Getting the right Rights right.

Ditto: ".., he has a right to live as a rational being: nature forbids him the irrational."

Post 21

Friday, November 2, 2007 - 8:10pm

Proof that Rand viewed rights as having an objective, independent existence -- i.e., something not dependent on a man's "thought" or a man's "thinking":

Some of the Declaration's journalistic allusions are not relevant today, but its principles are: above all, the concept of individual rights. There is, however, one minor fault on the level of fundamentals: the idea that men are endowed with rights by their Creator rather than by Nature.

From:
The Ford Hall Forum (Ayn Rand Answers), 1972

Recap:
Man has rights by "Nature" -- not by "thinking correctly" about social relationships (note the emphasizing capitalization of "Nature" here).

... and ...

Observe that the philosophical system based on the axiom of the primacy of existence (i.e., on recognizing the absolutism of reality) led to the recognition of man's ... rights.

From:
"The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made" (PWNI), 1973

Recap:
Rights are independent, objective existents; i.e., really existing things to be recognized (or not) -- they are not dependent, individual "products" of some logical human thought about social relationships.

In other words, rights "just are" (at least according to Rand's matured view on them).

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 11/02, 8:12pm)

Post 22

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 9:06am

Of course, it is always possible that if you say �rights are part of man�s nature,� some people might seize on this formulation, along with other ideas from Objectivism, and advocate some form of intrinsicism. But a thoughtful person keeping in mind the full context of Ayn Rand�s argument could not misunderstand, because this manner of expression with this meaning is everywhere in human thought, and has considerable epistemological justification. I only have time to explain this with a list of points as follows:

1. When we say that rights are part of human nature, we are conceiving them as a quality possessed by the individual, even when not granted/recognized. Now, quality is a very general thing�something that may be �said of� something. It does not mean that that quality is a material thing or entity, and it does not mean that it cannot involve a relationship. And even the concept of relationship is extremely general.

2. A quality, for example, can be in some manner contingent, a potential, another very wide term. We may say that a substance is volatile or poisonous, even though it is sitting on a shelf in an empty room doing nothing.

3. This is not just a matter of language, of idiom. The fact is that whenever an entity has effects that we perceive, the cause of those effects is attributed to the entity by conceiving of it as an attribute of that entity. Suppose you have a visitor, and she asks you the color of the vase in your bedroom. Would you answer that it does not have any color, because no one is looking at it? No, the word �color� means and has always meant something that the vase has, not something that comes into being only when you see it. The actual experience of color in our awareness does indeed depend upon our perceptive apparatus, but that need not stand in the way of the concept of color as something that inheres in the vase: its full definition might be �that attribute of the vase which causes a sensation of redness.� Ayn Rand herself warned, in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, against insisting on such a distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

4. An analogous issue arises as follows. Suppose you have a pain in your finger. Would you hold that the pain is not really in your finger, but in your brain? I don�t think that an Objectivist would or should. The scientific explanation of pain tells you why you have the pain in your finger. Any other approach to concepts of this kind will lead to endless confusion, the kind we see in intellectuals today.

5. If a tree falls in a lonely forest, are its leaves still green? Any reasonable handling of concepts says the answer is yes.

6. If a tree falls in a lonely forest, does it make a sound? This question is a bit more complicated, because sound is an effect of the tree�s action, and not a quality of the tree. Even here, however, the conventional negative answer is somewhat debatable. Sound is inescapably thought of as something we perceive, not something we create with our sensory apparatus. Suppose you are a long distance from the tree, but you can still hear it fall faintly. Now suppose you are even farther. You would say that the sound is fainter. Now suppose that the tree is so far away that you cannot hear the crash no matter how hard you listen. Of course, you might say that you cannot hear the crash or the sound is so faint as to be inaudible. (If you said �There is no sound,� you might mean there is no sound that you can hear.) In such case, the sound is thought of as an effect out there in reality, not a mental construct. If you want to use another concept of sound that necessitates a hearer being present, you can also do that. But most of the time there is no need to make such a distinction, especially since everybody knows that sound involves perception. People move between the two ideas with ease.

