Getting the right Rights right.

Bill,

First, note that you accidently addressed your response in 77 to Ed.

You say:

No, it doesn't! Granting rights to murderers is incompatible with the requirements for human survival.

But earlier you were picking Rand's definition "conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival" as the better definition. You were pointing at the root human need as the "rights" that "just are". But murderers and tyrants have those same needs. If it is just those conditions of existence which makes up rights, then everyone would have them. Whereas if rights are moral sanctions, then not everyone has them. You can complain that I'm not being sympathetic to the context of your points, but your wording says another. You've attempted to fix the wording by saying things like "rights 'just are' contextually".

In this case, you talk about granting rights. I assume that's a slip since you claim rights exist independent of moral evaluation. But did you mean respecting their rights is incompatible? Or do you mean that they don't have rights? That somehow, rights which "just are", just aren't in this case.

And I'm not sure about your argument. Take the conditions of existence definition. Who's existence? The rights-bearer? Or someone else? One of the clear points in rights is that individuals need them to live by their minds, unimpeded by the coercion of others. But are you saying that this conditions of existence is not about those needs at all? But about the needs of the person interacting with him? That the rights are based on his needs? I ask because you bring up "the requirements for human survival" in this argument about murderers. But it's not the murderer's requirements you're talking about. It's not the rights-bearers. It's the other person. The rights-recognizers or rights-violators. Can you not see how this isn't obvious?

Similarly, your discussion of the moral principle of rights has been worded in a way that either shows a disagreement, or obscures your actual meaning. You started off describing it as a conduct. Okay, you changed it. But then it became a recognition of a moral obligation. Then it became a recognition of a moral obligation if you want to achieve some results.

Now my position is has been that it is primarily an recognition of a causal relationship. It's the understanding of that causal relationship that guides your actions. The moral principle is not just stating the conclusion, "You should do X to achieve Y". It is retaining and focusing on the causal relationship. It is primarily a principle:
http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/principles.html
From the lexicon:

A principle is "a fundamental, primary, or general truth, on which other truths depend." Thus a principle is an abstraction which subsumes a great number of concretes. It is only by means of principles that one can set one's long-range goals and evaluate the concrete alternatives of any given moment. It is only principles that enable a man to plan his future and to achieve it.

It is not simply a statement of how you should act, or a statement of how you should act when you have a goal. It is an abstraction. It's an identification. And with that identification, and your life as the standard, it can provide you guidance in how to act under different contexts. See my response #53 on this thread. Notice also that the "abstraction" does not exist out in reality. A moral principle requires someone to make that abstraction. To take the concretes at abstract them into a general truth. So earlier when you asked, "But if one is to recognize a moral principle, doesn't the principle have to exist independently of one's recognition", what do you think?

So it's not if you want X, do Y. It's more like if you want X, do Y, because of Z. Z is the principle you've identified. The causal relationship. Without it, X and Y become no better than rules, as the means to deal outside of the narrow context in which they are defined.

In your last post, you say "Principles are guides to action." Yes they are. But what kind of guide is the question. Principles are actually abstractions that recognize some general truth of reality. See the lexicon. That's what they actually are. And like all forms of knowledge, they can (and should) be used as guides to action.

Can you start to see where your wording can cause confusion? Or do you think I really am being unsympathetic to someone I have a ton of respect for?

As far as the principle I am advocating, I described it in post 43. It is a recognition of your own needs to be free, that others share this need, that your own freedom is promoted when the freedom of those living harmoniously have their freedom promoted, etc. All of it is necessary to formulate a moral principle.

Post 81

Tuesday, November 6, 2007 - 3:34pm

Joe, my apologies for addressing you as Ed. And Ed, my apologies for confusing you with Joe! ;-)

I wrote, "Granting rights to murderers is incompatible with the requirements for human survival." Joe (not Ed) replied,

But earlier you were picking Rand's definition "conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival" as the better definition. You were pointing at the root human need as the "rights" that "just are".

It depends on what you mean by "rights." It's the better definition for the purpose of identifying that rights exist independently of their being acknowledged. For example, a slave has the right to freedom even where it isn't being acknowledged. To say that he has that right only where it is acknowledged implies that if it isn't acknowledged, then it doesn't exist, in which case, those who deny it are not violating his rights.

As for the phrase "just are," it seems to have caused a lot of confusion. I and others mean one thing by it; you and Robert evidently mean another. Let's discard that phrase as unproductive, shall we?

But murderers and tyrants have those same needs.
Yes, but since they're denying others freedom, they forfeit their own. Did you think that when Rand made that statement, she was claiming that murderers should be granted the same conditions of freedom as rights respecting persons?
If it is just those conditions of existence which makes up rights, then everyone would have them.
Rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival, but that doesn't mean that everyone has rights. Murderers don't have them; they forfeit their rights when they violate the rights of others.
Whereas if rights are moral sanctions, then not everyone has them.
But isn't that a distinction without a difference? Does the principle sanction everyone's freedom (including that of murderers)? -- because the definition doesn't make explicit the distinction between those who violate rights and those who don't; it sanctions "man's freedom," and "man" would appear to subsume everyone. Now you will reply, but Rand was only referring to people who respect the rights of others. Exactly! So why are you criticizing her for not making that distinction explicit when she defined rights as "conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival"?
You can complain that I'm not being sympathetic to the context of your points, but your wording says another.

