Concepts and Percepts--Are They Different? Are They Certain?

Nathan:
>That notwithstanding, some claim that this is insufficient, that mental processes require something more than the physical and its organization.
>My response is simple: What?

But I think this response lands you back in position incompatible with Objectivism. Here's why.

The "organization" of (which is another way of saying "the laws governing") the "physical" is accounted for by two theories (that they are currently incomplete and incompatible is neither here nor there). They are:

1) Classical physics - roughly, the laws governing everything larger than an atom. These are highly deterministic, allowing us to predict the behaviour of, say, pulsars 30,000 light years away to the accuracy of 10 to the power of -14.

2) Quantum physics - roughly, the laws governing everything smaller than an atom. While these laws have a random element, the *probabilities* of atomic behaviour nonetheless can be predicted with similar astounding precision.

Given this, in my opinion *neither* theory is adequate to explain phenomena such as human *thoughts, choices, aims, purposes, arts, agreements* etc and all the other things we lump under the loose category "free will". Certainly classical mechanics would reduce us to merely complicated clockwork. On the other hand, neither do the random elements of quantum probability adequately account for human thoughts.

If they did - well, to coin a phrase, I cannot believe dice play god with our personal universes.

So this is not an "argument ad ignorantum" at all - simply that we observe phenomena that the two physical theories - which have been highly successful everywhere else - look unlikely to be able to explain now or in the forseeable future (to argue this would actually be an "argument ad ignorantum"!).

Hence, the hypothesis that these phenomena are *non-physical* is a perfectly reasonable one until shown otherwise. And it appears to be the only one compatible with Objectivism's view of human *volition* ie: that it is neither *determined* nor *random*. (Incidentally, I am not an Objectivist but a Popperian)

>Those in love with the notion of certitude will be uncomfortable with a universe which does not permit it, but they should really be thankful.

Couldn't agree more! Well said.

- Daniel

Post 121

Sunday, May 15, 2005 - 12:24am

Daniel:

>That notwithstanding, some claim that this is insufficient, that mental processes require something more than the physical and its organization.

>My response is simple: What?

But I think this response lands you back in position incompatible with Objectivism.

If so, I can live with that. A careful reader will note a number of departures I make from standard Objectivist thinking. If I'm right, Objectivism needs to change; if not, then I need to change. I can live quite happily with either outcome.

Here's why.

The "organization" of (which is another way of saying "the laws governing") the "physical" is accounted for by two theories (that they are currently incomplete and incompatible is neither here nor there). They are:

1) Classical physics - roughly, the laws governing everything larger than an atom. These are highly deterministic, allowing us to predict the behaviour of, say, pulsars 30,000 light years away to the accuracy of 10 to the power of -14.

2) Quantum physics - roughly, the laws governing everything smaller than an atom. While these laws have a random element, the *probabilities* of atomic behaviour nonetheless can be predicted with similar astounding precision.

"Highly" deterministic is just another way of saying "highly probable," which is just another way of saying that the universe doesn't operate in linear chains of determined sequences of events.

Your own language admits this. Either the universe is rigidly and wholly determined, or it isn't.

If it isn't, determinism as an argument against volition has just gone to Hell after centuries of Purgatory.

Given this,

But I'm not conceding that. Any picture which paints the world as causally and invariably determined is inadequate.

in my opinion *neither* theory is adequate to explain phenomena such as human *thoughts, choices, aims, purposes, arts, agreements* etc and all the other things we lump under the loose category "free will". Certainly classical mechanics would reduce us to merely complicated clockwork. On the other hand, neither do the random elements of quantum probability adequately account for human thoughts.

Conventional quantum theory is sufficient.

The macro world is composed of the 'organized randomness' of the quantum world. At what point, do you assert, in the heirarchy of the macro world's construction from quantum to macro does the world change from the random and bounded chaotic to a wholly determined (not just extremely probable) universe?

I submit that you cannot point to such a place, because such a place does not exist. Rigidly linear causality and the alleged "laws" of physics are a human invention. Determinists must ASSUME them to make their claims.

If they did - well, to coin a phrase, I cannot believe dice play god with our personal universes.

You're making a mistake in scope. I wouldn't claim that human thought arises directly from random quantum events. Rather, it is the nature of a macro world which DERIVES from its causally flexible components which allows circular causality to create an emergent outcome.

As I said, the universe is not just either random or rigidly deterministic.

So this is not an "argument ad ignorantum" at all

I'm afraid it was. You wrote: "You have to come up with Beethoven's 5th ... using the current laws of physics (or even future laws of physics)."

That's the precise form of argumentum ad ignoratium. If I cannot account for music from the known laws of physics, you are implying, my case is invalidated. That's the very definition of the fallacy.

- simply that we observe phenomena that the two physical theories - which have been highly successful everywhere else - look unlikely to be able to explain now or in the forseeable future (to argue this would actually be an "argument ad ignorantum"!).

Hence, the hypothesis that these phenomena are *non-physical* is a perfectly reasonable one until shown otherwise.

That is a "hypothesis" devoid of cognitive content. What, precisely, is the "non-physical"?

Unless you offer some identity, some properties or characteristics, you are saying "nothing" is responsible for these properties.

In modern scientific terms, since it is devoid of content, there is nothing to falsify, and if there's nothing to falsify it's not a hypothesis.

(Incidentally, I am not an Objectivist but a Popperian)

I'm afraid Karl would be turning over in his grave at the notion of your Non-physical Hypothesis. If Popper left us anything, it's the notion of falsifiability.

And it appears to be the only one compatible with Objectivism's view of human *volition* ie: that it is neither *determined* nor *random*.

If that is true, Objectivist's are in big trouble. If their only alternative to hard determinism or complete randomness were an intellectually devoid, contentless "non-physical hypothesis" that would indeed be a pity. That will not do.

Fortunately, whether they know it or not, there are conceptual alternatives which have cognitive content and are ultimately testable.

Nathan Hawking

Post 122

Sunday, May 15, 2005 - 3:42am

Daniel:
>>But I think this response lands you back in position incompatible with Objectivism.

Nathan replied:
>If so, I can live with that.

OK.

