Getting the right Rights right.

Leonard Peikoff makes the argument--a correct argument, in my opinion--that animals do not have rights, that the law of the jungle leaves them subject to any and every type of violation possible in a jungle. Does a steer about to be slaughtered for its meat have a right to its life? Only if a vegetarian buys the slaughterhouse and decides to spare him. And even then, the steer won't possess the foggiest notion about the concept (and that's the operative word) of rights because a steer is not a conceptual animal capable of grasping a conceputal abstraction like "rights." Although "rights" pertain to an existential animal, namely man, "rights" is a conceptual principle that is epistemological in nature, not metaphysical.

Rights are conceptual, learned or epistemologcial in nature, because if men did not mentally recognize them, unlike a lake or a tree, they would not exist. If there were no rational animals, no homo sapiens on planet earth, then there would be no rights, either legal or imagined. Rights imply boundaries--and there are no boundaries in nature. Man, the rational animal, measures reality and identifies boundaries, and to enable men to peacefully co-exits within boundareis, within divided reality, the concept of rights developed and evolved into a complex legal system.

Post 41

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 12:35am

Bill and Ed, I'm trying to keep your two arguments as separate because I don't know that you are in agreement. In general, though, you've both accused me of not reading your posts well enough. In my first response, I mentioned that you haven't given concrete examples of how your view of things leads to different results in practice. That's still the case, except possibly where Robert and my position is being construed as subjectivism. So perhaps if you were a little less abstract, we could see if there really are differences of opinion.

Ed, your view is that rights are "metaphysical". According to my understanding, that doesn't simply mean that rights are moral concepts rooted in an awareness of reality. It means these "rights" exist as entities, or perhaps qualities of an entity. Really? I disagree entirely. While all morality is linked to facts of reality, it doesn't mean that moral principles are actual things that exist out there, like an apple or a table, or the color blue. Nor are rights epistemological, as you give the other alternative. They are not simply an identification of what exists, although that's closer. You could say the recognition that we need liberty in order to survive is epistemological. It's an identification of reality. But rights go beyond that. They are moral principles. They say that we shouldn't interfere with the liberty of others, or let others interfere with our own liberty. To say that rights are metaphysical things is to wipe out the distinction between metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.

Again, let's try being concrete. If you think rights are metaphysical, that they simply just exist and everyone has them, then killing a murderer is a violation of his rights. There cannot be context when the claim is that rights just exist as some kind of metaphysical existent. You cannot say that a person abdicates his rights by murdering others. There is no context in which the "rights" don't exist. Nor could you use these "rights" as moral guidelines. If they simply exist as unalterable, context-free qualities, then there is no reason, for or against, protecting them. A violation of rights is not necessarily a bad thing at all. Only a moral principle can tell us that it's improper to harm others or restrict their liberty.

You think that calling it intrinsic is just a buzzword. But in fact, that is the meaning of it. An intrinsic value is one where the value is a metaphysical quality, that we somehow manage to perceive, and therefore must act upon it. The seemingly nice part about saying rights are metaphysical is that you can argue that they aren't subjective, as your post #1 said. You seemingly prove your position by saying they are actual metaphysical entities. But it's entirely wrong. They aren't. Nor are they metaphysical qualities. You can't build a rights-detector.

They are moral principles. We can identify certain methods that are conducive to our lives. We can recognize that we need to produce values and act on our minds in order to live. We can recognize that other people interfering with that process makes living harder. And we can establish a moral principle that says we shouldn't let other people do that. And we can go on to show that treating others that way is not only good for us (via the harmony of interests), but it better protects our own. So we can establish moral principles that guide us in how we should act in relation to other people. And we can call these moral guidelines "rights". But just because these principles are ultimately derived from reality doesn't make them metaphysical. Just as honesty isn't metaphysical, rationality isn't metaphysical, etc.

Post 42

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 1:05am

Bill, let me go back to your post 29, as I missed part of it the first time. You say:

Just to be clear, I said they are "forms of conduct required by mans' nature for his proper survival."

Again, I disagree. I don't think moral principles are forms of conduct at all. I think they are fundamentally an identification. The principle of honesty is an identification of the cause and effect relationship between an undistorted view of reality and effective action. By all means, you should act upon those moral principles. But the actions themselves are not the moral principles. You might call them virtuous acts, and say that a consistent application of the moral principle is a virtue. But the moral principles themselves are not forms of conduct.

Is this important? Seems to be. You seem to think moral principles don't require any recognition of facts of reality. For instance, you say in post 34:

Bill, as I said, we all agree that these conditions for living are real. So I'm not sure what you mean by saying that if they aren't recognized, there is no requirement to respect them.
That's not what I said, Joe. I said that "if you view moral principles as requiring human recognition, then where they're not recognized (i.e., identified), they don't exist, in which case, there is no requirement that they be followed."

I wasn't saying that your position was that if they aren't recognized, there is no requirement. But you seemed to be suggesting that my emphasis on human recognition of moral principles leads to this view. But this view is entirely subjectivist. If ignoring this fact of reality shielded you from the consequences of it, it wouldn't really be a fact of reality. You're accusing me, indirectly, of holding a subjectivist position here. I was answering that I don't agree with that position at all.

