Concepts and Percepts--Are They Different? Are They Certain?

Jordan,
As you pointed out, our views are perhaps similar. However, I worded my post as carefully as possible to avoid
just the things you repeat. (I don't say you are wrong to repeat them, simply that I don't have enough evidence or knowledge of neurology, etc to draw the same conclusion.)

In particular, I make no reference (as Rand does, illegimately I believe) to how percepts are formed. I don't know whether they're physical (I doubt it), nor whether they are integrations of sensations, or what not. All I use the term to mean, wrongly perhaps, is something like the following:

I see this tree right now. Later, I see another tree. I have to call them something for purposes of describing what I'm seeing, but not for seeing them. To do that, I just have to open my eyes and have all the right equipment and abilities. (Whatever those are; I leave that to psychologists and neurologists.) I hypothesis that in my mind there is some correlate called a 'percept'. At a later stage, I abstract and form something called a 'concept'. These are two distinct things/processes. (I don't really know whether a percept or a concept should be called a 'thing', in the sense of. mental entity, physical arrangement of neuron states, or whatever.)

But those two acts of perception (seeing the two different trees at two different times), I'm pretty sure, should not be called the same thing. Same kind of thing, yeah. But not the same thing. The mental correlate of this X I'm looking at is not the same mental correlate as this X, though they have much in common.

Further, those percepts are NOT the same thing as the concept 'tree'. I believe they differ in more than just the 'source of the data', but a discussion of that is complex and lengthy and will have to wait. (Naturally I don't expect anyone to be persuaded because of my 'belief'.)
In the short term, I can only recommend introspection, Gibson, and Kelley. An inadequate response, to be sure.

Post 41

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 11:57am

Michael:

Erggggggghh...

You say that stating that a brain is the faculty that integrates, and that a percept is what one type of integrated mental unit is called is "semantic confusion and hair-splitting"?

Michael, a brain is a hunk of meat, not a faculty.

Perception is the faculty, and percepts the product of the faculty.

You objected to my characterizing this as as 'a percept integrates,' so, yes, that is sematic confusion and hair-splitting.

Sorry dude, we really are on different wave lengths. We want different things from this discussion.

I wish you the best. I'm outta here.

I'd have to agree that if we can't get past something this basic we're not communicating.

Nathan

Post 42

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 12:45pm

Sorry in advance, Nathan, but this was too good to resist:

TWO DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF BRAIN

Merriam Webster (Definition 1 a):

Brain (1 a): The portion of the vertebrate central nervous system that constitutes the organ of thought and neural coordination, includes all the higher nervous centers receiving stimuli from the sense organs and interpreting and correlating them to formulate the motor impulses, is made up of neurons and supporting and nutritive structures, is enclosed within the skull, and is continuous with the spinal cord through the foramen magnum.

Nathan Hawking (Post 41 in Solo's Concepts and Percepts--Are They Different? Are They Certain? forum thread):

Brain: A hunk of meat.

LOLOLOLOL...

//;-)

Michael

btw - I used the word "faculty" in the colloquial sense of including the organ. Not very precise on my part, so, for the record, here is my rephrase:

A brain is an organ that bears the faculty of integrating. A percept is one type of integrated mental unit housed in a brain. Stimuli data from sense organs are what is originally integrated by a brain, then the mental units themselves also become elements that can be integrated into other mental units.

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 5/09, 12:47pm)

Post 43

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 2:31pm

Hi Jeff,

As you pointed out, our views are perhaps similar.....However...I make no reference (as Rand does, illegimately I believe) to how percepts are formed.

To be sure, I was just trying to illuminate Rand's view, not share my own. But let me clear something up:

I make no reference (as Rand does, illegimately I believe) to how percepts are formed. I don't know whether they're physical (I doubt it), nor whether they are integrations of sensations, or what not. All I use the term to mean, wrongly perhaps, is something like the following:

I don't think Rand mentions whether she thinks percepts are physical. (Actually, I doubt she does because she seems comfy withe idea that the mind and mental components are non-physical in nature. That is, it seems she rejects materialism.) What I said was that she views percepts as physical things as retained by the brain. Maybe what I should've said was that she views percepts as the brain's retention of a physical thing, where the physical thing would be, say, the tree, and the percept would be the brain's retention of that tree. But you're right that she viewed percepts as integrated sensations, and I suppose this does venture into answering not just what percepts and concepts and but how came to be.