>You're making a mistake in scope. I wouldn't claim that human thought arises directly from random quantum events. Rather, it is the nature of a macro world which DERIVES from its causally flexible components which allows circular causality to create an emergent outcome.

If I have deciphered the jargon correctly, I broadly agree with this...so it can't be too much of a mistake...;-) I consider "consciousness" to be an emergent property, that appeared unexpectedly out of the physical world.

>"You have to come up with Beethoven's 5th ... using the current laws of physics (or even future laws of physics)."...That's the precise form�of argumentum ad ignoratium. If I cannot account for music from the known laws of physics, you are implying, my case is invalidated.

Not really. I actually said your position might be possible, but was showing you've got some severe difficulties ahead if you choose to take it. (And do you ever!) Not to mention potential conflicts with central tenets of Objectivism. Pointing such things out is scarcely a logical error.

>That is a "hypothesis" devoid of cognitive content. What, precisely, is the "non-physical"?�

Um, things that are *abstract*! An example is a mathematical system (as opposed to the physical ink and paper it is written down on). So while it *is* rather vague - as is your hypothesis, with its "...causally flexible components which allows circular causality to create an emergent outcome etc..." - it is scarcely "devoid of cognitive content". Non-physical things - abstract systems for example - *exist*. Just not *physically*. As you say, there's not much point trying to be more precise than that.

>I'm afraid Karl would be turning over in his grave at the notion of your Non-physical Hypothesis.

;-) Actually, it's Popper's notorious "3 world" hypothesis I'm proposing!

>If Popper left us anything, it's the notion of falsifiability.

He left us far more than that, IMHO. But anyhow, this is Vulgar Popperianism. In fact, Popper thought unfalsifiable ideas as both inevitable in many areas (such as metaphysics) and very important to discuss even if inconclusively, just as we are doing now. (it's deliberately *avoiding* testability that is the problem...)

>Fortunately, whether they know it or not, there are conceptual alternatives which have cognitive content and are ultimately testable.

Are you saying you've solved this particular problem of philosophy then?

(Good discussion, by the way...;-))

- Daniel

Post 123

Sunday, May 15, 2005 - 6:02am

Hi Daniel,

If I may chime in here...

Um, things that are *abstract*! An example is a mathematical system (as opposed to the physical ink and paper it is written down on). So while it *is* rather vague - as is your hypothesis, with its "...causally flexible components which allows circular causality to create an emergent outcome etc..." - it is scarcely "devoid of cognitive content". Non-physical things - abstract systems for example - *exist*. Just not *physically*. As you say, there's not much point trying to be more precise than that.

I suspect that what you wrote here is incompatible with Objectivism, but I'm not certain. I think Rand would argue that abstractions don't exist apart from abstracters. That is, if no consciousnesses were to abstract a mathematical system, then that mathematical system would not exist, even though it might correlate quite nicely to physical events if it did exist. To posit that abstractions exist apart from the abstracter is to commit to something not unlike Plato's forms or perhaps what Rand would call "intrincism." If abstractions always connect to abstracters, then the physicalist has an easy time explaining abstractions as physical, for abstractions correlate with brain activity.

Now I know you're Popperian, and seeing as how Popper posited that third world of knowledge that exists independent of us, I think what you wrote above works for Popper. I just doubt it would work for Rand.

Two other points:

1. Abstractions might correlate with brain activity, but some Objectivists will argue that they are yet distinct from brain activity. This seems to kill parsimony.

2.

Given this, in my opinion *neither* theory is adequate to explain phenomena such as human *thoughts, choices, aims, purposes, arts, agreements* etc and all the other things we lump under the loose category "free will".

Nothing 100% adequately explains that stuff, if by "explain" you mean "predict." How does positing the nonphysical make it any better? The best explanations we have of these "free will phenomena" don't depend on the nonphysical, .e.g, explanations in fields including behaviorism, neuropsychology, and economics. Popper was largely instrumentalist, so far as I can tell. So would ask: why is positing the nonphysical more useful than keeping with the strictly physical?

Jordan

Post 124

Sunday, May 15, 2005 - 2:16pm

Daniel:

>"You have to come up with Beethoven's 5th ... using the current laws of physics (or even future laws of physics)."...That's the precise form of argumentum ad ignoratium. If I cannot account for music from the known laws of physics, you are implying, my case is invalidated.

Not really. I actually said your position might be possible, but was showing you've got some severe difficulties ahead if you choose to take it. (And do you ever!) Not to mention potential conflicts with central tenets of Objectivism. Pointing such things out is scarcely a logical error.

OK. If so, I suggest you be more careful not to give the appearance of implying that UNTIL such demands are met, a position is invalidated or is without foundation. Actually, in terms of appearance, I don't think it mitigates the fallacy much to say 'You may be able to,' because it seems to carry an unstated 'but until you do...'

>That is a "hypothesis" devoid of cognitive content. What, precisely, is the "non-physical"?

Um, things that are *abstract*! An example is a mathematical system (as opposed to the physical ink and paper it is written down on). So while it *is* rather vague - as is your hypothesis, with its "...causally flexible components which allows circular causality to create an emergent outcome etc..." - it is scarcely "devoid of cognitive content". Non-physical things - abstract systems for example - *exist*. Just not *physically*. As you say, there's not much point trying to be more precise than that.

I'm sorry, but you're being circuitous. You are saying that 'thoughts are nonphysical' and that 'the nonphysical is the abstract.' What are abstractions if not thoughts?

In what sense would geometry "exist" in an empty universe?

Finally, I'm afraid there is a WORLD of difference in the cognitive content of my "causally flexible components which allows circular causality to create an emergent outcome" and a "non-physical." My statement has at least one concrete in it, and a second concept (emergence) which is rooted in the concrete. Causality is somewhat more abstract.

>I'm afraid Karl would be turning over in his grave at the notion of your Non-physical Hypothesis.

;-) Actually, it's Popper's notorious "3 world" hypothesis I'm proposing!

Would Popper have called that a "hypothesis," though, as you did? I doubt it, but I'm no historian of philosophy and really don't care. As we've come to use the word, per his influence, it's not a hypothesis.

It's probably more apt to call it a philosophical conjecture, as I see it.

