Concepts and Percepts--Are They Different? Are They Certain?

http://nationalzoo.si.edu/Publications/ZooGoer/2002/4/orangcount.cfm

Ed:

Alright Nathan, I'll answer your proposed ape/man conundrum. Restated once more ...

--------------
NH wrote:

PROBLEM: Now tell us, without referring to lineage, which differentia make one being a pan and another a homo sapiens?

* Rationality? Chimps are rational.
* Bipedalism? Chimps can use their feet alone, and some people are born without them.
* Anatomy? Some human are born with unusual anatomy.
* Speech? Chimps are as capable as many humans who use sign language.
If you cannot, that should be sending you a signal that your concept-formation by classification has some serious defects and/or limitations.
--------------

OK so far.

First of all, you haven't marshalled compelling argument as to why lineage is forbidden--you've merely stipulated this (and that, itself, is substandard argumentation). That said, I will ignore it and proceed--according to your terms.

Maybe you missed my conversation with Jeff Perrin. In fact, I consider lineage (and genetic tests) the ONLY truly defining characteristic which differentiates IN PRINCIPLE between humans and other primates. I exclude it because:

It's tautological, i.e., 'Humans are those beings which descend from the human lineage.'
It is outside the classificatory tree type of characteristic-based essentialism you are espousing.

It is rationality that differentiates apes from us.

That would be falsified if some apes were more rational than some people. In that case, by your own methods you would either have to classify those apes as humans, or those people as nonhumans.

Here are some results of some ape trials to make this point clear and unmistakable:

"Both chimpanzees performed substantially and reliably above chance in collecting a quantity of dots equal to the target numeral, one chimpanzee for the numerals 1 to 7, and the second chimpanzee for the numerals 1 to 6."

From:
http://www.geocities.com/mjberan/counting_pub.html

The first point to take away from these results is that the apes did not decisively learn the numbers. What would you say, Nathan, about a 1st grader performing "reliably above chance" in counting to 7? Would you say she is exercising her mind's capacity--or would a red flag go up, pointing to a possible developmental disorder for this 6-year-old child?

The issue, Ed, is whether apes are RATIONAL, not whether they have all the cognitive abilities of an average adult human.

Is your criterion for "rationality" that apes master EVERYTHING a six-year-old human can? Why not four years old? Or do you not consider four-year-olds human?

The second point (again, pointing to a "perception-only" conclusion) is that the total amount of numbers used, lies within a margin of error for short-term memory (ie. for perceptual powers). Crows can perceive (and remember) up to 3 distinct things. Humans can perceive (and remember) about 7-10 distinct things--such as a 7-10 digit telephone number. It is thus highly plausible that apes can perceive (and remember) 6-7 distinct things.

This is astonishing! You're counting the fact that primate perceptual ability might overlap that of humans AGAINST the rationality of apes?

In Boysen�s tests, where choosing the smaller of two quantities of candy resulted in receiving a greater reward, chimpanzees chose the smaller quantity 27 percent of the time.

However, in otherwise identical trials that used numerical symbols rather than candies, they were able to choose the smaller quantity 66 percent of the time.

From:
http://nationalzoo.si.edu/Publications/ZooGoer/2002/4/orangcount.cfm

With a bit more study you would have learned that Boysen was testing the ability of chimps to overcome their natural tendency to grab the greater share of the food.

Not only are these success rates paltry (again, imagine 1st graders getting these same percentages--after repeated testing!)--but they show the unmistakable superiority of symbol memorization (where numerical symbols led to more than twice the success rate), over a rationalization of true counting prowess.

The selectivity of your eye for only evidence which appears to you to support your position, Ed, is very disturbing. WHAT YOU DIDN'T MENTION in the last article includes:

[orang utans] "use symbols consistently from the verb, food-name, and object-name categories with greater than 90 percent accuracy."

and

"Moreover, chimpanzees can label quantities from zero to nine with Arabic numerals and one individual, studied by Sarah Boysen at Ohio State University, can correctly add sets of items or Arabic numerals."

and

"The Think Tank study showed that orang utans use a variety of cognitive skills to make the optimal choices, and their skills are comparable to adult humans." (Emphasis added.)

and

On abstraction and problem solving: "Most important, the orang utans were able to work out that to get more grapes they had to choose less, and did so without any instruction or direct guidance during the process."

