Concepts and Percepts--Are They Different? Are They Certain?

Nathan:
>What do you think my P/O model would "deny or disparage"? What kind of knowledge do you think my model would deny? (etc)

I don't know enough about The Nathan Hawking P/O model to talk about it, so I didn't! My comments refer broad brush to the classic issues of philosophy ie:what is subjective, what is objective, what is physical, what is abstract. Subjectivists deny or disparage objectivity, and vice versa. Platonists disparage physicalists, and vice versa. (and all actually have some sound reasons for doing so). Popper was attempting to reconcile these long-standing problems with his hypothesis.

>Why, then, would you (or Popper) hold that mental abstractions are not also "physically encoded" in the human brain? Why resort to an explanation which implies that they are somehow "nonphysical"?

Simply, the need for (partly) independent abstractions - and indeed for two types of them! - is suggested by two problems. These can be summarised simply:

1) Firstly, retaining human freedom, or purpose, or "free will" in our philosophical model (and not just "probability"). Sure, Mandelbrot fractals are "emergent", but no-one will argue that they are *volitional*! *Emergence* is not the problem - *determinism* is the problem! The fractals are *determined exactly* by the complex algorithms of the computer. The fractals themselves have nothing to say in the matter...;-). Now, if you want to argue ("So, how is the brain any different?") that human intelligence is likewise computational, just more complex...fine! Lots of people agree. And these people are generally called "determinists".

2) The second type of problem is this. It appears that numbers exist that no human has ever thought of. If they are not encoded in to any human brain, *where are they*? More classically, we know a perfect circle can be described in theory, but not physically. Why not? Finally, when my brain produces a theory, how come it can contain implications or errors *that I did not know about*?

It is these puzzling questions Popper's hypothesis is trying to answer.

- Daniel

Post 141

Wednesday, May 18, 2005 - 2:58pm

Laj:

Answer: I think that it is fairly clear that I have not avoided the question. I have answered that no one questions the existence of volition

By "no one" are you referring to yourself, or to the entire planet? If the latter, we must be living on different planets.

but that the physicalist posits a different explanation for volition from that of a dualist. The parallel for life is the same: a physicalist agrees that life exists, but his explanation for the existence and inner workings of animals is different from that of a dualist.

However, the nature of a physicalist's explanation for life and volition is such that to a dualist, the physicalist's explanations are no more than a denial of what might be called "genuine volition" and are really a defence of "counterfeit volition". The only way to differentiate both, argue physicalists like Daniel Dennett or David Armstrong, is to say what would be consistent with each theory.

If so, then it is incumbent upon them--and you, since you are explaining their position--to define the difference between the posited "genuine" and "counterfeit" volition.

"Example: silicon dioxide molecules alone are organized at one level, collections of them in glass are one thing, but a quartz crystal exhibits another level of organization."
This is physicalism.

So?

I'm not sure what you mean by "testable distinction." Are you saying that my position is no different than a determinist's?

If so, perhaps you can specify which brand of determinism you refer to, and define that position?

We can go from there.
Yes, I am saying that.

Then you're sadly mistaken.

That's a partial answer. You left out the part about "testable distinction." Two questions:

1. What would you consider a "testable distinction"?
2. In what way(s) is/are the position(s) of determinists testable?

Any definition of determinism will do, but I will take one from Peter Van Inwagen: "there is at any instant exactly one physical possible future."

OK. Here is a definition of a nondetermined universe: "A nondetermined universe is one in which at any instant there is more than one physically possible future."

I'd say that's a distinction. Are you, perhaps, asking me to "test" my definition/distinction in some way you are not asking determinists to test theirs?

If you are referring to aspects of human nature which ARE determined, I doubt you will get much argument. But to extrapolate that into a universal hard determinism is patent nonsense.
More irresponsible rhetoric.

I think calling that irresponsible rhetoric is irresponsible rhetoric. I suggest you cool the rhetoric.

You haven't even substantiated the argument in an serious way, and neither has any major philosopher who engages in dialogue with the academic community done so and claimed to have solved the problem of free will.

Wil you actually answer a few questions?

1) Which argument have I failed to substantiate?
2) Which alternative have you substantiated?

Peter Van Inwagen, a well-regarded defender of libertarian free will, argues for free will from paradox and intuition and not from the claim that hard determinism is patent nonsense...

That's him, not me.

Besides, I didn't say that hard determinism is patent nonsense. I said that reasoning from the specific to the universal, i.e., from "aspects of human nature which ARE determined [to] a universal hard determinism is patent nonsense."

There are clearly things in this universe which are apparently not deterministic. There's your single white crow.

(he would of course admit that libertarian free will is paradoxical too). Please, educate me with what you have discovered that improves upon his arguments and those of many others.

Waving another philsopher and asking that I engage in comparative philosophy is a hollow and diversionary demand. If you have specific points, bring them up--but do not attempt to play a philosophical shell game with me.

If you believe that only parts of human nature are determined, fine. I am waiting for you to substantiate that argument from your physicalist position with more than rhetoric.

Burden of proof fallacy. If you're making the affirmative claim that more is required for consciousness/volition than the physical/organizational, then you are obligated to say what.

As Daniel Barnes pointed out, the philosophic consensus after years of debate is that quantum indeterminacy doesn't advance the libertarian position.

Fallacy of argumentum ad verecundiam. Make an argument, not an appeal to authority.

Arguing hard determinism from neuroscience and evolutionary biology is arguing that a Boeing 757 and a IBM Blue Gene/L 32,000 CPU supercomputer are the inevitable consequences of our neurology and evolution, and not the products of millions of individual choices and design decisions.
And what is the distinction, if individual choices and design decisions depend upon the structure and organization the matter that underlies them? And what research program can we base upon your beautiful theory?

Good Lord. Talk about circuitous reasoning.