If moral principles are recognitions of reality, than of course they need to be recognized. But the recognition is to avoid potentially adverse consequences. Not because recognizing them somehow changes the objective facts, or not recognizing them lets you avoid them. Moral principles are recognitions of causal connections, and we use them to guide our choices.

You go on to say (in response to my statement "Moral principles do require human recognition"):

The choice to practice them requires human recognition, but the fact that you ought to practice them (if you are to achieve your values) does not.

Practice what? Oh yeah...moral principles. Which you think is some form of conduct?!?!

If I'm reading it right, you think there are objectively proper choices to make. Fine. I'm not arguing with that. Is this another attempt at trying to portray my position as subjectivist, as opposed to the intrinsicist/metaphysical view that Ed is promoting? How does this at all related to moral principles? I see moral principles as guides to acting in a life-furthering way. The fact that there are objectively better ways of living is not being disputed, but confirmed by my position. But even then, I wouldn't claim that moral principles are an identification of that preferred way of living. I would say that moral principles are guides to understanding the consequences of our actions, so that we can attempt to better identify the preferred choices.

Post 43

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 1:43am

Now for the semantics. Obviously the use of the term rights is not perfectly clear. Are they "things", which we "have"? Is that shorthand way of describing them, or is it a claim that rights exists as metaphysical qualities?

Let me offer an alternative. Yes, we recognize certain facts about reality, like that we require the freedom to act on our own judgment in order to live our lives. We can say that we have these requirements, but it doesn't say anything else. It doesn't say that we should act to secure this freedom, or that we should protect the freedoms of others. It's just a statement about the world.

Now we can make some moral statements.
1.) We can argue that we should use violent force against other people in order to protect our own freedom while we are living harmoniously with others.
2.) We can argue that we should protect the freedom of others when our interests are harmonious, because it adds security for our own freedom.
3.) And we can argue that it is proper and understandable for those others to use violent force to protect their own freedom of action when they acting harmoniously, because we would want the same consideration.
4.) Harmonious living means respecting the freedom of other people.

We can even add corollaries:
1.) We should act harmoniously with others, or they won't respect our freedom.
2.) If others are not acting harmoniously, their freedom should not be protected or respected.

Now what are rights? We could say they are simply the need for freedom. But that is just one underlying fact. It doesn't necessitate any of these moral statements. Murderers would have the same needs. If we called these rights, it wouldn't provide us any moral guidance about what to do with this knowledge. If we treated them as intrinsic values, something to pursue regardless of our own self-interest, we'd fall into the anarchist, pacifist position of sacrificing lives for rights. We'd also be stuck with trying to figure out who's rights are more important, a murderer or his victim? We'd end up with stupid principles like the murderer is the biggest threats to rights in general, so his are worth less than the victims. All in some crazy attempt to maximize "rights".

A different way to view it is that rights denote these moral boundaries described above. In general, we say that people have rights. But really, we're saying that we should respect their freedom to act according to their own minds. A right to freedom of speech would mean that we should respect their freedom to speak their own minds, and that it is proper for us or them to defend that freedom with force.

But the difference is that we would say that these rights, or moral boundaries, only exist within the stated contexts. We should respect their freedoms only under the conditions where they are in fact living harmonious with us. We can say they have rights, but the context is crucial. If they stop living harmoniously, like start murdering people, we don't say that they still have those rights. Rights are not actual things. They're better thought of as moral sanctions, or as Rand said "a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context." When you have them, you have a moral sanction to act freely, and to defend your freedom from violations. When you murder others, you lose this moral sanction.

The point is that we don't need to view rights as some kind of metaphysical thing that we simply have. We can view it consistently from the position that it is a moral concept.

Post 44

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 6:43am

Joe wrote:

A different way to view it is that rights denote these moral boundaries... [W]e would say that these rights, or moral boundaries, only exist within the stated contexts. We should respect [other people's] freedoms only under the conditions where they are in fact living harmonious with us. We can say they have rights, but the context is crucial. If they stop living harmoniously, like start murdering people, we don't say that they still have those rights. Rights are not actual things. They're better thought of as moral sanctions, or as Rand said "a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context." When you have them, you have a moral sanction to act freely, and to defend your freedom from violations. When you murder others, you lose this moral sanction. [Emphasis added]

The point is that we don't need to view rights as some kind of metaphysical thing that we simply have. We can view it consistently from the position that it is a moral concept.

Absolutely. ;^)

Joe, Ronald, and Karyn: sanctions all around. Each of you "get it."

In her "Textbook of Americanism," Rand wrote: "A right is the sanction of independent action." Likewise, in "Man's Rights," Rand wrote: "A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context."

It is only in that sense that man can be said to "have rights" -- i.e., have a moral sanction to act in social contexts. But we don't "have rights" in the sense of possessing some metaphysical quality or attribute called "rights." Rights don't arise from our DNA; they arise -- as all moral principles do -- from our thinking about the requirements of our lives and well-being.

Yes, objective requirements of human life do, in fact, exist; and yes, they give rise to the need for moral principles to define boundaries in society. But the principles that define social boundaries do not simply exist somewhere "out there"; nor do moral principles reside within us, as some aspect of human nature. Principles must be defined by man, through identifying causal relationships in reality.