Nevertheless, "non-physical" is a term which means no more than "nothing" so far as I can tell. "Abstraction" seems to mean either a) ideas (composed of the physical and the organization of the physical), or b) the organization of the physical.

Popper's 3rd World, it seems, amounts to renamed abstractions. If he actually offered anything new in principle, which is entirely possible, I'm unaware of it.

>If Popper left us anything, it's the notion of falsifiability.

He left us far more than that, IMHO. But anyhow, this is Vulgar Popperianism. In fact, Popper thought unfalsifiable ideas as both inevitable in many areas (such as metaphysics) and very important to discuss even if inconclusively, just as we are doing now. (it's deliberately *avoiding* testability that is the problem...)

I'm not a philosophical historian, and have no desire to be, so I'll defer to your understanding on that.

>Fortunately, whether they know it or not, there are conceptual alternatives which have cognitive content and are ultimately testable.

Are you saying you've solved this particular problem of philosophy then?

I wouldn't put it that way. I indicated my belief that there are "conceptual alternatives [to the false determined/random dichotomy] which have cognitive content and are ultimately testable."

If I were convinced I had "the" solution, I doubt I'd label it as such and proclaim the problem solved. The world has a way of making an ass out of people who behave that way.

Perhaps I'll eventually expand my treatment of the subject and then you may decide for yourself.

Nathan Hawking

Post 125

Sunday, May 15, 2005 - 3:15pm

Jordan:

If I may chime in here...

Daniel wrote:

Um, things that are *abstract*! An example is a mathematical system (as opposed to the physical ink and paper it is written down on). So while it *is* rather vague - as is your hypothesis, with its "...causally flexible components which allows circular causality to create an emergent outcome etc..." - it is scarcely "devoid of cognitive content". Non-physical things - abstract systems for example - *exist*. Just not *physically*. As you say, there's not much point trying to be more precise than that.

I suspect that what you wrote here is incompatible with Objectivism, but I'm not certain. I think Rand would argue that abstractions don't exist apart from abstracters. That is, if no consciousnesses were to abstract a mathematical system, then that mathematical system would not exist, even though it might correlate quite nicely to physical events if it did exist. To posit that abstractions exist apart from the abstracter is to commit to something not unlike Plato's forms or perhaps what Rand would call "intrincism."

We have a difficult time grasping it, just as we have a difficult time seeing space and time as coming into existence or warping, as various physical theories predict, but it is at least conceivable that numerical relationships could be different in different universes.

In each universe the living entities would be children of those relationships, so to speak, and they would feel as 'natural' to them as Euclidean geometry feels to us.

If there is merit to the Axiom of Values, as I believe, it only says they must exist for anything to "be," but it doesn't dictate their form. Numbers and evaluable relationships don't hold much meaning for me in a universe devoid of physical existents, so I don't suppose I'd make a good Platonist.

If abstractions always connect to abstracters, then the physicalist has an easy time explaining abstractions as physical, for abstractions correlate with brain activity.

Mathematically-describable RELATIONSHIPS exist whether we're there to describe them or not, but are these "abstractions"?

That use of "abstraction" doesn't make much sense to me.

Given this, in my opinion *neither* theory is adequate to explain phenomena such as human *thoughts, choices, aims, purposes, arts, agreements* etc and all the other things we lump under the loose category "free will".
Nothing 100% adequately explains that stuff, if by "explain" you mean "predict." How does positing the nonphysical make it any better? The best explanations we have of these "free will phenomena" don't depend on the nonphysical, .e.g, explanations in fields including behaviorism, neuropsychology, and economics. Popper was largely instrumentalist, so far as I can tell. So would ask: why is positing the nonphysical more useful than keeping with the strictly physical?

Good question. The only "answer" I've seen to date on this, that comes to mind, is that 'everything physical is subject to deterministic cause-effect (or randomness), thus there must be something more.'

The unstated (to the best of my recollection) assumption is that the 'non-physical' is exempt from the allegedly implacable deterministic 'laws' posited for the physical.

Reminiscent of the flaw in the Strong Argument from Design, we're forced to ask: If there's some way this 'non-physical' realm can CIRCUMVENT hard deterministic cause-effect, then why could that not also apply to the physical realm?

If God doesn't need a designer, why must nature? has an exact parallel in If the nonphysical can be nondeterministic, why can't the physical?

This, of course, speaks to that select group of determinist nonphysicalists, if I have that terminology right. Apparently that would include some Objectivists.

Nathan Hawking

Post 126

Sunday, May 15, 2005 - 5:25pm

Nathan,

We have a difficult time grasping it, just as we have a difficult time seeing space and time as coming into existence or warping, as various physical theories predict, but it is at least conceivable that numerical relationships could be different in different universes.

I don't see how this responds to my post. First, I don't know what you mean by "numerical relationships could be different." The number systems we use (like Euclidean geometry) don't change under any circumstances. A number system is a number system is a number system. They are what they are; they might just lose application in universes different from ours, or even in certain conditions within our universe. But if you meant that laws governing physics could have been different, then okay. I agree. Still, I don't see how your bit there responds to my post, but I do see how the following does.

Mathematically-describable RELATIONSHIPS exist whether we're there to describe them or not, but are these "abstractions"?

That's the point. I think Rand would say no. Abstractions don't exist without abstracters. An abstraction ceases to exist as the abstracter disappears.

I do appreciate your response, though. I'm just wondering what think the people who actually accept the nonphysical. Perhaps Daniel can explain.

G'day,
Jordan

Post 127

Sunday, May 15, 2005 - 6:56pm

Jordan:

We have a difficult time grasping it, just as we have a difficult time seeing space and time as coming into existence or warping, as various physical theories predict, but it is at least conceivable that numerical relationships could be different in different universes.
I don't see how this responds to my post. First, I don't know what you mean by "numerical relationships could be different." The number systems we use (like Euclidean geometry) don't change under any circumstances. A number system is a number system is a number system. They are what they are; they might just lose application in universes different from ours, or even in certain conditions within our universe. But if you meant that laws governing physics could have been different, then okay. I agree. Still, I don't see how your bit there responds to my post, but I do see how the following does.