I think your view (which I think we agree is subsumed in Rand's view) is a little safer than Rand's because it avoids answering how percepts are formed. But you do seem to hint a little at answering how when you write:

I hypothesis that in my mind there is some correlate called a 'percept'. At a later stage, I abstract and form something called a 'concept'. These are two distinct things/processes.

Here I see you saying that however percepts are formed, it is not by the same process by which concepts are formed, and not at the same time either. Rand would agree I'm sure. My trouble with this is the same trouble I have with what I take as Nathan's view: I don't know how to test it.

Jordan

Post 44

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 2:42pm

Jordan:

Nathan wrote:

My difference with her is that I extend the notion of concepts all the way down to the unconscious and perceptual level. This is not to say that there are no additional cognitive requirements for conscious conceptual thinking--it is to say that the fundamentals are the same.

Ok. What are those same fundamentals? It seems you think that both identification and categorization are present throughout cognitive processes.

Yes.

Certainly even at the level of the sensory cells, identification (at that level) is taking place. A certain neuron receptor, for example, will fire in the presence of molecules of the amino acid glutamate. The simple logic of this neuron is, expressed in computer pseudocode:

if IsGlutamate then GlutamateSignal else DoNothing;

That's clearly identification. It is also inherently categorization in that it knows two categories of molecules, glutamate and NOT-glutamate.

At the level of perception, we thus have both identification and categorization, but we also have an additional feature, integration of a number of the senses and their data. A percept which identifies meat, for example, might handle the data from the senses like this, expressed in computer pseudocode:

if GlutamateSignal and
if SaltySignal and
if SolidSignal and
if MeatPropertyASignal and
if MeatPropertyBSignal and
...
then MeatSignal
else TestForOtherKnowSubstances;

The meat-eating organism, to identify meat, must retain a mental list of sufficient properties of meat to enable it to distinguish meat not only from NOT-meat, but from water, from rotten meat, from rocks, etc. In short, even at the level of percepts, the organism must have a CONCEPT of what "meat" is--as you note below, that entails a category.

Anyone who denies this is obligated to logically demonstrate what process would be between that which I describe for sense and for percept.

Roughly speaking, the act of employing the latter algorithm is perception, while the percept is (data + algorithm), akin to those "mental units" Rand described.

Also, I see what some other discussers are saying about your word/definition choice.

A different model may require that some words be defined differently. There are only so many words.

Rand's use of "percept" and "concept" differ from their common usages and from your uses of them.

At the fundamental levels, mine, Rand's, and the general useage are rather alike. See:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concept
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percept

Beyond that, of course, there are differences, which I'll note below.

If you compare the Wikipedia definitions, you'll see something which can be brought to bear here:

A concept is "an ... idea ... that serves to designate a category ..."

A percept "cause[s] ... the activation of a certain category in the mind, i.e., the percept."

In these views, and mine, categorization is involved in both perceptual and nonperceptual conceptualization.

I suspect one reason Rand's definiton of percept seems to differ so is her use of the unexplicated notion of "mental unit."

For Rand, a "percept" is just a physical thing as retained by the brain, while a "concept" is a category as retained by the brain.

I prefer to say that REPRESENTATIONS of physical things are retained by the brain.

Rand would argue that we can't retain a category until we identify at least two or more things that would be members of that category. (ITOE, pg 10).

I guess she rejected the idea that categories could have only one member, but I don't see why. Let's just give her the benefit of the doubt and assume she would allow categories so long as at least one member of the category is identified first.

Etymologically, a category is an assemblage. In contemporary use, it's simply a classification irrespective of number.

Rand would say that we first identify a thing, then categorize it -- that identification and categorization don't happen simultaneously, and that categorization doesn't precede identification.

I'm not sure if she would say that. I'll leave that to a Rand scholar.

I hold that identification IS an act of categorization. Even a single cell, as I noted above, which is sensitive to certain molecule M, has two implicit categories, M or NOT-M.

A foundational perceptual categoric concept is: THING or NOT-
THING.

I think for your view to work, every physical thing as retained by the brain would also have to be simultaneously retained by the brain as a member of a category. I don't have any big quips with this view; I'm just not sure how to test it.

My epistemological views are testable in the same ways one tests the views of Rand, Dennett, Searle, Gibson, Kant, Chalmers, et al.