So, Boeing 757s and IBM supercomputers would only demonstrate volition if they arose, somehow, INDEPENDENTLY of the "structure and organization the matter that underlies them"?

So, in order to have volition, humans cannot have brains. LOL

You want a research program?

How about this: Shall we observe a planet for 3 billion years and see if an intelligent species evolves which produces things like Boeing 757s and IBM supercomputers, and if they can, we'll consider it evidence that they are volitional beings?

Admittedly, getting NSF to fund that would be a problem, but fortunately I know of a little planet where all the real work has been done.

The word "inevitable" is often abused, and I side with Dennett's treatment of the issue. We have all the free will we need, but unsubstantiated rhetoric disguised as fantastic argument will not advance our understanding of the issues.

Well, "there is at any instant exactly one physical possible future" sounds a whole lot like inevitability to me.

As for having "all the free will we need," who's claiming otherwise?

I'm finding your arguments thoroughly confused. One one hand you seem to be denying that Boeing 757s demonstrate anything empirically, but on the other hand you seem to be saying we have volition.

Do you actually have a coherent position? If so, what would that be?

And once again, I'm seeing your invocation of unspecified "unsubstantiated rhetoric" as hollow rhetoric.

What empirical test, we might ask, WOULD one devise to test the hypothesis that humans are volitional agents? You seem convinced that empirical evidence demonstrates the contrary, so what evidence WOULD be compelling in the affirmative?

Unless you are willing to state that, you are clearly arguing from a one-sided perspective.

You keep repeating that volition entails assumption, but refuse to acknowledge what I pointed out in an earlier post, that antivolitional hard determinism is replete with its own assumptions.
Yes, it is replete with assumptions. The only thing left to do is to see which view is more consistent with the empirical evidence in a qualitatively and quantitatively predictive way.

My view would suggest that things like Boeing 757s would be possible.

You have yet to even HINT at how hard determinism might account for them. I can see why you're reluctant to do so, why MOST philosophers are reluctant to do so. That's simple:

Arguments that hard determinism gives rise to Boeing 757s and IBM Blue Gene/L supercomputers cannot be distinguished from the claims of the delusional!

Inflated rhetoric? Argument from mockery? Not at all. It is a statement, albeit a dramatic one, of FACT. Ask any psychiatrist.

Here are a few things that would help the cause of indeterminism,or at least, the postulation of volition as a causal power more than a clockwork mechanism:

Identical twins differing widely in behavioral traits by power of choice.

#1 Bogus. All that's necessary to suggest volition is difference in CHOICES, not general personality or physical traits. And, in fact, twins DO exhibit variety in their choices. And, if asked specifically to behave differently, twins can choose to do so. (Assuming that antecedent causes didn't make them do THAT as well--the old Infinite Regress of Denial ploy.)

People with brain damage regenerating their wills by choice.

#2 Bogus. An obviously circuitous demand. Presupposes will to generate will. If they had choice, why would they need to "regenerate their wills"?

People choosing to be one standard deviation more intelligent as measured on their IQ tests than their first IQ test at 5-years old reports.

#3 Bogus. If possible, that would be explained by hard determinists as determined by antecedent, nonvolitional causes. Why would this be evidence for choice any more than choosing between chicken or fish for dinner?

Changes in mental health taking place without a change in physical brain chemistry.

#4 Bogus. Assumes that mentation is independent of the physical brain. My model would suggest exactly the opposite, namely that changes in mental health COULD involve brain chemistry.

All the current results of experiments related to the above issues support a physicalist view of volition strongly.

If by "physicalist" you mean the position that 'nothing more is required for mentation, including genuine volition, than the physical body and its organization,' then who ever said otherwise? I deny that physicalism implies hard determinism, of course.

And at least, we all know about the revolutions in biological sciences fostered by a paradigm of determinism.

Sigh. Can you point to a single volitionist who believes that EVERYTHING is choice? The implication that volitionists would never study something like inherited personality characteristics is completely false and you know it.

Your mysterious view of volition would not have supported an investigation into any of them.

Speaking of irresponsible rhetoric...

Apparently my view of volition is mysterious to YOU. Your implication that my views would have precluded research in ANY area is blatant nonsense.

To genuinely assert that you'd have to believe that I think ALL things are volitional, and I'm having difficulty accepting that even you could honestly believe that.

If you can cool your rhetorical pronouncements and actually DIRECTLY address the questions I put to you, I'd be glad to continue this discussion. Otherwise, I think it has run its course.

Nathan Hawking

Post 142

Wednesday, May 18, 2005 - 5:40pm

Daniel:

Thanks for responding. I've been enjoying our exchanges.

Questions from the previous posts which you did not answer:

How does Popper's model ACTUALLY do anything but say "they're different" and deny physicality?
Is he denying that his World 2 and 3 consist of the organization of the physical? If so, in what manner do they actually "exist"?
You note that [abstractions] must be "physically encoded somewhere." Why, then, would you (or Popper) hold that mental abstractions are not also "physically encoded" in the human brain?

>What do you think my P/O model would "deny or disparage"? What kind of knowledge do you think my model would deny? (etc)

I don't know enough about The Nathan Hawking P/O model to talk about it, so I didn't! My comments refer broad brush to the classic issues of philosophy ie:what is subjective, what is objective, what is physical, what is abstract. Subjectivists deny or disparage objectivity, and vice versa. Platonists disparage physicalists, and vice versa. (and all actually have some sound reasons for doing so). Popper was attempting to reconcile these long-standing problems with his hypothesis.

>Why, then, would you (or Popper) hold that mental abstractions are not also "physically encoded" in the human brain? Why resort to an explanation which implies that they are somehow "nonphysical"?

Simply, the need for (partly) independent abstractions - and indeed for two types of them! - is suggested by two problems. These can be summarised simply:

1) Firstly, retaining human freedom, or purpose, or "free will" in our philosophical model (and not just "probability"). Sure, Mandelbrot fractals are "emergent", but no-one will argue that they are *volitional*! *Emergence* is not the problem - *determinism* is the problem!

