Getting the right Rights right.

Joseph Rowlands wrote:

Let me give you an example. Two men meet one day. Mr. X decides that Mr. Y probably won't be a direct benefit to his life. He isn't going to learn anything. He isn't going to trade with him. There's no possibility of a friendship. And Mr. Y has $100 in his wallet. Should Mr. X decide to kill him?

By your notion of a value calculation, he would be pulling the trigger already. But this is a complete denial of the moral principle. We don't refrain from killing someone simply because we find they will serve us better in life. We refrain from killing them because we want the principle of rights consistently respected. If we could kill someone on a whim, other people could do the same. We recognize that our own freedoms, our own rights, are intertwined with everyone else's. We don't violate these rights because to do so would be to abandon our own. And our freedom is critical to our lives. It's a fundamental requirement.

The value of respecting rights is not simply the value of the specific individual to our lives. It is the value of our freedom itself. It's the value of being able to live among other human beings, with all of the enormous benefits that provides. This is not something to discard easily.

Here, from my prospective, is the heart of the matter. What you describe here, whether intentionally or not, is the "social context" of "rights" which has been mentioned often in this thread, but then all but ignored.

You assume that Mr. X and Mr. Y are members of the same society. Why do I say this? Because you write about the "value of being able to live among other human beings, with all of the enormous benefits that provides." Only human beings who are members of the same society (or of cooperating societies) are able to reap the "enormous benefits" of living together. Human beings who are members of warring societies or societies having contradictory mores are not able to reap such benefits, not to mention human beings who are members of no society at all.

If Mr. X met Mr. Y on a battlefield and they were members of warring societies, then Mr. X might decide to kill Mr. Y and feel fully within his "rights" to do so. Similarly, if Mr. X met Mr. Y in a remote jungle and neither man was a member of any society, Mr. X might make the cold, hard value calculation you describe and not feel constrained by any notion of "rights" at all.

In your example Mr. X refrains from making the value calculation of which you speak and refrains from killing Mr. Y not because he makes a personal, philosophic judgement that "rights" must be "consistently respected." He refrains from murder and theft because the mores of the society to which both he and Mr. Y belong prohibit murder (and theft) under pain of severe punishment.

Now you might argue that the individuals interacting to form the society to which Mr. X and Mr. Y belong sat down and pondered their own individual "rights" and decided that their "rights" were "intertwined with everyone else's" and that freedom was "critical" to their social lives and that to "violate these rights...would be to abandon" their own. I prefer to think it was merely common sense: cooperation cannot exist between human beings if individual cooperators are allowed to kill each other "on a whim." Isn't this a self-evident truth?

When cooperating human beings form a society and ban murder and theft, they do so because they know (either by bitter experience or by self-evident common sense) that, if whimsical random murder and theft are not taboo, then cooperation among members would be impossible. This is a self-evident fact of the reality of human nature having nothing to do with intrinsic (or moral concept) human "rights."

Indeed, members of any society enjoy the benefits of their society because murder and theft must be taboo in every cooperative society. Societal members might infer that they have "rights" of life and property because of their society's taboos against murder and theft, but their notion of these "rights" is strictly an afterthought. The societal taboos came first. This must be the case because, as Robert Bidinotto correctly stated in Post #16:

"...[R]aised alone on a desert island, a man would never have conceived of a moral principle such as "rights," nor have any need for the concept. A moral principle that defines social boundary lines does not arise from nor apply to an asocial context.

Thus, concepts of social "rights" cannot precede cooperative society. The notion of social "rights" must be and is a product of cooperative society.

Post 121

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 8:28am

Michael E. Marotta wrote:

Why do most people refrain from violating rights that they do not conceptualize or even perceive?

The answer is easy: Because they live in a cooperative society. See my post previous to this one. (My posts are going through a moderator so I can't give you a Post #. Sorry.)

Post 122

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 9:36am

Robert B. wrote to Joe:

�From your language, I have the weird sense that you and perhaps others somehow regard the terms "babies" and "children" as designating species or entities different from one called "adults"�

It is no weird sense, Robert; that is precisely how Joe sees it. He�s quite clear about it on this thread, as he was the last time this was debated.

