Getting the right Rights right.

Mark,

In light of your Post #175, I wonder how you would respond to these direct quotes from Ludwig von Mises' Human Action?

The discovery of the inescapable interdependence of market phenomena overthrew this opinion. Bewildered, people had to face a new view of society. They learned with stupefaction that there is another aspect from which human action might be viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust. In the course of social events there prevails a regularity of phenomena to which man must adjust his actions if he wishes to succeed. It is futile to approach social facts with the attitude of a censor who approves or disapproves from the point of view of quite arbitrary standards and subjective judgments of value. One must study the laws of human action and social cooperation as the physicist studies the laws of nature. Human action and social cooperation seen as the object of a science of given relations, no longer as a normative discipline of things that ought to be--this was a revolution of tremendous consequences for knowledge and philosophy as well as for social action.

Source:
http://www.mises.org/humanaction/introsec1.asp

And...

It is true that economics is a theoretical science and as such abstains from any judgment of value. It is not its task to tell people what ends they should aim at. It is a science of the means to be applied for the attainment of ends chosen, not, to be sure, a science of the choosing of ends. Ultimate decisions, the valuations and the choosing of ends, are beyond the scope of any science. Science never tells a man how he should act; it merely shows how a man must act if he wants to attain definite ends.
It seems to many people that this is very little indeed and that a science limited to the investigation of the is and unable to express a judgment value about the highest and ultimate ends is of no importance for life and action. This too is a mistake. However, the exposure of this mistake is not a task of these introductory remarks. It is one of the ends of the treatise itself.

Source:
http://www.mises.org/humanaction/introsec3.asp

Post 181

Saturday, November 17, 2007 - 11:39am

Ed, thanks for your generous appraisal of my comment. I'm still not 100% certain about all this, but I'm going to read the rest of the posts and Kelley's book and try to figure it out.

I'd like to respond to Sherman Broder's last two or three posts about how Austrian economics accords with the idea of objective moral values. I've been interested in this topic for years, because I came to libertarianism through Austrian economics, a discipline in which I immersed myself for quite a few years. Like most defenders of individual freedom, I counted on free market economics--especially of Mises and Rothbard--as the frontline of the defense of liberty.

However, I still recall as a college kid asking myself: "How can the Austrian or neo-classical proposition that both parties to any voluntary exchange necessarily gain value from the exchange (or there would be no agreement to trade between them) be true?" If I borrow money to buy an overvalued investment asset that drops in value soon after, bankrupting me and causing my wife to leave me, and later leading to serious physical illness from the stress and turmoil my choice created in my life, how could any realistic person conclude that I had gained value from this exchange?

Neo-classical economists respond that the reality of my happiness, or my despair, is simply irrelevant to the issue of whether or not I acted voluntarily. They assert the alleged gain in my utility as a truism: people act to maximize marginal utility. Utility or personal gain are subjective, and are seen as conceptually indistinct from action. Therefore, if A acts voluntarily, that fact means A gained value from his action.

What's wrong with this subjectivist view of human action, that denies the possibility of moral values, of virtues and vices, of man as moral agent?

The moral agnosticism of Austrian and other schools of neo-classical economics is simply at variance with all of human experience, emphatically including the human experience of Austrian economists. For we all attach moral values to the processes of living and dealing with others. Every society, including the Ludwig von Mises Institute, assesses the actions of others with blame and praise. In fact, praise and blame are essential to every culture in the history of man. Surely this ought to alert us to the fact that people realize that moral values exist and are important.

When a neo-classical economist returns home in the evening, after a hard day at the office investigating the implications of the fact that people choose morally neutral means in line with their subjective value scales to attain morally neutral ends, and learns from his wife that his 13 year old daughter has been caught heavily petting with her new 18 year old boyfriend, and that his 11 year old son was hauled into the principal's office for fighting (in connection with a drug deal), does he shrug and remark that well, we're all, even children among us, engaged in maximizing marginal utility according to our subjective value preferences? Most likely, no. More likely, he'll blow his stack: for he knows full well that his children's choices are NOT value free; they are bad choices bound to make for subsequent unhappiness in their lives. He knows this with the certainty of a man who has lived life.

But, a doctrinaire Misian Austrian devotee might answer, when the economist goes home he leaves his economist's hat at the office and don's his philosopher's hat. But there is a big problem with this counter argument. For neo-classical economics does not present its idea that man is a perpetual utility maximizing machine as an intellectual device for the narrow purpose of tracing through cause and effect in economics. To the contrary, neo-classical economists such as Milton Friedman and many (not all!) Austrian economists contend that value subjectivity and mutual gains associated with voluntary exchange are facts of Life, of Reality, of the World as it actually is!

Confounding this logical incoherancy, well meaning Austrian moral agnostics then smuggle in through the back door, as they inevitably have to, objective moral values whose existence they formally renounce. (This smuggling, of course, is unconscious; a logical error, not an intellectual con-game.) For just as medicine implicitly upholds human health and well-being as its ultimate moral value, so economics implicitly upholds productivity and material well-being as its ultimate moral value. Examples of smuggled moral values include recommendations to read Human Action and Man Economy and State, policy prescriptions that uphold prosperity and individual chocie as moral values, and arguments that socialism is a bad system because economic calculation--the enacted choices of individuals--is impossible (begging the question of why one should value individual choice, or individual actions--values that many collectivists abhor...).

To see why the alleged value-agnosticism of Austrian economics fails, consider posing arguments from Austrian economics to a hard core Green, who favors starving the human population on the Planet back to perhaps 250,000 people living "in harmony" with nature. The Green explicitly disavows the moral value of human prosperity and well-being, because he believes that the allegedly intrinsic value of nature is damaged by all human activity. Austrian economics, which is built around the implied proposition that human well-being is a moral value, but explcitly embraces moral agnosticism, is helpless to respond persuasively.

Post 182

Saturday, November 17, 2007 - 12:36pm

Sherman, I hadn't seen your remarks addressed to me, and your quotes from Mises, when I wrote my long post about problems with Austrian moral-agnosticism. I'm almost out of time, but I'll try briefly to respond to both quotations.

The first quote expresses his recognition of the importance (which really means: the moral value) of recognizing and understanding the regularities and principles discovered in economics. Mises correctly points out that these principles regulate economic activity, and that the principles operate even if one (a socialist, for example) finds the process and outcome morally repugnant.

I don't find the principles morally repugnant. I notice that those principles accord with the moral value of individual liberty. In fact, I view economics as an investigation of the political and economic conditions necessary to achieving the moral value of social prosperity. Murray Rothbard also viewed economics as a branch of moral philosophy.

The second quote expresses Mises' conviction that "science" cannot prove the existence of moral values, cannot instruct people as to the ends they ought to pursue. Like all other branches of "science", according to Mises, economics can only inform us of the proper means to attain the subjectively chosen ends. Thus, by implication, an economist might instruct a dictator in creating optimal conditions--means--in pursuit of the end of exterminating a race of troublesome subjects. No one can criticize the end of extermination, at least in a meaningful way, according to Mises. One can only criticize the means employed as proper or improper.

Of course, Mises would have been outraged, would have recoiled in disgust and anger, at the thought of helping mass murderers. Mises was a civilized, brilliant, and very brave defender of individual liberty for whom I have profound admiration. I am only pointing out the logical implication of his positivism.

Finally, Mises' repeated reference to "science" as descriptive of the discipline of economics reveals his view of man from the perspective of reductive materialism. This is the idea that there is no such phenomenon as human consciousness; reality can be properly understood only by reference to one ultimate idea: matter-in-motion. This is why Mises sees human consciousness as nearly robotic: man as eternal utility maximizer, automatically calculating means to achieve random ends. From this perspective, human volition is either a myth, or is meaningless because the ends selected by choice are meaningless and interchangeable. "Science" is the study of matter-in-motion within various aspects of human life and broader existence. To Mises, moral values were the product of non-scientific and unprovable speculations: of sentiment, of religion, of moral feeling.

Rothbard saw the logical difficulties in Mises' approach, so he tried to build an ethical defense of liberty. Unfortunately, Rothbard was averse to investigating the area of "personal moral values" (as opposed to political rights and ethical norms), and he was (I think) phobic in his obsession to steer clear of Rand's ideas about the source and nature of moral values. So his defense of ethical values is an "axiomatic" approach, which I think fails. But I liked Rothbard: he was a great economist and a social critic capable of rare and valuable insight. In some ways, I have come to appreciate and admire Rothbard more than I used to; in other ways less than I used to. None of which bears on the issue you raised.

Two books might interest you. First is "Capitalism" by George Reisman, which integrates the moral values of Rand with the economic insights of Mises. This is the greatest book on economics I have read. The second book is Tibor Machan's "Capitalism and Individualism" Reframing the Argument for a Free Society" which sheds light on this subject far more capably and completely than I could ever hope to do.

Post 183

Saturday, November 17, 2007 - 2:26pm

What's wrong with this subjectivist view of human action, that denies the possibility of moral values, of virtues and vices, of man as moral agent?

You need remember that ethics or morals is the science of values - particularly viable values, those which enhance our flourishing as humans.... this means that every choosing, by its nature as being a choosing, has moral implications to it - within the context of the time - right or wrong, true or false, rational or irrational...... as such, even seemingly subjective actions have moral implications - it is inescapable.....

Post 184

Saturday, November 17, 2007 - 2:29pm

Mark,

A few observations about your Post #181...

You write:

"How can the Austrian or neo-classical proposition that both parties to any voluntary exchange necessarily gain value from the exchange (or there would be no agreement to trade between them) be true?" If I borrow money to buy an overvalued investment asset that drops in value soon after, bankrupting me and causing my wife to leave me, and later leading to serious physical illness from the stress and turmoil my choice created in my life, how could any realistic person conclude that I had gained value from this exchange?