Second, the evidence is overwhelming that our senses CAN be invalid, i.e., that we can "sense things" which are not really there. For anyone to deny this evidence is, in my view, nothing short of dogma.

Sure. Sometimes senses screw up. Rand should've said that some senses have to be valid some of the time. But she overstated her case.

As for certainty. I don't know what you're arguing for or against.

Overstated is an understatement. LOL

At least, her interpreters regularly take the position that certitude (in the strong sense) is not only possible but necessary if we are to avoid intellectual and moral chaos.

As I noted, this is a Perfectionist Fallacy. I'm arguing:

FOR: The general efficacy of the human senses and the human mind, their fitness for most, if not all, of our needs as human beings. That we hold knowledge of the world and how it operates.

AGAINST: The assertion that certitude is essential to knowledge, that without it we are adrift in a sea of chaos. The assertion that certitude is even possible in any significant way.

As noted, I consider myself a Representationalist. I believe that the correct elements of Objectivism fit within that framework, as a subset, so in that regard (among others) I consider myself an Objectivist.

Along this same line, I don't think Ayn Rand or her philosophy have to be perfect to earn my respect. Nor, do I think, we honor her better angels by being afraid to extend or modify or even supplant her thinking where necessary.

Thanks, Jordan, for posing such interesting questions.

Nathan Hawking

Post 45

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 3:00pm

Jordan,
My view is very unlikely to be 100% consistent since I really don't know the correct answer.
I hedged my bets, inadequately to be sure, by calling it a 'thing/process'.

I wasn't ascribing to Rand the view that percepts are physical; I was responding
to Michael's posts there (and possibly yours?).

Still, your post seems to suggest that she said they were physical (and that possibly you too think so), when you write:

"What I said was that she views percepts as physical things as retained by the brain. Maybe what I should've said was that she views percepts as the brain's retention of a physical thing"

At best that statement seems ambiguous. So simple question: Do you believe percepts are physical, like a neuron is? I.e. are they composed of molecules in some particular arrangement in motion? I honestly don't know the answer to that. Aware as I am of the 'dangers' of materialism, I'm inclined to think not. (And this from an ex-grad student of physics!)

You keep referring to 'brain', and to 'physical things', etc. That may be right ... I just don't have enough knowledge of cognitive science and neurlogy to have a well founded opinion.

As to testing the hypothesis ... so far as what I'm asserting, which is pretty minimal, introspection, a little philosophy, and some very elementary knowledge of anatomy seems to be enough.

I see a tree. At that stage I have no clue that sensations are involved. (Knowing that sensations are involved is a much later scientific/philosophic understanding. Of course, what I know or don't know isn't a standard that specifies what is. But given the difficulty, even in psychological testing labs of isolating individual sensations from percepts, I don't think I can be too far wrong.)

I'm reliably informed that brains, et al are what make this possible. Not believing in the supernatural I'm inclined to accept this. I'm trying -- and getting nowhere -- to be really simple (but not too simple) minded about this. The properties of this, can I say experience? thing?, are such that they are different in important ways from what concepts are.

To the best of my limited knowledge, which will expand soon, there is nothing in contemporary cognitive science or neurology which overthrows this view.

For more detail. see Gibson's books, Kelley's Evidence of the Senses and ITOE. But then you know that already.

And quite frankly, I haven't yet figured out what Nathan is talking about. But I'm going to keep trying.

Post 46

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 3:06pm

Michael:

Sorry in advance, Nathan, but this was too good to resist:

TWO DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF BRAIN

Merriam Webster (Definition 1 a):

Brain (1 a): The portion of the vertebrate central nervous system that constitutes the organ of thought and neural coordination, includes all the higher nervous centers receiving stimuli from the sense organs and interpreting and correlating them to formulate the motor impulses, is made up of neurons and supporting and nutritive structures, is enclosed within the skull, and is continuous with the spinal cord through the foramen magnum.

Nathan Hawking (Post 41 in Solo's Concepts and Percepts--Are They Different? Are They Certain? forum thread):

Brain: A hunk of meat.

LOLOLOLOL...

//;-)

Michael

In the spirit of jocular precision, then...

Brain: A LONG hunk of meat.