Your interpretation of my wording says another. And it's not just my wording; it's Rand's too.

In this case, you talk about granting rights. I assume that's a slip since you claim rights exist independent of moral evaluation.

By "granting," I simply meant recognizing or respecting. Of course, I don't believe that rights are literally handed down by arbitrary fiat.

But did you mean respecting their rights is incompatible? Or do you mean that they don't have rights?

I meant that murderers don't have a right to freedom -- that they forfeit that right.

And I'm not sure about your argument. Take the conditions of existence definition. Who's existence? The rights-bearer? Or someone else?

Everyone's. But the murderer forfeits his rights; so he forfeits the condition of freedom that is required for his proper survival. It's the price he pays for violating the rights of others.

Similarly, your discussion of the moral principle of rights has been worded in a way that either shows a disagreement, or obscures your actual meaning. You started off describing it as a conduct. Okay, you changed it. But then it became a recognition of a moral obligation. Then it became a recognition of a moral obligation if you want to achieve some results.

Initially, I took it as understood that "moral obligation," as I was using it, referred to a conditional (rather than a categorical) imperative (I'm not a Kantian, after all), but when it became clear that I wasn't being understood, I made a point of clarifying the term by stressing that the obligation pertained simply to the means of achieving a given end. Yet, you construed this as a change in meaning when it was simply a clarification.

Now my position is has been that it is primarily an recognition of a causal relationship.
Yes, that's my position as well.
It's the understanding of that causal relationship that guides your actions. The moral principle is not just stating the conclusion, "You should do X to achieve Y". It is retaining and focusing on the causal relationship.

I agree.

It is not simply a statement of how you should act, or a statement of how you should act when you have a goal. It is an abstraction. It's an identification. And with that identification, and your life as the standard, it can provide you guidance in how to act under different contexts. See my response #53 on this thread. Notice also that the "abstraction" does not exist out in reality. A moral principle requires someone to make that abstraction. To take the concretes at abstract them into a general truth. So earlier when you asked, "But if one is to recognize a moral principle, doesn't the principle have to exist independently of one's recognition", what do you think?

It has to exist independently of one's recognition of the principle. You can't "recognize" something that doesn't already exist. What you're referring to is the formulation of the principle. A principle does not exist independently of its formulation, obviously. The important point here is that the principle that one ought to respect other people's rights refers to the fact that one ought to respect them, and facts exist independently of one's awareness of them.

So it's not if you want X, do Y. It's more like if you want X, do Y, because of Z.

Well, yes, if you want X, do Y, "because" Y is a means to X.

Z is the principle you've identified. The causal relationship. Without it, X and Y become no better than rules, as the means to deal outside of the narrow context in which they are defined.

Well, sure; I didn't mean to suggest otherwise. Obviously, when I said "Do Y, because you want X and Y is a means to X, I was identifying a causal relationship -- one of final causation.

- Bill

Post 82

Wednesday, November 7, 2007 - 2:00am

Hi Bill,

I'm more than happy to discard the phrase "just are". It's late, so I'll have to keep my response short.

And I'm not sure about your argument. Take the conditions of existence definition. Who's existence? The rights-bearer? Or someone else?
Everyone's. But the murderer forfeits his rights; so he forfeits the condition of freedom that is required for his proper survival. It's the price he pays for violating the rights of others.

Again, this is confusing. I asked about the conditions of existence. If the conditions of existence is referring to the fact that each individual needs to be free, then what does it mean for the murderer? He still requires those same conditions to live his life. He just can't expect anyone to respect his freedom. You say he forfeits his rights. But his requirements for living haven't changed at all. The conditions he needs in order to live his life have not been altered. That's why I'm trying to understand what you think the "conditions of existence" definition even means. I take it to be that the rights-bearer has certain conditions of existence he himself needs. If that is all that rights are, then the murderer doesn't lose his rights. He just loses the expectation that people would respect those rights.

The quote "conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival" is interesting. If the "his" in the quote refers to the rights-bearer, and this definition was thought of as being fully accurate, then even the murder would still have his rights, since he still has the same requirements.

Now if you thing the "his" refers to not the rights-bearer, but those who interact with him (they may also be rights-bearers, but that's not the point), then it has some different meaning I'm not sure I understand. Which is why I asked you. But your answer was "everyone's", which didn't resolve the question.

As for the murderer, the thing that's been altered is his relationship to others. If the definition of rights only talks about the rights-bearers requirements for living, the murderer would continue to have these "rights". A proper definition has to connect his requirements with the requirements of others.

The important point here is that the principle that one ought to respect other people's rights refers to the fact that one ought to respect them, and facts exist independently of one's awareness of them.

I agree that there is a fact that one ought to respect "them". What's "them"? Rights? But then your statement would be "rights refer to the fact that one out to respect rights". How about freedoms?

Well, sure; I didn't mean to suggest otherwise. Obviously, when I said "Do Y, because you want X and Y is a means to X, I was identifying a causal relationship -- one of final causation.

