Concepts and Percepts--Are They Different? Are They Certain?

Hi Nathan,

I tend to absorb and generate ideas, and I tend not to worry about who did what already or what a school of thought is called. This is a way of saying that I'm more interested in philosophy than the history thereof, though the two are obviously inseparable.

I'm interested in efficient understanding is all. I would understand your view quicker and more thoroughly if I found that you resembled someone else whose theory I thoroughly knew.

Now back to the show,
Jordan

Post 101

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 9:04am

Guys,

What's the desired result of all this speculation?

Laj

Post 102

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 9:27am

Abolaji,

What's the desired result of all this speculation?

Apparently to better understand the world we live in and even better understand how we understand it.

But there are some hidden agendas and practical uses:

1. Improving teaching methods from isolating the components of memory, percepts and concepts.
2. Making cheeseburgers out of cows.
3. Arriving at some kind of "neumenal" realm of non-physical existence.
4. Fitting ponies into living rooms
5. Inventing remote thought control devices.
6. Making a better foot.
7. Carving out a niche in the annals of philosophy.
8. Writing captivating plots and producing more exciting TV programs.
9. And.. the most important, ha-hah! ha-hah! ha-hah! RULING THE WORLD!!!!

(Howls of laughter echo through the hallway as a dramatic exit, including a most effective swirl of a cape, is masterly executed and impressionably beheld...)

(... thunder in the distance...)

Michael

Post 103

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 10:02am

MSK,

Wow! World domination is actually in sight... I should have known that I was watching another episode of The Pinky and The Brain!

Post 104

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 10:28am

�Hell, just bean him over the head and see if it still stays in there, whatever it is.�

Such crude mockery, Michael. So short of the quality of sarcasm I know you are capable of.

Exemplary capacity for pretending not to grasp one bit of what the other side is saying, though. Let me try that: I�ll rap you upside the head and if any Love-For-Kat pours out I�ll be sure to stuff all of it back in. (You owe me a long purrrrrrr for that, Kat!)

So my post 68 obviously isn�t getting to you, nor the short Sciabarra quote in 83 (I still have not found the really good sections�still looking, will post.)

Not to appeal to authority, I simply can�t do better. Here is N. Branden, The Psychology of Self-Esteem, ch. 1, pg. 9:
�That mental processes are correlated with neural processes in the brain, in no way affects the status of consciousness as a unique and irreducible primary. It is a species of what philosophers term �the reductive fallacy� to assert that mental processes are �nothing but� neural processes�that, for example, the perception of an object IS a collection of neural impulses, or that a thought IS a certain pattern of brain activity. A perception and the neural processes that mediate it are not identical, nor are a thought and the brain activity that may accompany it. Such an equation is flagrantly anti-empirical and logically absurd.�

Then he quotes J.B. Pratt:
�[Reductive materialism] maintains that consciousness IS A FORM OF BRAIN ACTIVITY [I can�t make italics, sorry�Jon];�that it is either some fine and subtle kind of matter, or (more commonly) some form of energy, either kinetic or potential�To say that consciousness IS a form of matter or of motion is to use words without meaning�Argument against any given position must regularly take the general form of the reductio ad absurdum. He therefore, who chooses at the beginning a position which is absurd as any that can be imagined is in the happy position of being armor proof against all argument. He can never be �reduced to the absurd� because he is already there. If he cannot see that, though consciousness and motion may be RELATED as intimately as you please, we MEAN different things by the two words, that though consciousness may be CAUSED by motion, it IS not itself what we mean by motion any more than it is green cheese�if he cannot see this there is no arguing with him.�

Post 105

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 11:06am

Jon,
As you may know I am generally on your side in this debate.
I find such arguments from meaning as Pratt's, though, to be less than fully satisfying.

After all 'meanings' refer to reality, if they are to be meaningful, and it may be that because of centuries of
lack of knowledge of neurology, etc that the meaning of the word 'conciousness' will have to be modified in light of that
(and still to come) later knowledge.

