil, I do not necessarily think that the more limited knowledge available to all people at all times in the distant past (say, in ancient Greece) should subject those people to the same moral assessment.

The conflation of the two senses of "wrong" -- i.e., "harmful/mistaken" with "immoral/evil" -- is actually a conflation of "objective" morality with the "intrinsic" morality. Objective moral judgments proceed from one's full context of knowledge: they depend on reason. Intrinsic moral evaluations, by contrast, "just are": certain ideas and actions are "good in themselves" or "evil in themselves."

I see this conflation of "objective" and "intrinsic" throughout this thread -- first, in the discussion of rights; now, in the discussion of morality. For example, in post #98, Bill writes:

So, you acknowledge that slavery was wrong even before it was recognized as wrong. Would you say, then, that the wrongness of an action exists independently of man's recognition of it?

In the sense of "harm" -- yes. In the sense of "immoral" -- no. Morality presupposes knowledge and free choice. If a person commits an act with no awareness that it is harmful, his action may be wrong in the sense of "mistaken," but not "wrong" in the moral sense.

In another confusing formulation, Bill writes:

To be sure, the wrongness of an action is identified by recognizing that it violates a moral principle, but that doesn't mean that its wrongness depends on that identification.

Here again, the dual senses of "wrongness" -- innocent harms versus intentional harms -- are confused. Certainly, an action may be "wrong" in the sense of being demonstrably harmful; no one is disputing that. But that "wrongness" is in a different category from the "wrongness" that violates a recognized moral principle.

In a similar vein, Merlin Jetton in post #95 writes:

Robert Bidinotto wrote:

Note that I said nothing about "rights" in describing the evil of slavery.

No, but you did say "slavery is wrong", i.e. slavery is not right. And "evil" means "morally wrong" or "morally not right".

This misunderstands my point. When I wrote of "the evil of slavery," I meant it from the standpoint of our own full context of knowledge of slavery's harmful consequences. We are certainly qualified to pass moral judgment on that practice and on anyone who -- having any glimmer of those harmful consequences -- would advocate or practice slavery.

But that does not mean slavery (or killing, or any other act) is intrinsically evil. Actions per se are neither intrinsically good or intrinsically evil, as Merlin seems to interpret me as saying. Regarding slavery: We can morally confine someone under forced-labor conditions: a convicted criminal, who has forfeited his rights. Regarding killing: We can, quite morally, even kill someone: in self-defense. Etc. Forced labor and killing people are not intrinsically good or evil, per se; it all depends on context.

The moral status of people and their actions is always determined contextually: by virtue of their context of knowledge, their intentions, and their freedom to have chosen alternatives. That is based on the objective view of morality, rather than the intrinsic view (which holds that certain ideas and actions are inherently good or bad).

If you go back to carefully parse my language characterizing slavery, or concerning "wrongs" and "rights," you'll find it comports with the objective, not intrinsic, senses of the words. The confusion of readers stems from trying to cram my objective meaning of these terms into an intrinsicist paradigm.

Post 103

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 1:46pm

Bill, I thought after post #84 that we were on the same wavelength at last. But now I don't think I understand your position at all.

Before this moral principle was conceptualized, grasped and understood, was slavery wrong?

This could mean a few things. If you invested your money in internet stocks in the late 90's, was it wrong? Certainly, assuming you would have or did lose most of that money, you could argue that it was not actually in your self interest. We can evaluate that fact pretty clearly. Was it morally wrong? Assuming it was an error in knowledge, we could take the position that it wasn't morally wrong, even though it was actually against your own self-interest. Is there enough of a distinction there? So if you claim that people really didn't have any idea, or reason to believe, that slavery was wrong, we could still say that it wasn't in their rational self-interest, but still allow the argument that an error of knowledge does not make the act immoral.

Of course, the claim that people had no idea, or reason to believe, is difficult to swallow.

So we can all agree that it was in fact bad for their self-interest, whether any of them recognized it or not.

If your answer is "yes," then how can you claim that a right is simply a moral principle that does not exist independently of human cognition?