I don't see the problem here. Surely both parties at the moment of the exchange are more satisfied making the exchange than not making the exchange. This is why they make the exchange. If there were no gain (material or psychic) to one side or the other, why would the parties engage in exchange?

No Austrian economist I know argues that every exchange profits each individual in the long run. As you say, such a position would be unrealistic. Neither can it be logically deduced from the premise of Austrian economics (man acts with purpose).

You write:

The moral agnosticism of Austrian and other schools of neo-classical economics is simply at variance with all of human experience, emphatically including the human experience of Austrian economists. For we all attach moral values to the processes of living and dealing with others.

This again doesn't square with my understanding of Austrian economics. An Austrian economist doesn't deny that human actions are motivated by moral values. However, because the Austrian's interest is in the action itself, what motivates that action is irelevant to his reasoning. It's kind of like when a physicist measures the speed of a body falling out of a plane. Why the body fell out of the plane is irrelevant to the physics of the falling.

You write:

Every society, including the Ludwig von Mises Institute, assesses the actions of others with blame and praise.

What do "blame and praise" have to do with the science of economics? I'm sure mathematicians blame and praise their colleagues, but does this blame and praise change the truth and accuracy of their work?

You write:

When a neo-classical economist returns home in the evening, after a hard day at the office investigating the implications of the fact that people choose morally neutral means in line with their subjective value scales to attain morally neutral ends, and learns from his wife that his 13 year old daughter has been caught heavily petting with her new 18 year old boyfriend, and that his 11 year old son was hauled into the principal's office for fighting (in connection with a drug deal), does he shrug and remark that well, we're all, even children among us, engaged in maximizing marginal utility according to our subjective value preferences? Most likely, no. More likely, he'll blow his stack: for he knows full well that his children's choices are NOT value free; they are bad choices bound to make for subsequent unhappiness in their lives. He knows this with the certainty of a man who has lived life.

But, a doctrinaire Misian Austrian devotee might answer, when the economist goes home he leaves his economist's hat at the office and don's his philosopher's hat. But there is a big problem with this counter argument. For neo-classical economics does not present its idea that man is a perpetual utility maximizing machine as an intellectual device for the narrow purpose of tracing through cause and effect in economics. To the contrary, neo-classical economists such as Milton Friedman and many (not all!) Austrian economists contend that value subjectivity and mutual gains associated with voluntary exchange are facts of Life, of Reality, of the World as it actually is!

I can't speak for Friedman or other Austrians, but my understanding is that Austrian economics professes to be a science, not a philosophy or a system of political advocacy. The fact that individual Austrians may be associated with political movements or political associations does not mean that Austrian economics per se is associated with these political movements. An Austrian says that each individual acts with purpose, i.e., he acts trying to substitute a more satisfying state of affairs for a less satisfying state of affairs. This seems totally realistic to me. How is it not true?

You write:

For just as medicine implicitly upholds human health and well-being as its ultimate moral value, so economics implicitly upholds productivity and material well-being as its ultimate moral value.

If you mean this statement to describe Austrian economics, then it is a complete misrepresentation. Austrian economics always considers means from the point of view of the ends sought after. The fact is that -- the Greens notwithstanding -- most human individuals seek after "material well-being" as their ultimate end. Is Austrian economics to be indicted simply for this fact.

You write:

The Green explicitly disavows the moral value of human prosperity and well-being, because he believes that the allegedly intrinsic value of nature is damaged by all human activity. Austrian economics, which is built around the implied proposition that human well-being is a moral value, but explcitly embraces moral agnosticism, is helpless to respond persuasively.

On the contrary, Austrian economics would study the means taken by a Green to attain his stated end sought after just as it studies any other human individual's actions. All of the economic predictions and knowledge generated by Austrians about the consequences of individual human action apply to the Green as well. Whether or not the Green is persuaded does not diminish the logic and truth of the Austrian argument. Libertarians and other political actors may use the Austrian argument to buttress their political opinion but it is their political opinion, not the Austrian's.

By the way, I didn't mean in my Post #180 to answer you Post #175 by advising you to read "Human Action." I quoted the paragraphs I did in response to your last paragraph of Post #175:

I am dying to write something about the relationship between Rand's Aristotelian value laden world view, and Mises' allegedly value-free positivism. With a few non-essential adjustments, Austrain economics merges perfectly with objectivism. George Reisman, and even Rand-hater Murray Rothbard before him, have explained this clearly. Economics is actually a branch of the philosophy of ethics, dealing with the conditions required, both economic and political, for the production and acquisition of material abundance--a moral value.

Clearly from the excerpts I quoted Mises himself had a view 180 degrees different from yours, regardless of what Reisman or Rothbard may have said about the matter. I think it's fair to say Mises would have choked reading your contention that Economics is a branch of the philosophy of ethics. As best I can remember, Mises considered Economics among the rational sciences such as mathematics and logic itself.

Post 185

Saturday, November 17, 2007 - 11:02pm

I wrote, "All human beings value happiness, and to that extent, have the same values." Sherman replied,

All human beings value the idea of happiness as a general concept, but the particulars that comprise the idea of happiness vary for each individual person. Thus, there is no possible way all persons share the same particular values."

All people don't just value the idea of happiness as a general concept. They value happiness as a particular experience! To be sure, there is a certain variation on the kinds of things that contribute to people's happiness, but it's not deuces wild. A starving person isn't happy, nor is a person who has just lost his job, flunked out of school or been told he has cancer. A person who has satisfied his basic physical necessities will be happier, all other things being equal, than one who has not; a person who is successful in the pursuit of his life's goals will be happier than one who has failed in that pursuit. There are certain objective conditions that are required for the achievement of happiness -- both physically and psychologically. If those conditions are not met or are met suboptimally, the person will not be happy or will be less happy than he otherwise would be.

I wrote, "We value happiness, because it is part of our biological nature to do so -- because we are wired in such a way biologically that pro-life actions contribute to our happiness and anti-life actions are inimical to it. Injury and illness cause pain and suffering; health and wellbeing produce pleasure and enjoyment."

We value happiness because it is part of our human nature to do so. Yes, we are biologically hardwired to feel pain and suffering, pleasure and enjoyment, but these physical sensations do not directly correspond to or are inimical to our happiness.
Really? A cancer patient who is in physical agony can be just as happy as someone who is perfectly healthy and pain free? I don't think so! Besides, suffering and enjoyment are psychological as well as physical. If I lose my job, I won't feel any physical pain, but I will certainly suffer psychologically. If I get a raise, I won't experience any physical pleasure, but I will definitely feel elated at having more money.
Many individuals choose painful means to achieve their end of happiness, a football player, for example, or a saintly martyr."

Sure, if they judge the benefits to exceed the cost -- if they view the amount of happiness to be worth the pain required to achieve it. My mother had a tooth pulled without any anesthesia, because she was allergic to it. Does that mean that she didn't value happiness as an end in itself? Of course not. In the same way, the football player doesn't choose pain directly; he would prefer to avoid it. What he values is the challenge of the sport, not the physical pain and injury that often accompanies it. Yes, he risks pain and injury, but he considers the benefits -- physical achievement and athleticism (and, if he is a professional player, the high salary) -- to be worth it. The physical injury and pain is not itself a benefit; it is a cost. It is the price he pays for playing the sport and reaping its benefits.

As for the saintly martyr, he evidently believes he'll be rewarded for his personal sacrifice in the afterlife, so his martyrdom is the price he pays for his reward in heaven. It is, of course, possible that he isn't sacrificing himself for the sake of any reward, either in heaven or on earth, but is doing it simply as a moral ideal. This is the evil of altruism, naked and unadorned -- self-sacrifice for its own sake -- as an inverted moral ideal. In this case, the saintly martyr still values his life and happiness; he simply believes that it is moral to sacrifice them -- a view that Objectivism abhors and rejects, but one that the Austrians evidently condone. Yet, if they were as "scientific" as they say, they would oppose it too, for they would recognize that since the martyr's ultimate value is his own happiness, he is failing to pursue the means to that end.

I wrote, "I meant that by criticizing the political values of the socialists or interventionists, the Austrians are implicitly claiming that these values are objectively wrong -- even if only as means for achieving the desired ends."

The economist in me responds: "By criticizing the means advocated by socialists or interventionists, Austrian economists are saying directly that these means are objectively incapable of achieving the ends sought when considered from the point of view of those seeking those ends.
Right, which means that, according to them, the actions taken to achieve those ends are objectively wrong.
The Austrians are simply stating that the means chosen are incompatible with the end sought, just as straw inside a rubber balloon is incompatible with the end of building an atomic bomb. In no way, either directly or implicitly, does such a "scientific" statement imply that these means are wrong in an objectively moral sense.

Yes, it does; it states that the means are wrong in an objectively moral sense as means, which is the only way they can be morally evaluated. As I mentioned before, ultimate ends cannot be morally evaluated, because there is no further end in relation to which they can be assessed. All one can do is identify the ultimate end or value; one cannot prescribe it.

The philosopher in you offers your scenario of knifing my best friend and suggests my obvious response should be to dissuade you by arguing that murder is wrong. The economist in me responds that your scenario is philosophic in nature, not economic. By using the term "murder" you have charged the scenario with social and moral values, removing it from the realm of economic discussion. An economist�s scenario would have used the term "kill."

So, are you telling me that an economist could not condemn the murder of your friend -- that he must describe it morally neutral terms and refer to it simply as a "killing"? If so, this is a perfect illustration of what is wrong with the economics profession. It has abdicated moral judgment. Economics is a social science, but you wouldn't know it by talking to economists, who eschew moral judgments, on the grounds that these somehow make their discipline less scientific, which is nonsense. Ethics can itself be scientific. The Objectivist ethics is a case in point, for it is based on man's needs as a particular kind of living organism. Of what value is an economics that does not recognize the importance of human wellbeing and of the principles required to attain it?