Branden's quote is helpful, but he doesn't say what the logical absurdity is, nor what empirical facts he has in mind.
(A common failing from early Oist writings, I fear.)

I'm still researching the issue.

(Added in editing: Michael, please stop with the meat cleaver arguments. No one is here suggesting any mystical, 'noumenal' realm or any such things. I'm not asking you to accept a position you disagree with. But on the face of it, in the absence of lots of advanced knowledge of neurology, etc isn't it really somewhat prejudiced to believe that 'well it simply must be physical'.
Arguments over scientific issues of the sort 'it must be so because of this philosophical principle' are often causes for later embarrassment. No one is denying that physical things are necessary for mental stuff to exist and function.
Please do not act as if your debaters are stupid, mystical/irrational, incapable of providing definitions, etc. Granted I have yet to deliver, and in the final analysis your position may be correct, but mockery does not help advance the discussion. Save it for the bad guys.)

(Edited by Jeff Perren on 5/11, 11:15am)

Post 106

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 11:49am

Jon,

My contention is not that today's known methods for identifying and measuring neural processes is all there is to it. My contention is that the "it" does exist in physical reality to the extent that one day we will be able to identify/measure it.

Branden's quote has the catch-word "correlated":

... mental processes are correlated with neural processes in the brain...

You can argue about what the essence is that is being "correlated with neural processes," but you have to admit that is is something. Not just a floating abstraction.

But there are some very real ways to modify this essence (consciousness) physically - which leads one to the conclusion that others will be found over time - which leads even to a further conclusion that maybe, just maybe, such essence is a really complicated physical form.

Here goes:

1. Bean someone over the head. You called that sarcasm, but it was not. Doing that will most definitely affect any "non-physical consciousness" that is inhabiting that particular head. If you bean it hard enough, you can even kill it. Don't ask me what the carcass of a dead consciousness looks like because I have no idea - but I bet it will ultimately be found.

2. Mind altering drugs. These are physical modifications on neurons and neural processes that profoundly affect the consciousness inhabiting them. Check out crack or cocaine, if you have observed those who use it. They experience a very real fear and paranoia while on the drug that disappears once the drug is gone. Awareness has been completely altered. How about LSD? How about even Zoloft? What does a "non-physical consciousness" do under that kind of bombardment? Hide behind some neuron or other until it all goes away - or is that consciousness altered during the run of the chemical?

And if you can alter "it" through physical means, then that is a pretty good indication that "it" is physical.

3. Sensorial overload and subliminal sound and sight "implants." Here we get into hypnotism, brain entrainment and the cloak-and-dagger stuff I mentioned earlier. All of these methods are very much physical and all of them profoundly affect the "non-physical consciousness." As I stated above (and this does bear repeating), if you can alter "it" through physical means, then that is a pretty good indication that "it" is physical.

And this is just a start.

So if "it" is not physical, but "correlates" physically to physical neural processes, (1) what is this nonphysical essence like, and (2) how does "it" bind to physical things?

If we can take physical existence apart enough to go to the moon by taking our environment with us in a suit, and blowing ourselves to smithereens, we sure as hell can do a lot of stuff with consciousness too.

That is unless you consider consciousness to be something somehow "beyond" working with in reality, something that is just "there" (then blank-out).

Even spooks are attributed by mystics more physical essence (ectoplasm) than this.

Michael

Post 107

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 12:25pm

HUMOR DISCLAIMER

I never mock anyone at anytime to be funny.

I rarely mock anyone at all. Once I do, I hardly ever post to that person again. He/she is history.

I hate that word "mock" anyway, and it goes against everything in my soul that cries out to be benevolent.

My good-natured ribbing sure gets on some people's nerves though - as if my intention were to somehow scornfully prove my superiority over them or something - instead of taking light-hearted delight and a jab at contradictions and unusual connections - or even noticing when a person slips on a metaphorical banana peel.