Ed wrote:

Nathan, unless you can marshall compelling evidence and reasoning (as I have done here), I consider this problem solved.

Ed, I don't have to marshal compelling evidence. You simply need to actually LOOK at the evidence before you on the very pages from which you selectively quote.

For some strange reason, however, I predict that you will merely argue that I've only STATED that the problem is solved, as if I've really said nothing here

No, this time you actually addressed the problem. Unfortunately, you used only selected facts and completely misinterpreted them.

There's so MUCH evidence for the rationality on nonhuman animals! Rejecting it requires the same mindset as a diehard creationist who rejects evolution--and to sustain the belief one has to emulate their selective research methods or willful ignorance, I believe. Writing off ADDITION of physical quantities or symbols for quantities as merely "perceptual" is absurd.

So, no, you have not solved the problem, Ed. Rationality, by most reasonable definitions, is a feature shared by many animals. The difference is one of degree.

Nathan Hawking

Post 281

Monday, May 30, 2005 - 11:58am

Jordan:
>I'm familiar with Popper's arguments; I just don't think they overcome the problem of induction. While Popper hands us a tool (falsification) for shoving aside false theories, he doesn't give us much for�ascertaining which theories are true.

Yes that's correct. But it is not much of a criticism, given a) that he doesn't think this is possible and b) his critics cannot offer such a means either....;-) So we must make the best of what we have.

>And�what is a�severe test�if not the�degree to which it is doubted given past evidence? So far as I can tell, everytime we rely (or choose or use) the past, we're stuck with induction.

No, as in the raven example, a single counterexample (one white raven) is enough to provide a complete falsification. And further falsifications do not make "all ravens are black" more false!! That is the logical situation. It is quite clear cut.

This is also very different from the idea behind induction - that the *more* something happened in the past, the *more* true it is likely to be.

- Daniel

Post 282

Monday, May 30, 2005 - 8:30pm

Daniel:

>And what is a severe test if not the degree to which it is doubted given past evidence? So far as I can tell, everytime we rely (or choose or use) the past, we're stuck with induction.

No, as in the raven example, a single counterexample (one white raven) is enough to provide a complete falsification.

Do you think it's fair to say that, at least in part, 'induction proposes and deduction disposes'?

And further falsifications do not make "all ravens are black" more false!! That is the logical situation. It is quite clear cut.

True. But how does observing a green baloon make "all ravens are black" more likely, do you suppose?

(Jordan may wish to say something succinct here.)

This is also very different from the idea behind induction - that the *more* something happened in the past, the *more* true it is likely to be.

I think the formula is pretty simple. We assume order exists and assume we can perceive order, so the more order we appear to be perceiving the more likely there is an OBJECTIVE order underlying the perception.

That's perfectly sound. There are no guarantees, except that given the premises we will probably be correct some of the time.

I can live with that.

Nathan Hawking

Post 283

Monday, May 30, 2005 - 11:20pm

Nathan,

-------------
Maybe you missed my conversation with Jeff Perrin. In fact, I consider lineage (and genetic tests)�the ONLY truly defining characteristic which differentiates IN PRINCIPLE between humans and other primates.
-------------

Indeed I did--lineage is out (my value judgment of substandard-ness in argumentation is retracted).

My solution to the Nathanean conundrum: It is rationality that differentiates apes from us.

Your retort:
-------------
That would be falsified if some apes were more rational than some people. In that case, by your own methods you would either have to classify those apes as humans, or those people as nonhumans.
-------------

Fair enough.

-------------
The issue, Ed, is whether apes are RATIONAL, not whether they have all the cognitive abilities of an average adult human.
as humans, or those people as nonhumans.
-------------

Rationality is identified by conceptual prowess.

-------------
Is your criterion for "rationality" that apes master�EVERYTHING a six-year-old human can?
-------------

Rationality is identified by conceptual prowess.

