Getting the right Rights right.

Look, when I said that you don't have to experience something in order to have an idea of it, I was referring to something like a golden mountain. I haven't seen a golden mountain, but I nevertheless have an idea of it. Instead of jumping on my statements, taking the worst possible interpretation of them and then pouncing with glee on what you think is fallacy, why not make an effort to understand what I'm saying?!

Well, if the idea of God is a supernatural consciousness, which does not require a body in order to exist, then doesn't that imply a consciousness without a body? You say that a supernatural consciousness does not require a body in order to exist. Then how does it perceive reality without sense organs, or think without a brain or do anything else that bodies are required for? You say that it can do these things because it's a supernatural being. What do you mean by a "supernatural" being? One that is above the laws of nature? By that definition, a supernatural being is impossible, because it would violate the principles of identity and causality.

Obviously, the concept "supernatural" exists in the minds of billions of people the world over. Whether or not this concept has a referent in reality is another question I neither have the time nor inclination to pursue here.

Forgive the misunderstanding, but I was using "God," "infinity" and "logic" as examples of non-empirical knowledge. I wasn't trying to draw you into a discussion on the validity of these concepts. I was clumsily trying to press you for an epistemological explanation of them as conceptual knowledge, i.e., you clearly think all knowledge is empirical. The concepts of "supernatural," "infinity," and "logic" are conceptual. They have no concrete referents in reality that can be observed empirically.

The human mind can conceive of any number of concepts and theories about reality which have no immediate or apparent or obvious connection to reality as we know it. The critical question is: How do we know? How do we go about determining whether an idea in a man’s head has a corresponding existence in reality?

You need empirical evidence.

Many concepts seem divorced from reality when they are first conceived, but later we learn they are not unrealistic.

Exactly. We later learn that they are true. How do we learn it? By observation and inference.

The theory of Copernicus that the earth revolves around the sun is one.

Right, and how did we discover that the earth revolves around the sun? By the science of astronomy, which involves perceptual evidence and rational calculations based on that evidence.

The ancient idea that the earth was flat is another. Non-euclidean geometry is another. Einstein’s theory of relativity is another. String theory is another. The theory of germs and viruses is still another.

One can't persuasively assert that such theories are self-evidently true or false, or that they obviously violate the laws of nature, or the laws of identity or of causality.

How, specifically, should these ideas be examined in order to know they violate such laws?

The claim that the earth is flat violates the law of identity, because it contradicts the fact that the earth is round. We know that the earth is round, because we have incontrovertible evidence to support that conclusion.

Indeed, how do we acquire a certain knowledge that such laws are inexorably firm and fast over time?

The law of causality is a corollary of the law of identity, which cannot be denied without self-contradiction. The law of causality states that a thing must act according to its nature -- according to the kind of thing it is -- that in order to act differently (under the same conditions) it must be something different.

Do we rely on the inductive scientific method?

Yes.

Is theory verified by observing that particular referents in reality comport to it?

That depends on what you mean by "comport to it." If you mean consistent with it, then no. If every swan I observe is white, that is consistent with the theory that all swans are white, but it doesn't verify the theory for obvious reasons. But if by "comport to it," you mean confirm it, then the only way one could verify the theory that all swans are white is to observe every swan and find none that isn't white. If one cannot be sure that one has observed every swan, then there is no way to verify that theory that all swans are white. However, one can certainly falsify it, by observing a swan that isn't white.

Or can theory only be falsified by inductive research?

Theories can be falsified by inductive research, but theories can also be verified by inductive research. For example, the theory that (non-amorphous) ice floats in water can be verified by observing that the structure of ice takes up more volume than water molecules and therefore is less dense than water.

Can pure reasoning confirm or falsify theory?

Reasoning from what? A philosophical assumption? A self-evident truth? How?!!!!! What specific rational/scientific tools does an Objectivist like yourself use to gain the certain knowledge of reality which you undoubtedly profess to have?

Bodies are required for such things in the natural, physical world. I can imagine a supernatural being who exists outside of the natural, physical world (hence the term "supernatural") who is pure consciousness, who communicates and senses its dimension of reality and ours by means of a power or energy unknown in our natural world (or not yet discovered).

Some physicists have theorized about a dimension of reality that exists distinct from our, yet intersected with it.