As I said earlier, since Ayn Rand, like everyone else, sometimes uses words in slightly different (but always related) senses�even in the same discussion (I explain one instance of this in my Lulu.com essay Understanding Imaginaries Through Hidden Numbers)�it is necessary to keep in mind the context and purpose of any statement. And most of the time, honest thinkers do not pounce on a seeming contradiction without doing so, or insist upon a certain usage that is more in line with their own particular and preoccupations and concerns.

Sorry for participating in this discussion, since I cannot continue past this point.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 11/03, 9:10am)

Post 23

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 9:14am

If you're in the jungle, and a wild lion is about to attack you, try telling it that you're endowed with rights, including the right to life. The concept "rights" is meaningless outside of a human social context. The law of the jungle does not include rights; the laws of man, on the other hand, are all about defining individual rights in various social contexts. Rights do not exist in nature; they only exist under man-made social contracts.

What Rand has done, via her hierarchy, is to identify the rights that a human being should be entitled to in a rational, moral society. Obviously, the first and foremost right, without which other rights are meaningless, is the right to life. Consequently, Rand's poltical philosophy is based on the implications of an individual's right to his own life in a social context.

Post 24

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 9:19am

Ronald: Of course!

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 9:50am

You can convey that you believe you have a right to life by defending yourself agaisnt the lion, against nature etc.

Survival and the choices one makes are based on something that "is" exsistent in man : I live , I will work and fight to live. Not ," I desire to live", but , "I deserve (have a right) to live (value) at all cost" There is no "choice". "I don't deserve (have a right) to live (the value of my life is such that I choose to end my right to live.) My choice (value judgement) based on my right to my life is consistent and based on an exsistent in man alone. Right ? : D
Sound vibrations are, whether there are receptors or not.)))))))

(Edited by Gigi P Morton on 11/03, 10:32am)

Post 26

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 10:27am

You can convey the belief that you believe you have a right to life by defending yourself agaisnt the lion, against nature etc.

No - you merely have a desire for life, the same as the lion... "There are no rights at the waterhole", to use an old familiar phrase - only among conceptual beings does the issue of rights accrue, as the issue is one of sapiency, not sentiency....

Post 27

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 4:42pm

Ed Thompson wrote, "And rights just are...." To which Bob Bidinotto replied,

Ed, that statement summarizes perfectly the erroneous, traditional, intrinsicist "natural rights" view of the Founders, who believed that some metaphysical essences called "rights" exist as a kind of indelible stuff within human nature.

That was not Rand's view of rights. She described rights as "moral principles defining and sanctioning man's freedom of action in a social context." Rights, then, are a subset of morality: moral principles to be specifically applied to social relationships.

True.

But principles are not things, and moral principles do not exist as facts of nature. Rather, they are human identifications of natural, factual relationships.

Bob, I wouldn't say that a right is an identification of a factual relationship. As you've indicated, a right is a moral principle, and moral principles are simply forms of conduct required by man's nature for his proper survival. Those requirements exist regardless of whether or not anyone identifies them. Even if no one were to identify man's survival requirements, they would still exist. Human beings didn't create rights; they discovered them, and you can't discover something unless it already exists.

The idea that the moral principles of rights "just are" is no more intelligible or defensible than saying that any other moral principles, like honesty or integrity, "just are."

Well, the fact that one ought to be honest and the fact that one ought to practice the virtue of integrity "just are," wouldn't you say? They exist as moral requirements even if no one recognizes them.

The facts that give rise to principles certainly exist in nature; but principles themselves are not existents. Likewise, the factual requirements of human nature (food, water, freedom, etc.) "just are," and they are thus metaphysically absolute; but the moral principles themselves (rights) are not existents, either.