Rand: "If man is to live on earth, it is right for him to use his mind, it is right to act on his own free judgment, it is right to work for his values and to keep the product of his work. If life on earth is his purpose, he has a right to live as a rational being: nature forbids him the irrational."

It is clear that Rand is not simply declaring "rights are"; if she believed that, she would simply assert their existence. Instead, she is demonstrating the logical connections of thought required to validate a principle of rights: to establish a transition from personal morality to the need for some moral principle that sanctions the pursuit of self-interest in a social context, and that can define the boundary lines for doing so.

Look, I understand the tendency to want to "metaphysicalize" our philosophical principles -- to establish their "reality" firmly, by locating them in nature. People tend toward this intrinsicist approach to grounding concepts because they fear that otherwise, their concepts and principles will be "arbitrary" and "subjective." It feels a whole lot more secure to regard one's ideas as parts or aspects of nature itself. That way, they seem as secure as bedrock.

But this approach is an illusion. Ideas (and both concepts and principles ARE ideas) are not part of nature, existing independently of US. They are products of our consciousness, as we apply it to reality. Yes, the facts that give rise to our concepts (including rights) are indeed part of nature, and those facts are absolute. But the concepts and principles that we derive from those facts, through conscious thinking, are not themselves part of nature; and, if valid, they can apply "absolutely" only within the appropriate contexts.

If you accept the traditional, intrinsicist view of "natural rights" -- as qualities or attributes of human nature, innate, inborn, and inalienable -- you will have a devil of a time with such issues as abortion, or with executing a murderer (even in self-defense), or with self-defensive acts of war that will inevitably kill innocents. Logically, if individuals have some innate, inherent, intrinsic moral qualities called "rights," then those rights cannot be forfeited or alienated -- no matter what. All mental gymnastics and sophistry to the contrary notwithstanding, it is logically impossible to reconcile the traditional notion of "natural, inalienable rights" with, say, third-trimester abortions, or with the use of deadly force in ANY circumstance, even self-defensive, because you would be violating the "inherent" or "intrinsic" or "inalienable" or "God-given" or "natural" rights of another.

Anyone familiar with the history of the libertarian and conservative movements knows that it is just such confusion over "rights" that has led many, in the former case, to anarchism and foreign-policy pacifism, and in the latter case, to the "right to life" movement. Intrinsic-rights thinking on the left, by contrast, has led to such notions as economic rights -- "the right to an income," "the right to housing," etc. -- and to such environmentalist nonsense as "animal rights" and "the rights of nature."

If, by contrast, rights are principles of social morality derived from the requirements of rational self-interest, then such moral dilemmas vanish. If we regard rights as moral principles that men have identified, for reasons of self-interest, in order to define and sanction the proper boundaries of their actions in social relationships, then we can begin to see rights as tools of self-interest morality -- not as some sort of commandments of nature that we must obey (or even sacrifice ourselves and others to).

For example, an intrinsicist conception of "the right to life" would mean that taking a human life is always wrong -- even in self-defense. However, an objective conception of "the right to life," rooted in a morality of rational self-interest, holds that rights are principles, not inherent qualities of man; thus, they are not ends in themselves. As moral principles, then, rights do not apply in certain contexts. So, taking a human life may be a heinous evil or a virtuous act, depending on the context: e.g., murder or self-defense. Even taking an innocent human life can be either morally evil or morally necessary, depending on context (i.e., murder vs. "collateral damage" during wartime).

Rational self-interest governs the application of rights if they are a principle; however, if they "just are," then nothing can govern their application: We simply have a duty to respect them...even to the point of self-sacrifice.

There is a great irony in the intrinsicist position. While advocates of "inherent rights" aim to "ground" rights in reality, their claims are actually completely arbitrary. To say that rights "just are" -- i.e., that they don't need to be derived via a process of human thought -- is an arbitrary assertion. Clearly, one does not see in nature, or embedded on people's skin, some label declaring: "HERE ARE RIGHTS." So where, exactly, do we find these mysterious, invisible attributes?

Our Enlightenment forefathers simply asserted their existence, as "God-given" attributes, even though there is not one instance in biblical monologues from "God" in which "He" says a word about "rights." Our Founders realized, implicitly, the NEED for such a social/political concept...but then merely, arbitrarily declared that "God" had ratified it. Religious conservatives continue to make the same claim.

Today, some Objectivists and most libertarians are doing exactly the same thing -- but, being secular, they're substituting "nature" for "God." However, their claim of rights as inherent attributes of human nature is every bit as arbitrary. For example, "Individuals have rights" are the opening words in the Preface to Robert Nozick's famous libertarian treatise Anarchy, State, and Utopia -- thus blithely asserting the very premise that he had to prove.

The simple reply to those who claim that rights "just are" is: Prove it. If you believe rights can merely be asserted and don't require a conscious derivation and rational defense, then how do you answer those (billions) who deny that rights exist? The onus of proof rests on the person making the positive claim. So, don't you think that a concept as important as individual rights requires a better grounding than an arbitrary assertion?

(Edited by Robert Bidinotto on 11/04, 6:54am)

Post 45

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 8:09am

Ronald,

Leonard Peikoff makes the argument--a correct argument, in my opinion--that animals do not have rights, that the law of the jungle leaves them subject to any and every type of violation possible in a jungle.

Right, but irrelevant to the human context at hand.