I don't see the problem. If I said a concept does not exist independently of human cognition, as it is an abstraction and not simply a collection of referents, would you have a problem with that? The abstraction "car" does not exist out in the world, while individual cars do.

If rights are not some metaphysical things (or stuff) that exists out there, but moral principles (and principles are abstractions), then what's the problem? The moral concept does not exist out there. The concrete facts do. That in situation X, Mr Y should not violate the freedom of Mr. Z because of all the reasons we've stated several times in this thread. The same is true in situation A, with Mr. B and Mr. C. The abstraction of this, the concept of rights, exists only when these concrete events are recognized, and a general principle is abstracted from the events.

Later, in post #98, you say:

So, you acknowledge that slavery was wrong even before it was recognized as wrong. Would you say, then, that the wrongness of an action exists independently of man's recognition of it? And if you would, then why not say that the violation of a right exists independently of man's recognition of it?

I also acknowledge that slavery was wrong before it was recognized, if wrong simply means bad for your self-interest. And I would say that the wrongness of an action exist independently of man's recognition, if again by wrong you mean bad for one's self interest. If by "wrong" you mean that they acted immorally, taking an action they new violated their self interest, then I wouldn't say that. Is your confusion based on the two possible meanings of this word? Because once the two meanings are clear, these questions seem trivial.

As for why we shouldn't say that a violation of a right exists independently of man's recognition, that's more complicated. One good reason is because if you do state something like that, it confuses the issue of rights by making it seem as if the "rights" exist on their own, and not as some kind of moral sanction. This whole thread is a testament to that problem.

But having said that, I don't know that it's inappropriate to say that in the hypothetical past where nobody knew that there was something called rights, that they still had them. While the people at that time (if such a time really existed) did not morally sanction the freedom of action of others, we offer that moral sanction. We can say that their freedoms should have been secured and respected. We can say that they had rights. Just as if someone in our time doesn't respect the rights of another, and doesn't understand or acknowledge the concept of rights, we can still say that the person has rights and that they are violated.

And finally, you say:

Similarly, the violation of a right is identified by recognizing that it violates a moral principle, but that doesn't mean that its violation depends on that identification.

This gets closer to being a semantic issue. The violation of a person's freedom certainly is identifiable. That it is a violation of the person's rights is something else. I don't know how you can argue that his rights are violated if you haven't formulated the moral principle of rights.

Post 104

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 2:02pm

Joe, in response to Bill you said:

I also acknowledge that slavery was wrong before it was recognized, if wrong simply means bad for your self-interest. And I would say that the wrongness of an action exist independently of man's recognition, if again by wrong you mean bad for one's self interest. If by "wrong" you mean that they acted immorally, taking an action they new violated their self interest, then I wouldn't say that.

This seems like an admission that rights are metaphysical things -- i.e., real relations of real entities -- instead of epistemological things (purely rationalistically-forumulated principles).

I don't know how you can argue that his rights are violated if you haven't formulated the moral principle of rights.

Yes. If rights are only things formulated by human minds -- and have no basis in reality -- then it'll seem like folks don't even have them; until someone thinks straight about them (and then folks "magically" have them after that).

I admit that that was too coy.

;-)

Ed

Post 105

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 2:24pm

Robert,

It was a nice run while it lasted, but now I have to part companies with you. Let me just state a few points of disagreement.

Fact: The moral purpose of the rights concept is to extend and apply the moral principles of rational self-interest to social contexts, to define and sanction every individual's free pursuit of his life and well-being.

Conclusion 1: This conception of rights contradicts the moral purpose of the rights concept, stated at the outset -- and hence, it cannot be a valid conception of rights.

I don't see the contradiction. The moral purpose you stated is to extend the principles of rational self-interest. How does a violation of the interests of others contradict this? The correct answer is that it is within our interests to have this aspect of their interests preserved. And that's certainly the case for other adults. It becomes less applicable as you move to younger ages because their development is not complete. And when you get to newborns, there's negligible development.

But you seem to be arguing that the purpose why we recognize the moral principle of rights is so that others will benefit.