Sure, I might laugh, but I will most definitely be there to help the person up - and even extend my own hand to be helped up myself when I slip, all the while laughing it off.

There seems to be some kind of extreme difficulty with Objectivists (not all but a lot) to understanding this kind of good natured benevolence, which is based on a delight in learning and enough respect for others to want to share the good vibes - not sneering mockery.

I could speculate on the whys of the this - like some people hate being wrong or contradicted and so forth, but frankly I am just not that interested in dissecting sourpussing.

Hell, even Nathan Hawking, with whom I have had several serious disagreements so far, got it. He laughs. His cheeseburgers are cows with great potential.

He uses his lump of meat while I use my lump of meat - and we even see if and where we can get our different lumps to meet.

The humor makes it all fun.

So please bear with me and understand that I do not - nor will not - ever - share any negative kind of vision with anyone, regardless of who it is, nor do I like to make a bastard use of something wonderful like humor to express contempt, which to me is a serious issue.

Michael

Post 108

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 1:26pm

Anybody want to start a new thread discussing physical v. non-physical? It's a big enough issue to discuss on its own.

Also, I'm still not sure what Nathan wants to say about certainty.

Jordan

Post 109

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 2:31pm

Jordan:

Anybody want to start a new thread discussing physical v. non-physical? It's a big enough issue to discuss on its own.

Done. (Though I'm not sure how much time I'd have for a new topic.)

Also, I'm still not sure what Nathan wants to say about certainty.

A previous post in this thread covers my view rather well, as I recall.

If not, I'm certain I covered it in the commentary under Ed Thompson's Veridicality article.

Certitude probably deserves a separate discussion as well, though I wouldn't have time at the moment.

Nathan

Post 110

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 3:38pm

Jon:

Not to appeal to authority, I simply can�t do better. Here is N. Branden, The Psychology of Self-Esteem, ch. 1, pg. 9:

�That mental processes are correlated with neural processes in the brain, in no way affects the status of consciousness as a unique and irreducible primary. It is a species of what philosophers term �the reductive fallacy� to assert that mental processes are �nothing but� neural processes�that, for example, the perception of an object IS a collection of neural impulses, or that a thought IS a certain pattern of brain activity. A perception and the neural processes that mediate it are not identical, nor are a thought and the brain activity that may accompany it. Such an equation is flagrantly anti-empirical and logically absurd.�

That, as that nasty President man said, is a matter of what IS is.

I can't think of any sane person (which excludes a few philosophers) who would claim that a Patek Philippe Calibre 89, the most complicated mechanical watch ever produced, is just a collection of metal and glass chunks.

Yet is IS "a collection of metal and glass chunks." It differs from other metal and glass chunks only in the nature of its organization.

This is not to minimize the transcendental nature of that organization. It is to say that what Branden writes is, taken literally, incorrect.

So far as we know, mental processes ARE "'nothing but' neural processes... a collection of neural impulses, ... a certain pattern of brain activity." Furthermore, "a perception and the neural processes that mediate it" ARE inclusive and identical.

If, as Mr. Branden claimed in this early work of his, equating brain activity and thought is "anti-empirical and logically absurd," it is incumbant upon the claimant to produce that empirical evidence and logic. I'm not sure he would still make this claim in this fashion. I will put the question to him.

Then he quotes J.B. Pratt:
�[Reductive materialism] maintains that consciousness IS A FORM OF BRAIN ACTIVITY [I can�t make italics, sorry�Jon];�that it is either some fine and subtle kind of matter, or (more commonly) some form of energy, either kinetic or potential�To say that consciousness IS a form of matter or of motion is to use words without meaning�Argument against any given position must regularly take the general form of the reductio ad absurdum. He therefore, who chooses at the beginning a position which is absurd as any that can be imagined is in the happy position of being armor proof against all argument. He can never be �reduced to the absurd� because he is already there. If he cannot see that, though consciousness and motion may be RELATED as intimately as you please, we MEAN different things by the two words, that though consciousness may be CAUSED by motion, it IS not itself what we mean by motion any more than it is green cheese�if he cannot see this there is no arguing with him.�

"To say that consciousness IS a form of matter or of motion is to use words without meaning..."