In Atlas Shrugged, Galt states, "Rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival." (Rand's emphasis) Those conditions are metaphysically absolute, as is the fact that they ought to be respected. Therefore, I think we can say that, according to Objectivism, rights are metaphysically absolute. As for a right's not being an existent, on Page 5 of ITOE, Rand defines an "existent" as "something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action." I would say that a right is "something that exists" and is therefore an existent. Of course, a right is not some kind of metaphysical essence or indelible stuff that exists within each person.

The moral principles governing human relationships (rights) must be held and applied absolutely -- IF the goal is to further human life and well-being. But holding and applying moral principles "absolutely" is not the same thing as saying that the principles themselves exist in nature as "absolutes." That latter, traditional, platonic/intrinsicist conception of rights is precisely what Rand challenged and rejected.

Well, the concept of rights doesn't exist in nature independently of human recognition, nor does the recognition of one's obligation not to initiate force. But the obligation itself does exist, even if no one recognizes it. To say that one is obligated to respect the rights of others is simply to say that if the requirements of human survival are to be met, then one must abstain from physical aggression. That condition exists as a fact of reality independently of anyone's identification.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/03, 4:53pm)

(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/03, 4:54pm)

Post 28

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 5:56pm

I don't know what most of the people on this thread thinks the point of this discussion is. It comes off as mere semantics. We all recognize that the concept of rights is somehow rooted in our nature as human beings, that there are facts of reality that we base this off of, and it isn't merely arbitrary. But is this simply an argument over the best wording to describe something?

So far, I think Robert Bidinotto has made the strongest/only argument that there is actually a difference between how people understand these rights and how it will work in practice. I'll try to summarize my understanding, and hopefully not misstate his position.

If you view rights as an intrinsic quality, or some metaphysical facts, it will lead you to a different application. From the original post Ed cited, you will tend to be drawn towards anarchism and non-interventionism. You'll view rights as a context-free phenomena, and any violations of those rights as being immoral and criminal. So while defending your country from a murdering dictator, if you happen to kill some innocent civilians, you are guilty of murder. You have violated their rights. In this view, rights are like moral rules, where you have to obey them in any situation, or you are immoral.

Robert proposes a contextual view of rights instead. Rights, qua moral principles, are not context-free rules that we obey. They're guides to living on earth. They are recognitions of facts of reality. But more specifically, they are an identification of a cause and effect relationship.

Bill mentions moral principles are simply forms of conduct. I disagree. I think they are the recognition of cause and effect, a form of identity. Honesty is not simply not telling a lie. It's a recognition of the connection between the truth and the possibility of pursuing values, and how distorting our understanding of reality is not an effective way to achieve success.

Given this contextual view of rights as moral principles, we can understand that it is in our interests to protect and respect the individual liberty of each person, but that interest is contextual. It doesn't apply to people who don't respect our rights. It doesn't trump our own self-interest. If to defend our lives, such as defending against a murdering dictator, innocent people will die, we have to live with it and defend our lives. It's a bad situation, but morality is not always performed in ideal situations. And we can work to avoid these kinds of situations by opposing dictators before they put us in the position to have to choose.

Again, if this discussion is anything more than a semantic game, there should be real consequences to the particular positions.

For instance, in Ed's first post, he says that if you witness a rape in a situation where there is no police or civilization, it's okay to "off" the rapist. But his wording is informative. He says "there are situations were[sic] you do wrong -- but you do wrong in a humanly way". This is clearly the intrinsic view of rights. While the decision is considered the best choice, it's still being viewed as a moral wrong. Morality is being pitted against self-interest, and the latter is being written off as a necessary evil. This follows from the view that rights "just are", and the implication that morality demands we not violate them. The moral principle itself is treated as a moral rule, which is what happens when the value is treated as intrinsic instead of contextual.

There may be some argument over what part is being offered as intrinsic. Certainly our requirements for living could be called inherent to our nature. But that doesn't translate directly to the view that we should protect or respect rights. That requires an understanding of our actual interests, and how a recognition that other people have these same requirements, and that promoting them is usually a promotion of our own interests. It's a recognition of a moral principle, of a cause and effect. But if we instead believe that these requirements have some kind of intrinsic value that compels us, via morality, to respect the liberty of other people, we drop all context and raise the intrinsic value of rights above the value of our own lives. And this is exactly where a difference in practice will occur.