But please don't miss the point. If computers can generate emergent constructs without resorting to a 2nd and 3rd "world," why cannot the human brain? ("It just can't" is not an answer.)

Why would we hold that consciousness and volition are not simply more emergent properties but are instead "nonphysical"?

Why is Popper's physical world subject to determinism but NOT his hypothetical worlds--how do they escape determinism in a way which would not apply to the physical world?

Unless you can answer that question, then Popper's worlds could hardly be justified on the basis of volition. ("They just do" is not an answer.)

The fractals are *determined exactly* by the complex algorithms of the computer. The fractals themselves have nothing to say in the matter...;-).

Nor does volition will itself into existence. But the point is that it DOES arise where before it did not exist.

So, the question is, can it arise, like the complex fractal displays, from the existing physical realm--or does it require the creation of two more "worlds"?

I'm not particularly an adherent of Occam's, but which is the simpler explanation:

that an embryo develops into a child and a) consciousness-volition arise as an emergent property from its physcial nature,
or that the child developed a) world 2 and b) world 3 and c) consciousness-volition? Or would those "worlds" exist in an empty universe, independent of humans? If the latter, how do we come to be aware of them? How is awareness of something OUTSIDE our physical brains a better explanation than that we are simply aware of our internal states?

Now, if you want to argue ("So, how is the brain any different?") that human intelligence is likewise computational, just more complex...fine! Lots of people agree. And these people are generally called "determinists".

We don't believe in guilt-by-association, do we? LOL

I believe that intelligence is probably computational. But I don't make the assumption that all computationality is hard-deterministic.

2) The second type of problem is this. It appears that numbers exist that no human has ever thought of. If they are not encoded in to any human brain, *where are they*?

More classically, we know a perfect circle can be described in theory, but not physically. Why not?

Basically, the same way we describe a unicorn. Would we hold that a unicorn must actually exist in some 'world'?

We model it using physical/organizational representations in the human brain. Computers can do the same thing--are we to hold that there must be some nonphysical realm which corresponds to the model of a circle in a computer's memory?

Finally, when my brain produces a theory, how come it can contain implications or errors *that I did not know about*?

Back to those Mandelbrot equations in a computer's hardware. The equational algorithms and seed data produce results the computer cannot model in advance--it actually has to DO the algorithmic processing to create a model of the results.

Would it be any different for the human mind? We create theories using assumptions and rules of processing representational elements. Should it surprise us that those elements and processes have unanticipatable consequences?

To hold that those consequences, known and unknown, must exist "somewhere" in some other "realm" seems the height of fancy to me. How does the UNIVERSE "know" all of these things?

Why should another "world" be able to host such things but our physical realm be unable?

It is these puzzling questions Popper's hypothesis is trying to answer.

I agree that some metaphysical issues seem rather mysterious, but why compound the mystery by claiming that there are still MORE mysterious "worlds"?

That no more answers the question than the claim that God is "supernatural."

What MORE does it really buy us conceptually than saying, "these are part of the nature of the physical realm"?

To recap my questions from this post:

If computers can generate emergent constructs without resorting to a 2nd and 3rd "world," why cannot the human brain?
Why would we hold that consciousness and volition are not simply more emergent properties but are instead "nonphysical"?
Why is Popper's physical world subject to determinism but NOT his hypothetical worlds--how do they escape determinism which would not apply to the physical world?
Would we hold that a unicorn must actually exist in some 'world'?
Computers can model circles as our mind does--are we to hold that there must be some nonphysical realm which corresponds to the model of a circle in a computer's memory?
[If we] hold that [theoretical] consequences, known and unknown ... how does the UNIVERSE "know" all of these things?
Would those "worlds" exist in an empty universe, independent of humans?
If the latter, how do we come to be aware of them?
How is awareness of something OUTSIDE our physical brains a better explanation than that we are simply aware of our internal states?

If nothing else, you should focus on why these worlds would be uniquely nondeterministic, and on how these worlds would "know" about stuff like circles when our physical universe could not--and how would we 'tap into' these worlds.

This is all sounding rather mystical.

Nathan Hawking

Post 143

Wednesday, May 18, 2005 - 10:09pm

Nathan,

The paragraph was put together to make a point. Your splitting it apart forces a misinterpretation that I never intended. I find that mode of argument dishonest.

Answer: I think that it is fairly clear that I have not avoided the question. I have answered that no one questions the existence of volition
By "no one" are you referring to yourself, or to the entire planet? If the latter, we must be living on different planets.

I think that the paragraph you split up and the paragraph that follows it, when read as a whole, shows why we are not living on different planets. So I will address this no further and simply request that you re-read those paragraphs.

If so, then it is incumbent upon them--and you, since you are explaining their position--to define the difference between the posited "genuine" and "counterfeit" volition.

For an indeterminist, if volition is determined by antecedent factors, it is not true volition. This is still true if those antecedent factors are a part of what constitutes the self. Ultimate responsibility for an action lies with the self that initiates choices and acts in a way that defies apportioning causal responsibility to other things, even parts of the self. If that sounds incoherent, that's the paradox of indeterminism.

For a determinist, compatibilist or otherwise, volition is volition, even if is wholly determined by antecedent factors,be they genes, brain size or social status. Ultimate responsibility is pointless to define, and what is more important is an understanding of cause and effect. The problem with determinism is its incompatibility with ultimately responsible selves.

Then you're sadly mistaken.

That's a partial answer. You left out the part about "testable distinction." Two questions:

1. What would you consider a "testable distinction"?
2. In what way(s) is/are the position(s) of determinists testable?

1. A testable distinction is a distinction between two positions that can be made clear by a reference to the results of some experiment(s), event(s) or activit(y)/(ies). Testability involves predictions.
2. By seeing to what degree different behaviors follow from sets of similar factors, especially physical ones. This is tied to (1).