Joe,

I mentioned that you haven't given concrete examples of how your view of things leads to different results in practice.

Not that ends EVER justify means, but if my view of rights were adopted, then American rivers would flow with milk and honey. Rights violators would be imprisoned or killed. Rights "acknowledgers" would remain free. Are you that pedantic that you require an example of a rights violator?

Ed, your view is that rights are "metaphysical". According to my understanding, that doesn't simply mean that rights are moral concepts rooted in an awareness of reality. It means these "rights" exist as entities, or perhaps qualities of an entity. Really? I disagree entirely.

It was also Rand's matured view that rights are metaphysical, rather than man-made (see post 21 for proof of this).

Nor are rights epistemological, as you give the other alternative.

You're saying that rights -- at root -- aren't metaphysical or epistemological. That's nonsense.

To say that rights are metaphysical things is to wipe out the distinction between metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.

So, what would you say that rights are -- if they are not metaphysical things, epistemological things, or ethical things? Are you saying that we require more classifications in order to talk about rights? Are you saying that talk of metaphysical facts, epistemological knowledge, and ethical merit -- are not enough to encompass, contain, and classify the concept of individual rights?

If you think rights are metaphysical, that they simply just exist and everyone has them, then killing a murderer is a violation of his rights.

I addressed this earlier (see posts 0 and 1). Killing murderers is fine (even "good").

Nor could you use these "rights" as moral guidelines. If they simply exist as unalterable, context-free qualities, then there is no reason, for or against, protecting them.

Re-think the difference between rights and their exercise (outlined in my posts 0 and 1).

An intrinsic value is one where the value is a metaphysical quality, that we somehow manage to perceive, and therefore must act upon it.

We don't have to act upon inherent rights, we can act against them -- at our loss.

Nor are they metaphysical qualities. You can't build a rights-detector.

I can understand Identity (and that's enough).

But just because these principles are ultimately derived from reality doesn't make them metaphysical. Just as honesty isn't metaphysical, rationality isn't metaphysical, etc.

Metaphysical means things that are the given -- by the Identity of various Existents. The opposite of Metaphysical is the Man-Made. For instance, man made the U.S. into 50 states.

Did man make rights, or were they existing things discovered and recognized?

Ed

Post 46

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 9:34am

I won't argue this tired point any longer, since the intrinsicists view has already been well-refuted.

But given the direction this thread has taken, I think it�s necessary to add one more point of clarification. Because a person reading this might conclude, that a severe criticism is being made against the founding principles of America. And for my part, this is definitely not the case.

I think that the creation of an America based on the idea, that rights are a god-given inalienable metaphysical gift to man, was within the context of the world then, a monumental leap forward in human progress. Consider the gigantic step forward this was from the almost universally accepted idea of god-given Aristocratic privilege. And I think that if you just look at our country today, it would be hard to argue against the wonderful results of this revolutionary principle.

I might get some flak on this next one, but I also believe that the usefulness of the intrinsic view of rights has not been outlived. Because I believe that there are still a great many parts of this world, where if this idea were to take hold, the results would be amazing. Imagine waking up one morning and learning that revolutions had taken place in a half-dozen Islamic countries. And imagine that those revolutions held as their guiding principle: the Allah-given inalienable metaphysical gift of, mans individual rights!

But I suppose that eventually, the final conclusion of an idea will always come home to roost. And although it has taken over 200 years, within the part of the world where this idea has been in place for some time, the inherent flaw of the original premise is taking an increasing toll on the culture. But I don�t think that toll is as pervasive as many think, and I sure as heck wouldn�t want to live anywhere else.

As far as philosophy goes, what I think Rand brought to the table in regards to the idea of inalienable individual rights, was not its negation, but a road map to its proper evolution.

K

(Edited by Karyn Daniels on 11/04, 9:37am)

Post 47

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 9:36am

Karyn, outstanding post #46. Sanction!

Post 48

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 10:04am

I wrote, "Just to be clear, I said [that rights] are "forms of conduct required by mans' nature for his proper survival.'" Joe replied,

Again, I disagree. I don't think moral principles are forms of conduct at all.
I'm sorry, Joe; I now see that that was a bonehead statement. What I meant to say is that "a respect for rights is a form of conduct required by man's nature for his proper survival."
I think they are fundamentally an identification. The principle of honesty is an identification of the cause and effect relationship between an undistorted view of reality and effective action. By all means, you should act upon those moral principles. But the actions themselves are not the moral principles. You might call them virtuous acts, and say that a consistent application of the moral principle is a virtue. But the moral principles themselves are not forms of conduct.

I agree that they are not forms of conduct (thanks for keeping after me on this one), but they're not an identification either. The recognition of a right is an identification, but the right itself is not, because the moral obligation to abstain from initiating force against others exists whether or not we identify it. If it didn't, we couldn't identify it to begin with. Something must exist before it can be identified or conceptualized. Remember, Rand also defined 'rights" as "conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival." If we go by this definition, it's easy to see that rights are survival requirements which exist independently of human identification.