Robert goes on:

�But when we talk of "babies," "children," and "adults," we are talking about US -- at various ages. That's all. And rights are moral principles that pertain to humans as a species -- not merely to time periods in the lives of humans.�

And this is how I see it. Joe considers this formulation to be an example of intricism born of emotionalism.

Post 123

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 12:41pm

A rock falls when dropped. That's because it's related to the earth in a certain (gravitational) way.

Are humans related to each other in a certain way that fits in with their nature -- like the falling rock and the earth to which it falls?

My answer is yes. My justification for my answer is that Existence is Identity. And Identity, like Existence, is a purely metaphysical thing.

And rights, being real relations like that between rocks and earth, would be metaphysical things, too. Even though, like gravity, you can't see or hear the direct evidence of their existence -- and even though it appears that the notable relation is "just out there".

Time constraints restrain me from saying more on this (and I'll bet some of you are glad that I can't say more than I already have!).

;-)

Ed

Post 124

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 3:36pm

Well dammit, Jon, if you agreed with it, why didn't you sanction my post? I mean, don't you realize I'm within reach of my 5th little "Atlas" guy?

;^)

Post 125

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 4:38pm

Rectified.

Both the post with quotes I agreed with and also the affirmation-begging post above!

Edit: You might consider sanctioning this post.

(Edited by Jon Letendre on 11/09, 4:39pm)

Post 126

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 4:39pm

Robert, I don't think babies are a different species. I just don't think being a part of the species is relevant to the concept of rights. If the principle is formulated in the context of adults, establishing a harmony of interests between them, then the principle is applicable to adults. Spreading it out to all humans, including babies, is an example of using one criteria to formulate the concept (rational men living harmonious), and another criteria to expand it (part of the human species). I don't think it applies.

I get the feeling that you would like to establish the principle of rights as a useful moral tool. But from my perspective, it is simply an abstraction. We know that it Concrete Situation A, we should respect the freedom of this individual. The same in Concrete Situation B. And C and D and on an on. The abstraction is a recognition of what all of these concrete situations have in common. And the moral principle recognizes the cause and effect connection between that abstraction and our lives.

But that means any particular instance of rights should rise or fall on its own terms. We should be able to judge the concrete example. And the principle provides us with a powerful method of recognizing whether the concrete example is valid.

Contrast this with a view that rights are some kinds of method or policy. In that case, you can simply decide to apply this policy to babies as well. And the same goes for animals, fetuses, plants, or whatever. If it's simply a policy of action, then there's no question of whether it's valid or not to apply it to these other groups.

So then, the question isn't whether we can apply this policy to other groups (as we certainly could). The question should be, given the reasons behind this particular moral principle, does a specific individual (whether it's an adult, child, fetus, animal, or whatever) meet the criteria.

That's why being a part of a species doesn't matter. It's why we would apply rights to aliens that we met, or sentient robots, or whatever, presuming the criteria was met.

Post 127

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 5:45pm

Joe,

Well, we are at long last getting down to defining where our differences lie. And yes, we do have a different approach here. But teasing out the implications and justifications is an activity that I must leave for another day. I have the January-February content of The New Individualist to prepare for layout by next Wednesday. Yikes! Better get to it...

Seriously, thanks for this exchange. You are very, very thoughtful in how you approach issues -- even on those (rare) occasions when I disagree with those thoughts.

Post 128

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 6:54pm

Thanks Robert. The pleasure is mutual. Good luck on The New Individualist. Thanks for taking them time to participate.

Post 129

Friday, November 9, 2007 - 10:24pm

With regard to rights, I wrote, "Before this moral principle was conceptualized, grasped and understood, was slavery wrong?" Joe replied,

This could mean a few things. If you invested your money in internet stocks in the late 90's, was it wrong? Certainly, assuming you would have or did lose most of that money, you could argue that it was not actually in your self interest. We can evaluate that fact pretty clearly. Was it morally wrong?
It was the wrong decision, but I wouldn't say it was morally wrong, unless, of course, it was made irresponsibly without sufficient consideration of the alternatives.
Assuming it was an error in knowledge, we could take the position that it wasn't morally wrong, even though it was actually against your own self-interest.