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/17, 11:28pm)

Post 186

Sunday, November 18, 2007 - 3:45pm

Hi Sherman,

Austrian and Chicago School proponents often appeal to those critical of free markets with the argument that free markets are based on voluntary exchange and benefit everyone, because all such transactions are, by definition, voluntary. People who enter into a voluntary exchange only do so if they benefit, this argument runs; therefore, we ought to permit the reign of free markets.

Moreover, my claim about this argument fits perfectly with Mises' view of man as necessarily perpetually engaged in seeking to maximize subjective utility. As the quotes of Mises that you posted make very clear, Mises did not view subjective utility as merely an analytical device. He thought this accurately described man's nature, based on the observations of science. He, of course, conceded that some were motivated by their belief in morality (while others were inspired by alternative forms of subjective "psychic value"); but he was not concerned as such with moral values because he thought they were meaningless---beyond the scope of rationality, of "science".

Mises also explained that economics does not concern itself with either the ends that people pursue, which he believed could not be subjected to rational examination; or with why people seek some ends and reject others. Economics is only concerned with the implications of the fact that "acting man" uses scarce means to attain subjective ends.

Although it is true that economics necessarily directs its focus to the logical implications of human action, this fact does not, by itself, contradict the idea that moral values exist as conditions of man's existence, and can be proven as such. In other words, Mises was a moral agnostic; but his agnosticism is not essential to his economics. Nor does Austrian economics depend for its validity on Mises' ideas about positivism and reductive materialism, nor on his belief in the ideas of Kant. The great body of Mises' insights about principles of economics is prescient and extremely valuable.

But the demonstrable flaws in his philosophical foundations, uncorrected, render his arguments from economics ultimately unpersuasive to people who are unsympathetic to individualism. This is true, because disputes about politics ultimately boil down to disagreements about moral values and ethics. Rothbard pointed this out way back around 1970--and probably before that. I tried to illustrate this point about moral values lying at the crux of political disagreements with my example about Greens and their intrinsic disgust with all human works. "Value-free" free market economics can prove to people that various state intrusions will produce consequences very different from those promised by politicians, but that line of argument will not persuade most people. This is why the price of oil can rise to $250 per barrel, and most people will remain reluctant to drill in Alaskan wildlife and wilderness preserves. They have absorbed uncritically the Green ethos that nature is intrinsically valuable, so that the best impact by man on nature is thought to be the least. Ayn Rand pointed out that people don't embrace political collectivism because they believe in lousy economics; they buy lousy economics because they believe in political collectivism.

Austrian economics is not "value-free", contrary to the stance taken by many neo-classical economists, nor should it be. As often presented today, it embraces the moral value of individualism, but implicitly, through the "back door". Austrian free market economics would be strengthened by explicitly upholding the moral value of human productivity and prosperity, and on this basis, using its powerful insights about the implications of scarcity and human action to refute the programs of big government reformers. In other words, reformed Austrianism would not formally interject moral values into its chains of reasoning about the implications of the fact that individuals act to seek their own ends in a world of scarcity. Rather it would explicitly ackowledge that individual freedom and prosperity are morally valuable, and affirm that Austrian economics, through its carefully elaborated concepts and principles, stands ready to defend those moral values against the misconceptions, lies and schemes of political collectivists.

Post 187

Sunday, November 18, 2007 - 4:58pm

Bill, I like most of what you've written to Sherman (that I have read--I haven't read all your posts). But a couple of points you made raised questions in my mind.

You wrote..."We value happiness, because it is part of our biological nature to do so -- because we are wired in such a way biologically that pro-life actions contribute to our happiness and anti-life actions are inimical to it. Injury and illness cause pain and suffering; health and wellbeing produce pleasure and enjoyment."

Being the suspicous type, and recalling your ideas about psychological determinism, I wonder if you think we value happiness as a psychological response to achieving moral values. Or do you think that we really are "hard-wired" by biology, (by instinct?), to seek happiness?

On thinking about this more, I agree we are hard-wired biologically to seek happiness. But people can lose contact with this natural orientation, through experiencing trauma and suffering.

I also know that people who are psychologically confused seek their own suffering subconsciously, but perhaps not because they want only to suffer. Rather, they unconsciously believe that suffering is the key in their life to getting what they imagine (or imagined when they were young) they really must have to be happy and sane: perhaps revenge against someone, or against "women", or "men", or Dad or Mom; or love and approval from some symbolically important individual from years ago; or whatever. Others absorb uncritically--maybe reinforced by early psychological confusion--ethical altruism. They suffer, as was just possibly true of Mother Teresa, because they believe, in some complex way, that suffering is the pathway to moral virtue and proper living. They suffer because "its the right thing to do." And, "One can't be happy--truly happy--unless one does the right thing."

So to summarize, perhaps we all want happiness. But many of us absorb destructive values that we fantasize will achieve a psychological state that remains, to most people, vague and undefined. People want to "feel happy", but they too often do not understand that happiness requires the fullfillment of proper virtues. They have little understanding of what proper virtues are.

I recall reading another of your posts in which you stated that anyone who really understands that some action is wrong would not take that action. But that idea contradicts the possibility of the virtue of integrity: holding to a course that one knows to be morally proper, in spite of feelings that temporarily reward a bad choice.

Finally, you wrote that ultimate ends cannot be defended rationally. What is an ultimate end? The choice to live or die? Do you think there are other ultimate ends?

If life or death were the ultimate end, then one could morally (rationally) evaluate those alternatives. For the purpose of moral values is to support the individual's flourishing in life; therefore, any value that obstructs the achievement of a proper life should be appraised as bad. For example, an attempt to commit suicide by someone who mistakenly believes she cannot end her unhappiness can be morally evaluated. But the evaluation pertains not to the end of death, but to the failure in life to persist in trying to achieve that which she could achieve, if she would only do what is necessary in her situation.

It seems strange to posit death as an ultimate end ("The End"), because an end is a purpose. One normally thinks of purpose within the context of living life. Death, of course, is the end of purpose. One can choose death to end one's suffering, but here the purpose is to end a dis-value, suffering, rather than to end life because, absent suffering, one prefers death.

Whew! I admit to being confused about ultimate ends.

Post 188

Sunday, November 18, 2007 - 8:09pm

I wrote..."We value happiness, because it is part of our biological nature to do so -- because we are wired in such a way biologically that pro-life actions contribute to our happiness and anti-life actions are inimical to it. Injury and illness cause pain and suffering; health and wellbeing produce pleasure and enjoyment."

Mark replied,

Being the suspicous type, and recalling your ideas about psychological determinism, I wonder if you think we value happiness as a psychological response to achieving moral values. Or do you think that we really are "hard-wired" by biology, (by instinct?), to seek happiness?

Not hardwired to seek happiness -- because people can and do act altruistically (i.e., self-sacrificially) insofar as they believe it is their moral obligation to do so -- but hardwired to value it in the sense in which we value pleasure and disvalue pain. Just as we are hardwired biologically to value pleasure and disvalue pain, so we are hardwired biologically to value happiness and disvalue suffering. That doesn't mean that we will always seek our happiness, because we can mistakenly adopt a morality of altruism in which believe that we ought to sacrifice our happiness for the sake of others.

Of course, it can reasonably be asked why one should sacrifice his happiness the sake of others? Either the moral agent values his own happiness preferentially or he doesn't. If he doesn't, then there's no reason for him to sacrifice it for the happiness of others, since they wouldn't value his sacrifice. And if the moral agent does value his own happiness preferentially, then again there is no reason for him to sacrifice it for the happiness of others. In neither case would self-sacrifice make sense.

I recall reading another of your posts in which you stated that anyone who really understands that some action is wrong would not take that action. But that idea contradicts the possibility of the virtue of integrity: holding to a course that one knows to be morally proper, in spite of feelings that temporarily reward a bad choice.

I meant at the time that one takes the action, one values it over the alternatives; this is true even if it violates one's previously held value judgments. I see the virtue of integrity as being faithful to one's conceptually held values in the sense of not giving them up on a whim, simply to satisfy an emotional urge or desire. But if one does give them up to satisfy an emotional desire, then one values the satisfaction of the desire more than being faithful to one's conceptual values. One views the satisfaction of the desire as the right thing to do at the time; otherwise, one wouldn't do it. But to the extent that one surrenders one's principles to satisfy one's whims, one undermines any confidence that one can formulate a code of moral values and adhere to it. Integrity means being faithful to one's conceptually held values and not surrendering them for light and transient reasons.

Finally, you wrote that ultimate ends cannot be defended rationally. What is an ultimate end? The choice to live or die? Do you think there are other ultimate ends?

Ultimate ends cannot be prescribed, because to prescribe an action, one must show that it leads to a value -- that it is a means to end. However, that doesn't mean that an ultimate end cannot be rationally defended. The way that one rationally defends it is to show that it is one's ultimate value. That the presence of happiness (and its corollary, the absence of suffering) is one's ultimate value is self-evident. There are no other ultimate values -- no other things are valuable for their own sake -- that are not forms of happiness or enjoyment. The preservation of one's life can be viewed as a concomitant value in that happiness is a consequence of life-serving actions. Death can sometimes be a value if a positive state of happiness is no longer possible (as in the case of someone who is dying of cancer) and committing suicide is the only way to bring an end to one's suffering.