I was just thinking out loud, not being adversarial.

As for numbers and the systems arising from them being invariants, I SAID it would be difficult to grasp. So difficult I can't even give an example of how that might work.

To the 'laws' of physics being different, I come at it from the other direction. I think this MAY be the only physical universe possible given the way numerically-described relationships work, though it's also possible that we could come up with, using our math, myriad sets of equations to describe myriad universes.

I was reaching for another extreme, that numbers might work differently in other realms, in ways we can't conceive of.

Look at it this way: after four million years we have evolved brains capable of advanced mathematics. But chimps did not.

Why should we suppose that we are at an evolutionary intellectual terminus, any more than austalopithecines might have? That's quite an assumption.

We can conceive of things chimps can not; why would we conclude--except from sheer hubris--that another four million years might not allow comprehension far beyond our own.

Chimps are to simple arithmetic as
Humans are to calculus as
Future humans are to __________?

Calculus is beyond a chimp's brain. What's beyond ours?

It's a stretch, but it is at least fitting to entertain the idea that our way of perceiving numerical relationships may not be the only one possible. I wouldn't base any philosophy on the notion, not yet, but I'll think about it.

Mathematically-describable RELATIONSHIPS exist whether we're there to describe them or not, but are these "abstractions"?
That's the point. I think Rand would say no. Abstractions don't exist without abstracters. An abstraction ceases to exist as the abstracter disappears.

I do appreciate your response, though. I'm just wondering what think the people who actually accept the nonphysical. Perhaps Daniel can explain.

Sure. I'd like to hear their thinking on the matter.

Nathan Hawking

Post 128

Sunday, May 15, 2005 - 2:45pm

Jordan wrote:
>I�suspect that what you wrote here is incompatible with Objectivism, but I'm not certain. I think Rand would argue that abstractions don't exist apart from abstracters.

Yes, you may well be right. The issue then, of course, is that this makes it hard to avoid the next pitfall, which is obviously subjectivism! (After all, who's to say *your* abstraction from reality is the correct one, and not my one....etc)

What's nice about Popper's "3 World" hypothesis is that it allows knowledge to exist objectively - that is, *outside of the knower*, thus escaping the above problem. (World 3's independence is suggested by the common experience of someone noticing an aspect of a theory or problem *that the original thinker did not notice*) And the fact that it is emergent from humans, not prior to, escapes the mystical aspects of Platonism.

This is all very rough of course, but it seems you are a little familiar with the idea so I don't need to explain too much. While it is only a speculative hypothesis, it does offer a way out of quite a few philosophical snafus, and offers suprising explanatory power for things like the rapid pace of human developmment vs other animals.

>I think what you wrote above works for Popper. I just doubt it would work for Rand.�

Yes, I tend to agree. With his theory Popper goes further than Rand ever would. But then if I thought Rand was right, I'd be an Objectivist...;-)

But leaving Popper aside, strict physicalism/materialism seems to be more in line with the deterministic spirit of Marxism than the free willed spirit of Objectivism. You are probably too young to know the old Cyd Charisse comedy "Silk Stockings". She plays an dutiful young Soviet babe who tries to earnestly persuade decadent Westerners that love is "just a chemical reaction"! It's that sort of thing I'm criticising, and it seems to be an inevitable consequence of doctinaire physicalism. (and tellingly, the more *considered* a physicalist argument gets, the more abstract it seems to get...) I think people get so fearful of being labelled a Platonist or a mystic they cling to physicalism without really understanding the consequences of it.

In fact, Rand said things that could support either position, hence the Objectivist confusion over the issue (as Hieseh has summarised). So, given the choice, I'll take the side from which the existence of something like "voliton" is easier, rather than harder, to defend.

I'll return to your two points shortly.

- Daniel

Post 129

Sunday, May 15, 2005 - 6:10pm

Jordan writes:
>1. Abstractions�might correlate with brain activity, but some Objectivists will argue that they are yet distinct from brain activity. This seems to kill parsimony.

Death to parsimony, then!..;-)

Brain activity consists of electrical signals and chemical reactions. Thus they are covered by the predictive powers of classical physics and quantum physics respectively. Yet neither electrical circuitry and chemical reactions exhibit anything like "volition" in any other circumstance in the universe, so why should it in humans?

>2....How does positing the nonphysical make it any better?

Accepting the above then leaves you with, roughly speaking, two options:

1) That "volition" or "consciousness" is an illusion, and that what we percieve as consciousness is simply an elaborate clockwork percieving its own ticking. This is the essence of the nightmare of a comprehensive physicalism/determinism, and of course I consider it a very plausible nightmare! Indeed it is where a great many thinkers have ended up. But of course, you cannot pretend you have more "free will" in this model than the clock on the mantelpiece or the computer on your desk.

2)The second option is to postulate humans (and other animals to a far lesser extent) as special cases - that there is another property at work that is emergent from, depends upon and interacts with the physical brain - but is *not commensurate with it*. Call it a "self", or "consciousness", or what you like. And as we do not observe "voluntary" phenomena in any other aspect of physics - random as they are, I do not think quantum particles make choices! - we are free to hypothesise something else is at work. Then, as this "something" isn't controlled by the laws of physics, we might as well say that it is therefore *not physical*!

This is all very simplistic, of course. It's a massive topic. But in essence that's where you more or less end up. Does that answer your questions?

- Daniel

Post 130

Monday, May 16, 2005 - 6:43am

Hi Nathan,

Thanks for the clarifications.

I was reaching for another extreme, that numbers might work differently in other realms, in ways we can't conceive of.

See, I thought what you were saying was that something like Euclidean geometry might differ from universe to universe. To me, that's like saying that what a cow is might differ from universe to universe. My response to that would be: a cow is a cow is a cow. If something in universe X differs from what we call cow in universe Y, then the thing in universe X isn't a cow. But now it seems more like you're saying that different maths could spring up or have greater application other universes. If so, then we're eye to eye. If not, then once again, I ask for clarification.

Hi Daniel,

Thanks for responding.

And the fact that it is emergent from humans, not prior to, escapes the mystical aspects of Platonism.