Not at all. Every day thousands of AI researchers are putting matter into motion (computers) and producing machines which are more and more becoming "conscious" in very sense of that word.

Their consciousness does not yet quite resemble HUMAN consciousness, but it does resemble that of lower animals. To demand anything more is absurd--nature had 3 billion years to evolve human intelligence, and we've been working on the problem in a substantive way barely over 3 DECADES. We are still about 10-15 years away from having raw computer power equivalent to that of the human brain, and an unknown number of years away from modeling the PROCESSES of the human mind.

Those who hold that consciousness/mind is "something more" than physical brain and organization/pattern are obliged to say what that might be. Just claiming that the physical/organizational is "not enough" without stipulating what else is required is hollow denial.

That position could conceivably (though I doubt it) be ultimately correct, but I would require evidence and sound reasoning to be persuaded.

Nathan Hawking

Post 111

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 5:09pm

Jon:

A follow-up to my earler post:

Jon:

Not to appeal to authority, I simply can�t do better. Here is N. Branden, The Psychology of Self-Esteem, ch. 1, pg. 9:

�... �

If, as Mr. Branden claimed in this early work of his, equating brain activity and thought is "anti-empirical and logically absurd," it is incumbant upon the claimant to produce that empirical evidence and logic. I'm not sure he would still make this claim in this fashion. I will put the question to him.

I did put the question to Nathaniel Branden, and he tells me he's rethinking his position from scratch.

Nathan Hawking

Post 112

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 7:16am

MSK
>How?Like a spirit from Heaven inhabits the flesh?

This is one of the confusions that has crept in due to the warp and woof of history. Ancient Greeks explored abstract systems such as mathematics from the point of view of a culture steeped in superstition and mysticism. So it was only natural that they mixed the two up, from the number mysticism of Pythagoras to the mystical circles of Aristotle. Things became even worse once the Christians got into the act, and Plotinus etc started taking these Greek confusions and adding their own spin to it. Abstractions and abstract systems got muddled with religious mystery, which they have yet to fully shake off.

On examination, it is the *religious* aspect that Rand is attacking, not the abstract aspect. She talks about "abstracting" and "abstractions" all the time. But as I've said, I don't think she was all that clear on the issue herself. Hence far from having solved it, Objectivism's position is all over the map.

For a good summary, check out Diana Hsieh's "Mind in Objectivism: A Survey of Objectivist Commentary on Philosophy of Mind"
http://www.dianahsieh.com/papers/mio.html

It will be good background for you on the issue anyway. At bottom, your problem is still this: if your consciousness is physical, then it in principle can be *predicted via the laws of physics*. Obviously, then you *can't have free will*, any more than you can say *any* physical system has free will. Ok? It's a can't-have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too situation. I think Rand agreed, and I agree with her.

>But joking aside, how about a real kneejerk and let's define our terms? Like "physical" and "non-physical" for starters?

Certainly, bearing in mind Nathan Hawking is absolutely right: there is not much point defining these terms, other than ostensively. So, for example, something "physical" is a mathematics book, made of paper with ink symbols printed on it. Something "non-physical" or "abstract" is the mathematical system the ink patterns symbolise.

- Daniel

Post 113

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 7:41am

Nathan:
>I think you may be confusing referents, Daniel. I can hold the abstract concept "unicorn." The REFERENT of the abstraction does not exist, but the abstraction-as-concept is encoded in the patterns of my living brain...For you to say that my abstraction-as-concept is not "physical," you would have to deny that organization of matter is not physical.