If life or death were the ultimate end, then one could morally (rationally) evaluate those alternatives. For the purpose of moral values is to support the individual's flourishing in life; therefore, any value that obstructs the achievement of a proper life should be appraised as bad. For example, an attempt to commit suicide by someone who mistakenly believes she cannot end her unhappiness can be morally evaluated. But the evaluation pertains not to the end of death, but to the failure in life to persist in trying to achieve that which she could achieve, if she would only do what is necessary in her situation.

Right.

It seems strange to posit death as an ultimate end ("The End"), because an end is a purpose. One normally thinks of purpose within the context of living life. Death, of course, is the end of purpose. One can choose death to end one's suffering, but here the purpose is to end a dis-value, suffering, rather than to end life because, absent suffering, one prefers death.

You mean that "absent suffering, one prefers life," right? I think you misspoke yourself here. But with that understanding, I agree with what you're saying.

- Bill

Post 189

Monday, November 19, 2007 - 3:04pm

Bill,

I think we're talking past each other. Maybe we have to, respectfully, agree to disagree.

First, personal experience tells me that happiness is not inextricably linked to food, shelter, health and material wealth. Period. I won't be persuaded otherwise. I've seen with my own eyes cancer patients who by their own account are happier post-cancer than pre-cancer. I know of perfectly happy human beings who have little or no food or material wealth. My own eyes dispute your argument.

Second, I think it is possible to be both an Austrian economist and a moral person just as it is possible to be a mathematician and a moral person or a physicist and a moral person. Austrian economics is not a political philosophy; it is a science. I believe moral judgments should be made not by the science but by the scientist.

Third, you write: "Ethics can itself be scientific." This single, short sentence is the reason we will never agree and, if it is a tenet of Objectivism, it is the reason I will never be an Objectivist. In my view this sentence misunderstands the meaning of either "ethics" or "scientific" or both. I don't believe you, Ayn Rand or any other philospher has ever objectively deduced an "ought" from an "is."

I'm sorry, but with all respect to your firmly and sincerely held beliefs, the above are mine and they are not likely to change. If we disagree on the above three points, I don't see how we'll ever find common ground in politics or economics.

Regards,
Sherman

Post 190

Monday, November 19, 2007 - 3:39pm

Mark,

I appreciate your suggestion of Reisman and Machan. Thanks. Coincidentally, I enjoy Reisman's blog immensely. He doesn't post often, but when he does they are well-reasoned blockbusters. It's interesting that the crux of his argument is generally science or logic, not ethics. Which is an apt segue to the rest of your comments.

You and I do not see eye-to-eye on Mises, his personal views or his economics, but that's neither here nor there. I just don't have the time to get into an extensive discussion citing sources, references, etc. What I find most interesting in your posts is the idea that Austrian "free market economics would be strengthened by explicitly upholding the moral value of human productivity and prosperity, and on this basis, using its powerful insights about the implications of scarcity and human action to refute the programs of big government reformers." I disagree.

This is of course my own personal judgment, but I believe if the goal is political persuasion, moral values and ethics is the very worse tact one could choose. I have yet to change the mind of an ardent believer in a certain moral position by challenging his moral beliefs. Most moral beliefs are logically derived from an arbitrary premise which is totally unassailable by logic. I find I have better success persuading by means of an economic argument based on facts and logic.

Then again, I think persuading a political or philosophical opponent is over-rated. Unless two people hold moral beliefs which are mutually exclusive so as to preclude living together in the same society, I think it is far more fruitful to concentrate on how philosophical opponents can become tolerant of each other and then cooperate with each other. This, to me, is more a question of sociology and economics than philosophy. After all, I don't have to agree with every tenet of Objectivism in order to live in society with and cooperate with Objectivists to the end of our mutual benefit.

Regards,
Sherman

Post 191

Monday, November 19, 2007 - 3:48pm

Sherman, you wrote,

I think we're talking past each other. Maybe we have to, respectfully, agree to disagree.

First, personal experience tells me that happiness is not inextricably linked to food, shelter, health and material wealth. Period. I won't be persuaded otherwise. I've seen with my own eyes cancer patients who by their own account are happier post-cancer than pre-cancer. I know of perfectly happy human beings who have little or no food or material wealth. My own eyes dispute your argument.

That's because you're not listening to my argument. :-) I added the qualifier "all other things being equal."

Second, I think it is possible to be both an Austrian economist and a moral person just as it is possible to be a mathematician and a moral person or a physicist and a moral person. Austrian economics is not a political philosophy; it is a science. I believe moral judgments should be made not by the science but by the scientist.

And what is the purpose of the science of economics if not to prescribe what economic policies are appropriate. If the study of economics has no normative value, why study it?

Third, you write: "Ethics can itself be scientific." This single, short sentence is the reason we will never agree and, if it is a tenet of Objectivism, it is the reason I will never be an Objectivist. In my view this sentence misunderstands the meaning of either "ethics" or "scientific" or both. I don't believe you, Ayn Rand or any other philosopher has ever objectively deduced an "ought" from an "is."

Every concept pertaining to reality must be rooted in reality, and this includes ethics. Ask yourself what it means to say that we 'ought' to respect each other's freedom. It simply means that by respecting each other's freedom, we obtain the values that we desire (e.g., life, liberty, security, the pursuit of happiness, prosperity). That's all it means. There's nothing else that it could mean. If I tell you that you "ought" to do such and such, it's legitimate for you to ask why? In asking why, you are asking what value there is to be gained by your doing so. If I simply reply, you ought to do it because you ought to do it, I haven't answered your question.

You, as an Austrian economist, should understand this. Austrian economics says that you can't prescribe ends, only means. You prescribe means by showing that they lead to the desired ends. In that respect, a prescription is simply another kind of description; and so is ethics, which simply tells you how to get what you want at the most fundamental level.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/19, 3:59pm)

Post 192

Wednesday, November 21, 2007 - 10:39am

Bill,

You wrote:

That's because you're not listening to my argument. :-) I added the qualifier "all other things being equal."

I am listening. Surely you've heard of blind people who would opt to remain blind even if it were possible for them to see again. By their own testimony such people are happier deprived of sight, other things being equal.

You wrote:

And what is the purpose of the science of economics if not to prescribe what economic policies are appropriate. If the study of economics has no normative value, why study it?

Why study pure mathematics? Or pure physics? These are not normative sciences, yet scientists use mathematical and physical knowledge to do appropriate (and unappropriate) things (considered from your point of view). Recall what Nazi scientists accomplished by means of their normative science of eugenics.

You wrote:

Every concept pertaining to reality must be rooted in reality, and this includes ethics. Ask yourself what it means to say that we 'ought' to respect each other's freedom. It simply means that by respecting each other's freedom, we obtain the values that we desire (e.g., life, liberty, security, the pursuit of happiness, prosperity). That's all it means. There's nothing else that it could mean. If I tell you that you "ought" to do such and such, it's legitimate for you to ask why? In asking why, you are asking what value there is to be gained by your doing so. If I simply reply, you ought to do it because you ought to do it, I haven't answered your question.

You, as an Austrian economist, should understand this. Austrian economics says that you can't prescribe ends, only means. You prescribe means by showing that they lead to the desired ends. In that respect, a prescription is simply another kind of description; and so is ethics, which simply tells you how to get what you want at the most fundamental level.

How does one determine whether or not an ethical concept is "rooted in reality?" I know of only two means of gaining knowledge about reality: inductive science and deductive science. How do you know that by "respecting each other's freedom, we obtain the values that we desire?" You must have deduced that truth from some premise you assume to be true, because I don't believe your ethical prescription is a theory that you believe can be disproved by a single, falsifying controlled social experiment. So what is the premise you assume to be true from which you deduce the ethic of "respecting each other's freedom?"

Austrian economics prescribes neither ends nor means per se. No matter what critics may claim, the method of Mises' economics was subjective individualism, i.e., all means studied or prescribed were considered from the point of view of a purposeful, individual, human subject as a given. The self-evident premise from which the whole of Austrian economics is deduced is: man acts (with purpose), i.e., each individual human being acts (uses means) with a purpose in mind, a purpose we must accept as a given so as not to prejudice or bias our economic reasoning. Austrian economics does not agree or disagree ethically or morally with this given end. The given end is irrelevant to economic reasoning.

Earlier I offered an example of a body falling from a plane. The reason the body left the plane has nothing to do with the science of its falling. Do you agree? Do you think physics would be improved as a science if it prescribed one set of rules for a body pushed from a plane and another for a body accidently dropped?

Would mathematics be improved as a science if it were normative? If it forbid calculations or systems of calculating from being considered if they did not correspond to reality? Should non-Euclidean geometry have been outlawed because its roots in reality were suspect? Mathematics and (Austrian) economics are deductive sciences. They are faithful only to the premises from which they are deduced and that is exactly as it should be.

Regards,
Sherman

Post 193

Wednesday, November 21, 2007 - 4:04pm

Sherman wrote,

Surely you've heard of blind people who would opt to remain blind even if it were possible for them to see again. By their own testimony such people are happier deprived of sight, other things being equal.

That's because once they've been blind for a certain amount of time, it's very difficult for them neurologically to adapt to sight. They're more comfortable relying on their sense of touch and hearing. There was a famous case of a man who was blind from birth who regained his sight, but he found he couldn't navigate using his sense of sight, because he had severe difficulty judging distances and perspective. Obviously, the conditions had changed for him over what they would have been had he been born sighted or been able to regain the same abilities as a normally sighted person. So, this is not a counter-example to my argument that happiness has an objective basis in reality. In fact, it supports it.

I wrote: "And what is the purpose of the science of economics if not to prescribe what economic policies are appropriate. If the study of economics has no normative value, why study it?"

Why study pure mathematics? Or pure physics? These are not normative sciences, yet scientists use mathematical and physical knowledge to do appropriate (and unappropriate) things (considered from your point of view). Recall what Nazi scientists accomplished by means of their normative science of eugenics.