I know I may be sounding pedantic here, but I'll very quickly try to point out the issue I'm concerned with. In general, moral principles show us how to achieve values through certain means, by explaining the causal relationship. But the range of possible values vary in degree. And sometimes, the costs are so significant, that you recognize that the value you'd gain through this process is not worth it. Take rights. The value in respecting the rights of a human shield that protects a psychopath about to kill all your loved ones and yourself still exists. There is value there. But the costs completely outweigh it. By recognizing the causal relationship, we can see make this kind of judgement, and decide to not take use the means to achieve that value.

When you state the principle as "Do Y, because you want X", it may be true that Y leads to X, but it doesn't mean you should do it. Don't respect the rights of a human shield when larger values are at stake. So formulating any principle as "Do Y, because you want X" or "If you want X, do Y" is not worded in the most useful way. Even if I want to live harmoniously with the human shield, and I know respecting his rights is the way to do it, I still have to reject those means. It's not that the principle doesn't apply to them, or that I'm not interested in that goal. It's that some other value is more important.

Now I wouldn't say that I'm rejecting the principle in this case. The principle has informed me of a causal relationship. I know that to achieve that desired goal, I need to follow those means. But I'm also informed by other knowledge, like that the psychopath needs to be stopped before he kills my loved ones. And I have to do a value trade-off.

Similarly, there are varying degrees of rights violations. If I could simply steal the property of the human shield instead of kill him, the principle (via a causal relationship) could inform me which rights violation most closely achieves the goal of a harmonious relationship. Again, if I just take it as some kind of conditional obligation, where I have must do Y if I want X, the principle only guides me in nice, clean-cut situations.

Hopefully that explains why I think the issue is important, anyway.

Post 83

Wednesday, November 7, 2007 - 2:17am

I wanted to hit on a related idea. It's the fact that Objectivist morality deals with relational values. Something is good for a particular person. It's not simply good on its own.

If rights are a moral concept, they're going to be relational as well. There informing us of what kinds of actions are appropriate, and those are appropriate because of the values the achieve. We respect the freedom of others because their freedom benefits us. It does so first because it makes it more likely that our own freedom will be secure. And also, because there is a harmony of interests between rational men, and we benefit from others living their lives effectively, through trade, education, etc.

One point of confusion with this is that if someone deserves to have their freedom respected, they deserve to have it respected by everyone. So the relational quality is obscured. Everyone is supposed to respect a person's freedom. So it seems like these "rights" exist in some non-relational way. But in fact, the relation is just true for every human. It happens that our interests are common in this case.

But once people start treating these "rights" as non-relational, it's easy to think they exist as as inherent quality that the rights-bearer just has, maybe as a part of his nature. They seem to emit from the rights-bearer himself, instead of from the rights-respecters. Since the value is common to everyone, it's treated as if it is a value in and of itself.

Part of what I've been arguing on this thread for is to try to shift the focus of the moral concept back on the rights respecters as individuals, with their own individual reasons for respecting the freedom of others. And this is why I've promoted the idea that rights are a moral concept, and not some metaphysical thing that just is.

Post 84

Wednesday, November 7, 2007 - 9:42am

Joe,

Okay, I see your point on the conditions of existence requirement. The murderer still has those requirements for survival. Does that mean that he still has rights? Clearly not. So Rand's statement cannot be correct. Rights cannot simply be "conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival," because if they were, then murderers and other rights violators, who also have those survival requirements, would themselves have rights. They would have the same liberties as everyone else, which they clearly do not.

As to her definition of a right as "a moral principle defining and sanctioning man's freedom of action in a social context," you could say that this statement doesn't suffer the same problem, because when a murderer loses his rights, his freedom is no longer sanctioned.

Got it.

Now that I think about it, I suppose we could amend her conditions of existence statement by saying that rights are conditions of existence, etc. that ought to be respected by others. That would eliminate the murderer and other rights violators from being covered by it. In short, we ought to respect the freedom of everyone except those who violate freedom.

I wrote, "The important point here is that the principle that one ought to respect other people's rights refers to the fact that one ought to respect them, and facts exist independently of one's awareness of them."

You replied,

I agree that there is a fact that one ought to respect "them". What's "them"? Rights? But then your statement would be "rights refer to the fact that one out to respect rights". How about freedoms?

Yes -- "freedoms." That would avoid the circularity.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/07, 9:44am)

Post 85

Wednesday, November 7, 2007 - 1:03pm

My summary statement on rights:

I think a lot of the confusion here could be resolved by taking Rand's clear definition of rights at face value, and then regarding her other statements about rights (e.g., "conditions of existence...," "...means of subordinating society to moral law," etc.) as descriptive amplifications, or as explanations of the various benefits of a rights principle.

So many confusions and problems simply evaporate if we view rights as she said: as "moral sanctions" of certain kinds of actions in social contexts -- as principles that we formulate from the factual requirements of human nature (e.g., the life-serving need for freedom of action), but which we need to understand, recognize, and apply thoughtfully and contextually.