-------------
You're counting the fact that primate perceptual ability might overlap that of humans AGAINST the rationality of apes?
-------------

Rationality is identified by conceptual prowess.

-------------
With a bit more study you would have learned that Boysen was testing the ability of chimps to overcome their natural tendency to grab the greater share of the food.
-------------

I did not require more study to identify this aspect of reality. It was evident to me from the outset. What is your point of postulating this "veil of ignorance" that you take me to be under?

$64,000 question: Why do you "project" this "unreasoned ignorance" on to my view of these data?

-------------
WHAT YOU DIDN'T MENTION�in the last article includes:

[orang utans] "use symbols consistently from the verb, food-name, and object-name categories with greater than 90 percent accuracy."
-------------

Explained by perceptual powers (outlined in post 269).

-------------
"Moreover, chimpanzees can label quantities from zero to nine with Arabic numerals and one individual, studied by Sarah Boysen at Ohio State University, can correctly add sets of items or Arabic numerals."
-------------

Explained by perceptual powers (outlined in post 269).

-------------
"The Think Tank study showed that orang utans use a variety of cognitive skills to make the optimal choices, and their skills are comparable to adult humans." (Emphasis added.)
-------------

Skills at what? Memory & association? These are perceptual--AGAIN.

-------------
On abstraction and problem solving: "Most important, the orang utans were able to work out that to get more grapes they had to choose less, and did so without any instruction or direct guidance during the process.
-------------

And they "did so" only 2 thirds of the time--explained by perceptual powers (outlined in post 269).

-------------
Ed, I don't have to marshal compelling evidence. You simply need to actually LOOK at the evidence before you on the very pages from which you selectively quote.
There's so MUCH evidence for the rationality on nonhuman animals!
-------------

Nice try (see above).

-------------
There's so MUCH evidence for the rationality on nonhuman animals!
-------------

Where (you haven't shown this)?

-------------
Rejecting it requires the same mindset as a diehard creationist who rejects evolution--and to sustain the belief one has to emulate their selective research methods or willful ignorance, I believe.
-------------

This is true--though you believe wrongly.

-------------
Writing off ADDITION of physical quantities or symbols for quantities as merely "perceptual" is absurd.
-------------

That's a statement, not an argument (as you've said here before--in somewhat similar terms--please state your argument, not merely your conclusion).

Nathan, I now have you--you will be assimilated (resistance is futile).

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 5/30, 11:26pm)

Post 284

Tuesday, May 31, 2005 - 1:36am

Ed:

The issue, Ed, is whether apes are RATIONAL, not whether they have all the cognitive abilities of an average adult human.

Rationality is identified by conceptual prowess.
...
Rationality is identified by conceptual prowess.
...
Rationality is identified by conceptual prowess.
...
Explained by perceptual powers (outlined in post 269).
...
Explained by perceptual powers (outlined in post 269).
...
These are perceptual--AGAIN.
...
explained by perceptual powers (outlined in post 269).

I don't see much point in continued argument, Ed.

But here's a suggestion, something you can do in private:

List a few abilities in humans which you see as "rational"--BEARING IN MIND THAT ALL HUMANS MUST HAVE THIS ABILITY.

Research whether nonhuman animals mainfest the same or similar abilities.

Remember, you're not allowed the explain them as "rational" in humans and "perceptual" in nonhumans just because they're humans and nonhumans respectively. That would obviously be question-begging and dishonest.

Writing off ADDITION of physical quantities or symbols for quantities as merely "perceptual" is absurd.

That's a statement, not an argument (as you've said here before--in somewhat similar terms--please state your argument, not merely your conclusion).

No, it's an argument. If you're claiming that mathematical abilities are "perceptual," and not a sign of rational cognition, you have some serious explaining to do.

But not to me. This is between you and yourself. If I were you, I'd be asking myself what proof was actually good enough.

Nathan, I now have you--you will be assimilated (resistance is futile).