That's interesting. It seems like we wind up with Plato's forms under this view anyway, even though we start from a non-mystical point, i.e., a human originator. <shrug>

The issue then, of course, is that this makes it hard to avoid the next pitfall, which is obviously subjectivism! (After all, who's to say *your* abstraction from reality is the correct one, and not my one....etc)

I know Peikoff discussed this with his talk of "encirclist." Where that was I don't remember. And I have my own answer to this, but I don't want to digress too much. Still, I do see why you hold onto Popper's 3 world hypo.

But leaving Popper aside, strict physicalism/materialism seems to be more in line with the deterministic spirit of Marxism than the free willed spirit of Objectivism.

I think this was Rand's view. Whenever she brought up materialism/determinism, it seemed clear to me that she was referring to the Marxist variety.

Yet neither electrical circuitry and chemical reactions exhibit anything like "volition" in any other circumstance in the universe, so why should it in humans?

But how do we know that "volition" exists in the first place? According to Rand, we must observe it somewhere, and all observation stems from our sense-perception. Perhaps she would say that we can infer it from our observations. But then I would ask again, why bother positing this extra nonphysical concept? Why not just say that X, Y, and Z physical events are what we refer to as volition? We're back to killing parsimony again. :-)

As for your answers:

1) That "volition" or "consciousness" is an illusion,

2)The second option is to postulate humans (and other animals to a far lesser extent) as special cases - that there is another property at work that is emergent from, depends upon and interacts with the physical brain - but is *not commensurate with it*.

We need more options. Physicalism is more robust than this. Again, why can't "volition" just refer to the events we observe that tell us when an entity is acting volitionally? I don't think this puts us in the same boat as the clockwork orange. We still make choices. It's just that choice would be something we can observe, rather than something we must infer from observation.

Jordan

Post 131

Monday, May 16, 2005 - 3:37am

Jordan:
>An abstraction�ceases to exist�as the abstracter disappears....I do appreciate your response, though. I'm just wondering what think the people who actually�accept the nonphysical. Perhaps Daniel can explain.

Nathan:
>Sure. I'd like to hear their thinking on the matter.

Well I can't speak for other species of non-physicalist, but here's the 411 on the physical and non-physical aspects of Popper's theory. As it turns out, there is one physical, and *two* different abstract aspects. (Outrageous idea!)

Basically, existence consists of what we will call 3 "worlds". These "worlds" all *interact*, but are not commensurate with each other.

"World 1" is the *objective physical* world, the world of stones, foodstuffs, water, planets, refrigerators, ink, paper, sounds, molecules etc. In both chronological and fundamental senses, it is the primary world.

"World 2" is the world of consciousness, the *subjective non-physical* - the world inside your skull that none but you can truly access. It is the world of emotion, sensation, imagination, viewpoints. It emerged unexpectedly at some point from the physical world, just as life emerged unexpectedly from dead matter.

"World 3" is the world of objective knowledge. It is *objective and non-physical*. It is the world of mathematical systems, rules, theories, problems, recipes, art, music etc. It emerged - equally unexpectedly - from World 2, but nonetheless exists *independently* of it. (The best way to picture this unusual idea is to consider that a numerical system, whilst a human creation, contains numbers that *no human has ever thought of*). World 3 objects, however, are *dependent* upon World 1 to survive. That is, they require ink and paper, chalk and a blackboard, stone and a chisel or a computer disk in order to exist. However, they are not *derivable from* physical World 1 objects - you cannot discover the theme of a poem or the fallacy of an argument from the chalk dust it is written on the blackboard with. Hence we can reasonably postulate that these are *abstractions* which we grasp equally *abstractly*.

The "worlds" cross-interact continually in complex ways. For example, there is a drought (World 1). A man feels hunger and fear (World 2). He creates a plan for irrigation (World 3) which in turn causes him and his neighbours to make changes to World 1...and so on.

What is the use of all these silly "worlds"? Why can't we just have *one* and have done with it? Well, firstly they solve a few problems that a millenia of philosophical shoe-horning still can't make fit together - that is to say, the problems of the *subjective* and the *objective*, the *physical* and the *abstract*. It now becomes unnecessary to feverishly deny or disparage one or the other or all. We can acknowledge they exist, and even better, put them in a roughly sensible order. We can preserve objective knowledge without rejecting the subjective imagination - in fact, it becomes an integral part of the schema. We can acknowledge the abstract/non-physical, but see it as an evolutionary and emergent phenomenon, not a mystical one.

Can abstractions exist without their abstracters? Yes, of course, so long as they are physically encoded somewhere. Shakespeare's themes have so far survived Shakespeare. Imagine a holocaust that destroyed all but a handful of humans, but left our books intact. You can see that civilisation could be restored relatively quickly. Then imagine a holocaust that destroyed all but a handful of humans, and *all their books too*. Civilisation would take infinitely longer to restore - perhaps never.

No doubt this will raise more questions in your mind than answers, but I do not hope to convince you of this outlandish notion in just a few paras. Hopefully it will merely inspire your curiosity, and that is enough.

- Daniel

Post 132

Monday, May 16, 2005 - 5:46pm

Daniel:

Well I can't speak for other species of non-physicalist, but here's the 411 on the physical and non-physical aspects of Popper's theory. As it turns out, there is one physical, and *two* different abstract aspects. (Outrageous idea!)

Basically, existence consists of what we will call 3 "worlds". These "worlds" all *interact*, but are not commensurate with each other.

"World 1" is the *objective physical* world, the world of stones, foodstuffs, water, planets, refrigerators, ink, paper, sounds, molecules etc. In both chronological and fundamental senses, it is the primary world.

I'm OK with that so far. (Except that I include "organization" at the metaphysical level, and meta-organization at higher levels.)

"World 2" is the world of consciousness, the *subjective non-physical* - the world inside your skull that none but you can truly access. It is the world of emotion, sensation, imagination, viewpoints. It emerged unexpectedly at some point from the physical world, just as life emerged unexpectedly from dead matter.

I depart from this view here. I consider life, consciousness, etc., emergent properties of the physical/organizational, emergent MANIFESTATIONS of it. Just as a carbon atom is the manifestation of the organization of quarks and quarks may be the manifestation of the organization of strings, consciousness and thoughts are ULTIMATELY manifestations of the way carbon, hydrogen, etc., atoms are arranged.