Let me offer a slight reformulation of Rand's "rights" definition that might add some clarity here:

"Rights" are extensions and applications of the moral principles of rational self-interest that define and sanction man's freedom of action in social contexts.

If we view rights that way, then we'd have a securely "natural" grounding of the rights principle, while we'd simultaneously avoid intrinsicism and all its attendant problems. We'd realize that, as moral principles rather than some inherent qualities of human nature, "rights" are not ends in themselves, but means to an end: means to securing the ultimate value, human life, in social contexts.

If "rights" are intrinsic, however -- if they "just are" -- then they exist on a separate moral track from "self-interest." Both become primary, independent, and competing moral considerations and guides to our actions. There is the tug of self-interest; then there's this competing tug of "rights," like some categorical imperative.

But this conflict is untenable. It means that we often will be forced to choose between protecting someone's "inherent" rights, or instead, acting in our own self-interest. How do we choose? If rights are something everyone "has," then they cannot be forfeited. Ever. You can't forfeit an intrinsic fact of nature.

So, for example, under the "intrinsic rights" concept, when attacked from Afghanistan by al Qaeda on 9/11, we cannot retaliate if we will violate the "inherent rights" of innocent Afghan civilians who might be harmed. This means we must adopt instead a policy of pacifistic self-sacrifice in the face of such aggressors, lest we violate "the inherent rights of innocent bystanders."

Again: Under intrinsic rights theory, self-interest and rights are on a collision course, because they are on totally separate moral tracks: either "rights" must trump self-interest, or self-interest is to be purchased at the price of "violating rights."

Viewing rights as a moral principle, not as an inherent natural essence or quality, gets us out of that dilemma. We'd see "rights" as principled social applications, extensions, and manifestations of the morality of rational self-interest -- not as something existing independently of rational self-interest. Thus, any application of the rights principle that would require self-sacrifice, or that would protect social predators, etc., cannot in logic be a proper application of that moral principle.

By analogy, applying rights is like applying the moral principle of honesty. Honesty doesn't just "exist." It's a moral principle that WE draw, consciously and rationally, from the facts of reality, and that we then apply. Yes, the human need for such a principle can be demonstrated factually and objectively. But that doesn't mean "honesty" is some inherent quality of humans. Honesty is a moral principle based on the human requirement of a policy of maintaining a rational fact-focus, in order to serve human life. Viewed as a life-serving moral principle, honesty can't be viewed and applied acontextually, as an end in itself, regardless of context or consequence. It is no longer a moral principle that serves life if the Nazis come to your door and say, "Where are your kids?" -- and you think, "Well, the principle of honesty demands that I don't lie; I must tell them the truth, no matter what."

It's the same with the moral principle of rights. Just as you don't apply "honesty" as a metaphysical absolute, contrary to its life-serving context, you have to apply "rights" in the same way: contextually, to support the value of human life.

The rights principle defines and sanctions how freedom is to be utilized in social contexts, establishing what the proper boundaries of human freedom of action are. When we say, "you have rights," we mean: "You have the moral sanction to act freely in this context, to this extent; and that moral sanction arises from every human's natural need for freedom to act in support of his life. However, you do NOT have the moral sanction (right) to initiate forcible, destructive actions against others; you can do that ONLY in self-defense."

Because the rights principle (like the principle of honesty) doesn't exist metaphysically on its own, but must be recognized and rationally applied, then those who do not recognize and adhere to that moral principle cannot claim its protection. For the same reason that the immoral Nazis at the door can't claim that you owe them the moral principle of honesty, those who reject and violate the moral principle and sanction of "rights" cannot simultaneously claim its protection. They forfeit their rights (their moral sanction) to act in violation of the implications of that principle.

Thus, when we say someone has a "right to life," we mean he has a principled moral sanction to act to pursue his rational self-interest in social contexts. But the person forfeits that moral sanction to act if he negates and rejects that foundational principle by infringing upon the freedom of action of others to do likewise. If he wishes to repudiate the rights principle by acting violently, then he has forfeited any claim to the protection of the rights principle, and the rest of us can defend ourselves by responding to him with violence.

Extending further: Hostage situations involve the hostage-taker's negation of the moral principle of rights by infringing on our freedom to act in support of our lives. When he does so, the principle of rights no longer applies to the circumstances.. He has forced us into a situation whereby we can no longer pursue our lives and self-interest without harming an innocent person or persons. The hostage-taker pits our lives and well-being against the hostage's -- by force. This makes civilized, life-serving social relationships impossible. Morality no longer applies, because there is no moral alternative.

The only moral thing we can do in such circumstances is to end the hostage situation by whatever means are required. Just as the hostage(s) cannot exist as a slave to the hostage-taker, we cannot exist as slaves to his extortion -- a scheme in which he counts on our helping him and sacrificing ourselves in order to spare the hostage. That is an intolerable alternative. So, if we are forced to harm or kill the hostage(s) in order to end this state of affairs, we literally have no moral choice: Morality ends at the point of a gun.