I'd say that is purely perceptual. LOL

Nathan Hawking

Post 285

Tuesday, May 31, 2005 - 11:59am

Hi Daniel,

Jordan:
>I'm familiar with Popper's arguments; I just don't think they overcome the problem of induction. While Popper hands us a tool (falsification) for shoving aside false theories, he doesn't give us much for ascertaining which theories are true.

Daniel:
Yes that's correct. But it is not much of a criticism, given a) that he doesn't think this is possible and b) his critics cannot offer such a means either....;-) So we must make the best of what we have.

Sure, but then Popper tries to sweep induction under the rug as it applies to science, which I don't think works because, again, if science is to progress, I think scientists must choose or use some theories over others, and falsification as a tool fails to tell them which as-of-yet unfalsified theories to choose or use.

Jordan:
>And what is a severe test if not the degree to which it is doubted given past evidence? So far as I can tell, everytime we rely (or choose or use) the past, we're stuck with induction.

Daniel:
No, as in the raven example, a single counterexample (one white raven) is enough to provide a complete falsification. And further falsifications do not make "all ravens are black" more false!! That is the logical situation. It is quite clear cut.

This is also very different from the idea behind induction - that the *more* something happened in the past, the *more* true it is likely to be.

Well, I'm sure you know that Popper hesitated to cast aside a theory after just one alleged falsification, for he thought we should consider the possibility that our observation/measurement might be mistaken. But that aside, falsification doesn't tell us which theory to pick, only which to abandon, and it pretty much does that in clear cut fashion, like you said. But so far as I can tell, we're largely if not solely stuck with induction as the means by which to choose or use a theory. I thought Popper would disagree with me here in that he thought science doesn't use induction at all.

Jordan

Post 286

Tuesday, May 31, 2005 - 1:55pm

Heya Nathan,

True. But how does observing a green baloon make "all ravens are black" more likely, do you suppose?

To claim that observing a green balloon makes "all ravens are black" more likely is like what I was suggesting in my "severely limited universe" aid to the problem of induction (in the other thread). Everytime we see that a nonraven fills a spot in our world, we get that much closer to proving that "all ravens are black." Unfortunately, the world has lots of spots that ravens could fill, and besides, we're already making at least two inductive assumptions with this aid: (1) solids (e.g., balloons and ravens) can't overlap, and (2) the universe has a finite number of spots that a raven could fill. So I worry that spotting that green balloon doesn't really help us with "all ravens are black."

Jordan

Post 287

Tuesday, May 31, 2005 - 7:02pm

Jordan:

Heya Nathan,

True. But how does observing a green baloon make "all ravens are black" more likely, do you suppose?
To claim that observing a green balloon makes "all ravens are black" more likely is like what I was suggesting in my "severely limited universe" aid to the problem of induction (in the other thread).

I know.

I posted a couple of solutions to this in a new thread. It took less time than I thought it might, so I'm glad you persisted. LOL

Nathan

Post 288

Tuesday, May 31, 2005 - 7:48pm

Nathan,

I don't see much point in continued argument, Ed.

Ditto.

List a few abilities in humans which you see as "rational"--BEARING IN MIND THAT ALL HUMANS MUST HAVE THIS ABILITY.

Research whether nonhuman animals mainfest the same or similar abilities.

Ditto.

If you're claiming that mathematical abilities are "perceptual," and not a sign of rational cognition, you have some serious explaining to do.

Hypothetical mathematical "abilities" that are so scant as to be entirely explained by perceptual powers of awareness ARE NOT a sign of rational cognition. An ape who could count to 40--an amount beyond perceptual awareness--would be needed to ground what it is that you are saying--firmly to the twin pillars of reason and reality.

This is between you and yourself. If I were you, I'd be asking myself what proof was actually good enough.

Ditto.

Ed

Post 289

Wednesday, June 1, 2005 - 1:09am

Ed:

If you're claiming that mathematical abilities are "perceptual," and not a sign of rational cognition, you have some serious explaining to do.
Hypothetical mathematical "abilities" that are so scant as to be entirely explained by perceptual powers of awareness ARE NOT a sign of rational cognition. An ape who could count to 40--an amount beyond perceptual awareness--would be needed to ground what it is that you are saying--firmly to the twin pillars of reason and reality.