Post 29

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 6:29pm

Okay, Joe -- rights "just are" contextually. :-) In other words, they "exist" within a given context and not in other contexts (e.g., in a life-and-death emergency).

You wrote,

Bill mentions moral principles are simply forms of conduct. I disagree.
Just to be clear, I said they are "forms of conduct required by mans' nature for his proper survival."
I think they are the recognition of cause and effect, a form of identity. Honesty is not simply not telling a lie. It's a recognition of the connection between the truth and the possibility of pursuing values, and how distorting our understanding of reality is not an effective way to achieve success.

A true grasp of the virtue of honesty would entail a recognition of the fact that distorting our understanding is not an effective way to achieve success. But, if you view moral principles as requiring human recognition, then where they're not recognized (i.e., identified), they don't exist, in which case, there is no requirement that they be followed. Do you really want to say that?

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/03, 6:41pm)

Post 30

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 7:28pm

Bill, as I said, we all agree that these conditions for living are real. So I'm not sure what you mean by saying that if they aren't recognized, there is no requirement to respect them. That would seem to imply that they are just convention or subjective opinion. But our choice isn't between subjectivism and intrinsicism.

Let's try a different example. Take a look at some of the virtues. Take honesty. Does honesty just exist? Is it just out there (even contextually)? Well, the facts that give rise to it may be. Even if you don't recognize that faking reality is not an effective way to gain values, the underlying reality will affect you. But that's not enough. To live effectively, you have to recognize the principle. It's only when you recognize it that you can act accordingly.

Each virtue requires a similar recognition. It's true of any moral principle. They aren't simply subjective opinions about how we should behave. They are recognitions of facts of reality.

As I said, there isn't a question of whether or not there are underlying facts in these cases, or in the case of rights. In each case, the moral principle consists in understanding these facts, and understanding the cause and effect relationship between those and the pursuit of our lives.

Now what do we do with these identifications? With honesty, we use it to recognize that a commitment to reality is our best means of gaining value. In the case of rights, we recognize that securing and respecting the individual liberty of people in general is in our interests.

But the point is that we use these recognitions in pursuit of our own lives. We don't simply obey them as rules from the gods. By recognizing the causal connections involved, we use them as guides. They're tools for pursuing our lives, not rules to sacrifice our lives to.

So even if we recognize these moral principles, they is no "requirement to respect them". We respect them because they promote our lives, and we respect them to that extent.

Now are rights the conditions that are in general requirements for living? Or are rights "the moral principles principles governing human relationships". I'd prefer not to get into a semantic debate. The issue that Robert brought up is the important one. Do we treat these moral principles as intrinsic values? Do we sacrifice our lives for them? Do we assume that any violation of these conditions for survival is necessarily immoral, even if it's a necessary evil?

Post 31

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 7:33pm

"But, if you view moral principles as requiring human recognition, then where they're not recognized (i.e., identified), they don't exist, in which case, there is no requirement that they be followed."

Let me answer that more directly. Moral principles do require human recognition. If you don't, then you aren't aware of the consequences and will suffer. That doesn't mean that the lack of recognition means that you won't suffer the consequences. Why would it? Are you suggesting that there's no need to recognize these cause and effect relationships? It seems to me that it's precisely because there are unavoidable consequences that moral principles do require human recognition.

Post 32

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 7:38pm

Well put, Rodney and Bill.

Ronald,

If you're in the jungle, and a wild lion is about to attack you, try telling it that you're endowed with rights, including the right to life. ... Rights do not exist in nature; they only exist under man-made social contracts.

This is inaccurate. First of all, you can't tell lions anything. So, saying that talking to lions about things won't work -- doesn't prove anything about the existence or merit of something. Secondly, you say that rights come into existence under man-made social contracts. This is called a positivist view of rights -- where rights are "created" by legislators, or relevant parties, ex nihilo -- and it is incorrect to think of rights thusly (as myself and others here have shown).