When you say:

Conclusion 3: Therefore, at minimum, a basic "right to life" (moral sanction to live) must be recognized in children if any humans are to survive to adulthood and exercise their full rights.

First, that statement isn't really true. If we said they didn't have even the basic right to life, I assume most children would still make it to adulthood. Parents don't refrain from killing their children because they respect their rights, but because they love their children. And simply arguing that their parents' rights shields them from interference, like it shields the parents' property, would be enough to ensure that most children would live to adulthood. And if that statement isn't definitively true, your proof fails.

But even if it were absolutely true, it doesn't make the point that you seem to be suggesting. It doesn't show that they actually have that basic right. Only by positing that we must let humans survive to adulthood would that argument hold up. But then, the moral justification for the child's rights is not our own self-interest, but the interest of another.

Not only does this argument fail for many reasons, but the argument itself applies equally to the fetus as it does to the newborn. If we want to have children grown up to humans, and they have a biological development, then we must grant rights to the unborn as well.

I also disagree with this statement:

Because of their natural biological dependency on adults throughout childhood development, do children have a positive "right" to be taken care of and nurtured to adulthood? Meaning: Are adults obligated to care for babies and children?

The answer is easy when it comes to their biological or legal parents: Yes.

I would say that the parents are obligated to care for babies and children, or they're obligated to let others do it for them. And if nobody is willing to do it, then that's that.

Also, I don't think you can properly call this a positive "right". If it was, it would be an obligation on everyone. The use of force in their name, to keep them alive, would be what is being morally sanctioned. And that wouldn't stop at just the parents.

And in post #97, you say:

I'd challenge that formulation. It's a mistake to say that we establish rights for babies solely by appealing to our self-interest as adults.

I agree, assuming the operative word is "solely". Even for rights as adults, we don't formulate this principle based simply on our own needs. The principle must recognize the needs of others as well. If others didn't have the same needs as we do, then there would be no reason to recognize those needs. But I'd be careful here. The moral justification is our own self-interest. What else could it be? To have a moral justification that ignores our life and self-interest wouldn't mean having some intrinsic value, a value that exists independent of our lives, but we have to follow anyway.

The moral justification for rights is our own rational self-interest, not the interests of the others. Rights recognizes that these interests are in harmony, but it is our own that gives the justification for it.

Post 106

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 2:35pm

Ed, your post #104 is wrong on so many levels. Please don't even try to characterize my views in the future. You obviously have no ability or desire to understand. I also have to assume that you have no understanding of Objectivist epistemology.

Post 107

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 2:37pm

In a similar vein, Merlin Jetton in post #95 writes:
Robert Bidinotto wrote:

Note that I said nothing about "rights" in describing the evil of slavery.

No, but you did say "slavery is wrong", i.e. slavery is not right. And "evil" means "morally wrong" or "morally not right".

This misunderstands my point. When I wrote of "the evil of slavery," I meant it from the standpoint of our own full context of knowledge of slavery's harmful consequences.

Huh? 'Nuf said.

But that does not mean slavery (or killing, or any other act) is intrinsically evil. Actions per se are neither intrinsically good or intrinsically evil, as Merlin seems to interpret me as saying. Regarding slavery: We can morally confine someone under forced-labor conditions: a convicted criminal, who has forfeited his rights. Regarding killing: We can, quite morally, even kill someone: in self-defense. Etc. Forced labor and killing people are not intrinsically good or evil, per se; it all depends on context.

I thought we were talking about slavery with its usual meaning, not imprisonment or killing in self-defense. I don't hold nor did I say intrinsically.

Edit: I think if intrinsic (or a variant) is going to be used here, the user should be clear about what he/she means. Is it the pejorative way that Rand typically used it? Like here:

The extreme realist (Platonist) and the moderate realist (Aristotelian) schools of thought regard the referents of concepts as intrinsic, i.e., as "universals" inherent in things (either as archetypes or as metaphysical essences), as special existents unrelated to man's consciousness�to be perceived by man directly, like any other kind of concrete existents, but perceived by some non-sensory or extra-sensory means.