In the future I'll discuss why mathematical abilities such as addition and subtraction using symbols involves more than what you call "perception." For now I'll simply say: Use of mathematical symbols is reasoning from analogy. Apparently you believe that "percepts" can do this.

Which is where this thread began, isn't it?

I will add this, and let it go at that:

"It is clear that animals of quite a range of species are capable of solving a range of problems that are argued to involve abstract reasoning; modern research has tended to show that the performances of K�hler's chimpanzees, who could achieve spontaneous solutions to problems without training, were by no means unique to that species, and that apparently similar behaviour can be found in animals usually thought of as much less intelligent, if appropriate training is given."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_cognition#Reasoning_and_problem_solving

Nathan Hawking

Post 290

Wednesday, June 1, 2005 - 3:00pm

Nathan,

I will add this, and let it go at that: [Wikipedia link]

But I won't "let it go at that." From the self-same link:

Self-awareness, by this criterion, has been reported for chimpanzees and also for some other great apes, and some cetaceans, but not for monkeys. However both the interpretation of such data, and the data themselves, remain controversial.

No convincing evidence has been found for theory of mind in any primate species other than the great apes; the interpretation of the data from great apes is currently controversial, but some researchers are convinced that they do show theory of mind.

The broad programme of research into animal cognition has achieved a good deal. Nonetheless, its results and philosophy continue to be debated, on a number of grounds:

So much for letting it "go at that" ...

Ed

Post 291

Wednesday, June 1, 2005 - 3:23pm

Ed:

But I won't "let it go at that." From the self-same link:

Self-awareness, by this criterion, has been reported for chimpanzees and also for some other great apes, and some cetaceans, but not for monkeys. However both the interpretation of such data, and the data themselves, remain controversial.

That something is controversial does not give us an out to believe whatever we wish, Ed.

We can, for example, ignore the fact that nonhuman animals can do arithmetic using symbols, or solve problems by reasoning from analogs--we may wave our hand and declare all that "perceptual" if we wish.

The purpose of my link was not argument from authority--I can read the "controversial" parts as well as you. It was to provide a gateway to anyone genuinely interested in the truth about animal cognition.

I suspect that some Objectivist Fundamentalists will remain convinced of human rational uniqueness until they die. But the science is clearly moving in the opposite direction. We can see it, if we apply the same standards to animals we apply to young humans.

Nathan Hawking

Post 292

Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 12:25am

Nathan, you are, indeed, a "tough sell."

For resolution, we may have to go back to the original premises of this debate of man and animal--while taking into account Robert Malcom's insight:

---------------
" ... it might be worth to look at Mortimer Adler's THE DIFFERENCE OF MAN AND THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES... in which is postulated 'perceptual abstractions' - something which higher animals have a capacity of, but which are not conceptual, something only self-aware beings [humans] have."
---------------

Perhaps insight from Mortimer Adler will prove productive in gaining a mutual understanding of the difference between animal and man. As you are an intellectual opponent that refuses to "read up on" previous works--I will quote extensively: 11 quotes! (for the possibility of securing finality in this discussion).

***
For the "copyright-law" experts here, I am operating off of the assumption of the copyright rule that up to 2 full chapters (of an individual's work) may be legally quoted--in a single session. The following quotes account for less than 2 full chapters.
***

The following quotes come from Adler's magnum opus: "(How to think about ... ) The Great Ideas." Nathan, I would certainly enjoy your response to the following (others are welcome to chime in, as well):

Adler 1
---------------
" ... the fossils, I say, prove nothing because if the psychological missing link is impossible, then evolution cannot account for the origin of man's mind, even if it does account for the origin of man's body."
---------------

Adler 2
---------------
" ... the great German psychologist Wolfgang Kohler during the first world war on the island of Tenerife. Let me tell you some stories about what he found. He had a chimpanzee, for example, in a cage. And at the top of the cage some bananas were hanging. And around the cage scattered were boxes. Well, this chimpanzee put the boxes one on the other, scampered up the boxes, reached for the banana before the boxes fell, and pulled the bananas down."
---------------