This line of argument is fine, but it amounts to MSK's hardcore physicalism. So you would then have to explain how your consciousness- the electrical and chemical patterns of your living brain - is not in principle predictable, down to the last detail, by the laws of physical systems. In which case...*it's bye-bye free will*. In which case, it's bye bye Objectivism. (Incidentally, I don't hold that consciousness *is* matter, though it depends on matter for survival. Hence it dies with the brain).

Now, I think the hardcore physicalist/determinist argument is a pretty viable one - some of my best friend are determinists! And evidence wise, their side is getting better every day. But neither side is decisive yet - and call me sentimental, but I'm for the hypothesis that preserves free will...;-)

Daniel wrote:
>You can't derive the plot of the (TV)show from studying the activity of the electrons (in your TV set)

Nathan replied
>I'm afraid I don't follow this.

Think about it. Do you think you can derive the theme of Beethoven's 5th from examining the sound waves, or of "Atlas Shrugged" by chemically analysing the ink and paper? Well, that's the analogy between your consciousness and the action of the electrons in your brain.

- Daniel

Post 114

Wednesday, May 11, 2005 - 7:47am

Jordan:
>Oh, and let me disagree with Daniel here that physicalism necessarily entails determinism. There're plenty of non-determinist physicalists. They accept randomness and chance, emergent properties and causal primaries such as free will. They just accept these as physical in nature.

Hi Jordan,

I was just giving MSK a brief outline of the issue. Of course there are multiple variations of this old problem. But to quickly cover some of that off - randomness, chance, quantum probablilities etc don't really cover "free will". Free will is volitional. It is not the same as saying "let's toss a coin". But I would agree that "consciousness" is an emergent property from the physical world, not a magical insertion by a mysterious creator.

- Daniel

Post 115

Thursday, May 12, 2005 - 2:13am

Daniel:

Interesting commentary.

I think you may be confusing referents, Daniel. I can hold the abstract concept "unicorn." The REFERENT of the abstraction does not exist, but the abstraction-as-concept is encoded in the patterns of my living brain...For you to say that my abstraction-as-concept is not "physical," you would have to deny that organization of matter is not physical.

This line of argument is fine, but it amounts to MSK's hardcore physicalism. So you would then have to explain how your consciousness- the electrical and chemical patterns of your living brain - is not in principle predictable, down to the last detail, by the laws of physical systems.

Your premise entails what I call Metaphysical Legalism. It assumes that everything in the universe operates according to "laws," and if these laws could just be known, everything would be predictable. (And, of course, if everything is predictable, why there goes volition.)

Modern physics does not appear to support this view. We are not citizens of a dictatorial universe, ruled by totalitarian fiat. We are each islands, and on these islands we make many of our own laws--we call them "choices."

In which case...*it's bye-bye free will*. In which case, it's bye bye Objectivism. (Incidentally, I don't hold that consciousness *is* matter, though it depends on matter for survival. Hence it dies with the brain).

No, the macro universe is apparently highly PREDICTABLE, but not WHOLLY DETERMINED.

Too, the flaw in this thinking is the failure to see consciousness not just as the INFLUENCED, but as an INFLUENCER.

*Why, to sharpen this point, would my parents and friends be deterministically influential in my life, but I incapable of exercising influence upon myself?

I see no way that the physicality of the universe demands determinism--to accept that is to ignore the mounting evidence of the nature of things.

Now, I think the hardcore physicalist/determinist argument is a pretty viable one - some of my best friend are determinists! And evidence wise, their side is getting better every day. But neither side is decisive yet - and call me sentimental, but I'm for the hypothesis that preserves free will...;-)

If I accepted Metaphysical Legalism and ignored contemporary physics, I might be less convinced about volition.

The topic of how volition can arise in a macro world of cause-effect and a micro world of considerable randomness is not one I can go into at length here, but I will say that I've not encounted a determinist who could mount anything resembling a compelling case, or come anywhere close to directly and honestly answering the question above marked with the *.