You seem to think moral principles don't require any recognition of facts of reality. For instance, you say in post 34: Bill, as I said, we all agree that these conditions for living are real. So I'm not sure what you mean by saying that if they aren't recognized, there is no requirement to respect them. "That's not what I said, Joe. I said that 'if you view moral principles as requiring human recognition, then where they're not recognized (i.e., identified), they don't exist, in which case, there is no requirement that they be followed.'" I wasn't saying that your position was that if they aren't recognized, there is no requirement.

But you said that rights require our identification, didn't you? If in order to exist they require our identification, then if they're not identified, does it not follow that they don't exist?

But you seemed to be suggesting that my emphasis on human recognition of moral principles leads to this view. But this view is entirely subjectivist. If ignoring this fact of reality shielded you from the consequences of it, it wouldn't really be a fact of reality. You're accusing me, indirectly, of holding a subjectivist position here. I was answering that I don't agree with that position at all.

Then I don't understand your position. Either the moral obligation to abstain from the initiation of force exists independently of our identification or it doesn't. Are you saying that it doesn't? -- that we must identify it in order for the obligation to exist? -- because it seemed to me that that's what you were saying.

If moral principles are recognitions of reality, than of course they need to be recognized.
In order to exist?
But the recognition is to avoid potentially adverse consequences. Not because recognizing them somehow changes the objective facts, or not recognizing them lets you avoid them. Moral principles are recognitions of causal connections, and we use them to guide our choices.

The grasp of a moral principle is the recognition of a causal connection; the moral principle itself -- that you ought to behave in a certain way -- is not. It exists independently of one's recognition. Even if no one recognized or identified the fact that we ought not to sacrifice others, that fact would still exist.

If I'm reading it right, you think there are objectively proper choices to make. Fine. I'm not arguing with that.... How does this at all related to moral principles? I see moral principles as guides to acting in a life-furthering way. The fact that there are objectively better ways of living is not being disputed, but confirmed by my position. But even then, I wouldn't claim that moral principles are an identification of that preferred way of living. I would say that moral principles are guides to understanding the consequences of our actions, so that we can attempt to better identify the preferred choices.

Right. I think I now understand your position a little better. According to you, moral principles are guides to action. I would amend that slightly by saying that one's recognition of a moral principle is a guide to action. I know what you're thinking -- that since a principle is not a concrete, it cannot exist independently of anyone's recognition -- independently of consciousness. But if one is to recognize a moral principle, doesn't the principle have to exist independently of one's recognition; otherwise, there would be nothing to recognize.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/04, 10:22am)

Post 49

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 10:32am

Bill writes:

Remember, Rand also defined 'rights" as "conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival." If we go by this definition, it's easy to see that rights are facts of nature that exist independently of human identification.

Cherry-picking of Randian definitions is contributing to the confusion here.

As we all should know, definitions are contextual. The one above was a very general description of what rights do for us, but it's hardly her "definitive" statement, in the sense of differentiating rights from other necessary "conditions of existence." Food, clothing, and shelter are also "conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival." So...are they all rights?

Similarly, we can say, "Honesty is a virtue required by man's nature for his proper survival." Fine -- but so are all the other virtues. Does this very general description of honesty really provide a helpful, contextual definition that differentiates honesty from other virtues? Does it really tell us what honesty is?

Rand's definitive statement on "rights" was in "Man's Rights": "A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning man's freedom of action in a social context." That is the definition that also leads the section on "individual rights" in the Lexicon; and the essay was considered definitive enough to be compiled in both Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal and in The Virtue of Selfishness.

I have quoted extensively from this definitive essay -- including its second paragraph, where Rand repeatedly refers to "rights" as "a moral concept." Plodding again, for a final time: You guys are ignoring this definitive statement by Rand, and also Chapter 5 of her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology -- especially the final two pages, where she explicitly rejects the metaphysical status of concepts.

Rights are concepts. Concepts are abstractions. Abstractions are not metaphysical existents.

Get it?

Post 50

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 11:05am

Robert Bidinotto:

You guys are ignoring this definitive statement by Rand, and also Chapter 5 of her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology -- especially the final two pages, where she explicitly rejects the metaphysical status of concepts.

I let it pass once (post 16), but here it is again. Rand did not reject the metaphysical status of concepts, but the metaphysical status of essences.

"Aristotle regarded 'essence' as metaphysical; Objectivism regards it as epistemological" (ITOE, p.52).

Post 51

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 11:47am

Merlin,

You stopped quoting Rand too soon:

The extreme realist (Platonist) and moderate realist (Aristotelian) schools of thought regard the referents of concepts as intrinsic, i.e., as "universals" inherent in things (either as archetypes or as metaphysical essences), as special existents unrelated to man's consciousness--to be perceived by man directly, like any other kind of concrete existents, but perceived by some non-sensory or extra-sensory means.

The nominalist and the conceptualist schools regard concepts as subjective, i.e., as products of man's consciousness, unrelated to the facts of reality...

The extreme realist school attempts, in effect, to preserve the primacy of existence (of reality) by dispensing with consciousness--i.e., by converting concepts into concrete existents...

None of these schools regards concepts as objective, i.e., as neither revealed nor invented, but as produced by man's consciousness in accordance with the facts of reality, as mental integrations of factual data computed by man--as the products of a cognitive method of classification whose processes must be performed by man, but whose content is dictated by reality. [Emphasis added]

Observe in the final paragraph that Rand makes absolutely clear that she is not limiting her objective/intrinsic/subjective distinction to "essences" only, but includes concepts as such. And she also makes absolutely clear that concepts as such are "products of a cognitive method of classification whose processes must be performed by man, but whose content is dictated by reality."