Adler 3
---------------
"Another chimpanzee was in a cage and outside the cage in front of him, but out of reach of his arm, were some bananas. And there were two bamboo sticks lying around. At first he tried to reach with one bamboo stick, and still couldn't reach the bananas. And then he tried to reach with another bamboo stick and still couldn't reach the bananas. And he sat back and held the two bamboo sticks in his hand and looked at them and nothing happened. And finally as he was looking at them they came into parallel lines of one another. And as soon as he saw them in parallel lines, he tried to fit one bamboo stick into the other, making a stick that was longer than either of the two sticks, he succeeded, reached for the bananas, and raked them in."
---------------

Adler 4
---------------
"What is a sign that animals make by instinct only and men by art? It is that in a given species of animal, whether it is a beaver or a bee or a bird, the production is exactly the same, generation after generation, because instincts are the same. Whereas in human production, works of human art from one tribe to another, from one century to another you have great variability, and more than that an improvement, a perfection of the art."
---------------

Adler 5
---------------
" ... man is the only animal that makes machine tools. [break] This shows that humans can separate the idea of the thing to be produced from the individual production. [break] They can put the making into the machine and the machine turns out a number. This is a sign of art in human making and here is seen man's grasp of the universal, the plan, the idea, apart from the individual instance."
---------------

Adler 6
---------------
" ... all animal thinking takes place in the course of problem solving. Now what is the next point? All the problems that animals solve are problems that arise from basic biological needs, problems they must solve in order to survive in the struggle for existence. And they solve them by trial and error or by perceptual insight the way Kohler's apes did. [break] ... men think in another way. In the first place, they think about problems that there is absolutely no need for them to solve so far as their biological needs, their struggle for survival, are concerned: the problems of mathematics ... "
---------------

Adler 7
---------------
"All other animals that are social or gregarious are so instinctively. The organization of the beehive, of the ant colony, of the termite colony, these are all instinctive organizations. They do not change from century to century, from generation to generation. [break] Man is the only animal who devises the constitutions and laws under which he lives. This is the evidence of his reason and freedom. In fact, instead of saying that man is the only political animal, what I perhaps should say even more sharply here is that man is the only constitutional animal."
---------------

Adler 8
---------------
"Think of the baby and the pig. You don't see any more reason in the baby than you do in the pig. They act very much the same way, but there is this difference: the baby usually grows up to be a rational human being; the pig never does."
---------------

Adler 9
---------------
"Or take the idiot and the dumbest of animals. Modern medical research is able to cure the idiot--we are about to cure creep idiocy, for example. [break] But the stupid animal is not subject to cure. This shows the presence in the baby and the idiot of the potentiality of reason absent from the animal who has no reason at all."
---------------

Adler 10
---------------
"An interesting point is that only man is ever unreasonable. Only man is irrational. Only man goes insane or becomes neurotic. [break] It takes a psychologist to give a rat something like a neurosis. Rats, cats, other animals left to themselves don't get that way."
---------------

Adler 11
---------------
"The intelligence of animals is a sensitive intelligence, an intelligence active in perception, memory, and imagination. Humans have that kind of intelligence too, although as a matter of fact they often have less of it than some non-human animals do. Animals often have greater perceptual acuity than humans, or longer memory. But though animals sometimes have a higher degree of perceptual intelligence, or sensory intelligence, they don't have the kind of intelligence that man and man alone has, the kind of intelligence that I think is abstract or rational intelligence."
---------------

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 6/02, 12:31am)

Post 293

Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 1:15am

Ed:

Nathan, you are, indeed, a "tough sell."

For resolution, we may have to go back to the original premises of this debate of man and animal--while taking into account Robert Malcom's insight:

---------------
" ... it might be worth to look at Mortimer Adler's THE DIFFERENCE OF MAN AND THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES... in which is postulated 'perceptual abstractions' - something which higher animals have a capacity of, but which are not conceptual, something only self-aware beings [humans] have."
---------------

So you're going to quote the OPINIONS of a man who wrote the above book FORTY YEARS AGO, years before any of the contemporary research into animal cognition.