The more and more experiments that point to similarities in factors about human beings and society leading to similarities in outcomes of human acts and choices, the more credible the physicalist determinist thesis becomes.

OK. Here is a definition of a nondetermined universe: "A nondetermined universe is one in which at any instant there is more than one physically possible future."

I'd say that's a distinction. Are you, perhaps, asking me to "test" my definition/distinction in some way you are not asking determinists to test theirs?

No. I'm saying that nothing you have written before this thread has distinguished your position from physicalist determinism. You've simply asserted that your position arrives at different conclusions as to what is determined and what is not.

BTW, where do these other possible futures exist? In alternate worlds or universes?

Wil you actually answer a few questions?

1) Which argument have I failed to substantiate?
2) Which alternative have you substantiated? .

1) The claim that extrapolating from determinism in particular instances to hard determinism universally is "patent nonsense". It is at best, correct, though that is unlikely given quantum mechanics, and at worst, a misguided assertion. "Patent nonsense" is a stretch.

2)The alternative that it is not patent nonsense, and that even with its limitations, it is plausible hypothesis. Laplace wasn't known for his love for "patent nonsense".

Besides, I didn't say that hard determinism is patent nonsense. I said that reasoning from the specific to the universal, i.e., from "aspects of human nature which ARE determined [to] a universal hard determinism is patent nonsense."

There are clearly things in this universe which are apparently not deterministic. There's your single white crow.

Yes, the accepted scientific explanations for some phenomena are non-deterministic theories which propose an indeterminacy amounting to randomness. Whether this solves the problem of free will is another story. If this is your view of what people free, I guess it might explain some of your arguments.

Waving another philsopher and asking that I engage in comparative philosophy is a hollow and diversionary demand. If you have specific points, bring them up--but do not attempt to play a philosophical shell game with me.

Fair enough, but the literature on free will and determinism is so extensive that I do no have the time to repeat it. As far as I can see, your argument is that since certain phenomena in physics are apparently not deterministic, volition need not be deterministic.

Burden of proof fallacy. If you're making the affirmative claim that more is required for consciousness/volition than the physical/organizational, then you are obligated to say what.

[Some comments from Laj]

Fallacy of argumentum ad verecundiam. Make an argument, not an appeal to authority.

I don't have to since I'm not defending indeterministic consciousness. Robert Kane wrote a whole book trying to defend something like your position, so I'm fairly confident that my position, which is a physicalism that holds that free will and determinism are compatible, is not in need of substantiation.

I think the problem surrounding reconciling quantum indeterminacy with moral responsibility is so well known that I will rest on "an appeal to authority" which is really an assumption that you are familiar with the arguments.

Good Lord. Talk about circuitous reasoning.

So, Boeing 757s and IBM supercomputers would only demonstrate volition if they arose, somehow, INDEPENDENTLY of the "structure and organization the matter that underlies them"?

So, in order to have volition, humans cannot have brains. LOL

You want a research program?

How about this: Shall we observe a planet for 3 billion years and see if an intelligent species evolves which produces things like Boeing 757s and IBM supercomputers, and if they can, we'll consider it evidence that they are volitional beings?

Admittedly, getting NSF to fund that would be a problem, but fortunately I know of a little planet where all the real work has been done.

Again, you miss the point. You never explained how to distinguish between the claim that the current world is a consequence of the laws of physics, and the current world is an inevitable consequence of the laws of physics. You simply find it implausible. Re-read my response to you in that context..

Well, "there is at any instant exactly one physical possible future" sounds a whole lot like inevitability to me.

As for having "all the free will we need," who's claiming otherwise?

I'm finding your arguments thoroughly confused. One one hand you seem to be denying that Boeing 757s demonstrate anything empirically, but on the other hand you seem to be saying we have volition.

Do you actually have a coherent position? If so, what would that be?

And once again, I'm seeing your invocation of unspecified "unsubstantiated rhetoric" as hollow rhetoric.

What matters is not whether the outcome is inevitable (which is simply a synonym for the outcome being determined- inevitable is just a loaded word), but whether the outcome can be anticipated. On the other hand, you've never taken the time to understand the perspective from which I'm writing so I'm not surprised that you find my position incoherent. I find yours equally muddled and your understanding of hard determinism facile.

Loads of (hard) determinists are evolutionary theorists.

#1 Bogus. All that's necessary to suggest volition is difference in CHOICES, not general personality or physical traits. And, in fact, twins DO exhibit variety in their choices. And, if asked specifically to behave differently, twins can choose to do so. (Assuming that antecedent causes didn't make them do THAT as well--the old Infinite Regress of Denial ploy.)

The first line is verbalism: making a distinction just to avoid a contradiction. Of course twins exhibit variety in their choices (which can be explained by an appeal to differences in their environments), but the degree to which genes influence their behavior and make their behaviors similar is stronger than most volitional theories would admit.

People with brain damage regenerating their wills by choice.
#2 Bogus. An obviously circuitous demand. Presupposes will to generate will. If they had choice, why would they need to "regenerate their wills"?

Then the logical consequence of your claim is that you agree that the quality of brain influences the quality of a person's choices. Is that right?

The next question would be whether you think that two physically exactly similar brains can arrive at different conclusions when presented with the same evidence, and if so, how. Remember, physicalist determinism is being discussed here.

People choosing to be one standard deviation more intelligent as measured on their IQ tests than their first IQ test at 5-years old reports.
#3 Bogus. If possible, that would be explained by hard determinists as determined by antecedent, nonvolitional causes. Why would this be evidence for choice any more than choosing between chicken or fish for dinner?

Yes, but it would be incompatible with physicalist determinism. Let's keep the context here.

