| | I wrote, "We can identify that other people value happiness as an end in itself, by observing that they are members of the same species as we are. We can know that happiness is experienced by them as self-evidently valuable, just as it is experienced by us as self-evidently valuable. You're not disputing that, are you?" Sherman replied, No. We can understand that other human beings seek to achieve ends in themselves (happiness) just as we do. However, I don't believe we can know that some of those valued ends are objectively or intrinsically "wrong" and some are objectively or intrinsically "right." Recall that, in an earlier post, I stated that there is no intrinsic value -- no end in itself -- that is morally right or wrong. (Of course, Objectivists use "intrinsic value" to refer to a value without a valuer instead of the way you're using it, as something that's valuable for its own sake.) So, I agree that one cannot morally prescribe ends, only means. But recall my statement that since everyone values happiness for its own sake (or as what you would call an "intrinsic value"), happiness "ought" to be recognized as our ultimate value. You don't disagree with that, do you? And since it is our ultimate value, the only question is, how do we achieve it -- by what means?
I wrote, "Well, without the freedom to act on your judgment, you can't act on your value judgments, right?" I can act on them, but I might not be able to achieve them. Come on! You're missing the point. By act on them, I meant choose them. You're not able to choose the actions that you value if you're not free to choose them. On the other hand, other individuals might be perfectly comfortable acting on their value judgments in a non-free environment simply because they hold different values than mine. They might be, but only if they're free to choose them, and in a society that does not recognize the right to freedom, their freedom exists only be default -- only by a role of the dice. If a different group gets into power with different values, they're out of luck. If they have no right to choose their values, then they have no right to life if someone in power wants them dead. They exist and function only by permission -- only at the behest of those who hold the power of life and death over them.
I wrote, "You can't "observe" it [the connection between "respecting each others' freedom" and "achieving our values"] in the sense that you can perceive it directly on a sensory-perceptual level, but you can certainly identify it by observing that certain conditions are required for man to achieve his values." By saying "certain conditions are required for man to achieve his values" you are implying that all men necessarily (intrinsically?) have the same values. We have to define our terms here. All human beings value happiness, and to that extent, have the same values. And freedom is certainly required for the pursuit of happiness. But if by "values," you are referring to what people act to gain and keep (Rand's definition), then freedom of action is required for that as well. By saying you can "identify" the connection you are assuming that the connection exists and that the "certain conditions" you have in mind are required by all individuals to achieve their values. That's right, and the connection does exist. The connection is freedom of action. I say no connection exists between a "right" to freedom and "achieving our values" because some of us may hold values (socialists and communists, for instance) which are not dependent on any "right" to freedom. Even a socialist or communist has to be free to choose his values; if he isn't free to choose them, he has no way to achieve them.
I wrote, "I think that Rand and Mises were on the same page regarding the conditional nature of means and ends as they relate to human action, but Mises didn't go any further than that; Rand did. Rand identified that without the recognition of a 'right' to freedom of action, the choice to act on one's value judgments cannot be preserved. Now this may have been implicit in Mises, but it wasn't made explicit. Also, Mises didn't relate human values to man's biological needs -- to the fact that man is being of a specific nature, who requires certain objective conditions for the achievement of his happiness. Mises left it entirely subjective. According to the Austrians, no voluntary choice can be criticized, because values are subjective, but if values are subjective, then on what grounds do the Austrians criticize the subjective values of the socialists and interventionists? While advocating subjectivism, the Austrians smuggle objectivist ethics in the back door. This is also the problem with the economics profession in general. They approach economics as if it were a value-free science ('Wertfreiheit'), and disdain any attempt to 'moralize' about economic values. Galt forbid that an economist should ever endorse the "right" to the pursuit of happiness. Austrian economics could use a good dose of Objectivism!" See my Post #166 to Jonathan. Based on it and your quote above I think we pretty much agree on the differences between Rand, Mises and their systems of thought. However, I must emphasize that Mises' economics were value-neutral although his political and philosophical leanings certainly were not. Mises was a classical liberal. He penned his political, social and philosophical preferences in a book called "Liberalism" in which he described a prototypical liberal society in which, I dare say, most Objectivists would feel comfortable living (and most libertarians would not, but that is another discussion). Why do you say that? Linking "human values to man's biological needs" is another point on which we disagree. I don't think such a link logically exists, but again that is another discussion. Sure it does. What do you think gives rise to values in the first place? We value happiness, because it is part of our biological nature to do so -- because we are wired in such a way biologically that pro-life actions contribute to our happiness and anti-life actions are inimical to it. Injury and illness cause pain and suffering; health and wellbeing produce pleasure and enjoyment. You ask "on what grounds do the Austrians criticize the subjective values of the socialists and interventionists?" In my opinion, the beauty of Austrian economics is that it accepts the values of the socialists and interventionists as they state them and then criticizes the means (i.e., socialism and interventionism) they choose to achieve their stated values. But the means are part of their values. Socialists and interventionists do not advocate socialism and interventionism as ends. They advocate socialism and interventionism as means to their ends, i.e., a chicken in every lunchbox and a roof over every head and the like. Austrian economics then sets out to prove by means of a value-neutral, logically consistent scientific method" that subjectivism [socialism?] and interventionism are unsatisfactory means of achieving the ends desired even when considered from the subjective point of view of the socialists and interventionists themselves. Okay, but then the Austrians are criticizing the values of the socialists and interventionists, are they not? This is not a value-neutral approach, whatever you may say about it. It should be clear from this that Austrian economists do not "smuggle objectivist ethics in the back door." By "smuggle objectivist ethics in the back door," I meant that by criticizing the political values of the socialists or interventionists, the Austrians are implicitly claiming that these values are objectively wrong -- even if only as means for achieving the desired ends. In fact, to do so would be counterproductive. Which is why their means are objectively wrong -- they don't in fact achieve the desired ends. For this reason I disagree that Austrian economics could use a "good dose of Objectivism." Why criticize an individual's ends when you can simply accept the ends as he states them and criticize the means he advocates to achieve his ends? Well, if the ends are bad (as means to more ultimate ends), then they deserve to be criticized, if only because you don't want bad ends to be achieved by any means. For instance, if you state you are in New York and your end is to be in Philadelphia and you say the shortest route to Philadelphia is via Los Angeles, why would I criticize your desire to be in Philadelphia? Why not simply accept your end desire to be in Philadelphia, as stated by you yourself (subjectivism) and then prove to you in a scientific, rational, logical, value-neutral manner that the route you suggested through Los Angeles is in reality not the shortest route to Philadelphia but one of the longest. In the process I could also point out the other consequences of choosing this roundabout means to achieve your stated ends which you might find unsatisfactory as well? Suppose that my end or goal were to murder your best friend and you found out that I was intent on stabbing him to death. Would you simply say, "Bill, using a knife is not going to work, because my best friend knows karate, and he'll disarm you before you get a chance to use it."? Or would you say, "Murdering my best friend is wrong -- i.e., not a proper goal, to begin with -- even if your means of achieving it is counterproductive."? Of course, you'd say the latter.
Now it is true that if we are talking about ultimate values, then you would employ an argument based on means, since you can't morally prescribe an ultimate value. (Recall my distinction between a moral 'ought' and an epistemological 'ought'.) So, according to Objectivism, since personal happiness is everyone's ultimate (or, in your words "intrinsic") value, human sacrifice (of self or others) is counterproductive, because it will result in the sacrifice of people's happiness.
- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/15, 5:29pm)
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