Philosophically, the mystic is usually an exponent of the intrinsic (revealed) school of epistemology.

Or does it have the more ordinary meaning? Like here:

in�trin�sic -- belonging to the real nature of a thing; not dependent on external circumstances; essential; inherent

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 11/08, 4:22pm)

Post 108

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 3:35pm

Ed, thank gawd Joe Rowlands finally gave you the public horse whipping you so richly deserve.

Any Objectivist worth his salt knows that A) Political deviants, including those who oppose non-defensive wars, taxation, and the military draft, on principle, clearly suffer profound philosophical confusion about epistemology and the very nature of principles; and B) Ayn Rand is no doubt scowling, snarling from her grave at self-esteem-deficient whimsical purveyors of philosophical bunk--that's you, Ed!--who know nothing--nothiiiinnggg!!--of the nearly unfathomable depths of OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY.

I've got one last message for you, Ed: to the wilderness GO!

It will be fun and interesting to write an article about the claims raised by Bidinotto and the True Enlightened.

Then, I'll join you in the Out Back.

Post 109

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 4:27pm

Joe,

I was admittedly glib and am now sorry that you took it personally. I was utiliizing bold terms because of the maxim that: if you are going to be wrong, it's better to be wrong boldly & brazenly -- so that everyone can clearly see the mistake. I've been bold & brazen because it's better to be that way than wishy, washy or willy, nilly. I haven't been bold & brazen in order to ridicule your thought on this matter -- though you seem to think so.

I'm sorry for being apparently malicious.

Ed

Post 110

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 5:20pm

(Throwing hands up in despair...)

Joe, in your post 105, you began with two points of mine from post #88 that you juxtaposed in a way that is confusing. In my original post, those two points were separated by several other transitional points. Here would be a condensed, but less confusing way to summarize what I was saying, and to which you responded:

Fact: The moral purpose of the rights concept is to extend and apply the moral principles of rational self-interest to social contexts, to define and sanction every individual's free pursuit of his life and well-being. [emphasis added]
...
Fact: ...the failure to recognize any rights in children until their conceptual abilities were fully formed would mean that no humans possess a moral sanction to exist and act in society (rights) until maturity.
...
Fact: This would mean a conception of rights that permitted the killing of any and all humans before their maturity.

Conclusion 1: This conception of rights contradicts the moral purpose of the rights concept, stated at the outset -- and hence, it cannot be a valid conception of rights.

It was to this line of reasoning that you answered (post 105):

I don't see the contradiction. The moral purpose you stated is to extend the principles of rational self-interest. How does a violation of the interests of others contradict this? The correct answer is that it is within our interests to have this aspect of their interests preserved.

The moral purpose of rights that I stated was to extend the principles of rational self-interest to define and sanction "every individual's free pursuit of his life and well-being." [emphasis added] I wasn't talking about just "violation of the interests of others"; I was talking about violating their rights -- i.e., their moral sanctions to pursue those interests. As principles of human action, rights must arise from general natural requirements of all humans, and they must be applicable generally to all "selves," if they are to be applicable to any. Or else they aren't "principles."

As I said, a rights principle that "permitted the killing of any and all humans before they reached maturity" would not just "violate the interests of others"; it would contradict the moral end of the rights principle, which is human life. I'm honestly confused as to the meaning of your criticism of this point. Perhaps you might explain how it is that my conception and yours would differ in practice, by means of some example.

You continue:

But you seem to be arguing that the purpose why we recognize the moral principle of rights is so that others will benefit.

This interpretation completely baffles me. How does my defense of a generic human moral principle, applicable equally to all, become translated into a justification for benefiting others? You lost me.

You go on:

When you say:

Conclusion 3: Therefore, at minimum, a basic "right to life" (moral sanction to live) must be recognized in children if any humans are to survive to adulthood and exercise their full rights.

First, that statement isn't really true. If we said they didn't have even the basic right to life, I assume most children would still make it to adulthood. Parents don't refrain from killing their children because they respect their rights, but because they love their children. And simply arguing that their parents' rights shields them from interference, like it shields the parents' property, would be enough to ensure that most children would live to adulthood. And if that statement isn't definitively true, your proof fails.