All the current results of experiments related to the above issues support a physicalist view of volition strongly.
If by "physicalist" you mean the position that 'nothing more is required for mentation, including genuine volition, than the physical body and its organization,' then who ever said otherwise? I deny that physicalism implies hard determinism, of course.

But in the absence of a conclusive explanation of how and why hard determinists are misguided, you should be more careful when calling those who extrapolate from certain causes to universal hard determinism to have subscribed to "patent nonsense". You have not explained how and where you differ from them in any serious way. Your defense of indeterminism would hardly differentiate you from a hard determinist.

And at least, we all know about the revolutions in biological sciences fostered by a paradigm of determinism.
Sigh. Can you point to a single volitionist who believes that EVERYTHING is choice? The implication that volitionists would never study something like inherited personality characteristics is completely false and you know it.

No, I cannot, because volitionists do respect science when it suits their cause. What I can point to are many libertarian volitionists (because, like I have said, there are many determinists who accept volition) who, whenever they are acquainted with evidence subsuming more of human behavior under the umbrella of predictability, complain childishly about scientific investigation into human nature and whip out philosophical defenses which amount to little more than emotionally charged rhetoric. If genetics hadn't advanced to the degree it has today, such libertarian volitionists would still be branding all determinists as evil people or defenders of "patent nonsense".

The truth is that all the great psychologists, whether as scientists or philosophers, have been determinists. I need not say more.

Speaking of irresponsible rhetoric...

Apparently my view of volition is mysterious to YOU. Your implication that my views would have precluded research in ANY area is blatant nonsense.

To genuinely assert that you'd have to believe that I think ALL things are volitional, and I'm having difficulty accepting that even you could honestly believe that.

If you can cool your rhetorical pronouncements and actually DIRECTLY address the questions I put to you, I'd be glad to continue this discussion. Otherwise, I think it has run its course.

I think that the discussion has run its course too. You seem unable to take your time to understand what I wrote. My main point is this: calling hard determinism "patent nonsense" and masquerading as a physicalist when you have not proposed a serious candidate theory for volition that is superior to the determinist, physicalist views researched everywhere is ridiculous.

Post 144

Wednesday, May 18, 2005 - 10:22pm

Nathan: �Why is Popper's physical world subject to determinism but NOT his hypothetical worlds--how do they escape determinism which would not apply to the physical world?�

Hi Nathan. I can�t speak for Daniel or Popper, but presumably his hypothetical worlds are regarded as �abstract�, that is, not physical. (I also assume the term �worlds� is metaphorical rather than literal.) The escape from determinism seems to be in the word �hypothetical�. If so, these worlds are interpretations, and interpretations are not bound by the stimuli that spark them.

In one sense, dualism and materialism face the same problem: how do material events �translate� into those experiences or states of consciousness � �mental events� -- that we describe as �enjoying a sunset� or �blissing out to Mario Lanza�?

If we examine the human body, we find various things happening at the cellular level � neuronal events, say � that we are not consciously aware of. These events cause other internal physical events � �markers� � that we can be aware of: the beat of the heart, temperature variations, stirrings of pain and pleasure, and so on.

But these physical markers under-determine actual states of consciousness. For example, the physical factors underlying the states of consciousness �fear�/�excitement� and �pain�/�pleasure� can be very similar. The underlying physical markers do not contain enough information to translate unequivocally into matching states of consciousness.

What I think happens is that we �choose� the appropriate state according to context � �pain� is relevant in one context, �pleasure� in another. In other words, we interpret by means of imagination and language the underlying markers, and the resulting descriptions or interpretations just are the states of consciousness.

But because the physical factors under-determine states of consciousness, we are not bound by these interpretations. We can �change our mind�, and what was �fear� can become �excitement�.

It seems to me that your notion of complexity and organisation assumes the existence of distinct internal material �structures� � isomorphic to states of consciousness -- that can be unequivocally isolated, identified and labeled as �pain�, �pleasure� etc.

I don�t think this is any way tenable, because whatever these structures are, they must be subject to material causation. Otherwise, you need to present an argument as to why some material structures escape causation. But you may already have done this, in which case it must have gone over my head.

Brendan

Post 145

Thursday, May 19, 2005 - 3:56am

Abolaji,

I see no point in continuing the discussion. Your arguments are riddled with blatantly fallacious verbiage-laden arguments that first-year college students could spot with half their minds tied behind their backs, at least the ones wearing high boots.

I leave a single example, one which persuades me that you resort to obfuscation and verbosity even in the face of the most obvious errors.

Abolaji, on a suggested test for volition:

People with brain damage regenerating their wills by choice.

Nathan: An obviously circuitous demand. Presupposes will to generate will. If they had choice, why would they need to "regenerate their wills"?

Abolaji:

Then the logical consequence of your claim is that you agree that the quality of brain influences the quality of a person's choices. Is that right?

The next question would be whether you think that two physically exactly similar brains can arrive at different conclusions when presented with the same evidence, and if so, how. Remember, physicalist determinism is being discussed here.

The circuitousness of your supposed test for volition is blatant enough for a Philosophy 101 course.

If you been possessed of the character to admit this, and not to try to bullshit your way out of it, I would have been interested in further discussion.

But you didn't, and I'm not. Too bad, too. The last question is a rather interesting one.

Nathan Hawking

Post 146

Thursday, May 19, 2005 - 4:08am

Brendan:

It seems to me that your notion of complexity and organisation assumes the existence of distinct internal material �structures� � isomorphic to states of consciousness -- that can be unequivocally isolated, identified and labeled as �pain�, �pleasure� etc.

No, that would be a gross oversimplification my view.

I don�t think this is any way tenable, because whatever these structures are, they must be subject to material causation. Otherwise, you need to present an argument as to why some material structures escape causation. But you may already have done this, in which case it must have gone over my head.