Think about it. Do you think you can derive the theme of Beethoven's 5th from examining the sound waves

I know what you're trying to say now. But your analogy is seriously flawed--you are asking the wrong question.

Remember, the issue is: Does the brain/nervous system and the pattern/process borne upon that physical medium ALONE account for thoughts and other mentation?

Consider Beethoven's 5th on a compact disk. You are asking me if I can look at the CD and hear the music. Clearly not. But that's the wrong question.

The correct question for your analogy is: Is a CD and sound system including player, amplifier, and speaker ALONE sufficient to reproduce the symphony?

The answer is yes. Nothing more is required.

Our thoughts are analogous to the music. The data for our thoughts' counterpart is the data on the CD. The playback system is the analog of our brain and nervous system.

Complete.

Eventually, probably within the next century by some well-informed estimates, we should be able to "play" human minds the same way we now play a sound system.

If that sounds bizarre, bear in mind that a century ago we were playing wax cylinders on crank-wound phonographs. And flying around in motorized box kites.

Nathan Hawking

Post 116

Thursday, May 12, 2005 - 6:38am

Once again, into the breach...

I'm a compatibilist and for all practical purposes, a materialist/physicalist.

*Why, to sharpen this point, would my parents and friends be deterministically influential in my life, but I incapable of exercising influence upon myself?

I see no way that the physicality of the universe demands determinism--to accept that is to ignore the mounting evidence of the nature of things.

The topic of how volition can arise in a macro world of cause-effect and a micro world of considerable randomness is not one I can go into at length here, but I will say that I've not encounted a determinist who could mount anything resembling a compelling case, or come anywhere close to directly and honestly answering the question above marked with the *.

I'm fairly surprised by the claims about the *. The answer is fairly simple - it all depends on how you define the "self".

Consider water. Water can be analyzed as H2O, and some of the chemical and physical properties of water can be understood by an analysis of the properties of hydrogen and oxygen (or at least, we've been able to logically induce and deduce certain things about water from integral and differential analysis of oxygen and hydrogen atoms in a variety of contexts, in addition to actually observing water).

Now, water possesses specific properties which cannot be observed in hydrogen apart from oxygen or oxygen apart from hydrogen and often, not even in hydrogen peroxide. Therefore, we could argue that a water sample influences the hydrogen and oxygen atoms contained within it. Does this make water free?

By analogy, the answer to your question depends on how *you* define the *you* that influences *yourself*: is it by chemicals reacting with other chemicals, or is there some *you* apart from those chemicals doing the influencing? And if it is the latter, then explain how this *you* breaks free of the properties of chemicals in a way that doesn't beg the question.

So the answer is: of course you influence yourself. I've not read any determinist who denies that claim. It is the nature of the self that interacts with itself that is at dispute.

Post 117

Friday, May 13, 2005 - 12:14am

Abolaji:

Once again, into the breach...

I'm a compatibilist and for all practical purposes, a materialist/physicalist.

*Why, to sharpen this point, would my parents and friends be deterministically influential in my life, but I incapable of exercising influence upon myself?

I see no way that the physicality of the universe demands determinism--to accept that is to ignore the mounting evidence of the nature of things.

The topic of how volition can arise in a macro world of cause-effect and a micro world of considerable randomness is not one I can go into at length here, but I will say that I've not encounted a determinist who could mount anything resembling a compelling case, or come anywhere close to directly and honestly answering the question above marked with the *.

I'm fairly surprised by the claims about the *. The answer is fairly simple - it all depends on how you define the "self".

I love simple answers. Especially when they're correct.

... Therefore, we could argue that a water sample influences the hydrogen and oxygen atoms contained within it. Does this make water free?

By analogy, the answer to your question depends on how *you* define the *you* that influences *yourself*: is it by chemicals reacting with other chemicals, or is there some *you* apart from those chemicals doing the influencing?