Extending still further: This same reasoning is the basis for defensive war, even those that threaten or harm the lives of innocent non-combatants. If an aggressor nation or terrorist group threatens our lives and well-being, the moral principle of rights no longer applies to them or to the situation. The aggressor has forced us from a context of principled (rights-based) self-interest to one of primitive, survivalist self-interest. If we do not fight back, for fear of harming innocents, we will die. Their survival comes at the price of our own self-sacrifice. Again, this coercive context makes any truly moral alternative impossible: The alternatives are between death (innocent civilians) and death (us).

Since rights are "a moral concept" and "a moral principle," and since there is no moral (life-serving) alternative at the point of an aggressor's gun, the principle of rights no longer applies on the battlefield. The goal of a defensive war is to stop the aggressor by any necessary means, in order to return society to operating on civilized (rights-based) principles.

I hope that fleshes out the context of my understanding of the rights principle. It arises from our rational recognition of "absolute" facts of nature -- man's requirement of liberty; and it must be recognized and applied "absolutely" in the appropriate social contexts, if human life is the end. But the rights concept is not metaphysically absolute, as some fact or quality existing independently in nature. Viewed that way, the concept collapses into incoherence, dilemmas, and moral paradoxes that render it useless as a moral guide to human lives in society.

Post 86

Wednesday, November 7, 2007 - 5:05pm

Dean,

What is a "human being"?

Look in the mirror.

How did "human beings" get the attribute of having the "Rights" you speak of?

The same way grass got the attribute of being green. It's actually not an attribute though, but a relation. If you hold a ball up and let go -- it falls. That's gravity. Gravity, something which can't be seen or heard (but still somehow exists), relates objects to one another -- objectively and naturally.

Humans have right relations, too. Humans are a type of thing which needs some exercise of something that's been called "I-N-D-I-V-I-D-U-A-L R-I-G-H-T-S". It's something humans require to flourish (just like flowers required water and sunlight to bloom).

Is having such "Rights" part of your definition of "human being"?

No. The proper definition of human being is "actual individual animal with potential rationality."

You have been a Rationalist on this topic.

I think that what you mean to say is that if I could not have effectively answered your questions above -- which I just did -- then that would make me rationalistic on this matter (by believing in "weird" things floating around called "rights"). Am I right?

... lets debate about what sort of action we should take in the situation. This "Rights" stuff is rationalistic garbage.

I disagree. And I'd call you too Existentialist about rights, Dean. Keep in mind, I did give real world outcomes though (regarding toys, rapes, and wars).

What do you think of them, Dean?

Ed

Post 87

Wednesday, November 7, 2007 - 8:53pm

This has been a great discussion, (too bad I am showing up.)

While following this discussion I have been sympathetic to both sides.

The pitfalls of the �rights as metaphysical� side are well taken, example: one couldn�t shoot through a hostage to save oneself from a bad guy shooting at oneself.

The �rights as metaphysical� side has not mentioned any pitfalls of the other side. One such pitfall came to mind when I read this paragraph from Joe�s post 83:

�If rights are a moral concept, they're going to be relational as well. The[y�]re informing us of what kinds of actions are appropriate, and those are appropriate because of the values the[y] achieve. We respect the freedom of others because their freedom benefits us. It does so first because it makes it more likely that our own freedom will be secure. And also, because there is a harmony of interests between rational men, and we benefit from others living their lives effectively, through trade, education, etc.�

This made me think of unwanted babies. Should we respect their rights? Do they even have any?

On the �rights as metaphysical� side, I think of Tibor Machan�s argument: A baby, (even prior to birth) has the brain wiring responsible for rationality, therefore a baby is a human being, therefore a baby has rights. My apologies to Tibor if I have this wrong, or if he would�nt want to be lumped in with the �rights as metaphysical� side of this debate, but his appears to be a metaphysical, (or maybe just physical,) argument. Meaning, even if some other argument is made for rights as such, this issue of whether babies are �in the family� of those possessive of rights is settled by appealing to a metaphysical, (or maybe just physical,) argument.
Joe�s angle, on the other hand, as I gather from the paragraph above, would need to appeal to whether respecting the rights of babies �benefits us.� Deciding whether or not babies have rights would depend upon a calculation of the �values achieved� by babies having rights versus their not.

So, babies have or do not have rights because they have this or that metaphysical qualification, versus: Babies have or do not have rights pending the outcome of a calculation of what they can do for me if they have rights compared to what they can do for me if they don�t.

From Joe�s post 82:
�In general, moral principles show us how to achieve values through certain means, by explaining the causal relationship. But the range of possible values vary in degree. And sometimes, the costs are so significant, that you recognize that the value you'd gain through this process is not worth it. Take rights. The value in respecting the rights of a human shield that protects a psychopath about to kill all your loved ones and yourself still exists. There is value there. But the costs completely outweigh it. By recognizing the causal relationship, we can see make this kind of judgement, and decide to not take use the means to achieve that value.�

Applying this to unwanted babies; �there is value there.� Afterall, the baby could grow up and invent cheap, clean, renewable energy�which would benefit me greatly. But is that wishful thought really worth it? What if what I want is a population of cheap human subjects to medically experiment with? What if I have already discovered, patented, and become rich by several blockbuster drugs this way and my next venture is to give a bunch of donated, unwanted babies cancer and test the safety and efficacy of an anti-tumor compound on them?