You imply that knowledge is not valid unless it is certain. I don’t agree. Man operates easily in everyday life using knowledge that is not certain.

Example for clarification of my meaning: He knows aspirin will relieve a headache but doesn’t know exactly why it works.

Your description of how we gain knowledge of the physical universe is basically correct, however the concepts "infinity" and "logic" are not strictly theories of the physical universe per se. One cannot gather empirical evidence by means of the scientific method to confirm or falsify them.

I don’t think you’ve thought this through clearly. Are you suggesting that man could not have knowledge of "infinity" prior to its use as a mathematical concept?

I’m saying that there is no such thing as actual infinity. The only valid concept of “infinity” is the one pertaining to the potential for extending a given size or quantity.

Early man could gaze at the night sky or at the distant horizon and observe an endlessness that he could conceptualize as "infinity."

Aren’t you contradicting yourself when you say that early man could gaze at the night sky or at the distant horizon and observe an endlessness? If he can observe endlessness by gazing at the night sky, then, contrary to your earlier statement, endlessness or infinity is empirically arrived at. But is this true? Can one observe endlessness or infinity? The answer is, no.

To observe an object is to observe it in relation to that from which it is distinguished, i.e., to observe its limits. In gazing at the night sky, one observes celestial bodies, aircraft and weather balloons. The surrounding blackness is simply the absence of any discernible objects; it is not itself an object.

It is true that in observing that the horizon continues to advance as one moves along the earth's surface, one is observing the extension of a limit, an observation which could have given rise to the mathematical idea of a limit's being extended indefinitely. But the mathematical concept of infinity is valid only insofar as it refers to the potential for a process of extension or addition that does not have a limit beyond which it cannot take place. One can, in principle, always add another unit or degree to any given quantity. One can always count further than one has already counted. But however far one counts, the number to which one has counted will be finite. Infinity can never be actualized, because an infinite quantity is a contradiction in terms. A quantity, by definition, is some specific number, but an infinite quantity is no specific number.

Furthermore, what do you mean by "concrete instances?" How do you observe concrete instances of "quantity, extension and limits?" If I observe three ducks, three cars, three trees and three fingers, am I observing the quantity three? I think not.

The concept "quantity" (as well as the concepts "extension" and "limits") cannot be observed. It is a product of something else.

But you see, you haven’t observed a concrete instance of logic. You’ve "arrived at" the concept of logic by using logic ("every existent is what it is and not something else"). When man observes a duck, a car, a tree and a finger, he does not observe the law of identity. He reasons that there are existents of duck, car, tree and finger. He assumes every "existent is what it is." From this premise he reasons that there is a law of identity.

But I’ve just shown that this is not true. Mathematics and logic have no concrete referents in reality that can be empirically observed.

They are products of human reasoning.

The law of identity is recognized by means of human reason, but exists independently of it – just as the law of gravity is recognized by means of human reason, but exists independently of it. Logic is ontological, because identity is existential.

Yes, the premises upon which they are based may have been inspired by concrete objects, but these premises were certainly not observed.

What premises are those?

I would go so far as to say that mathematics and logic are not only products of human reasoning, they are products of the logical structure of the human mind which exists prior to human observation of the physical world. A man can imagine the concept of mathematical infinity but not actual infinity because the logical structure of the human mind won’t allow him to imagine actual infinity, just as a man’s mind can’t comprehend a world in which the law of identity does not apply.

The knowledge that A is A is not gained by man observing reality. The knowledge that A is A is not knowledge at all, but an immutable fact of man’s very nature, an undeniable result of the way man’s brain is wired.

If all this is true, certainly you could name the "perceptual concrete" which is the lowest rung on the "conceptual ladder" with regard to mathematics and logic, i.e., the perceptual concretes on which mathematics and logic are based respectively.

As I mentioned, your explanations of how we use the scientific method to falsify our theories about our physical universe is accurate, so there is no reason for me to rehash it. However, I do take exception to one thing you said:

Theories can be falsified by inductive research, but theories can also be verified by inductive research. For example, the theory that (non-amorphous) ice floats in water can be verified by observing that the structure of ice takes up more volume than water molecules and therefore is less dense than water.