Mathematics is a science of method which has a practical application, and even though some of its discoveries may not appear useful now, they may turn out to be so in the future. In any case, economics is not mathematics; it is a social science that is concerned with value-judgments and their consequences. It makes no sense to point out the bad consequences of certain economic policies, as the Austrian economists do, while simultaneously embracing value neutrality.

As far as the Nazi scientists were concerned, they were wrong to apply their science in the way they did. But observe that I can say that only on normative grounds. If I eschew ethical value-judgments, I have no way to condemn their actions.

I wrote: "Every concept pertaining to reality must be rooted in reality, and this includes ethics. Ask yourself what it means to say that we 'ought' to respect each other's freedom. It simply means that by respecting each other's freedom, we obtain the values that we desire (e.g., life, liberty, security, the pursuit of happiness, prosperity). That's all it means. There's nothing else that it could mean. If I tell you that you "ought" to do such and such, it's legitimate for you to ask why? In asking why, you are asking what value there is to be gained by your doing so. If I simply reply, you ought to do it because you ought to do it, I haven't answered your question.

"You, as an Austrian economist, should understand this. Austrian economics says that you can't prescribe ends, only means. You prescribe means by showing that they lead to the desired ends. In that respect, a prescription is simply another kind of description; and so is ethics, which simply tells you how to get what you want at the most fundamental level."

How does one determine whether or not an ethical concept is "rooted in reality?" I know of only two means of gaining knowledge about reality: inductive science and deductive science. How do you know that by "respecting each other's freedom, we obtain the values that we desire?" You must have deduced that truth from some premise you assume to be true, because I don't believe your ethical prescription is a theory that you believe can be disproved by a single, falsifying controlled social experiment. So what is the premise you assume to be true from which you deduce the ethic of "respecting each other's freedom?

Are you seriously questioning the massive evidence for the practical value of freedom? -- evidence from economics, politics and philosophy? If you are, then all I can do is recommend that read the relevant Objectivist literature, such as Rand's novels and non-fiction works, as well as of course the Austrian economists. If you see no practical reason for human beings to respect each other's freedom, then ask yourself what happens when they don't.

Austrian economics prescribes neither ends nor means per se. No matter what critics may claim, the method of Mises' economics was subjective individualism, i.e., all means studied or prescribed were considered from the point of view of a purposeful, individual, human subject as a given. The self-evident premise from which the whole of Austrian economics is deduced is: man acts (with purpose), i.e., each individual human being acts (uses means) with a purpose in mind, a purpose we must accept as a given so as not to prejudice or bias our economic reasoning. Austrian economics does not agree or disagree ethically or morally with this given end. The given end is irrelevant to economic reasoning.

I understand that it considers the end irrelevant. Are you now saying that it considers the means irrelevant as well? -- because if it doesn't, then in what way is it not prescribing the means? To "prescribe" the means is simply to identify that they lead to a desired end. If the means lead to the end, and the end is a value, then the means are a value. If Austrian economics doesn't consider the relationship between means and end important, then why does it seek to identify the relationship?

Would mathematics be improved as a science if it were normative?

There is a sense in which it is normative: If you add 7 + 5, you 'ought' to get 12. If you get (say) 11, then you're wrong, because your goal, which was to find the sum of these two quantities, was not satisfied. Of course, mathematical principles do not give us ethical norms, because mathematics does not study the relationship between human action and its consequences. However, economics does, which is why economics has an ethical component. The conclusions of economic science imply that some economic policies are better than others and therefore ought to be implemented. For example, price ceilings, which create shortages, and price floors, which create surpluses, impose real economic hardship on people. It is absurd to view these price controls in value-neutral terms. Free-market economists, including the Austrians, should demand their repeal. The fact that they don't -- the fact that they choose to remain above the fray in their economic ivory towers and abstain from pronouncing moral judgment -- is one reason we're in so much trouble today. They, who are the proper guardians of economic policy, have abdicated their moral responsibility.

If it forbids calculations or systems of calculating from being considered if they did not correspond to reality?

It doesn't forbid them from being considered. But it does forbid them from being adhered to or accepted as true (not legally, of course, but mathematically). For example, the rules of arithmetic would forbid someone from believing in or accepting as true the proposition that "7 + 5 = 11." They would require him to believe that 7 + 5 = 12, if he is to draw the correct conclusion about the sum of these two numbers.

Should non-Euclidean geometry have been outlawed because its roots in reality were suspect?

Certainly not outlawed, because that would violate freedom of action and freedom of speech. Besides, there is real intellectual value in allowing the free exchange of ideas, especially those that challenge traditional orthodoxy.

Mathematics and (Austrian) economics are deductive sciences. They are faithful only to the premises from which they are deduced and that is exactly as it should be.

But those premises aren't arbitrary; they are grounded in empirical reality, right? The premise that human beings act for a purpose is an empirically observable truth, as is the law of diminishing marginal utility -- the idea that people satisfy their most important needs first, the next most important needs, second, etc. Austrian economics is a deductive science, to be sure, but it is also one that is grounded in concrete reality. So is mathematics, notwithstanding Platonist claims to the contrary. The number 5 has a referent in reality; it refers to the quantity | | | | |. Objectivism, as I'm sure you're aware, does not recognize the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. All truths are foundationally empirical insofar as they are based ultimately on observation.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/21, 4:27pm)

(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/21, 4:34pm)

Post 194

Friday, November 23, 2007 - 11:55am

Bill,

I have to be honest. Sometimes I think you�re arguing for the pure sport of it. If so, I�ve got better things to do with my time. If not, then you are so married to an irrational ideology you won�t allow logic or facts to get in the way of reason.

First case in point, you wrote:

"That's because once they've been blind for a certain amount of time, it's very difficult for them neurologically to adapt to sight. They're more comfortable relying on their sense of touch and hearing. There was a famous case of a man who was blind from birth who regained his sight, but he found he couldn't navigate using his sense of sight, because he had severe difficulty judging distances and perspective. Obviously, the conditions had changed for him over what they would have been had he been born sighted or been able to regain the same abilities as a normally sighted person. So, this is not a counter-example to my argument that happiness has an objective basis in reality. In fact, it supports it."

Are you kidding me? For Pete�s sake, just Google the web for "blind" or "deaf" advocacy sites and you�ll read a ton of posts like this one below which I found easily:

"If I had the choice of being Deaf or hearing, knowing that being hearing would remove a lot of obstacles and frustration, I would still choose to be Deaf. Deaf rules!"

Maybe you can read minds. Maybe you know better than people themselves what makes them comfortable or happy. If so, I salute you. If not, get real.

Second case in point, you wrote:

"As far as the Nazi scientists were concerned, they were wrong to apply their science in the way they did. But observe that I can say that only on normative grounds. If I eschew ethical value-judgments, I have no way to condemn their actions."

Why won�t you understand that there is a difference between science and scientists? It wasn�t a few immoral, loose-canon Nazi scientists that laid the groundwork for the Holocaust by wrongly applying their science. It was the science of eugenics itself. Why? Because the "science" of eugenics wasn�t a science at all. It was an ideology that masqueraded as a science. How so? Because eugenics was a normative science, the very normative science you want economics to be. Eugenics purported to make objective value-judgments. It prescribed means it claimed were "grounded in empirical reality." It scientifically prescribed the Holocaust!

You also wrote:

"If I eschew ethical value-judgments, I have no way to condemn their actions."

Here again, you refuse to distinguish between science and the scientist. Even if science is better served by being a value-neutral source of knowledge that makes no moral prescriptions, it is within the purview of the scientist to make moral prescriptions based on his philosophy and ideology. It is from this point of view, buttressed by the objective and unbiased findings of his science, that the scientist can and should "condemn their actions."

Third case in point, I asked:

"How do you know that by "respecting each other's freedom, we obtain the values that we desire?"

I did not ask this question because I am ignorant of the benefits freedom bestows on those who mutually respect it. I am an advocate of freedom and of the night watchman state as, presumably, you are. I advocate freedom and the night watchman state not because of my economics. Guided by knowledge gained by studying economics, I advocate freedom and limited government because of my philosophical ideology which I can best describe as utilitarianism or consequentialism.

I asked the question I did because I don�t believe there is an objective link between reality (what "is") and objective human morality (what each human being "ought" to do). I don�t believe the methods of the natural, inductive sciences can discover such a link. I don�t believe the methods of the social, deductive sciences, like economics (sometimes called a tautological science) can logically deduce such a link unless it first assumes that link in its original premise. So when I asked "what is the premise you assume to be true from which you deduce the ethic of 'respecting each other's freedom,'" I was anticipating a serious answer, not a suggestion to read Rand�s novels.

Fourth case in point, you wrote:

"There is a sense in which it [mathematics] is normative: If you add 7 + 5, you 'ought' to get 12."

I thought Rand was the master of smuggling concepts, but it seems she can�t hold a candle to you. Do you not see the difference between the two definitions of the word "wrong," i.e., between the meaning of "logically correct" as opposed to "morally proper?" Are you seriously suggesting that these two distinct definitions are "in a sense" identical and can be used interchangeably? Are you seriously suggesting that mathematicians must be held morally responsible for the accuracy of their calculations? The conflation of the two distinct meanings of the word "wrong" detracts from our discussion and merely allows you the pretension of bridging the "is-ought" gap.

You also write:

"To "prescribe" the means is simply to identify that they lead to a desired end."

Another subtle smuggling of concepts! To know that particular means lead to a specific end is not to prescribe those particular means as moral imperatives. Knowledge is not the same as prescription unless, again, you want to smuggle the pretension into our discussion that you�ve bridged the gap between "is" and "ought." Such a gap cannot be bridged easily. If you think you know of such a bridge describe it by making an argument, not by smuggling concepts and making bald assertions.