And complicated.

btw - I used the word "faculty" in the colloquial sense of including the organ. Not very precise on my part, so, for the record, here is my rephrase:

Just as I was using "percepts 'integrate.'" It was an inclusive expression.

A brain is an organ that bears the faculty of integrating. A percept is one type of integrated mental unit housed in a brain. Stimuli data from sense organs are what is originally integrated by a brain, then the mental units themselves also become elements that can be integrated into other mental units.

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 5/09, 12:47pm)

I don't have a single problem with that definition, so far as it goes. It fits perfectly within my epistemological framework.

Where I differ from Rand, in part, is that I SPECIFY more properties of percepts, which permits me to identify then in ways she did not and could not, so far as I know, within the milieu of her epistemology.

Nathan Hawking

Post 47

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 3:17pm

Nathan,

It will take some time to digest your hypothesis. In the interim, I offer this (useless, probably) advice.

I don't remember who said it but one author pointed out that philosophers tend to interpret according to the dominant
technology of their time. Thus, at one time the universe was regarded as a big mechanical clock; in the 20th century everyone hopped on the bandwagon of regarding the human mind as some kind of computer run by programming.

I'm strongly suspicious of the value of analogies of this sort. What will it be in 20 years when the technology is radically different?

I confess I don't have a super-duper alternative to offer. Other than to suggest that if a philosophical hypothesis is valid, it can probably be described in terms that were available 2,500 years ago. (Er, no that doesn't mean you are required to write in ancient Greek.)

(Unless you think the issue can't be understood without advanced knowledge of computer science and neurophysiology.)

But, possibly I'm too old-fashioned. As Dennis Miller says: I could be wrong.

Jeff

(P.S. I've done a lot of professional computer programming over the years, so that isn't the scary part.)

Post 48

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 3:18pm

Hi Jordan,

You worte:

I don't think Rand mentions whether she thinks percepts are physical. (Actually, I doubt she does because she seems comfy withe idea that the mind and mental components are non-physical in nature.

Ayn Rand wrote reams of stuff against the mind/body dichotomy. Of course she thinks percepts and concepts are physical "things" - she called them "mental units" and they are created, held and manipulated physically inside a living brain in this reality.

Their initial physical raw materials are sensorial stimuli (physical reality external to the agent), the senses themselves (physical interface between the agent's internal reality and the reality external to the agent but in physical contact with it), and their own inherent potential form (the agent's internal physical reality - a brain thing) after the data is delivered through the senses and integrated.

Once this "physical thing" is created inside a brain, it can also be used to make other similar "physical things."

I do not remember her saying the exact following words, but I am sure that she would have agreed that percepts and concepts are organic in nature. They go away (die) when a brain dies.

And as far as I know, she did not state the neurological/chemical/biological form or composition of them. But to her they were definitely things that existed in reality. Not floating abstractions cut off from a very physical living brain.

Michael

Post 49

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 3:36pm

Michael,
It's not a major point, but I have to respectfully disagree with your interpretation of Rand's views.

I believe, based on her view of consciousness as irreducible, (as well as lots of her writings),
that she would probably not regard percepts nor concepts as physical.

You might argue that her view entails that they are, if she is to avoid contradiction or to adhere to naturalism. But I think she would come down on the side that percepts and concepts as components of mind (not brain) that they are not physical. I myself am undecided on the issue.

Maybe Barbara knows?

Post 50

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 3:38pm

Jeff:

Hope it's OK if I but into your conversation with Jordan.

Still, your post seems to suggest that she said they were physical (and that possibly you too think so), when you write:

"What I said was that she views percepts as physical things as retained by the brain. Maybe what I should've said was that she views percepts as the brain's retention of a physical thing"

At best that statement seems ambiguous. So simple question: Do you believe percepts are physical, like a neuron is? I.e. are they composed of molecules in some particular arrangement in motion? I honestly don't know the answer to that. Aware as I am of the 'dangers' of materialism, I'm inclined to think not. (And this from an ex-grad student of physics!)

If you catch my post to Jordan, you can see that I have a problem with that too. A problem of the same sort as those who would call the senses or perceptions "direct."

My own view is that ALL mental processes are ultimately physical. There is good evidence that the mind entails change at every level: gross physical brain layout, cellular layout and connection, electrical, chemical, and patterns within patterns superimposed upon the physical.

...