Why would we separate mental phenomena in principle? I see no point.

"World 3" is the world of objective knowledge. It is *objective and non-physical*. It is the world of mathematical systems, rules, theories, problems, recipes, art, music etc. It emerged - equally unexpectedly - from World 2, but nonetheless exists *independently* of it. (The best way to picture this unusual idea is to consider that a numerical system, whilst a human creation, contains numbers that *no human has ever thought of*). World 3 objects, however, are *dependent* upon World 1 to survive. That is, they require ink and paper, chalk and a blackboard, stone and a chisel or a computer disk in order to exist. However, they are not *derivable from* physical World 1 objects - you cannot discover the theme of a poem or the fallacy of an argument from the chalk dust it is written on the blackboard with. Hence we can reasonably postulate that these are *abstractions* which we grasp equally *abstractly*.

The same holds for knowledge. Why would we believe that these are not meta-organizations of the organization of thoughts, which are the meta-organization of our physicial body, which is the meta-organization of still more primitive components?

What purpose is served by the worlds distinction? Isn't it sufficient to see them as different manifestations of the same physical/organizational phenomena? WHAT PROOF IS THERE THAT THEY ARE NOT?

The "worlds" cross-interact continually in complex ways. For example, there is a drought (World 1). A man feels hunger and fear (World 2). He creates a plan for irrigation (World 3) which in turn causes him and his neighbours to make changes to World 1...and so on.

What is the use of all these silly "worlds"? Why can't we just have *one* and have done with it? Well, firstly they solve a few problems that a millenia of philosophical shoe-horning still can't make fit together - that is to say, the problems of the *subjective* and the *objective*, the *physical* and the *abstract*.

I see a single "world" (physical/organizational) with a multitude of manifestations. What problems does Popper's model seem to you to solve that are otherwise insoluble?

It now becomes unnecessary to feverishly deny or disparage one or the other or all. We can acknowledge they exist, and even better, put them in a roughly sensible order. We can preserve objective knowledge without rejecting the subjective imagination - in fact, it becomes an integral part of the schema. We can acknowledge the abstract/non-physical, but see it as an evolutionary and emergent phenomenon, not a mystical one.

I don't understand this. Please clarify:

What do you think my P/O model would "deny or disparage"?
What kind of knowledge do you think my model would deny?
Why would a P/O model of the abstract be a denial of the abstract or an appeal to mysticism?
How does Popper's model ACTUALLY do anything but say "they're different" and deny physicality?

Can abstractions exist without their abstracters? Yes, of course, so long as they are physically encoded somewhere. Shakespeare's themes have so far survived Shakespeare. Imagine a holocaust that destroyed all but a handful of humans, but left our books intact. You can see that civilisation could be restored relatively quickly. Then imagine a holocaust that destroyed all but a handful of humans, and *all their books too*. Civilisation would take infinitely longer to restore - perhaps never.

No doubt this will raise more questions in your mind than answers, but I do not hope to convince you of this outlandish notion in just a few paras. Hopefully it will merely inspire your curiosity, and that is enough.

I wouldn't call it outlandish. I'm doubtful of its meaningfulness, though, and of its actual cognitive content. For example:

Is he denying that his World 2 and 3 consist of the organization of the physical?
If so, in what manner do they actually "exist"?

As for the independent existence of "abstractions," you note that they must be "physically encoded somewhere." I agree--that's one possible use of "abstraction."

Why, then, would you (or Popper) hold that mental abstractions are not also "physically encoded" in the human brain? Why resort to an explanation which implies that they are somehow "nonphysical"?

Thanks for taking the time to enlarge on his views, Daniel.

Nathan Hawking

Post 133

Monday, May 16, 2005 - 6:26pm

Jordan:

As for your answers:

1) That "volition" or "consciousness" is an illusion,

2)The second option is to postulate humans (and other animals to a far lesser extent) as special cases - that there is another property at work that is emergent from, depends upon and interacts with the physical brain - but is *not commensurate with it*.
We need more options. Physicalism is more robust than this. Again, why can't "volition" just refer to the events we observe that tell us when an entity is acting volitionally? I don't think this puts us in the same boat as the clockwork orange. We still make choices. It's just that choice would be something we can observe, rather than something we must infer from observation.

In response to Daniel's 2), I'm forced to ask:

If volition is an "emergent property" of the physical brain (and I agree that it is), is it still not A PROPERTY OF THE BRAIN?

"Emergence" does not means that thoughts leave the brain, as a butterfly from a chrysalis.

It means that it is a NEW PROPERTY of the host entity, just as surely as a Mandelbrot fractal on the screen of a computer is an emergent property of equations coded onto a computer's memory and of the algorithms which process them.

What is the Mandelbrot image "commensurate with"? Nothing, exactly. It has no 1:1 correspondence with any of the generative structures (excluding video card memory), yet there it is! It's correlates are considerably more subtle, and could not be found by a simple examination of a hex dump of memory.

Would we conclude that the processes which created the fractal display are "nonphysical"? I think that would be absurd.

So, how is the brain any different?

What, in the physics of silicon et al would lead us to memory, algorithms, and mathematical formulae processing? Yet there it is.

How is the brain any different?

Nathan Hawking

Post 134

Monday, May 16, 2005 - 8:04pm

Nathan,

My apologies: I'm quite busy these days.

Honestly, I don't get the point of your post 117. You are lamenting a difference that cannot be tested in any meaningful way. If your view of self-influence cannot be distinguished from that of a physicalist reductionist in some testable way, I can't seriously discuss it. No physicalist denies that life exists. What happens is that when people revise their understanding of a concept, the revised understanding may be so detached from the way common sense sees things that they deny that the commonsense view of the issue "exists". Hence, Einstein could still speak of God while he was an atheist. Ultimately, I don't like dwelling on empirically inconsequential differences.

First of all, your distinction between matter and organization of matter as subjects of physics is confusing. When last I heard, physics incorporated geometry and processes.