Theories about the physical universe cannot by verified by inductive research…ever! You can’t have it both ways and say that sometimes they can.

It depends on the theory.

The observation that "ice floats in water" is not "inductive research." It is an observation that "ice" and "water" are two different things, two different concepts, two different existents.

Now, one may theorize that ice does not float on water, but such a theory is easily falsified by a single experiment. One might also theorize that ice floats on water and spend the next hundred years trying to falsify such a theory, but to what avail?

Exactly, because it’s already been verified, inductively!

It would be like trying to falsify by means of inductive research a theory that says a table is a chair.

1. Outside of the realm of human action there is a regularity in the succession and concatenation of observable events. That is, what is true today of the physical universe with regard to the motion and behavior of matter and energy was true yesterday and will be true tomorrow and the day after. That is, the reality upon which our laws of physics rest is immutable.

What I think you're asking is, do I agree that non-human action occurs with mechanistic regularity and is therefore determined and predictable, whereas human action is not?

I don't think you can say that all non-human action occurs with mechanistic regularity. What about the behavior of animals? You certainly can't predict their behavior the way that you can the behavior of inanimate objects. Yet, I doubt that you would ascribe free will to animals. Nor can geologists predict the occurrence of earthquakes, which are themselves governed by immutable physical laws. The reason these laws are immutable is that they are governed by the law of causality, which in turn is based on the law of identity. The law of causality says that the same things must act the same way under the same conditions, because if they could act differently, then they wouldn't be the same things -- they wouldn't possess identity.  

But the law of identity applies to plants and animals including human beings just as well as it does to inanimate objects. It is true that one can't always predict the behavior of human beings, just as one can't always predict the behavior of the lower animals, but that is not because neither is governed by the law of causality; it is because both human and non-human animals are sufficiently complex organisms that we cannot isolate all of the causal variables in order to know precisely what to expect. But we can often predict their behavior within certain reasonable limits.

Now you mention free will, which is another subject entirely, but if by "free will," you mean freedom from the law of causal necessity, then I must disagree with you that human beings have free will. Man's choices are themselves determined by causal antecedents. As von Mises puts it, "The innate and inherited biological qualities and all that life has worked upon him make a man what he is at any instant of his pilgrimage. They are his fate and destiny. His will is not 'free' in the metaphysical sense of this term. It is determined by his background and all the influences to which he himself and his ancestors were exposed." (Human Action, p. 46.)

The fact that an action is in the regular course of affairs performed spontaneously, as it were, does not mean that it is not due to a conscious volition and to a deliberate choice. Indulgence in a routine which possibly could be changed is action.
Praxeology is not concerned with the changing content of acting, but with its pure form and its categorial structure. The study of the accidental and environmental features of human action is the task of history.

 So, I don't agree that the difference between the actions of human beings and of everything else is that human beings possess free will, whereas everything else is determined by antecedent causes.

As I've indicated in previous posts, there is a certain regularity and predictability to human action. If there weren't, then no one could plan or coordinate his activities with anyone else. We rely on being able to predict what other people do, just in order to function in a social environment. For example, we rely on the fact that cars and pedestrians will stop at red lights, that our employees will do their work with sufficient dedication, that our employers will pay our wages and salaries as promised, that stores will open and close at the times they say they will, that when we go shopping, there will be clerks in the store to handle our business, that the tellers at our banks will dispense the correct amount of money, that people will keep their appointments with us, etc.. To be sure, there will be times that our expectations are not met, but for the most part they are. There is a strong regularity and predictability to human action, just as there is to animal behavior, even though we cannot predict either with absolute certainty.

This paragraph is gobbledygook. You're saying in essence that just as I would be able to predict my cat's behavior if supplied with enough time, patience, knowledge and inclination, a scientist could predict my behavior if supplied with the same (or perhaps a little more) time, patience, knowledge and inclination. Total nonsense.

Why is it nonsense, if you add the qualifiers "enough time, patience, knowledge and inclination"?

And you can't save it from being nonsense by adding that "we can often predict their behavior within certain reasonable limits."

Predicting their behavior within certain reasonable limits is easy; it doesn't mean predicting it with absolute certainty. If I know you're a reliable person, and we make plans to have lunch, I can predict that, barring an emergency, you'll keep your appointment.