Fifth case in point, you write:

"But those premises aren't arbitrary; they are grounded in empirical reality, right? The premise that human beings act for a purpose is an empirically observable truth, as is the law of diminishing marginal utility -- the idea that people satisfy their most important needs first, the next most important needs, second, etc. Austrian economics is a deductive science, to be sure, but it is also one that is grounded in concrete reality."

There are so many errors in this particular quotation I barely know where to begin. Yes, the premise of Austrian deductive economic reasoning is a self-evident truth. However, the law of diminishing marginal utility is not "an empirically observable truth." For years economists believed, as you do, that value was objective and intrinsic, i.e., "observable" in things. Yet, despite all their powers of value-observation they couldn�t resolve the following paradox.

If wheat as food is a necessity of life and gold as a bauble is not a necessity with respect to life, then wheat's intrinsic value must be higher than gold's intrinsic value. However, if this is true, why the observation that gold's value in the marketplace is higher than wheat's?

"Empirical observation" could not explain this paradox. In fact, empirical observation gave rise to it. As you point out, the law of diminishing marginal returns explains the paradox. However, neither was this law empirically observed. This law was "discovered" by subjectivist economists like Karl Menger and Ludwig von Mises who did not have better powers of "observation" than other economists of their time. These subjectivists deduced this law from the self-evident premise upon which their entire science is founded: man acts with purpose.

Just as the law of diminishing marginal returns was deduced from an original premise rooted in reality rather than empirically observed, then so must be the objective "value" of "respecting each other�s freedom," if, indeed, "respecting each other�s freedom" is a concept "rooted in reality" as you claim.

Unless, of course, you believe that the "value" of "respecting each other's freedom" can be empirically observed by the methods of the natural sciences. You certainly imply such empirical evidence exists when you write things like:

Are you seriously questioning the massive evidence for the practical value of freedom? -- evidence from economics, politics and philosophy?

Then, again, perhaps you don't mean "evidence" in the sense of empirical evidence of the senses. Perhaps you mean "evidence" in the sense of deductive knowledge gained by those economists, political scientists and philosophers who deduce the conclusions you admire from self-evident premises.

If that is the case, then I ask again, in the interests of an honest and fruitful discussion: "What is the premise you assume to be objectively true from which you deduce the objectively true, moral ethic of "respecting each other's freedom?"

Regards,
Sherman

(Edited by Sherman Broder on 11/23, 12:03pm)

Post 195

Friday, November 23, 2007 - 1:14pm

Sherman,

In your Extended Profile, you claim to have read the following: Anthem, We the Living, The Fountainhead, Atlas Shrugged, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, Philosophy: Who Needs It?, Virtue of Selfishness, Romantic Manifesto, The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution.

In post #189 you said:

Third, you [Bill] write: "Ethics can itself be scientific." This single, short sentence is the reason we will never agree and, if it is a tenet of Objectivism, it is the reason I will never be an Objectivist. [Emphasis added.]

How could you possibly read all of Rand�s works and not know that one of the tenets of Objectivism is that an �ought� can be derived from an �is�? You went on to say:

I don't believe you, Ayn Rand or any other philospher has ever objectively deduced an "ought" from an "is."

I�m pretty sure you haven�t read or discussed everything that Bill has written or thought, and it�s obvious you don�t understand everything that Rand wrote, and, finally, I know you haven�t read all the philosophers. So, the only possible basis for your statement is that you have a logical proof that it is impossible to derive an �ought� from an �is�. Care to share?

You later say:

I'm sorry, but with all respect to your firmly and sincerely held beliefs, the above are mine and they are not likely to change.

In post #194, you said to Bill:

I have to be honest. Sometimes I think you�re arguing for the pure sport of it. If so, I�ve got better things to do with my time. If not, then you are so married to an irrational ideology you won�t allow logic or facts to get in the way of reason.

Based on your own statement, I would claim that it was you who came into this with your mind wide shut.

Finally, there is your disingenuous argument for the fact that some deaf people are happier for being deaf. Let�s put it back in context, shall we? Here is the full quote from the deaf person:

I honestly think that being Deaf has made me who I am and given me determination and motivation. I very much doubt that I would have chosen the path I have if I was hearing.
I always say that being Deaf has given me an interesting life � if I was hearing, would I have worked in London? Would I have been to Australia? Would I have the good friends I do now? My life would be so different if I was hearing, and not necessarily for the better.
If I had the choice of being Deaf or hearing, knowing that being hearing would remove a lot of obstacles and frustration, I would still choose to be Deaf. Deaf rules!

It�s not being deaf that makes this person �comfortable or happy�, it�s the things he�s achieved and enjoyed in life. And he mistakenly attributes these to being deaf. I say mistakenly because, firstly, he has no idea what he would have achieved if he were a hearing person (no control for the experiment), and, secondly, there is nothing a deaf person can do that a hearing person can�t.

Thanks,

Glenn

Post 196

Friday, November 23, 2007 - 6:11pm

Sherman, you wrote,

For Pete�s sake, just Google the web for "blind" or "deaf" advocacy sites and you�ll read a ton of posts like this one below which I found easily: "If I had the choice of being Deaf or hearing, knowing that being hearing would remove a lot of obstacles and frustration, I would still choose to be Deaf. Deaf rules!" Maybe you can read minds. Maybe you know better than people themselves what makes them comfortable or happy. If so, I salute you. If not, get real.

I'm not saying that people can't make bad choices -- choices that don't maximize their happiness. People who are addicted to drugs choose to continue taking them, even though the drugs are destroying their lives and making them miserable in the process. Of course, I don't know the details behind the life of the person whom you quoted as wanting to continue being deaf, even if by gaining the sense of hearing he could remove many of the obstacles and a good deal of the frustration in his life. [But I now see from Glenn Fletcher's post that your quote didn't provide the full context. And I thank Glenn for his excellent analysis, with which I agree.] The point I am making is that there are certain objective conditions that are conducive to one's happiness, even if people sometimes ignore them and make bad choices or decisions. Do you disagree with this? Do you believe, for example, that a drug addict is living an optimal lifestyle, one that promotes his happiness and well being, simply because he happens to have chosen it?

I wrote: "As far as the Nazi scientists were concerned, they were wrong to apply their science in the way they did. But observe that I can say that only on normative grounds. If I eschew ethical value-judgments, I have no way to condemn their actions."

Why won�t you understand that there is a difference between science and scientists? It wasn�t a few immoral, loose-canon Nazi scientists that laid the groundwork for the Holocaust by wrongly applying their science. It was the science of eugenics itself. Why? Because the "science" of eugenics wasn�t a science at all. It was an ideology that masqueraded as a science. How so? Because eugenics was a normative science, the very normative science you want economics to be. Eugenics purported to make objective value-judgments. It prescribed means it claimed were "grounded in empirical reality." It scientifically prescribed the Holocaust!

First, let's be clear on our understanding of the term "eugenics." That term can be used simply to refer to the improvement of human life through genetic engineering and to the elimination of inherited diseases. In that sense, it does not imply the kind of coercive, social engineering that the Nazi's and other eugenicists have engaged in and advocated. The fact that the Nazi's claimed to be prescribing means for the betterment of mankind that are grounded in empirical reality does not imply that those means were in fact grounded in empirical reality. Obviously, they were not. That doesn't mean that scientific prescription is therefore to be abandoned. It doesn't mean that the science of economics or of ethics cannot prescribe economic or governmental policy by demanding the repeal of price controls and of governmental interference in private behavior.

Furthermore, if there is no rational, scientific basis for a free society, then on what grounds do you object to what the Nazi's did? The only way you can object to it is on a normative, ethical basis, and if that basis is not established by a rational, scientific method, then it has no justification in reality. How then do you propose to object to governmental intervention in private affairs including that of totalitarian dictatorships like Nazism, Facism and Communism? The answer is: you can't. You need a normative or ethical basis in order to condemn what the Nazi's and Communists did. And that ethical basis has to be grounded in reality and rationally justified.

I wrote: "If I eschew ethical value-judgments, I have no way to condemn their [the Nazi's] actions."

Here again, you refuse to distinguish between science and the scientist. Even if science is better served by being a value-neutral source of knowledge that makes no moral prescriptions, it is within the purview of the scientist to make moral prescriptions based on his philosophy and ideology.
But if his philosophy and ideology have no rational, scientific basis, then his prescriptions cannot be defended.
It is from this point of view, buttressed by the objective and unbiased findings of his science, that the scientist can and should "condemn their actions."

From a subjective point of view, the scientists should condemn their actions?? Why? If they can't justify their condemnation, then they have no basis for it.

Third case in point, I asked:
"How do you know that by "respecting each other's freedom, we obtain the values that we desire?" I did not ask this question because I am ignorant of the benefits freedom bestows on those who mutually respect it.
But it is precisely those benefits that justify our moral obligation to respect it. That's the point I was making.
I am an advocate of freedom and of the night watchman state as, presumably, you are. I advocate freedom and the night watchman state not because of my economics. Guided by knowledge gained by studying economics, I advocate freedom and limited government because of my philosophical ideology which I can best describe as utilitarianism or consequentialism.

Great; I too am a consequentialist, as I am sure you gathered from reading my posts. So, I don't understand why you are questioning me on the normative value of freedom. Freedom is a good thing, because it leads to good consequences. If you agree with that, then what are we arguing about?

I asked the question I did because I don�t believe there is an objective link between reality (what "is") and objective human morality (what each human being "ought" to do).

The link is the relationship between means and ends. Freedom is in people's self-interest, and leads to good consequences, namely the ends they desire. Therefore, they "ought" to promote the means to those ends. They ought to endorse a free society. What's not to understand??