This is an explicit denial of the metaphysical (intrinsic) status of concepts. Concepts are products of rational human cognition. And since, to Rand, "rights" are "a moral concept," this also, necessarily and inclusively, denies the metaphysical status of the concept of rights.

Let's put it in a syllogism:

Major premise: According to Rand, concepts do not have metaphysical reality, but are products of rational human consciousness of reality.

Minor premise: According to Rand, rights are concepts.

Conclusion: Therefore, according to Rand, rights do not have metaphysical reality, but are products of rational human consciousness of reality.

(Edited by Robert Bidinotto on 11/04, 11:54am)

Post 52

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 12:26pm

Ed, I know you think your post #0 made a great case for your position. It's not that I haven't read it. It's just that I don't accept it at all. I think your position is riddled with contradictions.

You're last post was unhelpful. I asked for a difference, in practice, between the theory of rights that you're presenting and the one that Robert originally presented. This would show, in concrete terms, what the point of the argument is. According to Robert's original statement, your theory leads to anarchism and pacifism, where ours doesn't. But you could give your own view of how ours leads to bad results, while yours leads to better results. Instead, you say:

Not that ends EVER justify means, but if my view of rights were adopted, then American rivers would flow with milk and honey. Rights violators would be imprisoned or killed. Rights "acknowledgers" would remain free. Are you that pedantic that you require an example of a rights violator?

Let's see. In our theory, rights violators would be punished. Rights "acknowledgers" would remain free. So where's the difference? You haven't shown any difference, which makes it sound like you're arguing a pedantic, semantic game. If the two theories are really different, there should be differences in practice.

You go on to discuss "metaphysical vs. man-made". But that's ripping her comments out of context. That merely distinguishes those facts that people make up, versus those facts that have a metaphysical backing. It doesn't say that all moral principles are in fact metaphysical objects, that we can hold and throw around, or whatever. Metaphysical vs. epistemological is not the same kind of distinction, unless you want to make the absurd claim that epistemology is "man-made", in the sense of being arbitrary.

You're saying that rights -- at root -- aren't metaphysical or epistemological. That's nonsense.

Yes I am, and no, that's not ridiculous. Rights are moral concepts, or moral principles. While rooted in metaphysical facts, which we're aware of through epistemological reasoning, they are more than simply identifications of reality. They are normative abstractions. They are ethical ideas. You seem unable to understand that these are different branches of philosophy, and you can't simply call everything metaphysical without losing important distinctions.

Metaphysical means what exists out there, independent of our minds. Trees. Water. The moon. The color blue. The fact that animals need fuel to keep living. Epistemology deals with how we come to recognize these facts. And morality tells us what we should do with them. There are no magical things floating around called rights. There are simply a number of facts about reality, such as that since we produce by our minds, we need the freedom to act upon our minds. But that's not rights. Rights are a moral concept.

Post 53

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 1:30pm

Bill, glad to see some progress. I apologize in advance for the length of this post.

I still disagree with your terminology, and I think it leads to an incorrect position. So let me try some more.

Let's start when you say

Remember, Rand also defined 'rights" as "conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival." If we go by this definition, it's easy to see that rights are survival requirements which exist independently of human identification.

Robert already responded to this, showing Rand didn't make this the primary definition, instead used it as a further elaboration of the idea. But I don't want to simply argue what Rand thought. I think there's a very serious problem with trying to define rights this way.

The problem is that if you identify rights as simply these certain facts, like that humans need freedom in order to live a proper life, what does that tell you ethically? Nothing. It doesn't tell you that you should respect those requirements in others. It doesn't tell you under what circumstances you should respect them. It just simply states a fact. Just as an honesty principle could state the fact that acting on a distorted view of reality is not effective. If you simply described these requirements as "rights", the term would not have any moral significance. It'd be like saying you need food to live. True. But it doesn't inform you of how you should act. Is stealing food okay? Is murdering for food okay? Is begging for it preferred?

The fact behind the honesty principle does not directly imply that you should be honest. While the fact exists, that doesn't make it an automatic value in your life. To the extent that this principle can support your life, it has value. But even then, the value is to the extent that it supports your life. It isn't an intrinsic value. There are times where it doesn't support your life at all, like with the murderer asking where you're children are. Contrary to some of the opinions on this board, the principle isn't simply discarded in emergency situations. If the principle is a recognition of a causal relationship in reality, then you certainly don't throw out this understanding of the world when your life needs it most of all! No. The causal relationship is still true. The principle still holds. In some ways, this is obvious. If you say you're kids aren't home to the murderer, and he asks to come it to take a look himself, it is still improper for you to act on this distorted knowledge. If you threw out the principle because it's an emergency, you'd be justified in showing him in and walking right into your kids room. So the principle is not discarded.

Instead, if you understand that the principle is not some intrinsic value or rule-based morality, but is in fact a recognition of a causal relationship that has significant moral implications, then you could see that it is a guide to informing you about how your means will produce given ends. In this case, you distort reality for the murderer precisely because a distortion will make his actions ineffective. You aren't discarding the principle at all. You're confirming it. You are applying it.