Secondly, when you call life a "distinct phenomenon", you are only arguing with me if you believe that a specific physical formation of atoms leaves out information that is necessary to understand life, or in other words, that life is not a necessary consequence of certain formations of matter. Of course, how the parts fit is important, but ultimately, a physicalist is claiming that the ultimate constituents of life are inanimate objects which must have certain properties when organized in specific ways.

Inevitability is something I can discuss if your posts provide more scenario motivated thought experiments as guides. They are currently too abstract for me to be clear about what I'm discussing.

Post 135

Tuesday, May 17, 2005 - 1:00am

Abolaji:

Honestly, I don't get the point of your post 117.

OK, post 117 was in response to your statement: "... Explain how this *you* breaks free of the properties of chemicals in a way that doesn't beg the question."

I pointed out that LIFE apparently does that, even if we don't yet quite fully know how. If life, why not volition?

You are lamenting a difference that cannot be tested in any meaningful way.

If your view of self-influence cannot be distinguished from that of a physicalist reductionist in some testable way, I can't seriously discuss it.

I don't see myself as lamenting anything at all.

I notice that you did not actually address the question I raised

No physicalist denies that life exists.

That's probably a good thing. But the question was: Do we demand that someone "explain how [life] breaks free of the properties of chemicals" before accepting that life exists as a distinct phenomenon?

In short, do some have a different standard for life than they do for volition?

The concept is not that complicated.

What happens is that when people revise their understanding of a concept, the revised understanding may be so detached from the way common sense sees things that they deny that the commonsense view of the issue "exists".

I have no idea what this has to do with anything I said.

Hence, Einstein could still speak of God while he was an atheist. Ultimately, I don't like dwelling on empirically inconsequential differences.

I understand that Einstein was likely a deist. But this, too, has no discernable connection to anything I wrote.

First of all, your distinction between matter and organization of matter as subjects of physics is confusing. When last I heard, physics incorporated geometry and processes.

Obviously, there are different levels of organization. If you're interested, I discuss that in the "The Nature of the Physical and NonPhysical" thread.

Example: silicon dioxide molecules alone are organized at one level, collections of them in glass are one thing, but a quartz crystal exhibits another level of organization.

Secondly, when you call life a "distinct phenomenon", you are only arguing with me if you believe that a specific physical formation of atoms leaves out information that is necessary to understand life, or in other words, that life is not a necessary consequence of certain formations of matter.

I do exactly the opposite of arguing: Life is [apparently] a necessary consequence of certain formations of matter. There.

Of course, how the parts fit is important

Yes, and that's the nature of Organization.

but ultimately, a physicalist is claiming that the ultimate constituents of life are inanimate objects which must have certain properties when organized in specific ways.

Why would I disagree with this? It's what I've been saying all along. I would only rephrase the certainty aspect, because it has not yet been fully demonstrated.

Extend this, and we get the following: The ultimate constituents of consciousness/volition are [apparently] inanimate objects which must have certain properties when organized in specific ways.

Inevitability is something I can discuss if your posts provide more scenario motivated thought experiments as guides. They are currently too abstract for me to be clear about what I'm discussing.

I've not really discussed inevitability. My argument is with those who deny that "collections of chemicals" are necessarily insufficient to result in consciousness/volition.

My point was that empirical evidence demonstrates that life, consciousness and volition DO apparently "break free of the properties of chemicals," to use your words, and I do not have to demonstrate HOW before the position that they DO can reasonably be considered valid.

Further, I assert that it is apparently ORGANIZATION which largely accounts for these phenomena.

Nathan Hawking

Post 136

Tuesday, May 17, 2005 - 5:21am

Nathan,

OK, post 117 was in response to your statement: "... Explain how this *you* breaks free of the properties of chemicals in a way that doesn't beg the question."

I pointed out that LIFE apparently does that, even if we don't yet quite fully know how. If life, why not volition?

My point is that the difference you are making is semantic, and that unless you can make a distinction between what you think "LIFE apparently does" and what others say, it would be a waste of my time to discuss it. The difference between "life breaks free of the properties of its physical constituents" and "life is a property of its physical constituents with a special name, 'life', because of its functional importance in many contexts" is what you have not shown me how to distinguish. Once again, the testable distinction between your view of volition and that of a determinist has also not been made clear. All you are doing is asserting it.

Which is fine - I have no problem with the existence of paradox. However,I find it irresponsible to assert in the face of a paradox a statement like this one:

The topic of how volition can arise in a macro world of cause-effect and a micro world of considerable randomness is not one I can go into at length here, but I will say that I've not encounted a determinist who could mount anything resembling a compelling case, or come anywhere close to directly and honestly answering the question above marked with the *.

The view of volition and the self that ultimately arises in a physicalist, determinist world is definitely *NOT* the same as that posited by dualists and libertarians. This is the point that Daniel is making. You seem to disagree, but your arguments are hard to reconcile with the experimental evidence we have on the phenomena of volition.

Some libertarians or agent-causation defenders (who call themselves self-determinists, though they refuse to accept a reductionist view of the self) have gone as far as to call their view of choice "initiation"(the indefinable existence of creative capacities in human beings) while labelling the physicalist view of choice as "selection" (in which things revolve around the organization of matter). Of course, both determinists and libertarians think that their views of choice are sufficient to account for all the facts about human nature so unless one presents a testable difference in both views, arguments will always be circular.

Does a house break free of the properties of the bricks that are used to make it? Or is the house a name for bricks that are organized in a way to serve certain functions?

My point was that empirical evidence demonstrates that life, consciousness and volition DO apparently "break free of the properties of chemicals," to use your words, and I do not have to demonstrate HOW before the position that they DO can reasonably be considered valid.

My point is that your claim cannot be distinguished from that of a determinist in any meaningful way. All you are doing is claiming that it can be by using the words "emergent property" to describe what is a distinction in states from a physicalist perspective.

The empirically motivated arguments for some form of determinism from neuroscience and evolutionary biology are pretty extensive. Defining the locus of free will is becoming much harder these days. One just has to assume free will.

Post 137

Tuesday, May 17, 2005 - 6:00pm

Abolaji:

OK, post 117 was in response to your statement: "... Explain how this *you* breaks free of the properties of chemicals in a way that doesn't beg the question."