And if it is the latter, then explain how this *you* breaks free of the properties of chemicals in a way that doesn't beg the question.

To clarify this, I suggest the following:

Expand this to include a similar phenomenon, life itself. It's a bit more tangible, more easily considered. Is life something more than "the chemicals"? Clearly.

Do the properties of living organisms "break free of the properties of chemicals," as you put it? In one sense. I'd say that life is an EMERGENT property of the physics/chemistry. More precisely, per the other thread, it's a special ORGANIZATION of the physical.

Now, do we demand that someone "explain how [life] breaks free of the properties of chemicals" before accepting that life exists as a distinct phenomenon?

Not properly or reasonably. That would be a clear invocation of the fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantium. We have vast empirical evidence that life DOES exist, and no appeal to ignorance negates that.

Do we have any less empirical evidence that humans have consciousness and volition? Not unless we're claiming, in the most simplistic sense, that Boeing 757s and supercomputers, with millions of critical parts, inevitably result "from the properties of chemicals."

As for the level of self which is self-influential, self-referential, self-causing and self-modifying, that would be the level at which consciousness and volition arise as emergent phenomena.

The logical problem with demanding an explanation for self-referential, self-modifying behavior which does not involve circularity or appear to beg the question is that the phenomenon is INHERENTLY CIRCULAR. Such a demand is a Fallacy of Linearity.

It is, in part, the circularity which gives rise to BOTH life and volitional consciousness.

Having said that, I agree that if one assumes 1) a universe where linear causality prevails, 2) that no randomness exists which might be harnessed by consciousness, if one assumes that 3) self-referentiality and circular processes cannot give rise to life and volitional consciousness, 4) that cause and effect are distinct phenomena, then a deterministic self might be said to deterministically influence the self.

But can't you see that assuming these things is just as question- begging, even moreso, as assuming or concluding that the self-influence is the very thing which gives rise to the volition?

Which is the more extraordinary claim, that volitional consciousness exists, or that everything in the universe is inevitable? The more extraordinary claim bears the greater burden of proof, don't you think?

Nathan Hawking

(Edited by Nathan Hawking on 5/13, 1:58am)

Post 118

Thursday, May 12, 2005 - 3:47pm

Nathan writes:
>No, the macro universe is apparently highly PREDICTABLE, but�not WHOLLY DETERMINED.

Yes, I agree. We all must be determinists to a point.

>Remember, the issue is:�Does the brain/nervous system and the pattern/process borne upon that physical medium ALONE account for thoughts and other mentation?...The answer is yes. Nothing more is required.

>Our thoughts are analogous to the music. The data for our thoughts' counterpart is the data on the CD. The playback system is the analog of our brain and nervous system.

>Eventually.. we should be able to "play" human minds the same way we now play a sound system.

No analogy is perfect, but I think with your one you're not seeing the forest for the trees. The data, and the laser and the amplifier and the speakers all obey the laws of physics. Hence, incredibly precise predictions can be made about them and their activities - even before they've been built.

Well and good. No-one would suggest they, or any other physical system, has "volition" (or, as I'd prefer to say, "consciousness".)

But in order for your pure physicalist argument to hold, you now have to apply it *to the music*. You have to come up with Beethoven's 5th - or even better, one he never got to write - from scratch using the current laws of physics (or even future laws of physics). I don't believe quantum indeterminism will help you either, any more than trying to write a symphony by flipping a coin. See the problem?

Now, perhaps this is all possible, but I personally don't think so. And even if it were, how could this be at all compatible with Objectivism's position on human volition? Bottom line, if you thoughts are predictable in the way the movements of the stars are, or the probabilities of quantum electrodynamics - that is, incredibly so, even with today's understanding level - what have "your choices* got to do with anything?

Abolaji writes:
>It is the nature of the self that interacts with itself that is at dispute.

Hitting the nail on the head, as usual...;-)

- Daniel

Post 119

Friday, May 13, 2005 - 3:12pm