Okay, I was a bit sloppy in saying children need rights protections "...if any humans are to survive to adulthood..." That's an overreach. I should have said something like, "...if humans are to be protected from aggression as they mature to adulthood, when they can exercise their rights fully." But if you don't believe that rights protections are necessary for children through maturity, then why does anyone need rights protections at all? Following your line of reasoning, we could say that throughout most of human history, there was no recognized "individual right to life." Yet most people still made it to adulthood, lived out their natural lifespans, and died natural deaths rather than deaths due to aggression. Most people refrain not just from killing kids, but also from killing anybody. So, if we follow your line of reasoning as to why kids don't need rights protections, then we really don't need a principle of rights at all, because most people throughout history managed to survive without it.

But even if [that point] were absolutely true, it doesn't make the point that you seem to be suggesting. It doesn't show that [children] actually have that basic right [to life]. Only by positing that we must let humans survive to adulthood would that argument hold up. But then, the moral justification for the child's rights is not our own self-interest, but the interest of another.

Joe, you lost me again. How is it that when I say every human -- you, me, and everyone else -- has a right (moral sanction) to survive without interference to adulthood, I am justifying this principle by "the interest of another"? I'm either completely dense, or you aren't making your point clearly; but one way or the other, I just don't get this, because I don't believe I've either stated or implied any such thing.

Not only does this argument fail for many reasons, but the argument itself applies equally to the fetus as it does to the newborn. If we want to have children grown up to humans, and they have a biological development, then we must grant rights to the unborn as well.

Nope. Rights -- a moral principle sanctioning the freedom to act in a social context -- can only apply to independent entities that act in a social environment. A fetus is not biologically independent; hence, it's incapable of acting socially; hence, it can have no "moral sanction" to do so. The rights principle can't apply to a fetus. Once born and biologically independent, the baby begins to interact with its environment, taking conscious, self-directed actions in a world filled with other people. At that point, there's a need for a moral principle sanctioning its right to do so as it expands its abilities and mastery of the environment. Hence, the need for rights.

I didn't understand the specific nature of your objection to my statement about parents' being obligated to care for their children. Implied by that statement is that if they can't or won't assume parental responsibilities, they are morally and legally obligated to find someone else to do so. The possibility that they couldn't find a substitute caretaker, I find near-inconceivable. While there exists no moral-legal obligation for an adult to assume the burdens of guardianship for someone else's child, we NEVER hear of cases of children abandoned on doorsteps or hospitals and then just ignored by everyone and left to die. It just doesn't happen in our society; someone always volunteers to assume the responsibility; so that issue is moot.

I think the "positive right" criticism you raise may be a semantic quibble only. I specified that the "positive right" I meant was only a right of the child to be cared for by his parent(s) -- not a claim against the rest of society -- so I don't believe we are in substantive disagreement at all.

Even for rights as adults, we don't formulate this principle based simply on our own needs. The principle must recognize the needs of others as well. If others didn't have the same needs as we do, then there would be no reason to recognize those needs.

This is exactly the point I was trying to make earlier, about the nature of rights as a generic moral principle. Here, we seem to be suddenly agreeing again. But...

But I'd be careful here. The moral justification is our own self-interest. What else could it be? ... The moral justification for rights is our own rational self-interest, not the interests of the others. Rights recognizes that these interests are in harmony, but it is our own that gives the justification for it.

I must be missing something extremely subtle here, Joe. But I am not quite convinced by what you're saying, if I understand it.

It's one thing to say that the justification for the rights of anyone and everyone, ourselves included, is the fact that we all have a common need for a common moral principle to sanction our freedom to pursue our individual interests in society.

But it's a different thing to say (as I gather from your words) that because Joe needs to act freely in society to pursue Joe's interests, therefore his own self-interest is what justifies a principle of rights generally, for all.

Is that a fair understanding of your point? If not, could you please clarify, because I am very confused now as to what you mean.