The self-interest benefit of deciding against this course are that maybe the baby will trade with me some day, to my benefit. But look at the costs! All those prematurely dead adults (not to mention my billions of $) who could have benefited from experimentation!

(Before you say that my self-interest is best served by respecting the babies� right to their lives because many adults will come after me and hurt me for experimenting on babies, remember that the question is: are they morally right to do so? (They are, only if unwanted, donated babies have rights.) The question is: which of the competing notions of rights on this thread deals with that question best: The one that defers to some type of �they�re in the family of rights possessors, per this metaphysical argument� or the one that defers to a calculation of benefits?)

Post 88

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 6:44am

Jon,

It's an appropriate series of questions you raise, but I think you define the alternatives wrongly. You set up this as an alternative:

The question is: which of the competing notions of rights on this thread deals with that question best: The one that defers to some type of �they�re in the family of rights possessors, per this metaphysical argument� or the one that defers to a calculation of benefits?

Neither of these alternatives describes the position that I have put forth.

Let's cut to the chase with your example of "unwanted children." Assume you mean a familiar example of the baby abandoned on someone's doorstep. Does that baby, which cannot yet grasp or consciously exercise rights, "have" rights that must be respected? And, if so, to what extent do those rights impose obligations on others?

If we begin our analysis of rights as I do -- not by positing something called "rights" in nature, but a principle that we fashion from facts of nature -- then our rights principle must incorporate the biological facts of human development. Here's how I would present those considerations:

Fact: To pursue life and well-being in society, humans need to recognize a principle that sanctions their freedom to do so without interference.

Fact: The moral purpose of the rights concept is to extend and apply the moral principles of rational self-interest to social contexts, to define and sanction every individual's free pursuit of his life and well-being.

Fact: Humans are not born with fully formed conceptual faculties and abilities; those require years of biological development.

Fact: Because rights (moral sanctions to exist and act freely in society) are moral principles, requiring conceptual-level functioning to recognize and apply, full rights cannot be attributed to children, because they lack that conceptual ability to understand and apply rights.

Fact: However, the failure to recognize any rights in children until their conceptual abilities were fully formed would mean that no humans possess a moral sanction to exist and act in society (rights) until maturity.

Fact: This would mean a conception of rights that permitted the killing of any and all humans before their maturity.

Conclusion 1: This conception of rights contradicts the moral purpose of the rights concept, stated at the outset -- and hence, it cannot be a valid conception of rights.

Conclusion 2: A valid conception of a principle of individual rights must incorporate the biological fact that human conceptual consciousness develops and matures over time.

Conclusion 3: Therefore, at minimum, a basic "right to life" (moral sanction to live) must be recognized in children if any humans are to survive to adulthood and exercise their full rights.

Observe that none of these considerations imply that "rights are inherent" in the metaphysical sense. Rather, they are logical implications of each human being's basic requirement of freedom of action in society in order to further his life. That moral end -- individual life and well-being -- determines the universal human need for a principle that defines and sanctions such freedom of action; but the facts about how human consciousness develops gradually throughout childhood must determine how and when such rights are to be fully recognized and exercised.

The existence of a basic "right to life" (moral sanction to exist and act for one's own sake) therefore must be applied contextually. The biological facts of childhood must shape how rights apply to children.

By contrast, an intrinsicist, "inherent rights" concept allows for no such contextual considerations. If "rights" are something you "just have," how can anyone determine when you have them fully? Or do you have full rights from birth? or even from conception? And if so, then aren't the anti-abortionists correct in saying that abortion is murder? And aren't the predatory creeps from NAMBLA correct in claiming that a six-year-old has the "right" to have sex with an adult? And -- as a more common belief -- don't all children have a positive, legally enforceable right to be cared for by society as a whole, in cases of parental neglect or abandonment? How can the notion of intrinsic (metaphysical) rights deal with such questions? The answer: It can't -- not coherently, and not in a manner consistent with a morality of rational self-interest.

Given the facts of childhood development, in logic, all babies and small children have a basic right (moral sanction) to live, which imposes negative obligations on others: No one has the right to abuse, harm, or kill babies and children once they are born and achieve biological independence from their mothers.

The trickier question becomes: Because of their natural biological dependency on adults throughout childhood development, do children have a positive "right" to be taken care of and nurtured to adulthood? Meaning: Are adults obligated to care for babies and children?

The answer is easy when it comes to their biological or legal parents: Yes. Implicit in the decision to become parents is causal responsibility for the consequences of one's actions -- namely, responsibility for the creation of a dependent human life. From that causally derived responsibility, a parent has a positive moral/legal obligation to maintain the life of his offspring.

The answer is emotionally harder in the case of abandoned or neglected children -- certainly for all those who cherish human life. If biological/legal parents are not present to maintain their own child's life, does the child's "right to life" imply a positive moral/legal obligation on the part of other adults (or adult society generally) to maintain that child?

I would have to answer: No.