Ed

Post 33

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 8:09pm

Joe,

I don't know what most of the people on this thread thinks the point of this discussion is.

It's whether rights are -- at root -- metaphysical or epistemological.

It comes off as mere semantics.

I don't share this view with you.

So far, I think Robert Bidinotto has made the strongest/only argument that there is actually a difference between how people understand these rights and how it will work in practice.

True, only Robert has spoken of the different outcomes that come from the different ways folks view rights (though I think he's been mistaken in what he's said about that).

From the original post Ed cited, you will tend to be drawn towards anarchism and non-interventionism. You'll view rights as a context-free phenomena, and any violations of those rights as being immoral and criminal. So while defending your country from a murdering dictator, if you happen to kill some innocent civilians, you are guilty of murder. You have violated their rights. In this view, rights are like moral rules, where you have to obey them in any situation, or you are immoral.

I adequately addressed this phenomenon -- of wrongly viewing rights as rules -- in posts 0 and 1. You're answering as if you haven't yet read -- or don't yet understand -- what it is that I said there. To recap, I said that there are times when we get to exercise the rights that we, metaphysically, have. In times where we don't (like certain emergencies), we appropriately revert to "jungle law." But just because we can think of or get in a situation where the exercise of rights isn't possible -- doesn't mean that rights "go out of" existence.

Robert proposes a contextual view of rights instead.

Instead of ... what? Instead of my view of rights, which is also contextual? Something which is clear upon a diligent understanding of my posts 0 and 1? Robert is saying that rights come and go with the times and the contexts that we find ourselves in, I'm saying that their exercise is what it is that comes and goes. There's a difference and it makes a difference. There are rights, and there's the exercise of them -- and that's an important distinction to make, and make clear.

Honesty is not simply not telling a lie. It's a recognition of the connection between the truth and the possibility of pursuing values, and how distorting our understanding of reality is not an effective way to achieve success.

Well put.

For instance, in Ed's first post, he says that if you witness a rape in a situation where there is no police or civilization, it's okay to "off" the rapist. But his wording is informative. He says "there are situations were[sic] you do wrong -- but you do wrong in a humanly way". This is clearly the intrinsic view of rights.

First of all, you mistreated my words -- which involved the rapist also killing the daughter. The reason I chose to include senseless murder is because, when it's known that someone is a senseless murderer -- then it's okay (even morally "right") to kill him in pre-emptive self-defense. We do exactly that with dangerous animals, and senseless murderers have made themselves no different from dangerous animals. It's about treating people and things exactly how they should be treated.

And when I said that humans do wrong in a humanly way, I was trying to separate the moral mistakes we all make -- from time to time -- from senseless murder. I was trying to show how we can live with those common mistakes -- but how we can't live with senseless murderers (And wouldn't you agree on that?). So, if you want to call my view of rights "intrinsic" (because it's "against" senseless murderers; or because it "allows for" common mistakes) then go ahead -- but I think that you're just using a buzz-word (intrinsic) to devalue my view somewhat arbitrarily (by calling it a name, rather than addressing its logic).

Morality is being pitted against self-interest,

Whoa. From where are you getting these consequences? Please re-read my posts 0 and 1. Please attempt to tell me how -- in the words that I typed there -- how self-interest is ever trumped by anything; how morality is pitted against self-interest.

This follows from the view that rights "just are", and the implication that morality demands we not violate them. The moral principle itself is treated as a moral rule, which is what happens when the value is treated as intrinsic instead of contextual.

Reread posts 0 and 1.

And this is exactly where a difference in practice will occur.

I don't agree.

Ed

Post 34

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 8:55pm

Joe, you wrote,

Bill, as I said, we all agree that these conditions for living are real. So I'm not sure what you mean by saying that if they aren't recognized, there is no requirement to respect them.
That's not what I said, Joe. I said that "if you view moral principles as requiring human recognition, then where they're not recognized (i.e., identified), they don't exist, in which case, there is no requirement that they be followed."
That would seem to imply that they are just convention or subjective opinion. But our choice isn't between subjectivism and intrinsicism.