Finally, I am not sure that our positions on rights differ substantively, in how they would play out in application. If you think they would, please explain that to me.

My initial goal here was to clarify the difference between an objective conception of rights and an intrinsic one. However, as you can see by the sheer volume of posts I've devoted to this, I've gotten myself sucked down into one of those typical online vortices where every attempt at clarification only seems to lead to a host of new questions and confusions.

I honestly think that I have to pull up stakes now and simply lurk on the sidelines, to the (minimal) extent that time permits, and await other peoples' clarifications and continuations. I do have a magazine to run. Thanks to all who have participated with me. If nothing else, this sort of engagement helps stave off Alzh... ah.... Alzheim... um...you know, that disease where you forget stuff.

Post 111

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 5:25pm

Robert,

You're full of wit.

:-)

Ed

Post 112

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 6:38pm

Robert,

You were trying to show that children have rights. And your proof amounted to showing that if they don't have those rights, they may be killed early, as the whole human race might be killed if none were allowed to reach maturity. But my point is that the moral principle of rights does not hinge simply one the needs of those who's rights are protect. It hinges on the harmony of interests, and how it benefits others.

I have a need to be free to live my life. But that need alone is not a moral justification for you to respect my freedom. If my need was enough to justify it, then others needs would be as well. My dog also has certain requirement for living. She can't be killed. Her food can't be stolen. Etc. If the need of the individual was enough for a principle of rights, it would be easily extended to everyone or everything.

My claim is that you don't respect my freedom simply because I need it. You don't sanction my life because I want you to. You should respect my freedom because it is the best way to secure your own. It establishes and protects a harmony of interests. Similarly, I respect your freedom and life, not because it serves you, but because it serves my life to do so. It also servers yours, but that's the the moral justification for me to respect your rights. I do it because it is the objectively proper means of promoting my own life.

You said:

it would contradict the moral end of the rights principle, which is human life.

But the moral end of the rights principle is your own life, not human life in general. Respecting the rights of others, and formulating and espousing these principles to protect these moral boundaries is a means of promoting your own life.

So your proof, which consists of showing that even children have the need for rights, doesn't establish that they have those rights. To do that, you have to connect that moral sanction of another's life to the promotion of your own life. And you didn't do it.

The point is that yes, we can agree that the principle of rights benefits us all. But if someone proposed that children should have rights, or unborn babies, or animals, or plants should have rights, and in each case they would benefit from it, that doesn't prove anything. You have to show that it is in your interest to grant that moral sanction, or to respect their freedoms.

But if you don't believe that rights protections are necessary for children through maturity, then why does anyone need rights protections at all?

Again, from the position of the individual child, of course the child needs "rights protection". So does my dog. If we evaluate it from their point of view, then clearly they should have rights. But that would be others-oriented only. We have to ask why we should offer protection for other people's freedom, and why we would for children, or why we would for dogs. For adults, we offer protection because we recognize it as necessary to have our own rights protected. For children, the same argument doesn't apply, at least not fully. If our principle recognizes rights to the extent that individuals use their minds to live in a way that's harmonious with us, then older children are a less clear example than adults, but still recognizable. And we would want to err on the side of protection, as there is no conflict of interest, and we don't want to create a disharmony of interests. Get younger and younger, and the disharmony gets smaller and smaller. As you push the age down, and the ability to live by their minds down, they become less and less clear-cut examples. We might still say they are deserving of rights, to a very limited extent, but this would be because it's a borderline case and we can afford to be charitable.

Following your line of reasoning, we could say that throughout most of human history, there was no recognized "individual right to life."

Well, I don't know about that. Certainly it didn't have that name. And it wasn't as refined as it could be. But I have a hard time accepting that people would think that murder was perfectly okay, and that if someone tried to kill you, that all good too. People had to recognize the idea behind rights, even if they didn't apply it consistently or universally.

So, if we follow your line of reasoning as to why kids don't need rights protections, then we really don't need a principle of rights at all, because most people throughout history managed to survive without it.

Again, most people did have some basic protections. And kids do need these protections, even if they don't come from a fully formulated concept of rights. But that still doesn't establish that they have rights.