You may as well be quoting from the Bible.

Perhaps insight from Mortimer Adler will prove productive in gaining a mutual understanding of the difference between animal and man.
....
The following quotes come from Adler's magnum opus: "(How to think about ... ) The Great Ideas." Nathan, I would certainly enjoy your response to the following (others are welcome to chime in, as well):

Adler 1
---------------
" ... the fossils, I say, prove nothing because if the psychological missing link is impossible, then evolution cannot account for the origin of man's mind, even if it does account for the origin of man's body."
---------------

Is he suggesting God as the origin of the human mind? You're getting off to a bad start here, Ed.

[Obsolete chimpanzee anecdotes snipped. Try using some modern studies.]

[Quotes about "potential" intelligence snipped. We are discussing the defining characteristics of an entity, not a class. If you're going to argue from "potential" this or that, or the "class" of this or that, you're going to have to disallow abortions because they are "potential" human beings.]

['Man does better' quotes snipped. Nobody is disputing superior human achievement, or the higher intelligence of humans generally. What is in dispute is whether animals exercise the same rational faculties as some humans. Quoting some philosopher's opinion of human superiority proves absolutely nothing about animals.]

Adler 11
---------------
"The intelligence of animals is a sensitive intelligence, an intelligence active in perception, memory, and imagination. Humans have that kind of intelligence too, although as a matter of fact they often have less of it than some non-human animals do. Animals often have greater perceptual acuity than humans, or longer memory. But though animals sometimes have a higher degree of perceptual intelligence, or sensory intelligence, they don't have the kind of intelligence that man and man alone has, the kind of intelligence that I think is abstract or rational intelligence."
---------------

Ed, your quotes are nothing but someone's opinion. Argument from authority is a fallacy. Surely you know that.

If Adler had DEFINED "abstract or rational intelligence" and no animals could meet that definition while all humans could, then you might have a case.

But quoting these OPINIONS is absolutely worthless.

Quoting some philosopher's opinion that "man alone has the kind of intelligence that I think is abstract" doesn't make chimps and parrots unable to think in abstractions, faculties which they clearly demonstate to all but the intrasigent.

Nathan Hawking

Post 294

Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 1:59am

Nathan,

-----------------
"So you're going to quote the OPINIONS of a man who wrote the above book FORTY YEARS AGO, years before any of the contemporary research into animal cognition.

You may as well be quoting from the Bible."
-----------------

Nathan, philosophy primarily deals with timeless truths--your time-sensitive objection is fallacious.

-----------------
"Is he suggesting God as the origin of the human mind?"
-----------------

He may very well be, but I am not--alas a non sequitur.

-----------------
"If you're going to argue from "potential" this or that, or the "class" of this or that, you're going to have to disallow abortions because they are "potential" human beings."
-----------------

Individuals are actual beings--alas a non sequitur.

-----------------
"What is in dispute is whether animals exercise the same rational faculties as some humans."
-----------------

Agreed.

-----------------
"Quoting some philosopher's opinion of human superiority proves absolutely nothing about animals."
-----------------

Only if the subject matter is a matter of mere opinion--and not a matter of fact. Which is it, Nathan. Is human superiority a matter of opinion, or fact?

-----------------
"If Adler had DEFINED "abstract or rational intelligence" and no animals could meet that definition while all humans could, then you might have a case."
-----------------

Adler successfully defined what it is not (ie. abstract or rational intelligence IS NOT mere perception, memory, or imagination).

-----------------
"Quoting some philosopher's opinion that 'man alone has the kind of intelligence that I think is abstract' doesn't make chimps and parrots unable to think in abstractions ... "
-----------------

Fine. But wherein lies the burden of proof, Nathan? In those postulating a "new" similarity of man and animal (one that runs contrary to all former distinction), or those postulating an "old" difference?

To give perspective to the "old" difference--I cite Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding: " ... brutes abstract not ... "

Ed

Post 295

Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 9:47am

One of the biggest problems in this world:

(Some) People are still trying to solve scientific problems with rationalistic philosophy.

And they wonder why they get marginalized and ignored by scientists.