Throughout the world, countless millions of children are neglected or abandoned. If each adult had a positive, legally enforceable obligation to care for every such child, that obligation would impinge on our own abilities to pursue our own interests, live our own lives -- even support our own children. Those unchosen burdens would put every self-responsible adult at the mercy of every irresponsible parent around the world -- thus encouraging irresponsibility: the neglect or abandonment of one's children to "society." Why bother providing for your own kids if you can palm that responsibility off onto others?

Now, I do not for a moment believe that by rejecting any legal "right" for children to be maintained by any adults other than their parents, millions of neglected or abandoned children will die in the streets. The very fact that this issue is so often raised indignantly as a challenge to the Objectivist conception of children's rights tells us that concern for children's well-being is almost universal. The existence of innumerable child-welfare laws, agencies, and programs reflects this widespread concern. Indeed, virtually any proposed law or program, no matter how pernicious, can secure passage if it is framed as being "for the children."

In reality, then, the issue is moot: There are, and will always be, many adults willing to step in and care for neglected or abandoned kids. Laws that force non-parents to assume the responsibility of parenthood for such children are not only unnecessary, they are downright destructive to the principle of individual rights per se. No one is free if the law puts his life, time, and money at the mercy of the actions (e.g., sexual/parental irresponsibility) of others.

To conclude: I think that Jon posits a false alternative which, closely considered, seems to be the old intrinsicist/subjectivist one: either the recognition of "metaphysical" rights -- or the personal application of some cost/benefit calculus as to whether to treat babies and children as disposable commodities.

A truly principled understanding of rights would allow us to apply the concept contextually, incorporating our understanding of the developmental stages of human life, and thus affording appropriate moral/legal protections to children as well as to adults.

(Edited by Robert Bidinotto on 11/08, 8:05am)

Post 89

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 5:25am

What difference does it make if rights are "intrinsic" or if rights are a "moral concept," since in the end "rights" are irrelevant?

Please excuse my impertinent question. I�m new to the forum. I don�t know the protocol around here. Therefore, if you find my question or comments do not advance the discussion, you certainly have the right to ignore them.

I am not a philosopher. I am strictly a blue-collar thinker. However, as I read this excellent thread, the question above occurred to me. Allow me to explain.

A man sitting in prison in society "X" may claim he has the "right" to liberty. He may claim this "right" is intrinsic in his humanity. Or he may claim that this "right" is a moral concept. However, in the end, this man will remain in prison without liberty until society (through its individual minions) unlocks the cell door. If society fails to unlock the door, the prisoner will complain to deaf ears that his "right" to liberty (whether intrinsic or moral) is being violated.

If society unlocks the door, the prisoner will contend to his own satisfaction that his "right" to liberty has been appropriately recognized. In truth society "X" may have incarcerated the man and released him or not for reasons totally political or pedestrian having nothing whatsoever to do with rights.

Which occasions another question: If, in each and every case, society has the ability to trump an individual�s intrinsic or moral "right to whatever," i.e., if our claim of the "right to whatever" is simply wishful thinking in the face of society�s exclusive power to provide or not provide whatever, why is it correct to think that God, humanity or morality are the sources of our "rights" and not society itself?

Post 90

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 7:49am

Jon,

The pitfalls of the �rights as metaphysical� side are well taken, example: one couldn�t shoot through a hostage to save oneself from a bad guy shooting at oneself.

That's wrong (see my emergency "lifeboat" example of expediency trumping rights).

Ed

Post 91

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 8:01am

Sherman,

You bring up a good question -- the question of society. Rand disparagingly called it "social metaphysics" when folks took society as the last word for anything. Heck, she didn't even regard society as a metaphysical essential (it's just a number of individuals interacting -- not a separate thing; even if we have a "name" for it).

The reason it's right to think about rights as inherent has to do with the identity of humans. Dropped rocks fall according to nature "working" through gravity; an invariable relationship between objects. Slaved human beings fail to thrive for just-as-essential, just-as-metaphysical reasons.

Things cannot act in discordance with their nature. Rocks can't float in thin air, and humans can't thrive without some exercise of the rights that they have in virtue of being human. It's an example of Identity prescribing right action for a thing (in this case, humans).

Ed

Post 92

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 8:07am

I have a question for those who regard a right as simply a moral principle that does not exist independently of human cognition. Before this moral principle was conceptualized, grasped and understood, was slavery wrong? -- did it violate the slaves' right to freedom of action?

If your answer is "no," then how was slavery identified as wrong, if it wasn't wrong before that identification? If your answer is "yes," then how can you claim that a right is simply a moral principle that does not exist independently of human cognition?

Sherman Broder also has a question: "If, in each and every case, society has the ability to trump an individual�s intrinsic or moral 'right to whatever,' i.e., if our claim of the 'right to whatever' is simply wishful thinking in the face of society�s exclusive power to provide or not provide whatever, why is it correct to think that God, humanity or morality are the sources of our 'rights' and not society itself?"

In Atlas Shrugged, Rand's hero John Galt states:

The source of man's rights is not divine law or congressional law, but the law of identity. A is A -- and Man is Man. Rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival. If man is to live on earth, it is right for him to use his mind, it is right to act on his own free judgment, it is right to work for his values and to keep the product of his work. If life on earth is his purpose, he has a right to live as a rational being;: nature forbids him the irrational. Any group, any gang, any nation that attempts to negate man's rights, is wrong, which means: is evil, which means: is anti-life. (p. 1061)

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/08, 9:22am)

Post 93

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 9:07am

Bill, slavery was wrong on the grounds of its complete negation of individual rational self-interest.