I would not say that anything "escapes causation." I hold that cause and effect become a circuitous continuum. But I haven't time to go into that furthur here.

Nathan Hawking

Post 147

Thursday, May 19, 2005 - 8:09am

Nathan,

My "circuitous test for volition" was actually a challenge to you to explain how indeterminacy necessarily factors into volition, especially if you claim that the physics is all that there is. I'm trying to get the details of your position; in other words, where is this airtight argument that the hard determinist is wrong?

Here was what I wrote:

Then the logical consequence of your claim is that you agree that the quality of brain influences the quality of a person's choices. Is that right?

The next question would be whether you think that two physically exactly similar brains can arrive at different conclusions when presented with the same evidence, and if so, how. Remember, physicalist determinism is being discussed here.

If your approach to arguments is primarily that of a point scorer, I can understand why you think I contradicted myself. For me, what your response to the question revealed was that you do dissociate your view of volition from the dualist view. Obviously, given your response that a brain damaged person doesn't possess volition, you are a physicalist, but you believe volition requires indeterminacy.

That is the core of our disagreement. I do not think that it does, or that the answer seriously matters. Therefore, I see no reason to dump on hard determinists. The primary reason for my rhetoric is that I think you are trying to verbally dissociate yourself from a position that you are not logically entitled to.

The big reason why people want indeterminacy in volition is because they believe that it preserves moral responsibility. So I want to see how your version of indeterminacy preserves moral responsibility.

For a dualist, the simple answer is that there are immaterial causes which do the heavy-lifting. For a physicalist, that answer is untenable.

If you did not get that from my past posts, you misread them.

Post 148

Thursday, May 19, 2005 - 12:11pm

Hi Daniel,

I can understand why Popper posited that W3. I guess my basic problem with it is that I just find it more useful to stick with the physical world. I think reasons that avoid positing the nonphysical are sufficient for why we have "evolutionary advantage," why humans could rebuild their destroyed civiliation faster with the aid of books, why we have volition, where (and whether) numbers we haven't thought of exist, etc. Or if the reasons situated in the physical are insufficient (and they often are), then I find them at least more useful than W3. No need to go into those reasons here.

If it helps, my view here is similar for why I find it less useful than not to posit the existence of a god. I could attribute volition, human progress and whatever else to god. Hell, most of the world does. But this hardly advances our predictive capacity, and predictive capacity is the hallmark of good explanation. So far as I can tell, our predictive capacity is still stuck in induction (yup, I disagree with Popper here), which still depends on observation and analogy.

-Jordan

Post 149

Thursday, May 19, 2005 - 12:41pm

Abolaji:

My "circuitous test for volition" was actually a challenge to you ...

LOL You know, my bullshit detector keeps going off with you, loud and strong. This is just another example.

As a reminder:

YOU WROTE: "Here are a few things that would help the cause of indeterminism...
...
"People with brain damage regenerating their wills by choice."
...

Now you're claiming your blunder was a deliberate "challenge." LOL What a load!

If your approach to arguments is primarily that of a point scorer, I can understand why you think I contradicted myself.

You're just lying, pure plain and simple. You are incapable of simply acknowledging that you made a mistake most Philosophy 101 students would have spotted.

I'd probably overlook a single incident as misunderstanding were it not part of a pattern of doubletalk and evasion. But so far as I'm concerned, you had already hoisted yourself on your own petard when you:

Ignored my challenge of your implication that "in order to have volition, humans cannot have brains";
Doubletalked around "Boeing 757s and IBM supercomputers [as empirical] evidence [humans] are volitional beings."

Clearly, I indulged you and your argument-burying verbiage far too long. I failed to insist that you stake out a clear and coherent position from your first post, and I failed to discontinue the discussion when your blank-out double-talk became obvious, and for those I blame myself.

I won't make those mistakes again.

Nathan Hawking

Post 150

Thursday, May 19, 2005 - 2:45pm

Laj and Nathan,

Knock it off!

Jordan

Post 151

Thursday, May 19, 2005 - 3:24pm

Jordan:

Laj and Nathan,

Knock it off!

Jordan

LOL Consider it knocked off.

NH

Post 152

Wednesday, May 18, 2005 - 5:17pm

Nathan writes:
>Arguments that hard determinism�gives rise to�Boeing 757s and�IBM Blue Gene/L supercomputers cannot be distinguished from the claims of the delusional!

Sorry Nathan, but that's where you're wrong. That is exactly what the hard determinist argument *is*. Boeing 757s and IBM Blue Gene/Ls are no different from Beethoven's 5th, in that the the hard determinist argues that they can - in principle, if not currently in practice - be predicted from the physical and chemical actions inside the brain.

Tell me: what literature is your particular influence in the field of the mind/body problem? Mine is obviously Popper (for example, his enormous collaboration with famous neurologist Sir John Eccles, "The Self And Its Brain") and things like Roger Penrose's "Shadows Of The Mind" (where Penrose significantly improves on his much criticised arguments in "The Emperor's New Mind"). Laj is clearly a Dennett man ("Consciousness Explained") which I have not yet read. It's a vast field - what things have pushed you in your current direction?

- Daniel
�

Post 153

Thursday, May 19, 2005 - 5:43pm

Jordan
>I can understand why Popper posited that W3. I guess my basic problem with it is that I just find it more useful to stick with the physical world. ...if�the reasons situated in the physical are�insufficient (and they often are), then I find them at least more�useful than W3. No need to go into those reasons here.

Shame, I'm curious as to what those reasons might be. But that's ok.

Equally I think I understand why Rand might posit a non-physcial consciousness (I think her system requires it, even if she only partly realised it herself), but then stop short of a World 3 scenario. This is probably because, as I've said before, her view of the issue is too saturated with the Christianity and mysticism that Platonism was soaked in for millenia. She thows the abstract baby out with the religio/mystical bathwater....;-)

- Daniel

Post 154

Thursday, May 19, 2005 - 5:57pm

Jordan:
>So far as I can tell, our predictive capacity is still stuck in induction (yup, I disagree with Popper here), which still depends on observation and analogy.