You're not reading me carefully.

Let's try a different example. Take a look at some of the virtues. Take honesty. Does honesty just exist? Is it just out there (even contextually)?
What do you mean by "honesty"? The practice of honesty or the moral requirement to be honest?
Well, the facts that give rise to it may be. Even if you don't recognize that faking reality is not an effective way to gain values, the underlying reality will affect you. But that's not enough. To live effectively, you have to recognize the principle. It's only when you recognize it that you can act accordingly.

Of course. Who said otherwise?

In your next post, you quote me as follows: "But, if you view moral principles as requiring human recognition, then where they're not recognized (i.e., identified), they don't exist, in which case, there is no requirement that they be followed." And reply:

Let me answer that more directly. Moral principles do require human recognition.
The choice to practice them requires human recognition, but the fact that you ought to practice them (if you are to achieve your values) does not.
If you don't, then you aren't aware of the consequences and will suffer. That doesn't mean that the lack of recognition means that you won't suffer the consequences. Why would it? Are you suggesting that there's no need to recognize these cause and effect relationships? It seems to me that it's precisely because there are unavoidable consequences that moral principles do require human recognition.

I am not suggesting that there's no need to recognize these causal relationships. The point I was making is that the fact that you should behave a certain way does not require your recognition of that fact. Quite the contrary: your recognition of it requires that you should behave a certain way. The moral requirement to live in a pro-life manner must exist before it can be recognized.

- Bill

Post 35

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 9:07pm

The moral requirement to live in a pro-life manner must exist before it can be recognized.

Bill, thank you for -- in one sentence -- summarizing the importance and relevant consequence of this whole debate.

Ed

Post 36

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 9:08pm

Joe Rowlands has perfectly restated what I was driving at, providing additional context.

Rand described rights as a concept. A concept -- an abstract identification of a fact of nature -- is not the same thing as the fact of nature itself. Concepts are abstractions, and abstractions do not exist as metaphysical entities. The common equation of concepts and facts by some Objectivists (and nearly all libertarians and conservatives) has real-world consequences, and sadly, I see them every day on this website and others.

I'll reiterate: It is impossible to reconcile Rand's identification of rights as concepts with the claim that rights are facts of nature. If rights are concepts (abstractions), they cannot be facts of nature; if they are facts of nature, they cannot be concepts. If you believe the latter, your argument is not with me, but with Rand, who used words very precisely. And, I insist, with reality itself.

[Oops. Edits for grammar and spelling. Shame on me.]
(Edited by Robert Bidinotto on 11/03, 9:17pm)

(Edited by Robert Bidinotto on 11/04, 4:18am)

Post 37

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 9:38pm

That the source of a man�s rights is the law of identity, is not being disputed. And that all principles, not only the moral principle of rights, are derived from that law; this too, is not being disputed. However, a principle is not a concrete, but an integrated number of observations brought together by the mental process of abstraction. Thus a right, like any other form of knowledge, must be discovered by that very same epistemological process.

Rights are not instincts, you�re not born with an automatic knowledge of them; you have to discover them.

K

(Edited by Karyn Daniels on 11/03, 9:40pm)

Post 38

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 9:47pm

It might be helpful to point out some of the unfortunate consequences of the "intrinsic rights" point of view. I think the whole "positive" rights fiasco would be impossible to defend without it, it raises "inaction" to some sort of superior moral stance resulting in passivism and pacifism, relativism in all flavors stems for the "intrinsic" point of view. It begs an "effect without a cause" undermining the scientific view of nature. I think it is the single most destructive mistaken premise out there. A sort of "keystone" mistaken premise.

Man's nature is reasoning, problem solving, adaptive, action oriented. Not passive.

Post 39

Saturday, November 3, 2007 - 9:47pm