How long would a scientist have to study Hitler, Einstein, Henry Ford or Jonas Salk to predict their behavior "within certain reasonable limits?" And what does "certain reasonable limits" mean other than an opportunity for you to weasel out of virtually any objection offered in rebuttal?

Yes, "free will" is another subject entirely. I shouldn't have mentioned it. Free will in the sense you understand it has nothing to do with the point I was making.

What is the sense in which I understand it? I thought you were talking about free will in the sense that von Mises understands it, which is classical or "metaphysical" free will -- the ability to choose either of two alternatives under the same conditions.

I do not believe that human beings have "free will" in the metaphysical sense of the term.

However, neither do I believe that this absence of a metaphysical "free will" means that man's purposeful actions are determined, regular, mechanistic and predictable (within any "reasonable limits").

Neither, by the way, does von Mises. If you would have quoted his words in their full context you would have added these few sentences which capture the essence of his thinking:

"The fact that an action is in the regular course of affairs performed spontaneously, as it were, does not mean that it is not due to a conscious volition and to a deliberate choice. Indulgence in a routine which possibly could be changed is action.

"Praxeology is not concerned with the changing content of acting, but with its pure form and its categorical structure. The study of the accidental and environmental features of human action is the task of history."

I'm thrilled you're reading Mises, and quoting him no less. However, it's disappointing your endeavor results in misrepresenting his meaning.

The above is why it is fruitless to proceed with our discussion.

Why do you say that?

No object on the planet, animate or inanimate, other than man acts with purpose, i.e., imagines ends and chooses means to attain those ends. All objects on the planet other than man, animate and inanimate, are slaves to the deterministic forces in nature or in their own genes. Only man can step outside the bonds of this servitude in certain significant ways due to aspects of his own, unique biology which allow him to act purposefully.

You may object by offering examples of insects that build societies, or monkeys that use sticks to pry open ant hills or apes that can communicate non-verbally. But these objections do not prove that man's ability to act purposefully is not unique. They only prove that man is able to recognize a few, human-like, automatous behaviors in lower animals.

As for your last paragraph...well, it totally misses the point and, I might add, is a bit naive (or disingenuous) to boot. Do you actually imagine that the fact that human beings make many of the same pedestrian choices under similar, routine, social circumstances disproves the premise that human beings act purposefully?

Sherman, this is funny. Where did you get the idea that I don't believe that human beings act purposefully? From the fact that I view human behavior as a product of causal necessity? All I'm saying there is that man's choices are necessitated by his value judgments, and that his values judgments determine his purposes.

Re-read Page 46 of Human Action that you quoted above.

Besides, your observation does more to prove the premise of human purposeful action than it does to refute it.

Which shouldn't be too surprising, since I wasn't trying to refute it. :-)

Human cooperative society is a product of man's purposeful action

Of course, it is!

(unless you believe that human society springs from man's genes in the same way as ant society springs from an ant's genes). Human society and the culture it spawns encourages humans to be more knowable and predictable to their fellow human beings in normal social intercourse. The result is more conducive to peaceful cooperation.

Furthermore, if you think that citing a few menial examples of people stopping for stop lights, keeping appointments and showing up for work on time proves your theory that there "is a strong regularity and predictability to human action, just as there is to animal behavior, even though we cannot predict either with absolute certainty," think again. A more convincing proof would be an example of your ability to predict the winner of next year's presidential election, or the participants in next month's superbowl or the level of tomorrow's stock market index.

Moreover, these predictions I've cited and this knowledge of human action are collectivist-type decisions and knowledge of collectivist behavior. We've said little of being able or unable to predict what any given individual will do in any given circumstance. You may very well be able to guess with some degree of probability how human beings might act considered in a particular collective, but that degree of probability is all but worthless when the actions of an individual are considered.

Not necessarily. I can predict within a high degree of probability that my significant other will treat me differently than a total stranger -- that my professor will teach my class at the same scheduled time each week during the semester, that my dentist will keep his appointment with me to have my teeth cleaned, etc.

Will the President of Iran follow through on his threat to destroy Israel? Will my wife decide to take a new job? Will a certain troubled youth in a public school go postal and murder 20 people in a public mall?