Are you familiar with Popper's criticism of induction? The reason I ask is that your comment here doesn't seem to conflict too much with Popper.

The trick is not to confuse *empiricism* (that is, observation and analogy, or theory and experiment) with *induction* (the idea that the more something happened in the past, the more likely it is to happen in the future). Popper believed devoutly in the former, and devastatingly criticised the latter.

- Daniel

Post 155

Thursday, May 19, 2005 - 9:09pm

Nathan
>Thanks for responding. I've been enjoying our exchanges.

Ditto.

>Questions from the previous posts which you did not answer:

>1. How does Popper's model ACTUALLY do anything but say "they're different" and deny physicality?

Apologies, I thought I'd answered this in my #140 1) & 2). Perhaps it was not clear enough.

You need a non-physical - or you can call it "an emergent physical property that is somehow not subject to the laws of physics", it amounts to the same thing - consciousness. or W2, *to avoid hard determinism*. There is no way round this if you clearly understand the problem. I call it "non-physical" just because it is more clear cut - what is not subject to physical laws is surely not "physical" in any usual sense!!!

But it is not important to argue over the words.

In brief, by postulating a nonphysical (or whatever you'd like to call it) W2 Popper preserves human freedom in his system.

His W3 then allows for knowledge to exist *objectively* in the most easily understood sense of the word. That is, "objectively" as in "outside of ourselves" (the Latin root of the word is "objectum", something that blocks our path).

Because knowledge that exists *only* in our own brains is by definition *subjective* (otherwise the word "subjective" has little or no clear meaning).
Popper's first essay putting forward the idea was called "Epistemology Without An Knowing Subject" for this reason.

W3 also avoids the *reductionist* program that is part and parcel of physical determinism ie: that a book is nothing more than ink on paper.

Interestingly W3, being abstract, is nonetheless also *deterministic*, like W1. For example, mathematical systems are deterministic - in fact, far more precisely so than the physical world, as was first noticed by the great American philosopher Pierce. It is not necessary for them to be otherwise, of course, as free will is not a required assumption in W3. W3 things are not alive. They are abstract *objects*.

>Why is Popper's physical world subject to determinism but�NOT his hypothetical worlds--how do they escape determinism in a way which would not apply to the physical world?

See above. Hope this clarifies.

>If computers can generate emergent constructs without resorting to a 2nd and 3rd "world," why cannot the human brain?�

The issue is not "emergence" but determinism. Human freedom rests on the assumption we are *not* computers - unless you argue that computers can have free will (and some people do)

>Why would we hold that consciousness and volition are not simply more emergent properties but are instead "nonphysical"?

The issue again, is not "emergence". In this case it is *subjectivity* and *objectivity* in human knowledge.

>Why is Popper's physical world subject to determinism but�NOT his hypothetical worlds--how do they escape determinism which would not apply to the physical world?

In W2 because it must as a basic assumption, in W3 it is even more precisely deterministic than the physical world!

>Would we hold that a unicorn must actually exist in some 'world'?

We would say it does exist in your imagination (W2), in books (W3), but simply not in W1.

BTW, even the most determined physicalist has to admit your unicorn exists *in the physical patterns of your brain*, much like in Popper's W2. The only difference is that in Popper's scheme you can say the unicorn was freely invented by *your imagination*. In the physicalist scheme, however you have to say the imaginary unicorn was *actually a product of the laws of physics*!!!!...;-)

Seriously. This is the case.

>Computers can model circles as our mind does--are we to hold that there must be some nonphysical realm which corresponds to the model of a circle in a computer's memory?

Yes. Computers are mostly W3 objects! That is, they rely on *man-made* rules.

>If we]�hold that [theoretical] consequences, known and unknown ... how does the UNIVERSE "know" all of these things?

I'm not sure what you mean. Philosophically Popper's view is that the *universe is open*. It is not Laplacean - or at least, not completely.

>Would those "worlds" exist in an empty universe, independent of humans?

The physical W1 is primary. W2 is dependent on it. W3 could survive our destruction, but not the destruction of its physical W1 encoding. There would be little point, however, in W3 without some mind to use it. But yes, W3 is like a spiders web. We produce it, but it survives after the spider's death.

>How is awareness of something OUTSIDE our physical brains a better explanation than that we are simply aware of our internal states?

That which is outside our physical brains is *objective*, whether it is physical or not.

Internal states are called *subjective* states.

We want to avoid a comprehensive subjectivism first and foremost (hence W1), then a strictly subjective *knowledge* next (hence W3).

Getting clearer?

- Daniel

Post 156

Thursday, May 19, 2005 - 11:29pm

Daniel,

Sorry Nathan, but that's where you're wrong. That is exactly what the hard determinist argument *is*. Boeing 757s and IBM Blue Gene/Ls are no different from Beethoven's 5th, in that the the hard determinist argues that they can - in principle, if not currently in practice - be predicted from the physical and chemical actions inside the brain.

Thank you.

I quote a passage from D.M. Armstrong's The Mind Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction, a description of a solution to the infinite regress of volition problem that Armstrong attributes to Dennett:

"So, in the end, a Homuncular Functionalist sees intelligent processes of information and intelligent behavior as caused by a huge mass of unintelligent processes. But the unintelligent processes are complexly and hierarchically organized, and this organization gives us the intelligent mind. Each step up the hierarchy sophisticates the process a bit more. Of course, most of this is programme, not performance, but it looks to be the way that a materialist ought to go."