I don�t believe the methods of the natural, inductive sciences can discover such a link. I don�t believe the methods of the social, deductive sciences, like economics (sometimes called a tautological science) can logically deduce such a link unless it first assumes that link in its original premise.

But it does assume it; it assumes the end of utility or happiness, and proceeds to identify the means to its achievement -- free markets.

So when I asked "what is the premise you assume to be true from which you deduce the ethic of 'respecting each other's freedom,'" I was anticipating a serious answer, not a suggestion to read Rand�s novels.

Rand's novel Atlas Shrugged is not a serious answer?? If you don't think it's a serious answer, then you haven't read the novel or read it very carefully!

Fourth case in point, you wrote: "There is a sense in which it [mathematics] is normative: If you add 7 + 5, you 'ought' to get 12." I thought Rand was the master of smuggling concepts,
Where does she "smuggle in" concepts, if you don't mind my asking?
but it seems she can�t hold a candle to you. Do you not see the difference between the two definitions of the word "wrong," i.e., between the meaning of "logically correct" as opposed to "morally proper?"

Yes, and I indicated my awareness of the difference; I was simply pointing out that there was a sense in which math was itself normative, a point which is not irrelevant to an understanding of morality. You ought to employ the rules of addition, if you want to know the sum of two numbers. You ought to adhere to certain principles of conduct, if you want to achieve happiness. Quoting Galt in Atlas Shrugged:

You who speak of a 'moral instinct' as if it were some separate endowment opposed to reason -- man's reason is his moral faculty. A process of reason is a process of constant choice in answer to the question: True or False? -- Right or Wrong? Is a seed to be planted in soil in order to grow -- right or wrong? Does the nature of atmospheric electricity permit it to be converted into kinetic power -- right or wrong? It is the answers to such questions that gave you everything you have -- and the answers came from man's mind, a mind of intransigent devotion to that which is right. (p. 1017)

And to continue Rand's reasoning: Is freedom required by for man's proper survival? right or wrong?

Do you see how morality is itself simply a means to an end? That's the key point here. The normative nature of the principles of morality is no different, in this respect, from the normative nature of the rules of arithmetic. Both are prescriptive in the sense that both describe the means to a desired end.

Are you seriously suggesting that these two distinct definitions are "in a sense" identical and can be used interchangeably? Are you seriously suggesting that mathematicians must be held morally responsible for the accuracy of their calculations?

If the accuracy of their calculations is indicative of negligence or of a failure properly to check their results, then they could be held morally responsible for the consequences. However, if any mistakes were made despite due diligence, then the people making them are certainly not morally responsible, any more than a parent who feeds her child tainted spinach which she has every reason to believe is safe, is morally responsible. But that doesn't mean that the parent shouldn't abstain from feeding her child tainted spinach if she is aware of it. Similarly, no one should neglect to follow the rules of arithmetic if he is aware of them.

The conflation of the two distinct meanings of the word "wrong" detracts from our discussion and merely allows you the pretension of bridging the "is-ought" gap.

It was not my intention to conflate the distinction between an inadvertent mistake and a moral wrong, and if I gave that impression, I apologize. I'm certainly not saying that an unintentional error in addition is a morally wrong. Morality refers to the choices that a person ought to make, not to unintended consequences over which he has no volitional control. However, it's been my argument all along that there is no gap between "is" and "ought" -- not because there is no distinction between errors of knowledge and errors of morality -- but because a prescription is simply another kind of description. A conditional imperative (which is all that morality is) simply describes the means to a desired end -- i.e., the choices that will lead to that end.

Fifth case in point, you write: "But those premises aren't arbitrary; they are grounded in empirical reality, right? The premise that human beings act for a purpose is an empirically observable truth, as is the law of diminishing marginal utility -- the idea that people satisfy their most important needs first, the next most important needs, second, etc. Austrian economics is a deductive science, to be sure, but it is also one that is grounded in concrete reality." There are so many errors in this particular quotation I barely know where to begin. Yes, the premise of Austrian deductive economic reasoning is a self-evident truth. However, the law of diminishing marginal utility is not "an empirically observable truth." For years economists believed, as you do, that value was objective and intrinsic, i.e., "observable" in things.

But I don't believe that value is observable in things; nor do I believe that it is observable in actions as such, regardless of their context and consequences. And neither does Rand. According to Objectivism:

There are, in essence, three schools of thought on the nature of the good: the intrinsic, the subjective, and the objective. The intrinsic theory holds that the good is inherent in certain things or actions as such, regardless of their context and consequences, regardless of any benefit or injury they may cause to the actors and subjects involved. It is a theory that divorces the concept of "good" from beneficiaries, and the concept of "value" from valuer and purpose -- claiming that the good is good in, by, and of itself.

The subjectivist theory holds that the good bears no relation to the facts of reality, that it is the product of a man's consciousness, created by his feelings, desires, "intuitions," or whims, and that it is merely an "arbitrary postulate" or an "emotional commitment."

The intrinsic theory holds that the good resides in some sort of reality, independent of man's consciousness; the subjectivist theory holds that the good resides in man's consciousness independent of reality.

The objective theory holds that the good is neither an attribute of "things in themselves" nor of man's emotional states, but an evaluation of the facts of reality by man's consciousness according to a rational standard of value. (Rational, in this context, means: derived from the facts of reality and validated by a process of reason.) The objective theory holds that the good is an aspect of reality in relation to man -- and that it must be discovered, not invented, by man. Fundamental to an objective theory of values is the question: Of value to whom and for what? An objective theory does not permit context-dropping or "concept-stealing"; it does not permit the separation of "value" from "purpose," of the good from beneficiaries, and of man's actions from reason. ("What Is Capitalism," in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, pp. 22-23)

What you mean by "objective" in this context is what Rand means by "intrinsic."

Yet, despite all their powers of value-observation they couldn�t resolve the following paradox.

If wheat as food is a necessity of life and gold as a bauble is not a necessity with respect to life, then wheat's intrinsic value must be higher than gold's intrinsic value. However, if this is true, why the observation that gold's value in the marketplace is higher than wheat's?

"Empirical observation" could not explain this paradox. In fact, empirical observation gave rise to it.
By "empirical observation," I don't mean observation devoid of reason; I mean observation accompanied by reason. My apologies for not making that clear.
As you point out, the law of diminishing marginal returns explains the paradox. However, neither was this law empirically observed. This law was "discovered" by subjectivist economists like Karl Menger and Ludwig von Mises who did not have better powers of "observation" than other economists of their time. These subjectivists deduced this law from the self-evident premise upon which their entire science is founded: man acts with purpose.

Yes, and these economists are to be applauded for their discovery. But remember, Objectivists are not intrinsic-value theorists. Also, as you are no doubt aware, the Austrian concept of diminishing marginal utility differs from the neoclassical version. The neoclassical version simply says that one's value for an object diminishes the more of it one consumes, whereas the Austrian version says that a person satisfies his most valued wants first, his second most valued wants second, and so forth. Bohm-Bawerk's example of the frontiersman who has five sacks of grain comes to mind. The frontiersman uses the first sack to meet his minimum need for food; the second sack to give him enough extra calories to keep up his strength and energy; the third sack to raise some poultry to round out his diet; the forth, to distill some brandy, and the fifth, to feed some parrots for his amusement. But this concept of diminishing marginal utility is not one that you'll ever hear in a class on microeconomics in today's universities.

Just as the law of diminishing marginal returns was deduced from an original premise rooted in reality rather than empirically observed, then so must be the objective "value" of "respecting each other�s freedom," if, indeed, "respecting each other�s freedom" is a concept "rooted in reality" as you claim. Unless, of course, you believe that the "value" of "respecting each other's freedom" can be empirically observed by the methods of the natural sciences.
It can be observed by the methods of the social sciences like politics and economics.
You certainly imply such empirical evidence exists when you write things like:

Are you seriously questioning the massive evidence for the practical value of freedom? -- evidence from economics, politics and philosophy?

Then, again, perhaps you don't mean "evidence" in the sense of empirical evidence of the senses. Perhaps you mean "evidence" in the sense of deductive knowledge gained by those economists, political scientists and philosophers who deduce the conclusions you admire from self-evident premises.

If that is the case, then I ask again, in the interests of an honest and fruitful discussion: "What is the premise you assume to be objectively true from which you deduce the objectively true, moral ethic of "respecting each other's freedom?"

The premise that without freedom, one is not free to pursue and achieve one's values.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/23, 6:23pm)

(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/23, 6:48pm)

Post 197

Saturday, November 24, 2007 - 6:27am

Glenn,

Yes, I have read virtually all of Rand's work but many, many years ago. Yes, I am aware that Rand attempted to derive an "ought" from an "is." (I couldn't tell you in which of her works I read the attempt.) I have not kept current with Objectivist thought for some thirty or forty years. I have been tangentially aware that some thinkers (David Kelley?) have considered Rand from different perspectives. I thought maybe some of Objectivist thought had modified over the years as a result. From the response I'm getting, I guess not.

By the way, it was Rand's attempt to derive an "ought" from an "is" that soured me on her version of Objectivism years and years ago. (In my response to Bill's latest post I'll outline as best I can where I believe Rand goes wrong in her derivation.) I don't have a logical "proof" that an "ought" cannot be derived from an "is," thus I can't provide one. On the other hand, one can't prove a negative. Isn't it incumbent on those advocating a theory to present their "proof" of its correctness?

No, I am not familiar with all of Bill's writing. Nor have I read every philosopher. So, yes, there may be a "proof" out there I am unaware of. If so, I'd appreciate it if you'd call it to my attention.

Yes, I suppose you could say I've come here with my "eyes wide shut" with respect to deriving an "ought" from an "is." As I said, Rand's attempt to do so is what soured me in the first place. However, in the last many years I haven't come across a logically sound derivation. Hence, my close-mindedness. On the other hand, presented with a logically sound derivation I would be happy to change my mind and accept it.