All this is so obvious it makes me wonder why you persist in disputing it.

Could it be you are jumping through intellectual hoops not to get at the truth but to defend an ideology against which you can tolerate no disagreement whatsoever? I don't know. I do know I would never expect an Objectivist to claim that human action is virtually as predictable as the action of my pet cat!

I made two points -- two fairly simple points -- in my Post 229. I asked your opinion about them to make sure we're on the same page. Surely, you can see that if we can't agree on these two points, then we must disagree on virtually every issue with regard to economics, human action and, even, human rights, at least with regard to human knowledge about such matters. To continue a back-and-forth nitpicking discussion under such circumstances would be for naught (though I have learned a bit about Objectivist thinking from our discussion so far).

We are arguing at cross purposes.

You don't understand where I'm coming from.

Man's choices are determined by antecedent causes, among which are his values, goals and purposes, but his choices are nevertheless unconstrained. In that respect, his voluntary actions are due not to efficient causation, but to final causation (using two of Aristotle's four causes).

I didn't use the term "mechanistic." I do not believe that man's behavior is mechanistic; I believe that it is purposive. However, I don't see any contradiction in saying that purposive behavior is determined by one's value judgments. Nor do I see any contradiction in saying that it can be predicted within certain reasonable limits. We make predictions about people's behavior all the time based on our knowledge of their values and goals.

In short, his methods are bogus and cannot be saved by any amount of tampering with the data or by any new means of more precise analysis, viz., the computer.   

The problem here is not that he is using induction, but that he is using it improperly. A proper application of induction would already have shown that a minimum-wage law causes employment, not because it reduces the quantity of labor demanded below what it was before the law was passed or raised, but because it reduces the quantity of labor demanded below what it otherwise would have been had the law not been passed or raised. In other words, a minimum-wage law reduces the demand for labor ceteris paribus. No amount of statistical shenanigans from academic frauds like Card and Krueger (see their book Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum-Wage) can alter that fact. At higher wages rates, employers have less funds available for employment; hence their demand for labor must be less than it otherwise would be.       

I'm still interested in your responses to my two previous posts, which you said you would reply to, and also what you think of Peikoff's "Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy" article, because it's relevant to several of the issues we've been discussing.

I am not a philosopher. You are obviously well-versed in the nuances of philosophical reasoning. I am not. To be frank, I place little value on the nuances of philosophical argumentation.

If you're "not well-versed in the nuances of philosophical reasoning," as you say, then on what grounds do you "place little value" on it? Suppose I said that I'm not well-versed in the nuances of economic reasoning, but that I nevertheless place little value on it. Would you respect that statement? You are, in fact, engaged in philosophical reasoning, whether you care to acknowledge it or not. But to fill you in on the terminology, "efficient causation" refers to the force or agent producing the effect; "final causation," to the purpose for which a choice made. So a person's choices are "caused" not by some antecedent agent forcing him to make them (i.e., not by an efficient cause), but by the goal, purpose or value for which they are chosen (i.e., by a final cause).

I think most often philosophers get caught up in the trees and miss the forest.

Well, I'm not "most philosophers," any more than you're "most economists." So, be careful how you generalize!

I like Mises' economics not because of the philosophy which underpins it, but because his method works, plain and simple.

"Works" by what standard? To say that something "works" is simply to say that it serves a particular purpose. If the purpose is to understand economic activity, then what is the purpose of THAT? Why is understanding economic activity important? It is important, because it can better enable us to satisfy our material needs and values. And once you acknowledge that, you're right back into the normative aspect of economics. We SHOULD study economics, because it will enable us to achieve our material values, which are WORTH pursuing, because they are conducive to our own happiness.

Economics which rely on the methods of natural sciences to gain knowledge fail the "smell test." The conclusions of inductive economics are virtually always unrealistic, uncertain and undependable. In other words, they are all but useless in theoretical economics, in which I am most interested.

In my opinion, Mises greatest insight was: Absolute subjectivisim in method. This removes objective value from economic discussion...

By "objective value," you mean "intrinsic value" in the Objectivist terminology

...and allows economics to be raised to the level of a true "objective" and "non-normative" science.

Give me a break! When will you learn that objectivity is not incompatible with normative science!