Hmm. I'm not sure that's the relevant distinction. I know that Objectivism distinguishes between errors of knowledge and errors of morality, but aren't some errors of knowledge also errors of morality? For example, suppose that a person believes in the altruist morality. Is he not acting immorally, according to the Objectivist ethics? He's certainly not acting morally, for he's behaving self-sacrificially. Or suppose that a Muslim, who is raised to be an Islamic revolutionary, proceeds to kill American soldiers in what he believes to be an act of justice. Is he acting morally? The fact that he thinks he's acting morally doesn't mean that he is. What is morally right or wrong is determined not by what a person believes, but by the facts of reality. Even if no one were to accept and practice the morality of egoism or the principle of individual rights, it would still be one that people ought to accept and practice.

To say that I have a right against being murdered by a religious fanatic, is not to say that my right against his murdering me is some kind of metaphysical stuff; it is is simply to say that, whether he recognizes it or not, he shouldn't murder me, and that if he does, he deserves to forfeit his own life.

I wrote, "So, you acknowledge that slavery was wrong even before it was recognized as wrong. Would you say, then, that the wrongness of an action exists independently of man's recognition of it? And if you would, then why not say that the violation of a right exists independently of man's recognition of it?"

I also acknowledge that slavery was wrong before it was recognized, if wrong simply means bad for your self-interest. And I would say that the wrongness of an action exist independently of man's recognition, if again by wrong you mean bad for one's self interest.

I don't just mean bad for your self-interest. A hurricane is bad for your self-interest, but it isn't morally wrong. The weather doesn't have a moral obligation not to initiate force against you. Human beings do -- whether they recognize it or not.

If by "wrong" you mean that they acted immorally, taking an action they knew violated their self interest, then I wouldn't say that.

"Morally wrong" doesn't just mean taking an action that one knows violates one's self-interest. It means following a principle of conduct that violates one's self-interest, whether one knows it or not.

As for why we shouldn't say that a violation of a right exists independently of man's recognition, that's more complicated. One good reason is because if you do state something like that, it confuses the issue of rights by making it seem as if the "rights" exist on their own, and not as some kind of moral sanction. This whole thread is a testament to that problem.

The issue is whether or not the violation of a right does exist independently of man's recognition of it. If it does, as I am maintaining it does, then one ought to say that it does, because it is the truth, even if that truth is misunderstood by those who think that it refers to a right as some kind of intrinsic essence.

But having said that, I don't know that it's inappropriate to say that in the hypothetical past where nobody knew that there was something called rights, that they still had them. While the people at that time (if such a time really existed) did not morally sanction the freedom of action of others, we offer that moral sanction. We can say that their freedoms should have been secured and respected. We can say that they had rights. Just as if someone in our time doesn't respect the rights of another, and doesn't understand or acknowledge the concept of rights, we can still say that the person has rights and that they are violated.

But aren't you contradicting what you said earlier, when you stated that if it was an error of knowledge, then it wasn't morally wrong? If it wasn't morally wrong, then, according to your theory, it wasn't a violation of rights. Are you now retracting that statement and asserting that it was morally wrong (i.e., a violation of rights) even though it was an error of knowledge -- that the slavers shouldn't have held slaves, even though they didn't realize that they shouldn't have?

Let me take you one step further: Suppose that no one recognizes that slavery is morally wrong. Wouldn't slavery still be morally wrong -- just as morally wrong as if one person recognizes it, but no one else does? Doesn't the moral wrongness of slavery simply mean that people should adopt a moral principle of respecting other people's freedom?

And finally, you say:
Similarly, the violation of a right is identified by recognizing that it violates a moral principle, but that doesn't mean that its violation depends on that identification.
This gets closer to being a semantic issue. The violation of a person's freedom certainly is identifiable. That it is a violation of the person's rights is something else. I don't know how you can argue that his rights are violated if you haven't formulated the moral principle of rights.

Of course, you can't argue that his rights are violated if you haven't formulated the principle of rights. I'm not saying you can. Obviously, you have to formulate the principle in order to make the argument. But that still doesn't mean that his rights aren't violated, if he is enslaved. Of course, they're violated. That's what slavery does. It violates the slaves' right to freedom, whether anyone recognizes it or not, because it violates a principle that ought to be accepted and practiced.

- Bill

Post 130

Saturday, November 10, 2007 - 11:55am

I don't just mean bad for your self-interest. A hurricane is bad for your self-interest, but it isn't morally wrong. The weather doesn't have a moral obligation not to initiate force against you. Human beings do -- whether they recognize it or not.