Joe, you lost me again. How is it that when I say every human -- you, me, and everyone else -- has a right (moral sanction) to survive without interference to adulthood, I am justifying this principle by "the interest of another"?

Because you were justifying it through the needs of the the people to have their freedoms protected, and not justifying it by the self-interest of the rights-respecters. By arguing that babies need rights, you were justifying them through their needs, not ours.

Nope. Rights -- a moral principle sanctioning the freedom to act in a social context -- can only apply to independent entities that act in a social environment. A fetus is not biologically independent; hence, it's incapable of acting socially

I'm afraid this may simply be dismissing the argument by reference to a definition. Certainly if the fetus is killed, it is in a "social context". Sure, it doesn't act socially, but if I'm out on my farm trying to live a life away from the world (i.e., I am not acting socially, or acting in a social context), do you get to come kill me?

Not that I'm arguing for fetal rights. I just don't like your argument. :)

In your argument about parental responsibilities:

Implied by that statement is that if they can't or won't assume parental responsibilities, they are morally and legally obligated to find someone else to do so. The possibility that they couldn't find a substitute caretaker, I find near-inconceivable.

Agreed in today's context. But the point is that the parent's don't have a positive obligation, in the sense that their rights are in jeopardy. Their obligations are normal. You can't kill a baby. And I would argue that taking it from a hospital, deceiving the staff into believing you'll be a good parent, and starving the child, is actually a violation of negative rights (assuming they have them!) Just as if I took you on a vacation to a remote cabin in the forest, and left you there to die, I would be guilty of murder. It's not that you have positive rights, or that I have a permanent obligation to feed you. It's simply that by removing you from the place where you are able to fend for yourself, or others are able and willing to help you, it would be murder, just as if I had shot you.

Given the context of the world, and the ease of finding a caretaker, is this nit-picking? I don't think so. By phrasing it as some vague parental obligation, it is an open-ended obligation where your rights are on the line. It is actually a limited obligation. Don't take the child away from those who would fend for it if you aren't going to fend for it yourself. Don't prevent others from helping it. That sort of thing.

Back on the rights topic, you say:

But it's a different thing to say (as I gather from your words) that because Joe needs to act freely in society to pursue Joe's interests, therefore his own self-interest is what justifies a principle of rights generally, for all.

That wouldn't be my argument. Let's imagine there is just the two of us, stuck on an Objectivist island for life (the island had more Objectivists, but they all killed each other over philosophical disagreements). Now clearly I need to be free. But that's not enough for me to argue that I have rights. I have to show that it is within your interests to respect my freedom. Similarly, you realize that you need to be free. But again, to argue for a principle of rights, you have to appeal to my interest. We may decide individually (this isn't a social contract) that we should each respect the rights of the other, as that is a good way to preserve our own freedoms.

Now we find that Bill survived the great purge as well, and he is stuck on the island too. You and I have already recognized that we should respect the freedom of the other person. I respect your rights, not primarily because you need it, but because it serves my interests. And the reverse. But now that Bill is here, we go a step further. I recognize that if Bill violates your freedom, he is a threat to my freedom to. So our understanding is expanded. I don't just refrain from violating your freedom. I work to preserve it. And I see a violation of your freedom as a direct threat to my own. We both see this. And since Bill is a smart guy, he figures out the same thing.

The point is that we aren't establishing this principle of conduct because of the needs of the other people. We're doing it out of our own self-interest. So what happens when a wild bear shows up? He also needs to have his rights respected, or how will he live? But you, Bill, and myself all understand that his needs are not the key criteria of the principle of rights. Our own individual lives are the moral justification. And respecting the freedom of a wild bear just ain't gonna promote our lives.

Does that help?

Post 113

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 8:17pm

Joe,

It is not so that I will only accept an �intrisicist� argument for babies� rights and I can�t see why you would think so. I am on board with Robert and yourself as to rights being moral principles finding their derivation in self-interest.

What to do about babies?