I see a tree. At that stage I have no clue that sensations are involved. (Knowing that sensations are involved is a much later scientific/philosophic understanding. Of course, what I know or don't know isn't a standard that specifies what is. But given the difficulty, even in psychological testing labs of isolating individual sensations from percepts, I don't think I can be too far wrong.)

I'm reliably informed that brains, et al are what make this possible. Not believing in the supernatural I'm inclined to accept this. I'm trying -- and getting nowhere -- to be really simple (but not too simple) minded about this. The properties of this, can I say experience? thing?, are such that they are different in important ways from what concepts are.

Maybe my post to Jordan will shed a little more light on that.

See in particular where I use computer pseudocode to illustrate the differences between senses and perceptions, and where I note that (implicit) classification is required at every step. Also, the specific distinction I draw between sensation and percepts, and the specific comparison between perceptual concepts and nonperceptual concepts.

To the best of my limited knowledge, which will expand soon, there is nothing in contemporary cognitive science or neurology which overthrows this view.

For more detail. see Gibson's books, Kelley's Evidence of the Senses and ITOE. But then you know that already.

And quite frankly, I haven't yet figured out what Nathan is talking about. But I'm going to keep trying.

Glad to hear that. This conversation has been helpful. What I've written in years past on this subject is rather packed, and this conversation is helping me to unfold it and expand.

Nathan Hawking

Post 51

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 3:50pm

Jeff,

Are you kidding? (Sorry, no disrespect intended - just incredulity.) You think Ayn Rand would be capable of saying that knowledge is outside the physical realm?

Or that it exists "somehow," but not in physical reality, inside a physical brain?

Well OK, which reality then? Neumenal? Nope - she hated Kant. Heaven? Nope - she was an atheist. There is some kind of "mental realm" outside of physical reality? Sorry - I can't buy it.

Or how about percepts and concepts just are, but they are not physical? To me that is a blank-out.

How on earth can something exist and not exist at the same time? And then you think Rand was capable of postulating that?

OK. You are entitled to your opinion. But that goes against everything I ever read that she ever wrote.

Michael

Edit - Just so you don't imagine that I think a percept/concept is a lump of stuff like a small pebble, I consider its physical form ultimately will be determined in the chemical and energy reactions on living brain cells - with measurable attributes just like with anything else physical.

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 5/09, 3:59pm)

Post 52

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 3:56pm

Michael,
I'm not suggesting anything mystical. Maybe we have different definitions of what 'mental' and 'physical' are.
Sorry I haven't time to do better than that. But I will in a couple of weeks or less.

And please, it probably isn't intentional, can we keep the mocking out of it?

Post 53

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 3:58pm

Once one puts the Pagliaci mask on, it is hard to get it off.....

Post 54

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 4:04pm

Jeff,

No mocking intended. I just had no idea of what you are talking about all of a sudden. I mean it.

Those were the best examples I could come up with for a physical/mental dichotomy.

So I will be interested to read your thoughts on this. Once again, I mean it.

Michael

Edit - Jeff, OK, consciousness is irreducible as an axiomatic concept, however it still is interconnected with and dependent on the axiomatic concepts of existence and identity. A consciousness must exist, a specific one, in order to be conscious. Do you know of anything that exists and has identity that is not physical? I don't.
(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 5/09, 4:58pm)

Post 55

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 4:43pm

Testing the Consequences

Jordan:

Here I see you saying that however percepts are formed, it is not by the same process by which concepts are formed, and not at the same time either. Rand would agree I'm sure. My trouble with this is the same trouble I have with what I take as Nathan's view: I don't know how to test it.

Regarding the first part, that is also my understanding of Rand's position, that percepts and concepts are fundamentally different.

Rand holds that concepts are man's special tool, that humans are conceptual while animals are only perceptual. She holds that concepts are a faculty only of the conscious mind.

My position is that percepts and concepts are fundamentally the same, the major difference being the source of their data, i.e., the perceptual data includes that acquired from the senses.

I hold that conceptual thinking takes place all the way down, from conscious thinking through unconscious thinking through perception. In other words, percepts are concepts whose data is, in part, externally acquired.

Some Consequences of the Positions

If Ayn Rand's general position is correct, conceptual thinking evolved as a special human faculty, distinct in principle from perceptual thinking.

If my position is correct, conceptual thinking evolved before and apart from humans. Any living thing capable of perception is already using conceptual processing, and higher intelligence is largely an extension of what's already there.