This is what I've been championing. An obligation -- whether recognized or not -- to act in a certain way (a way prescribed by the type of entity that you are). It is a metaphysical thing, because it is grounded in the type of entities (i.e., in humans) existing -- and can, for better or worse, exist in ways that are in accordance or in discordance with it's nature.

Rights exist because we are a certain type of being, and not other types of beings. We have them because our Identity prescribes them for our own well-being (whether we epistemological recognize this fact of reality, or not). They're a simple presciption for our well-being.

Ed

Post 131

Saturday, November 10, 2007 - 3:56pm

I haven't read the lengthy accumulation of comments on this thread about the epistemological foundations of ethics and individual rights. So I might be off base in offering this comment.

It occurs to me that to believe that rights do not exist objectively as "facts of nature" (as I believe some on this thread have argued) because these rights are products of human understanding, entails a contradiction. For the law of identity holds that a thing is what it is, including all its aspects and manifestations. One aspect of the nature of human life is ethics, which is implied by the requirements of human living in society. If one doesn't know about the reasons for morality, one is ignorant of an aspect of humanity that exists. Or to offer a parallel, if I don't know what conditions permit my car engine to run smoothly, those very conditions, of which I am ignorant, still exist; they are subsumed under the nature of the internal combustion engine. To deny that aspects of a thing, of which one is ignorant, are not "existents" contradicts the law of identity.

A "fact" is a product of understanding that accurately identifies something that's "out there". Moral values are simply another class of facts. To claim that this insight, by itself, proves that the nature of moral values, and of ethics, and of individual rights, must ultimately conform to a particular political view doesn't follow. The nature of moral values follows from the nature of man.

It doesn't make sense to claim that "Objectivist Epistemology", by itself, refutes political ideas at odds with Mr. Bidinotto's idea that individual liberty is logically and morally subordinate to "social stablity", or to coercively-installed-and-maintained government, or to "wars-of-liberation" that he believes uphold these values. In other words, nothing in epistemology refutes political ideas at odds with Mr. Bidinotto's idea that individual rights only exist in a particular political context that he identifies with a coercively-installed state, non-defensive wars, taxation, and (I suspect, if necessary) a military draft.

Again, I have read only a few comments at the beginning of this long thread, and I do not want to misrepresent his thinking. If I have I apologize.

Post 132

Saturday, November 10, 2007 - 6:03pm

Humphrey's cowardly swipe at Mr. Bidinotto: "It doesn't make sense to claim that "Objectivist Epistemology", by itself, refutes political ideas at odds with Mr. Bidinotto's idea that individual liberty is logically and morally subordinate to "social stablity", or to coercively-installed-and-maintained government, or to "wars-of-liberation" that he believes uphold these values. In other words, nothing in epistemology refutes political ideas at odds with Mr. Bidinotto's idea that individual rights only exist in a particular political context that he identifies with a coercively-installed state, non-defensive wars, taxation, and (I suspect, if necessary) a military draft."

Humphrey, your quote goes well beyond a simple mischaracterization, and lands both feet into the sphere known as the dishonest smear. That Mr. Bidinotto pisses you off, Humphrey, that doesn't surprise me; after all, nothing enrages a bored fanatic, like the sight of an estimable mind. And Humphrey, you're getting sloppy, and the envy is showing.

K

(Edited by Karyn Daniels on 11/10, 9:33pm)

Post 133

Saturday, November 10, 2007 - 8:34pm

Bill, I don't think we're getting anywhere here. We've been going around in circles. You still treat rights as if they are these real "things" that people just have. And you interpret all of my statements as if I agreed with this, which compounds the confusion. I've been trying to not even use the word "rights" as part of my arguments because we're arguing over it's meaning. But it doesn't stop you from continuing to assert that people's rights are violated independently of anyone recognizing the principle. You've clearly got your view of it, and as long as you hold onto that view, I can't expect any progress.