The reason why people think the principle is discarded is because they think the principle is some kind of requirement on how you need to act in order to be moral. There is some intrinsic value, a value that has no relationship to your life and doesn't need to be evaluated in any specific context. The moral principles become requirements on how you act, instead of an understanding of reality (like all principles are) that are to be applied in various contexts to pursue your life. And once it's a requirement, it leads to all of the downsides of intrinsicism.

I took honesty as the example because it has less baggage. But any moral principle would act in parallel ways. The principles are not discarded in emergency situations. I could offer justice in the context of someone who's got a gun pointed at you taking your money. Again, you don't throw away the principle. You still recognize that he's the bad guy, and if someone rushed in to help, you wouldn't protect the mugger. But you also understand that the values gained by getting justice are not worth the probable costs of trying to enact it immediately. The principle is not discarded. It's applied.

Now back to rights. Going down the hypothetical path of claiming that rights are simply the human requirement to be free. What actions does it recommend? Like the facts behind honesty, it doesn't imply any particular action. Sometimes respecting these requirements is beneficial to your life. Sometimes its not. The facts themselves are interesting, but you still need a moral principle to guide you. The moral principle would be based on this causal relationship. It would say something like "Given that each person, to live life harmoniously and effectively, needs to be free to act on their own best judgment, you should seek to protect yours and others abilities to act on their own best judgment (freedom) so that you can live your life effectively and others can live their lives harmoniously with yours". And again, you could apply this principle to different contexts. You could say that a murderer is not living harmoniously with you, so protecting or respecting his freedom is no only unnecessary, but disastrous to your own life.

But what happens if you don't formulate such a principle? What if you simply treat the facts, as if they directly implied certain kinds of actions? Then you'd have intrinsic values. You'd have people protecting "rights", even in contexts where it is disastrous for your own life. It would be seen as a rule that you must obey. Instead of applying the principle, such as in the case of a murderer, you would be simply discarding the idea of "rights". Just ignoring it.

If you avoid the intrinsicism, you aren't left with moral guidance. These facts are just isolated facts, with no moral requirements. It's only by connecting them to our own lives, via a moral principle, that it becomes a guide to our actions.

But you said that rights require our identification, didn't you? If in order to exist they require our identification, then if they're not identified, does it not follow that they don't exist?

I said rights are moral principles, or moral concepts if your prefer. And if they aren't identified, it's true they don't exist. But remember, I'm not talking about these requirements of living, or conditions of existence, like you are. Those still exist. I just don't think that's what rights are. Your original phrase was:

if you view moral principles as requiring human recognition, then where they're not recognized (i.e., identified), they don't exist, in which case, there is no requirement that they be followed.

From my point of view, the problem comes at the end when you say "requirement". What does it mean? Certainly there is no requirement to act on a moral principle if you don't recognize it, in the sense that you can act against it (and suffer accordingly). So there's nothing forcing you to act according to the non-identified principle. But you seemed to be using "requirement" to mean something else. You seemed to be saying that if there was no requirement, then there would be no negative consequences. And that's not the case. There still would be, even if you don't formulate the moral principle.

There's some more semantic issues here causing confusion. You speak of a "grasp of a moral principle". It's as if these moral principle exist out in the world, and you're just perceiving them or identifying them. I don't agree. A moral principle is not those underlying facts that give rise to it. It is the human integration of those underlying ideas into a wide-reaching abstraction that acts as a guide for making decisions by identifying the causal relationship between means and ends. The facts exist, but the facts are just facts. Until you formulate it into a moral guide, it isn't a moral principle. It's just some facts that could have an impact on your life, but that you don't see that connection.

So when you say:

I would amend that slightly by saying that one's recognition of a moral principle is a guide to action. I know what you're thinking -- that since a principle is not a concrete, it cannot exist independently of anyone's recognition -- independently of consciousness. But if one is to recognize a moral principle, doesn't the principle have to exist independently of one's recognition; otherwise, there would be nothing to recognize.

You are right, that that is what I'm thinking. But no, I don't think the moral principle must exist independently. I think the facts that give rise to it do, and we recognize those. But the moral principle is actually an attempt to integrate those facts with our moral standard. It is applying those facts to our life. We're not simply recognizing these principles. We're formulating them.

I hope that helps explain my position and maybe why I put emphasis on some details that might not seem that important at first glance.

Post 54

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 2:47pm

Joe and Robert,

If, as Rand stated in 1972, men are endowed with rights by Nature (i.e., if men are metaphysically endowed with rights); and if, as Rand stated in 1973, rights are independent existents to be "recognized" (or -- in some cases -- not sufficiently recognized) -- then we can morally judge any society (based on whether it respects these "really-existing" rights of humans).

However, if rights are only "products" of a very specific and refined line of thinking (i.e., if they're epistemologically "born"), then we can't judge societies thusly -- because we can't be sure that these countries' leaders are mentally following along with the correct thinking that leads one to the correct conceptual adoption and integration of Individual Rights.

Have I just made this difference in real-world outcomes clear to you?

Ed

Post 55

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 3:02pm

I wrote, "Remember, Rand also defined 'rights" as "conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival." If we go by this definition, it's easy to see that rights are facts of nature that exist independently of human identification." Bob replied,

Cherry-picking of Randian definitions is contributing to the confusion here.