With regard to the quote I posted from the "Deaf rules!" person. Sorry, I didn't mean to be disingenuous. I quickly Googled the web and scanned the particular thread for a quote to make my point and didn't bother to read the entire thread. I apologize.

On the other hand, even considered within the context you provide, I don't understand how the quote contradicts my opinion or supports Bill's. Obviously, this person is happy being deaf and wouldn't change. Now you say this deaf person is mistaken in his happiness "because, firstly, he has no idea what he would have achieved if he were a hearing person (no control for the experiment), and, secondly, there is nothing a deaf person can do that a hearing person can�t." That is not the point.

The point is: first, this person is happy by his own account; second, he might be happy for the wrong reasons considered from your point of view, but since when does your point of view matter with regard to another person's happiness; third, none of us knows what we could have achieved if we lived under different circumstances. None of us has the luxury of a "control" over this "experiment" which is our own life. Yet, we can be happy in the reality of the circumstance we live; and fourth, don't be so cock sure that "there is nothing a deaf person can do that a hearing person can't. Talk to a deaf person first and get their perspective. I'm guessing, but I'll bet there is plenty of things, e.g., a vastly more acute sensibility of the other senses which would be impossible or extremely difficult to cultivate in the hearing; and the ability to control and enjoy absolute silence, which might also be difficult or impossible for the hearing to simulate.

Regards,
Sherman

Post 198

Saturday, November 24, 2007 - 10:01am

Bill,

First off let me say frankly that I appreciate this exchange and, regardless of how it may seem, I am learning from it. Thanks for the time you've invested.

Now down to brass tacks...

You write:

I'm not saying that people can't make bad choices -- choices that don't maximize their happiness.

Obviously, if an individual makes a "bad" choice it is "bad" from your point of view, not from his, or he wouldn't make it. Why else would a person make a "bad" choice? (And please don't say: "Out of ignorance," unless you mean to profess perfect knowledge is possible. And please don't say: "Out of ignorance of reality," unless you mean to profess perfect knowledge of reality is possible.)

Earlier in this thread a commentator gave an example of an individual who makes a financial trade which results in his economic ruin and the deterioration of his health. This commentator said it was a "bad" choice. Is such a trade a "bad" choice from your point of view? It seems so with the benefit of hindsight, but at the point the trade is made the "goodness" or "badness" of the trade is not clear. Again, why would a person knowingly make a trade that is "bad?" How does one know at the time a choice is made whether or not that choice will "maximize" one's happiness? It seems reasonable to me to believe that an individual who makes a choice makes it because he believes that choice will "maximize" his happiness. It seems reasonable to me to believe that in a vast majority of cases of such individual choices there is no obvious choice which, objectively, could be shown at the time to "maximize" the chooser's happiness. This is the crux of my argument.

You write:

The point I am making is that there are certain objective conditions that are conducive to one's happiness, even if people sometimes ignore them and make bad choices or decisions. Do you disagree with this? Do you believe, for example, that a drug addict is living an optimal lifestyle, one that promotes his happiness and well being, simply because he happens to have chosen it?

The point I am making is that Austrian economics (as I understand it) cannot logically deduce "that there are certain objective conditions that are conducive to one's happiness" from it's original premise (man acts with purpose). [If you can make such a deduction, I would be happy to read it.] Austrian economics is a deductive science built on the foundation of its orignal premise. Thus, whether I agree or disagree that "objective conditions" exist, is irrelevant to the science of Austrian economics.

Yes, as a consequentialist I would argue that "certain objective conditions" "are conducive to one's happiness," but I would have to argue this point from the value-laden point of view of consequentialism, not from the deductive point of view of Austrian economics.

You write:

That term can be used simply to refer to the improvement of human life through genetic engineering and to the elimination of inherited diseases.

Come on now, no smuggling concepts. It is clear from the context of my post I was referring to eugenics as it existed in the earlier 20th century. There is little doubt that eugenics then was a normative "science." With the benefit of hindsight it is easy for you to scoff that eugenics then did not comport to "empirical reality," but it was not so easy then, especially when the criticisms of real scientists then were labeled by eugenicists as "wrong" in the moral sense.

Consider our discussion of mathematics. You contend an individual who purposely adds 7 plus 5 and arrives at 11 performs an immoral act from the point of view of mathematics itself. But in such a case the "real" answer of 12 is obvious to almost all mathematicians. Now consider the "science" of eugenics as it existed in the early 20th century. Answers then were not so obvious. Neither was the "purpose" of critics. The intellectual atmosphere as a result took on the character of the Inquisition rather than legitimate scientific discourse. In such an atmosphere I don't see how anyone could think the concept of a "normative" science is a "good" one.

Even today many geneticists consider their science normative. They think their science has the mission of advocating the "improvement" of the human race which is "good" from the science's point of view. But "good" is not so easy to determine in the here and now. Ideas of "improvement" of the human race are bound to change in the next fifty to hundred years and there is the pesky problem of "unintended consequences" which means nothing more than "consequences resulting from imperfect knowledge of the "good." Therefore, I believe the human race would be far better of insisting that the science of modern genetics not be normative.

You write:

Furthermore, if there is no rational, scientific basis for a free society, then on what grounds do you object to what the Nazi's did?

Humanism, Christianity, Liberalism, Utilitarianism...take your pick. Recall that there was no "rational, scientific basis" for the "science" of eugenics on which the Nazi's based and popularized their actions. What makes you think a "rational, scientific basis for a free society" would have headed the Nazi's off? When science loses its legitimacy as an unbiased source of knowledge it loses respect in the realm of political persuasion.

You write:

Freedom is a good thing, because it leads to good consequences. If you agree with that, then what are we arguing about?

Means. The integrity of science. Politics. Epistemology. Not ethics.

You write:

Where does she [Rand] "smuggle in" concepts, if you don't mind my asking?

No, I don't mind, although you might not be satisfied with my reply since I don't have Rand's books readily at hand. [By the way, is there a source on the web that offers the text of Rand's writings which would make cutting and pasting convenient?]

It seems to me that Rand's entire argument hinges on the conflation of two meanings of the word "life." She proves that man cannot sustain his "life" without food, shelter and the material necessities of "life." Then, she contends that man must use his rationality to gain these material necessities of "life." Then, she concludes that man's "life" is not a proper "life" unless it is lived "qua man," i.e., rationally in every aspect. This is the leap of logic I don't buy.

Yes, man requires certain material necessities to sustain his biological organism, but man (as I see it) has two means of gaining these material necessities: rationality, which could mean forming society, trading and the like, or animal brute force, which could mean simply taking what one requires from nature or other humans by brute force. Rand chooses the former, obviously, as more suited to man's proper life qua man, but this conclusion is her value judgment coming to the fore. Logic did not lead her inextricably to this conclusion from the premise that man needs food to live. Only by conflating the two definitions of life, i.e., "life" as a biological function and "life" as a philosophical state of being, is Rand able to bridge the gap between "is" and "ought."

You write:

Do you see how morality is itself simply a means to an end? That's the key point here. The normative nature of the principles of morality is no different, in this respect, from the normative nature of the rules of arithmetic. Both are prescriptive in the sense that both describe the means to a desired end.

Once again you're conflating the two definitions of "wrong" in order to arrive at your conclusion. Yes, I agree morality is itself a means to an end, the end we should all seek to attain. But the "normative nature of the principles of morality" is essentially distinct from the "normative nature of the rules of arithmetic." This is the subject of our entire debate. You can't settle that debate by making a bald-faced assertion.

Arithmetic is a logical system deduced from an arbitrary premise. Insofar as the logic of arithmeticians is faithful to that premise, arithmetic considers their reasoning correct; insofar as it is not, arithmetic considers their reasoning incorrect. Arithmetic itself, qua science, goes no further than this. It makes no judgments of the purpose, motive or goal of the arithmetician. From the point of view of arithmetic, the calculations are either correct or incorrect...nothing more.

On the other hand, principles of morality are a logical system of ethics deduced from a normative premise. The rules of logic still apply. Reasoning from this premise must be correct. However, morality itself, qua ethics, makes value judgments of the purpose, motives and goals of the actor. From the point of view of ethics, moral reasoning is either good or evil, right or wrong (in the moral sense).

Now you may claim the premise of certain principles of morality are not normative but objective (or intrinsic or realistic), but you must prove such a claim by means of argument, not by means of assertion.

You write:

But this [Austrian] concept of diminishing marginal utility is not one that you'll ever hear in a class on microeconomics in today's universities.

Sad.

You write:

It [the "value" of "respecting each other's freedom"] can be observed by the methods of the social sciences like politics and economics.

I'd be interested in hearing you explain how it can be observed by the methods of these sciences. (You can't be talking about Austrian economics, because Austrian methods "observe" nothing. Austrian economics is pure deductive reasoning.)

I asked:

If that is the case, then I ask again, in the interests of an honest and fruitful discussion: "What is the premise you assume to be objectively true from which you deduce the objectively true, moral ethic of "respecting each other's freedom?"

You answered:

The premise that without freedom, one is not free to pursue and achieve one's values.

I expected your reasoning to be tautological, but I did not expect your premise to be tautological. "...[W]ithout freedom, one is not free..." Yes, I suppose this is objectively true, but it is also meaningless.

Why not simply say: "Freedom is necessary to the pursuit and achievement of one's values?" But that wouldn't be objectively true, unless we discount all of the world's socialists and the members of MoveOn.org.

Bridging the "Is-Ought" gap is a pesky problem indeed!

Regards,
Sherman

Post 199

Saturday, November 24, 2007 - 10:52pm