My thought is that we �pull them under the tent� so to say. We include them as possessors of rights established in the original and only derivation that is needed. In other words, we establish that people have rights and then we include babies because they are people. There may be issues/problems to solve with this, but that�s my view. I don�t see the intrisicism in it.

As I recall from the last time we debated the issue, you objected to pulling them under the tent. You said this is improper, that it�s not enough to say that since people have rights and babies are people, then babies have rights. Instead, you said, a case had to be made for babies� rights separate from the adult case, and that it had to be based, like the adult one, on self-interest.

The problem is that too much from the �adult context� is lost and the derivation doesn�t work for babies. For example, in the adult context we say that we must respect the rights of other people because it is the way we can best assure that our own rights will be respected. This is lost in the �baby context.� Babies cannot retaliate. We need not worry about babies disrespecting our rights in retaliation for disrespecting theirs.

You can call me an emotionalist all day long, Joe. But I am still waiting to see a derivation of rights for unwanted babies. One that would meet your own requirement of demonstrating the greater self-interest in respecting their rights compared to the potential for medical experimentation, organ harvesting, etc.

Post 114

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 9:53pm

Bill, rightness and wrongness don't exist in nature For example, a natural disaster like an earthquake or a tsunami is no respecter of a man's "right to life." The institution of slavery doesn't exist in nature. It is a man-made "social order" cognitively created to benefit certain human beings at the expense of others. Slaves do have rights--the rights their respective owners choose to give them. Slave owners, in general, will give their slaves the rights that will result in their being most productive. And slave owners themselves do not usually function in a social void. Their social order will often define their rights as slave owners relative to their slaves (or "personal property.").

Slavery is not wrong just because it violates a man's rational self-interest--an earthquake or a tsunami also violate a man's rational self-interest. It is wrong because, like Communism, Fascism, or radical Islam, it is the man-made (or contrived) institutionalization, or recognition, of the wrong rights.

Again, there can be no slavery without the recognition of "rights." But when men recognize the need for each and every individual to have the right to his own life, then slavery is abolished--and the right rights rather than the wrong rights become law.

Post 115

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 5:59am

Ronald,

But when men recognize the need for each and every individual to have the right to his own life, then slavery is abolished--and the right rights rather than the wrong rights become law.

When you say we recognize a need -- is that a metaphysical need?

I'm sorry if I'm being repetitive or pedantic about this point (about rights being metaphysical things -- i.e., "right relations" of existing entities, like gravity's metaphysical effects in relating things together).

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 11/09, 7:19am)

Post 116

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 7:35am

Folks,

My goal is to get my message across without burning intellectual bridges around here. Though I fear I've been unsuccessful in that twin-endeavor -- and much of that is my own fault.

Ed

Post 117

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 8:04am

Robert Bidinotto wrote: Most people refrain not just from killing kids, but also from killing anybody. So, if we follow your line of reasoning as to why kids don't need rights protections, then we really don't need a principle of rights at all, because most people throughout history managed to survive without it.

I realize that Bob intended that as a strawman argument, but it gave me pause. I cut and pasted it into a one-page Word document and saved it in a subfolder named /thesis where I keep ideas like this for next year at this time.

Why do most people refrain from violating rights that they do not conceptualize or even perceive? (When people wake in the morning, they yawn to honor the sleep god. Why do people honor a god that most of them do not know? ....)

... wow, that'a poser...

Post 118

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 8:25am

Ed, rights are not a metaphysically given, but they are an absolute need if men wish to move beyond "the law of the jungle" and establish a formal social order on any level. As man evolved into a rational animal, to maximize his survival and standard of living, he naturally attempted to move beyond "the law of the jungle" and create tribes: small social orders with rights. But these "rights" did not necessarily mean the right rights. They were no doubt "tribal rights," meaning that individual rights were sacrificed for the "common good" of the tribe and/or for the good of the the tribe leader(s).

As history proves, the right rights are hardly self-evident or a metaphysically given. Thanks to Ayn Rand, mankind has been blessed with a clear and concise philosophic system--Objectivism--that details what the right rights for a rational animal that properly exercises his rational faculty--man qua man--should be.

Post 119

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 8:43am