As we all should know, definitions are contextual. The one above was a very general description of what rights do for us, but it's hardly her "definitive" statement, in the sense of differentiating rights from other necessary "conditions of existence." Food, clothing, and shelter are also "conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival." So...are they all rights?

Of course not. And I should not have used the word "defined," because, as you point out, her statement was a not a definition. But the main point that I was making, which I think you are overlooking, is that while not every survival requirement is a right, every right is a survival requirement, whose existence does not depend on human identification. I can see now that I wasn't clear about this -- that I didn't distinguish adequately between a right as a requirement of human survival which we are morally obligated to respect, and a right as a moral principle which defines and sanctions that survival requirement. The former is metaphysical; the latter, epistemological.

Rand's definitive statement on "rights" was in "Man's Rights": "A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning man's freedom of action in a social context." That is the definition that also leads the section on "individual rights" in the Lexicon; and the essay was considered definitive enough to be compiled in both Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal and in The Virtue of Selfishness.

I have quoted extensively from this definitive essay -- including its second paragraph, where Rand repeatedly refers to "rights" as "a moral concept." Plodding again, for a final time: You guys are ignoring this definitive statement by Rand, and also Chapter 5 of her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology -- especially the final two pages, where she explicitly rejects the metaphysical status of concepts.

Bob, no one is saying here that concepts are metaphysical; at least I'm not. Nor am I taking issue with Rand's definition of a 'right" as a moral principle. The only point I was making is that that moral principle refers to a moral obligation which exists independently of our recognition of it, just as Newton's First Law of Motion refers to a fact of reality (inertia) which exists independently of our recognition of it. The fact that Newton's First Law of Motion is a principle of physical behavior does not mean that it has no existential referent independent of human identification. Similarly, the fact that Rand's concept of a 'right" is a principle of moral conduct does not mean that it has no existential referent independent of human identification.

Rights are concepts. Concepts are abstractions. Abstractions are not metaphysical existents.

In ITOE, Rand writes, "The building-block of man's knowledge is the concept (my emphasis) of an "existent" -- of something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action." (P. 5) Later in the same book, she writes, "An existent is a concrete. (My emphasis) 'Existent' is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and even mental events. They exist. [Prof. B: Relationships too?] AR: Yes -- everything that exists on which you can focus, a relationship, an action, or an attribute. The concept 'existent' refers to something that exists. And it is wider than the concept 'entity,' because it permits you to subsume under that concept, and focus on, attributes, or relationships or actions -- on that which depends on an entity but can be studied separately." (p. 241)

By this characterization, a right is an existent. Of course, "a right" (in quotes) is a concept, just as "existent" is a concept, but an existent (without quotes) is a concrete. Is a right (without quotes) a concrete if it refers to a particular right, like the right to the pursuit of happiness? Well, if a right is an existent and an existent is a concrete, then a right is a concrete; it is one of the units subsumed under the concept of "a right." "Concrete" in this context simply means particular (instead of general). Just as the concept of "chair" subsumes all particular chairs, so the concept of "a right" subsumes all particular rights, like the right to life, liberty, property, free speech, etc. So, whether 'a right' refers to a concept or to a unit of a concept depends on how the term is being used.

- Bill

Post 56

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 3:17pm

Robert,

Cherry-picking of Randian definitions is contributing to the confusion here.

But you keep quoting Rand from the early 1960s ("Man's Rights"), and I quoted her from the 1970s (in post 21).

It's not "cherry-picking" to move one's focus to someone's matured or refined view on a matter; by looking at how they ended up speaking about such things. It's actually logical to use later-made statements in order to correctly assess someone's thinking on anything. Though you could still take the line of reasoning that Rand "became" confused about rights -- in order to be able to make the statements that she did in the 1970s. Are you doing that?

In the 1970s (as I show in post 21), Rand viewed rights as things endowed metaphysically (i.e., by "Nature") -- to be either correctly recognized, or not so recognized; but nevertheless existing independently of our thought about them.

Do you agree with that, or disagree with that?

Ed

Post 57

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 3:20pm

Isn't that our evolutionary edge ?

Post 58

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 3:49pm

Robert B.,

I somewhat expected you would cite the first paragraph you quoted in #51. In your #16 Aristotle was the target. In #49 you did not name him, but you did allude to what you said earlier and used "metaphysical." In post #51 you switch to the intrinsic/objective/subjective distinction. It won't work; they are not equivalent. In said first paragraph Rand says "referents of concepts" -- not "concepts" -- and "intrinsic." Also, the other three paragraphs you quoted are about intrinsic/objective/subjective, not metaphysical/epistemological.

About your syllogism, I don't believe anyone here has said concepts or rights "have metaphysical reality" in the way you use it. Rather some have argued that rights have a metaphysical basis (are rooted) in reality -- human characteristics give rise to the concept of rights qua moral principles. I think Ed T. could have been clearer, but at least that's what I took him to mean when he has said rights are at root metaphysical. He can correct me if I've read him inaccurately. Your conclusion does likewise -- rights are "products of rational human consciousness of reality." The "reality" therein is man's nature, their root.

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 11/04, 4:36pm)

Post 59

Sunday, November 4, 2007 - 5:57pm