Here is a Dennett interview with Reason magazine that is very good. It discusses determinism, inevitability, homuncular functionalism and the evolution of free will.

http://www.reason.com/0305/fe.rb.pulling.shtml

Post 296

Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 10:26am

Hi Ed,

A point and a question.

Point: A definition, to be valid, must include each and every thing that it's supposed to define, and exclude each and every thing that it's not supposed to define. For "rational animal" to be a valid definition for "human," each and every thing that's supposed to be referred to as "human" must be rational (and an animal), and each and every thing that that's not supposed to be referred to as "human" must be be either non-rational or non-animal.

Question What test (i.e., set of observations and measurings) do you set up to determine whether an entity is or is not rational?

-Jordan

Post 297

Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 3:03pm

Jordan,

For "rational animal" to be a valid definition for "human," each and every thing that's supposed to be referred to as "human" must be rational (and an animal), and each and every thing that that's not supposed to be referred to as "human" must be be either non-rational or non-animal.

Okay, but I'd qualify this with capacity for rationality or potentiality for rationality. Otherwise the drunken monkey verbalists (linguistic analysts) will have a hey-day with: must "be" rational

They will go on an on about how sleeping folks aren't human--because they are not "being" rational, about how newborns aren't, etc, etc--ad nauseum.

What test (i.e., set of observations and measurings) do you set up to determine whether an entity is or is not rational?

Jordan, you've asked me this question before. Basically, a block-stacking test where old (ie.familiar) blocks are replaced by new, and somehow unfamiliar, blocks. Also key, in this test (now coined the Thompson Test for Rationality), are unforseen outcomes.

The evidence of rationality lies in wise incorporation and integration of unforseen outcomes (when parallel lines of reasoning are brought together for a grand conclusion that single lines of reasoning, on their own merit, could not have reached!). We are more than merely parallel processors. This is why the Chinese Room will eventually fail to fool. If conversation goes on long enough, then there will be unforseen outcomes that pre-programmed computers will miss--such as a joke that is not laughed at, for example.

This may boil down to intentionality. A computer does not have intentionality. Intentionality appears impossible to "program." Computers don't have "Eureka!" moments (epiphanies) regarding the unforseen emergence of something that single lines of reasoning would miss.

Dealing with new unfamiliar emergences--that is the strength of rationality.

Ed

Post 298

Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 3:53pm

Hiya Ed,

Okay, but I'd qualify this with capacity for rationality or potentiality for rationality. Otherwise the drunken monkey verbalists (linguistic analysts) will have a hey-day with: must "be" rational

They will go on an on about how sleeping folks aren't human--because they are not "being" rational, about how newborns aren't, etc, etc--ad nauseum.

Sounds more like a problem with your definition of "rationality," rather than the their definition of "human." I think sticking something in a category simply because it has the potential to be in that category violates the basic principles of definition.

Jordan, you've asked me this question before. Basically, a block-stacking test where old (ie.familiar) blocks are replaced by new, and somehow unfamiliar, blocks. Also key, in this test (now coined the Thompson Test for Rationality), are unforseen outcomes.

I remember discussing this with you, but I don't recall you providing any satisfactory answer. If you think this block-stacking idea is satisfactory, please elab on it because I don't see it as a test from the little you wrote of it above.

This may boil down to intentionality. A computer does not have intentionality. Intentionality appears impossible to "program." Computers don't have "Eureka!" moments...Dealing with new unfamiliar emergences--that is the strength of rationality.

So all humans and no animals are intentional? And all humans and no animals have "Eureka!" moments? And intentionality and "Eureka!" moments indicate rationality? Or maybe do you just think that if an entity can "deal [successfully] with new unfamiliar emergences" that it is rational, and that all humans and no human animals can deal [successfully] with new unfamiliar emergences? (I'm ignoring for now the lack of an [observable/measurable] test that would indicate intentionality, or a "Eureka!" moment, or the successful dealing with new unfamiliar emergences.)

I'll be away till about Tuesday.

Till then,
Jordan

Post 299

Thursday, June 2, 2005 - 7:23pm