I would like to note that you continue, even up until this last post, to question whether I think morality is in any way connected to reality. You ask whether "the slavers shouldn't have held slaves, even though they didn't realize that they shouldn't have?" Of course!!!! The fact that you're still asking this trivial question after so much dialogue shows you haven't understood anything of what I've said. I've been saying this repeatedly. If I were to question your motives, I'd say this is the biggest straw-man I've ever seen, and that you repeatedly go back to it no matter how many times I say so. Nowhere in this debate has Robert or I ever said or implied that you can act in the face of reality and live successfully. But dismissing subjectivism in ethics does not lead directly to intrinsicism. You keep acting as if our choice is between "anything goes" in ethics, or adopting the idea that rights are these magical things that "just are". Given that false dichotomy, it's impossible to explain that rights are a moral principle, grounded in facts of reality.

It's very frustrating. And my patience is gone.

Post 134

Saturday, November 10, 2007 - 9:07pm

Mark Humphrey:

I haven't read the lengthy accumulation of comments on this thread about the epistemological foundations of ethics and individual rights. So I might be off base in offering this comment.

Yes, Mark, that about sums it up.

Post 135

Saturday, November 10, 2007 - 11:45pm

Joe, I understand that you're frustrated, but I would encourage you not to question my sincerity or intellectual honesty. I do not question yours. I've learned something from you, and have acknowledged that in my previous posts. You write,

Bill, I don't think we're getting anywhere here. We've been going around in circles. You still treat rights as if they are these real "things" that people just have.

I don't know what you mean by real "things." Of course, we typically speak of people as "having" a right to freedom of action, but all I've taken this to mean is that people have a moral obligation not to interfere with other people's freedom of action (under the relevant conditions). I wouldn't say that this is treating rights as real things, if by "things" you mean entities of some kind. One could say that a right (or moral obligation) is an "existent" (in Rand's sense of the term).

And you interpret all of my statements as if I agreed with this, which compounds the confusion. I've been trying to not even use the word "rights" as part of my arguments because we're arguing over it's meaning.

Yes, but that's precisely the point at issue, isn't it? What exactly is 'a right'? Is it just an idea inside one's head; is it some indelible substance that exists in each individual; or is it a moral obligation not to interfere with other people's freedom of action?

I would like to note that you continue, even up until this last post, to question whether I think morality is in any way connected to reality. You ask whether "the slavers shouldn't have held slaves, even though they didn't realize that they shouldn't have?" Of course!!!!

Joe, I do understand that that was the position you expressed, but my point was that it contradicted an earlier statement you made in which you said that if an action constitutes an error of knowledge, then it isn't morally wrong or a violation of rights. I was simply asking if you had retracted your earlier statement. If you have, as I suspect you have, then I believe that you and I are in basic agreement on this point. We can say that the slavers were violating the rights of the slaves, because they were violating a moral principle that we are aware of, even if they weren't aware of it, which is the point that you were making, and one that I agree with.

The more interesting question is: If no one had recognized the principle, would the rights of the slaves have been violated. This is a different question from whether or not we can say that their rights were violated. Obviously, we can say it, because we are aware of the principle. If I understand you correctly, you would say that if no one recognized the principle of rights, then the slaves' freedom was interfered with, but not their rights, whereas I would say that their rights were interfered with (as well as their freedom), because a right is a moral obligation, which is simply the means to a desired end, and that means exists, even if it isn't recognized.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/11, 12:47am)

(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/11, 1:33am)

Post 136

Sunday, November 11, 2007 - 5:24am

Thinking out loud. A key to the rights of unwanted babies is the noninitiation of force. What value could a person gain or keep by harming an unwanted baby? It can't even be kidnapped for ransom. Why would a rational, or mere semi-rational, person think about harming an unwanted baby?

The phrase "initiation of force" gave me pause. I didn't recall it being used on this thread. So I searched the thread and found only one occurrence. Thanks, Bill.

Bill Dwyer (post #48): "Then I don't understand your position. Either the moral obligation to abstain from the initiation of force exists independently of our identification or it doesn't. Are you saying that it doesn't? -- that we must identify it in order for the obligation to exist? -- because it seemed to me that that's what you were saying."

Then I decided to search for it on the Objectivism Research CD I acquired recently. It does not appear in Man's Rights. It does not appear in Atlas Shrugged. It does appear a few times in Journals of Ayn Rand -- Notes While Writing Galt's Speech. Here are three:

Man's rights�inherent in the need of his survival as man. No initiation of force.