Of course, you do not believe any of this which makes discussion fruitless. As best I can tell, you believe "value" trumps and guides all notions of human choice.

YES!!! Your choices are BASED ON your value judgments! Even von Mises acknowledges that.

You don't believe in objective ethical values...

WHAT?!? I don't believe in OBJECTIVE ethical values??? You've got to be kidding! Where have you been throughout this entire discussion, in which I've quoted from Rand's "The Objectivist Ethics," in support of my views?? Are you paying attention to anything I say?!?

...but you do believe in metaphysical values which pretty much agree down the line with Ayn Rand's notion of the appropriate values for man qua man. Your quaint (at least in my judgment) notions with regard to metaphysical value color all your thinking.

Spare me the sarcasm!

While you're not a strict determinist, you believe metaphysical values shape and delimit human choices.

First of all, I don't know what you mean by "metaphysical values." I've never used that term. But I gather that you mean biologically based values -- values based on man's nature as certain kind of living organism. I.e., it is man's nature, not his whims, that determines what will make him happy. Secondly, contrary to your characterization, I AM a strict determinist, because I hold that a person's value-judgments determine his choices. But I DON'T hold that "metaphysical" values (your term for the objective conditions required for human happiness) shape and delimit human choices. Man can make irrational, self-destructive choices -- choices that sabotage his own happiness. The objective requirements for human happiness do NOT determine his choices.

So far as man makes choices in line with this ultimate value, he is happy.

Not necessarily. Sometimes a person can fail to achieve happiness due to events outside his control, despite making rational choices -- choices whose purpose is the achievement of his own happiness.

So far as he doesn't, he isn't and cannot be happy.

Well, he cannot be as happy as he otherwise would, all other things being equal.

Obviously, your views directly contradict Mises' method of absolute subjectivism, thus your vehement opinion that economics (not to mention ethics) should be (and is) normative. (If I'm wrong about any of this, I'm sure you'll straighten me out.)

Well, for the record, you did use the term "mechanistic," but not in reference to human action.

Yes, I didn't use it the way that you said I did!

In Post #230 you changed my original posit to: "What I think you're asking is, do I agree that non-human action occurs with mechanistic regularity and is therefore determined and predictable, whereas human action is not?" I think it is only fair that I get to use your terms in trying to prove your thesis is mistaken.

I do see a contradiction in saying that "that purposive behavior is determined by one's value judgments" if by "value judgments" you mean a metaphysical or motive essence that predetermines particular outcomes of human action.

I didn't mean that it determines particular outcomes of human action; I simply meant that it determines one's choices -- the object of one's actions.

Mises did not believe that. Neither do I. Purposive behavior is determined by man's conscious decision to strive after particular goals or ends (particular "values" considered in a general sense, if you will).

Yes, and what determines that decision? -- his value judgments!

Given the context of the above paragraph, surely you can understand why I see it is irrelevant (if not contradictory) to say that human action "can be predicted within certain reasonable limits." Specific predictions of the observable outcomes of particular human actions in an actual "real world" setting is not within the province of subjective economics.

You mean subjective economics can't say that price controls create shortages and surpluses? Surely, these are observable outcomes of particular human actions in a real world setting. Remember the long lines at the pump during the price controls on gas and oil in the 1970's during the Nixon and Carter Administrations, which were the direct, observable outcome of those policies?

It is within the province of economic history and/or psychology. I would say (and Mises would probably agree) that subjective economics is a science of means. It deductively concludes economic principles from the premise of purposive behavior with absolute certainty. It's method is entirely rationalistic. Making use of strictly controlled thought experiments governed by the principle of ceteris paribus it concludes that certain means inexorably lead to certain ends.

But isn't that a form of prediction -- that certain means inexorably lead to certain ends? Given the means, you can predict the ends.

Because of the impossibility of establishing these strict conditions in the real world, trying to confirm or predict with certainty real world consequences of policies based on these economic principles is vain. The economic principles are, nevertheless, true.