The concept of "rights" is secondary -- a social application of the ethics of rational self-interest. The concept of rights generalizes, in the form of a principle, the freedoms that man needs to pursue his self-interest in society, and that are negated by slavery.

Slavery is wrong because it is not to a man's best interests to practice a predatory lifestyle, or to encourage and live in a predatory society. A "dog-eat-dog" or "law of the jungle" society destroys the possibility of private property, thus capital accumulation, thus production, thus a division of labor, and thus and trade to everyone's mutual benefit. Slavery constrains human interaction to the level of animals in a food chain, thus inhibiting human progress, well-being, and long-term happiness.

Note that I said nothing about "rights" in describing the evil of slavery. The principle of rights was formulated based on human recognition of such facts about the social requirements of rational self-interest. It was formulated because men needed principles to set social boundary lines in order to prevent such social destruction and law-of-the-jungle behavior.

Violating or rejecting the principle that each person has a moral sanction, or right, to live his own life can be understood as evading a summation of the facts about the destruction involved. When we say "slavery violates human rights," we really mean: "Slavery negates the freedom of men to pursue and maximize their lives, well-being, and happiness."

To emphasize: The "wrongness" of slavery, at root, is not that it violates some metaphysical essence called "rights," but that it leads to destruction of human life, well-being, and happiness. Slavery negates each man's rational self-interest. That's the underlying evil -- not the "violation of the rights principle," in and of itself.

Moral principles, like rights, do not exist in nature and are not ends in themselves; they are means to an end, to protecting a value: human life. Slavery isn't wrong primarily because it violates some innate moral essence called "rights," but because it destroys the primary value of human life.

Post 94

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 9:16am

Robert,

We agree that if, by whatever argument rights for babies can be established, then those would be only negative ones: the right to not be abused, placed in dumpsters, etc.

The question is: Can rights be established for babies exclusively by an appeal to the self-interest of we adults?

You wrote:
�Fact: This would mean a conception of rights that permitted the killing of any and all humans before their maturity.�

And:
�Conclusion 3: Therefore, at minimum, a basic "right to life" (moral sanction to live) must be recognized in children if any humans are to survive to adulthood and exercise their full rights.�

Is this a fair summary of your attempt to establish rights for babies?�

If we don�t acknowledge rights for babies, none of us would be here. Is this a �let�s check it for universability� argument�We all want to be here, so we logically must recognize rights for babies?

Post 95

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 9:48am

Robert Bidinotto wrote:

Note that I said nothing about "rights" in describing the evil of slavery.

No, but you did say "slavery is wrong", i.e. slavery is not right. And "evil" means "morally wrong" or "morally not right". Moreover, "right" in this sense is linked to "rights" by Ayn Rand, as show by Dwyer's quote in #92.

Edit: That which Dwyer quoted, minus the last sentence, is also in Man's Rights.

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 11/08, 10:32am)

Post 96

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 10:03am

Bill,

I like what it is that you proposed in post #92 -- i.e., a challenge to those thinking rights are things (attributes, actions, relations) only existing after certain thoughts have been performed by certain humans -- rather than things existing independently of performed thoughts (or, to put it more bluntly, as metaphysically-existing things, per se; rather than things that wouldn't have existed if certain humans hadn't had certain thoughts about certain things).

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 11/08, 10:07am)

Post 97

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 10:04am

Jon writes:

The question is: Can rights be established for babies exclusively by an appeal to the self-interest of we adults?

I'd challenge that formulation. It's a mistake to say that we establish rights for babies solely by appealing to our self-interest as adults. "Self-interest" does not kick in to apply only when we become adults; it's part and parcel of our whole lifespan. Babies have basic rights (moral sanctions to exist and act) from birth, because they are humans at an early stage of development who need the freedom to mature, grow, and pursue their interests and well-being in society. Their rights to exercise that freedom expand over time, along with their physical and cognitive self-mastery. As they become more and more self-responsible, they are accorded a broader scope of rights.

Post 98

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 10:40am

Robert, you wrote,

Bill, slavery was wrong on the grounds of its complete negation of individual rational self-interest.

So, you acknowledge that slavery was wrong even before it was recognized as wrong. Would you say, then, that the wrongness of an action exists independently of man's recognition of it? And if you would, then why not say that the violation of a right exists independently of man's recognition of it?

(Of course, by "a right" I don't mean an intrinsic right that exists independently of man's rational self-interest, any more than by "the wrongness of an action," I mean an intrinsic wrong that exists independently of man's rational self-interest.)

To be sure, the wrongness of an action is identified by recognizing that it violates a moral principle, but that doesn't mean that its wrongness depends on that identification. Similarly, the violation of a right is identified by recognizing that it violates a moral principle, but that doesn't mean that its violation depends on that identification.

- Bill

Post 99

Thursday, November 8, 2007 - 12:25pm