The Morality of Life: Life as the standard�thinking as the only basic virtue�joy as the purpose�man existing for his own sake and for the pursuit of his own happiness�no duty, no temptation�evil as non-practical�the pattern of traders�justice, not mercy�no sacrifice, no initiation of force, no obedience to force.

The vices of the Life Morality: non-thinking�which means the evasion of knowledge, the placing of anything whatever above your own mind, any form of mysticism, of faith, or denial of reality; dependence�the placing of others above yourself in any manner whatever, either as authority or as love; aimlessness�the non-integrated life; pain�the submission to it or acceptance of it; humility�the acceptance of one's moral imperfection, the willingness to be imperfect, which means: the indifference to moral values and to yourself, i.e., self-abnegation; the initiation of force�as the destruction of the mind, as the method contrary to man's form of survival, as the anti-man and anti-life.

That struck me as very odd. In these Notes the link between initiation of force and man's rights is very strong. Yet not one occurrence in Man's Rights or Atlas Shrugged!

This is not to say she didn't use the concept in other words. I searched Man's Rights for "coercion." Two hits:

The concept of a "right" pertains only to action�specifically, to freedom of action. It means freedom from physical compulsion, coercion or interference by other men.

The Declaration of Independence stated that men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights." Whether one believes that man is the product of a Creator or of nature, the issue of man's origin does not alter the fact that he is an entity of a specific kind � a rational being � that he cannot function successfully under coercion, and that rights are a necessary condition of his particular mode of survival.

Then I decided to search for "noninitiation of force". One occurrence (!) -- in The Art of Nonfiction:

What they need are principles. And I would add that in social issues, the first such principle is the noninitiation of force.

I'm flabbergasted! So after one more question, I'll stop. Ed, is this a relationship you have hinted at?

Post 137

Sunday, November 11, 2007 - 7:37am

Mr. Dwyer writes:

If I understand you correctly, you would say that if no one recognized the principle of rights, then the slaves' freedom was interfered with, but not their rights, whereas I would say that their rights were interfered with (as well as their freedom), because a right is a moral obligation, which is simply the means to a desired end, and that means exists, even if it isn't recognized.

Questions from a frustrated observer on the sidelines:

1) If "rights" can exist independently of our recognition of them, presumably other "rights" might exist which are not currently recognized? What are these unrecognized "rights?" Have we now recognized all existing human "rights?"

2) Someone early on in this debate asked about a "rights detector?" It's a fair question. If "rights" exist, how does one detect their existence? For instance, you contend, Mr. Dwyer, that the slave's freedom was interfered with as well as the slave's right to freedom. Freedom is a quality of social interaction that we can define and objectively observe. How do we objectively observe (or detect) an individual's right to freedom? On the other hand, if an individual claims a "right" to medical care, how do we know by means of objective detection that no such right exists in reality? Or does it?

Post 138

Sunday, November 11, 2007 - 9:45am

Sherman Broder wrote,

Questions from a frustrated observer on the sidelines:

1) If "rights" can exist independently of our recognition of them, presumably other "rights" might exist which are not currently recognized? What are these unrecognized "rights?" Have we now recognized all existing human "rights?"

To say that other rights might exist that are not themselves extensions of the right to freedom of action (extensions such as the right to the pursuit of happiness or the right to freedom of speech) is to say that other rights might exist that contradict the right to freedom of action. But in that case, the right to freedom of action could not itself be recognized as a right. So if the right to freedom of action is recognized as a right, then there are no other rights that are not extensions of it.

2) Someone early on in this debate asked about a "rights detector?" It's a fair question. If "rights" exist, how does one detect their existence? For instance, you contend, Mr. Dwyer, that the slave's freedom was interfered with as well as the slave's right to freedom. Freedom is a quality of social interaction that we can define and objectively observe. How do we objectively observe (or detect) an individual's right to freedom?

By observing that people ought to refrain from interfering with that freedom and that if they do, they forfeit their own freedom.

On the other hand, if an individual claims a "right" to medical care, how do we know by means of objective detection that no such right exists in reality? Or does it?

We know that it doesn't exist in reality, because it contradicts the right to freedom of action that we know does exist. The right to medical care means that a patient has a right to the labor of doctors and nurses even if they don't choose to provide it, which means that the doctors and nurses are the patient's slaves, and slavery violates the right to freedom of action.

- Bill

Post 139

Sunday, November 11, 2007 - 11:12am