In Post #226 I described an econometrician using the methods of the physical sciences -- inductive research -- to test the validity of his theory that minimum wage laws cause unemployment. I concluded: In short, his methods are bogus and cannot be saved by any amount of tampering with the data or by any new means of more precise analysis, viz., the computer. In Post #228 you responded:

The problem here is not that he is using induction, but that he is using it improperly. A proper application of induction would already have shown that a minimum-wage law causes employment, not because it reduces the quantity of labor demanded below what it was before the law was passed or raised, but because it reduces the quantity of labor demanded below what it otherwise would have been had the law not been passed or raised. In other words, a minimum-wage law reduces the demand for labor ceteris paribus. No amount of statistical shenanigans from academic frauds like Card and Krueger (see their book Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum-Wage) can alter that fact. At higher wages rates, employers have less funds available for employment; hence their demand for labor must be less than it otherwise would be.

Here is the evidence for our arguing at "cross purposes." You argue that my econometrician used the inductive method "improperly." I assume you mean that the parameters of his research were flawed and that the subject variables were not isolated. With proper parameters and variable isolation you imply this econometrician would have produced the correct conclusion: "a minimum-wage law causes employment, not because it reduces the quantity of labor demanded below what it was before the law was passed or raised, but because it reduces the quantity of labor demanded below what it otherwise would have been had the law not been passed or raised."

I submit there are only two ways you could be certain of the truth of the economic principle under discussion: 1) You learned it by conducting (or studying the results of) economic inductive research; or 2) You learned it by conducting (or studying the results of) economic deductive ratiocination. However, if you learned it by means of inductive research your knowledge couldn't be certain because some research (Card and Krueger) falsifies the theory (no matter how flawed you think that research is). [We have not even considered whether perfectly controlled parameters and perfectly isolated variables are even possible in real world economic experiments!]

I've partially responded above. Do you really believe hashing out the nuances of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy would reconcile our differences demonstrated above?

A proper application of induction would already have shown that a minimum-wage law causes employment, not because it reduces the quantity of labor demanded below what it was before the law was passed or raised, but because it reduces the quantity of labor demanded below what it otherwise would have been had the law not been passed or raised. In other words, a minimum-wage law reduces the demand for labor ceteris paribus. No amount of statistical shenanigans from academic frauds like Card and Krueger (see their book Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum-Wage) can alter that fact. At higher wages rates, employers have less funds available for employment; hence their demand for labor must be less than it otherwise would be.

You still don't understand what induction is. Induction is not simply gathering statistics. It is any form of reasoning based on observation of the real world. Econometrics is inapplicable to an evaluation of the effects of a minimum-wage law, because, as a form of induction, it isn't fundamental enough. All it does is measure what happens after a given policy, like a minimum-wage law, is implemented. By its nature, it is incapable of isolating all the variables. It does not show what would have happened if the minimum-wage laws had not been implemented.

But the purpose of induction isn’t simply to discover mechanical regularities. You're assuming that induction in the physical sciences must yield the same results as induction in the social sciences, but that’s not true. What induction in the social sciences tells us is that human beings choose their actions based on their cultural and philosophical values. So if you want to know how people will act, you need to know how they think, and if you want to change their actions, you need to change their values.

Moreover, induction in economic science also tells us that, with very few exceptions, people try to get the best deal they can for their money. So a seller will typically want to receive the highest price that he can for his product, and a buyer to pay the lowest price. Even the idea that people's actions are goal-directed is arrived at inductively rather than deductively.

You and I evidently disagree on the meaning of induction. You hold that the principle that minimum-wage laws cause unemployment is strictly deductive, whereas I hold that it is both inductive and deductive: inductive in the sense that it was arrived at by observing human action in an economic context and then formulating a general principle -- the principle that price floors cause surpluses; deductive in the sense that that this principle can then be applied to a particular case, like a minimum-wage law or a farm price support in order to deduce the economic consequences -- a surplus of labor or of farm products.

The question is: How do you know this? How can you know prior to the econometrician's research what the correct conclusion of that research must be? Or what the correct parameters of his research must be? Or if such parameters are even possible to achieve in the real world? How do you know with certainty that "Card and Krueger" are "academic frauds" who engage in "statistical shenanigans?" Why throw out the results of their empirical research and accept the results of econometricians whose findings correspond to the findings you think are correct? Indeed, how do you know prior to any empirical research at all that "a minimum-wage law reduce[s] the demand for labor ceteris paribus?"!!!!!! How do you know that the economic principle you quote is a "fact?"!!!!!!!