Ayn Rand's epistemology would tend to predict:
Animals (as opposed to human animals) could only mimic language, never actually use it.
Animals would exhibit no capacity for devising novel solutions to problems.
Animals could never reason from analogy.
Animals could never reason from the specific to the general.
Animals could not classify entities.
Animals could not do mathematical problems.
Animals could not combine symbols to create new meaning.
... the list goes on.

Nathan Hawking's epistemology would tend to predict:

Lesser developed animals would have many of the same abilities as humans, different only in degree, including:
Animals could have some language skills.
Animals could devise novel solutions to problems.
Animals could reason from analogy.
Animals could reason from the specific to the general.
Animals could classify entities.
Animals could do mathematical problems.
Animals could combine symbols to create new meaning.
... the list goes on.

What do studies of animal cognition seem to be demonstrating?

Differences between human and nonhuman animals in principle, or difference largely in degree?

The evidence is out there, and some references have appeared in this thread.

Nathan Hawking

Post 56

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 4:56pm

All:

Jeff writes:

And please, it probably isn't intentional, can we keep the mocking out of it?

Seconded.

Edgy humor gets out of hand rather quickly in passionate discussion. Laughing AT somebody's ideas is not exactly the same as laughing WITH them.

Michael: I really did enjoy your joke about my minimalist description of the human brain, and responded accordingly, but as Jeff notes, that sort of humor easily moves into the realm of argumentum ad jocularium, to coin a phoney Latinism.

Nathan

Post 57

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 5:07pm

Nathan and Jeff,

If you don't like the good humor, then what other reaction would you deem appropriate to the contention that a brain is a hunk of meat?

I can think of a whole lot of less pleasant ones - the most unpleasant to me being to take something like that seriously.

A dead brain is a hunk of meat. A living one is an organ... is an... is...

...ah fuck it!

LOLOLOLOLOLOLOL...

How can anyone even discuss something like that?

Michael

Post 58

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 6:26pm

Jeff:

I don't remember who said it but one author pointed out that philosophers tend to interpret according to the dominant
technology of their time. Thus, at one time the universe was regarded as a big mechanical clock; in the 20th century everyone hopped on the bandwagon of regarding the human mind as some kind of computer run by programming.

I'm strongly suspicious of the value of analogies of this sort. What will it be in 20 years when the technology is radically different?

But I didn't make any statement that sensations or perceptions were programmed just like computers. I made no argument from analogy.

The implication was that the essense of their behavior can be described using the logical language of a computer program.

Pascal-like pseudocode amounts to nothing more than a plain-language representation of the LOGIC senses and perceptions use. I could have as easily described it mathematically or with symbolic logic.

Rather than turn a virtue into a vice, though, note that my pseudocode would ACTUALLY RUN as part of an artificially intelligent program.

Brains are not probably not von Neumann computers, but they use many, perhaps all, of the same logical structures we can model on computers. Some, like Hubert Dreyfuss, believe that sentient AI is impossible. Meanwhile machines are coming closer and closer to full-blown and obvious intelligence. They're about as smart as really stupid animals now, in terms of nonexpert, general AI.

As for your concern about comparing the solar system to a clock, that was not actually a bad descriptive tool at all, in its day. You'll find that most cutting edge research leans heavily on analogous thinking. Consider "string" theory. Physics is so far 'out there' that without metaphor we'd just be shoving symbols around on a chalkboard. Likewise with something as ephemeral as human consciousness--comparisons to computers are a valuable tool for attaining insight.

I confess I don't have a super-duper alternative to offer. Other than to suggest that if a philosophical hypothesis is valid, it can probably be described in terms that were available 2,500 years ago. (Er, no that doesn't mean you are required to write in ancient Greek.)

(Unless you think the issue can't be understood without advanced knowledge of computer science and neurophysiology.)

Exactly. At the least, it's an excellent metaphor. At most, the brain is entirely or partially a computer and cannot, will not, be understood without computer science. I lean toward the latter. Hell, I fall into its open arms I lean so far.

(P.S. I've done a lot of professional computer programming over the years, so that isn't the scary part.)

No, I took it that you were asking if I thought it was theoretically appropriate or essential.

Yes and yes, even though I drew no real analogy in that post. I just used structured English.

Nathan Hawking

Post 59

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 6:38pm