Note that the final line of Armstrong's summary is fully compatible with hard determinism ("...program, not performance..."). Now, let us note that the view of volition, the self and consciousness that arise out of this view are not the ones espoused by dualists and libertarians/indeterminists of any stripe. But the far bigger points are that
1) the control is bottom up, not top down.
2) a lot of the performance of the intelligent processes depends on the material causes that underlie them, so it is not clear how to escape determinism - a higher IQ brain is on average able to use less energy to think (the correlation is about brain glucose consumption with IQ is about 0.8 according to Arthur Jensen).

Tell me: what literature is your particular influence in the field of the mind/body problem? Mine is obviously Popper (for example, his enormous collaboration with famous neurologist Sir John Eccles, "The Self And Its Brain") and things like Roger Penrose's "Shadows Of The Mind" (where Penrose significantly improves on his much criticised arguments in "The Emperor's New Mind"). Laj is clearly a Dennett man ("Consciousness Explained") which I have not yet read. It's a vast field - what things have pushed you in your current direction?

Daniel Dennett, David Mamet Armstrong, Antonio Damasio and virtually anything aligned with empirical science and neo-Darwinism. Dennett's best work on the free will problem is Elbow Room (1984) - lucid and accessible. His Freedom Evolves (2003) tackles many of the same issues, but it is informed by 20 years of research that do not necessarily make the conclusions easier to digest.

Thanks once more. Hopefully, I'll be able to discern from your discussions with Nathan what I was unable to get out of him. Cheers,

Laj.

Post 157

Friday, May 20, 2005 - 3:07am

Daniel:

>Arguments that hard determinism gives rise to Boeing 757s and IBM Blue Gene/L supercomputers cannot be distinguished from the claims of the delusional!
Sorry Nathan, but that's where you're wrong.

LOL I think not, but I await your explanation.

That is exactly what the hard determinist argument *is*.

LOL And your point would be...

Boeing 757s and IBM Blue Gene/Ls are no different from Beethoven's 5th, in that the the hard determinist argues that they can - in principle, if not currently in practice - be predicted from the physical and chemical actions inside the brain.

All a hard determinist has to do to prove that claim is predict something more than the trivial, then, isn't it? Something like a Boeing 757.

But that's a claim that, like any delusional claim, will forever remain beyond the realm of the testable. How convenient.

Now a little story.

Mr. Determinist:

'Volition is impossible. All things which feel like volition have antecedent causes and are not actually the result of genuinely free will. It just feels that way. You have will, a desire, but you don't actually have a choice in what you desire.

'Everything which seems to be an invention of the human mind is actually inevitable.

'Boeing 747s, for example, were inevitable, and we could have predicted them if only we knew a) the state of a large portion of the universe at a particular moment, b) all the forces at work in that large region of the universe, and c) all the effects those forces could have on that large portion of the universe.

'In other words, in October of the year 1004 we could have predicted EVERYTHING about the last Boeing 757 to roll off the assembly line, every part, every wire, every computer chip, millions of parts, ONE THOUSAND YEARS LATER in 2004.

'Of course, this is a little difficult to demonstrate, because the number of facts we would have needed to know is approximately 10 to the power of 4.57 followed by 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 zeroes.

Give or take a quadrillion zeroes. And in 1004 four we only knew 8 facts, just a little shy of the requirement.

'What? What's that you say? You say that even if we knew all these things it wouldn't help, because many things are not predictable from their initial states?

'Well, if that's true, then volition is not a causal thing, it's just randomness.'

Mr. Hawking:

'I start with the evidence of my experiences. It certainly FEELS like I can make choices. I don't actually have any reason to doubt it.

'Some philosophers tell me there IS reason to doubt my naive sense of volition, that cause and effect, antecedent causes, determine everything I've done and ever will do.

I ask myself: What is the more likely explanation: that I do not actually make the choices I seem to be making, or that their view of causality is flawed?

'I think it vastly more probable that determinists do not understand causality. They cannot actually predict anything of consequence for which the more overwhelmingly likely explanation is volition, such as Boeing 757s. 'If we only knew enough things, we could!' is a very hollow claim.

'What experiments would I devise to prove that my choices are volition and not the chiming of a clockwork mechanism? What kind of event or result would clearly be the result of volition and beyond the claim of 'inevitable consequence'?

'As it happens, I have devised just such an irrefutable test, but it is too complicated to fit into the margin of this page. Besides, I CHOOSE not to tell you what it is.' NH

Daniel, there's not a lot of deep philosophy in there (or... IS there?), but I enjoyed writing it. And the thrust of my simple-minded patter has as much substance as the determinist position, when all the verbiage is stripped away.

Perhaps I'll wax a bit more technical on another occasion.

Tell me: what literature is your particular influence in the field of the mind/body problem? Mine is obviously Popper (for example, his enormous collaboration with famous neurologist Sir John Eccles, "The Self And Its Brain") and things like Roger Penrose's "Shadows Of The Mind" (where Penrose significantly improves on his much criticised arguments in "The Emperor's New Mind"). Laj is clearly a Dennett man ("Consciousness Explained") which I have not yet read. It's a vast field - what things have pushed you in your current direction?

I can't point to anything which has particularly influenced my thinking. I usually decide what I think first, mostly, then see what others have to say about the subjects.

Nathan Hawking

Post 158

Friday, May 20, 2005 - 8:15am

Hi Daniel,

Shame, I'm curious as to what those reasons might be. But that's ok.

I didn't want to distract from the original intent of this thread, but perhaps because the thread has largely abandoned its origins, I'll chime in with those reasons.

Are you familiar with Popper's criticism of induction? The reason I ask is that your comment here doesn't seem to conflict too much with Popper.

I think so, but perhaps not. As I understand him, Popper doesn't think we use (or should use?) induction when doing science. I disagree. I don't think Popper's view of science escapes the problem of induction although he gave us a valient try. Nevertheless, he did move us forward in other ways.

Jordan

Post 159

Friday, May 20, 2005 - 10:55am