I pointed out that LIFE apparently does that, even if we don't yet quite fully know how. If life, why not volition?

My point is that the difference you are making is semantic, and that unless you can make a distinction between what you think "LIFE apparently does" and what others say, it would be a waste of my time to discuss it.

You must decide for yourself what is a waste of your time.

My rather obvious point is that YOU implied the necessity that one "explain" how volition "breaks free of the properties of chemicals," presumably to establish that volition is possible.

I pointed out that LIFE is clearly possible and few sane epople question its existence. This has a PARALLEL in volition.

Question: Why would we accept the existence of life without explaining how life "breaks free of the properties of chemicals" but refuse to accept that volition exists unless that is "explained"?

You appear to be avoiding that question and muddying the water.

The difference between "life breaks free of the properties of its physical constituents" and "life is a property of its physical constituents with a special name, 'life', because of its functional importance in many contexts" is what you have not shown me how to distinguish.

Perhaps that's because your premise is flawed and there's nothing to distinguish.

You are apparently using "breaks free" in a literal sense. I would not. I do not think that an emergent property literally "breaks free," but is instead simply "a property of its physical constituents."

It's rather clear in the example I gave in my last post:

"Example: silicon dioxide molecules alone are organized at one level, collections of them in glass are one thing, but a quartz crystal exhibits another level of organization."

Quartz crystal properties are emergent properties of silicon dioxide, and do not "break free" in any but a metaphorical sense.

To expand, I reproduce a passage from post 133:

Nathan Hawking wrote:

If volition is an "emergent property" of the physical brain (and I agree that it is), is it still not A PROPERTY OF THE BRAIN?

"Emergence" does not means that thoughts leave the brain, as a butterfly from a chrysalis.

It means that it is a NEW PROPERTY of the host entity, just as surely as a Mandelbrot fractal on the screen of a computer is an emergent property of equations coded onto a computer's memory and of the algorithms which process them.

What is the Mandelbrot image "commensurate with"? Nothing, exactly. It has no 1:1 correspondence with any of the generative structures (excluding video card memory), yet there it is! It's correlates are considerably more subtle, and could not be found by a simple examination of a hex dump of memory.

Would we conclude that the processes which created the fractal display are "nonphysical"? I think that would be absurd.

So, how is the brain any different?

What, in the physics of silicon et al would lead us to memory, algorithms, and mathematical formulae processing? Yet there it is.

How is the brain any different?

Abolaji wrote:

Once again, the testable distinction between your view of volition and that of a determinist has also not been made clear. All you are doing is asserting it.

I'm not sure what you mean by "testable distinction." Are you saying that my position is no different than a determinist's?

If so, perhaps you can specify which brand of determinism you refer to, and define that position?

We can go from there.

Which is fine - I have no problem with the existence of paradox. However,I find it irresponsible to assert in the face of a paradox a statement like this one:

The topic of how volition can arise in a macro world of cause-effect and a micro world of considerable randomness is not one I can go into at length here, but I will say that I've not encounted a determinist who could mount anything resembling a compelling case, or come anywhere close to directly and honestly answering the question above marked with the *.

We covered that several posts ago. I'm not sure why you're bringing it up again.

The view of volition and the self that ultimately arises in a physicalist, determinist world is definitely *NOT* the same as that posited by dualists and libertarians. This is the point that Daniel is making. You seem to disagree, but your arguments are hard to reconcile with the experimental evidence we have on the phenomena of volition.

Labels cover a lot of ground. Which views? Which arguments? What experimental evidence?

Some libertarians or agent-causation defenders (who call themselves self-determinists, though they refuse to accept a reductionist view of the self) have gone as far as to call their view of choice "initiation"(the indefinable existence of creative capacities in human beings) while labelling the physicalist view of choice as "selection" (in which things revolve around the organization of matter). Of course, both determinists and libertarians think that their views of choice are sufficient to account for all the facts about human nature so unless one presents a testable difference in both views, arguments will always be circular.

You'll find I'm not inclined to argue generalities.

Does a house break free of the properties of the bricks that are used to make it? Or is the house a name for bricks that are organized in a way to serve certain functions?

I think I've already answered that. I remind you that it was you who introduced the expression "break free." I presumed you were using it in a metaphorical sense. I should not have assumed that.

My point is that your claim cannot be distinguished from that of a determinist in any meaningful way. All you are doing is claiming that it can be by using the words "emergent property" to describe what is a distinction in states from a physicalist perspective.

I never said otherwise. In fact, I explicitly stated that very thing. The problem with that rather accusative statement is that I'm arguing several issues in this thread.

If "the" determinist or physicalist position is that emergent properties happen, then I agree with them in that respect. So what? I would disagree with determinists regarding the nature of causality.

I raise the issue of emergent properties with those who hold that the physical is insufficient to explain consciousness and volition.

The empirically motivated arguments for some form of determinism from neuroscience and evolutionary biology are pretty extensive. Defining the locus of free will is becoming much harder these days. One just has to assume free will.

So you say.

If you are referring to aspects of human nature which ARE determined, I doubt you will get much argument. But to extrapolate that into a universal hard determinism is patent nonsense.

Arguing hard determinism from neuroscience and evolutionary biology is arguing that a Boeing 757 and a IBM Blue Gene/L 32,000 CPU supercomputer are the inevitable consequences of our neurology and evolution, and not the products of millions of individual choices and design decisions.

(And THIS is why we need the weak argument from design.)

If you wish to make that claim, Abolaji, be my guest. But if THAT bolded paragraph is not a persuasive "empirically motivated argument" then I'm afraid you're beyond persuasion.

What empirical test, we might ask, WOULD one devise to test the hypothesis that humans are volitional agents? You seem convinced that empirical evidence demonstrates the contrary, so what evidence WOULD be compelling in the affirmative?

Unless you are willing to state that, you are clearly arguing from a one-sided perspective.

You keep repeating that volition entails assumption, but refuse to acknowledge what I pointed out in an earlier post, that antivolitional hard determinism is replete with its own assumptions.

Nathan Hawking

(Edited by Nathan Hawking on 5/17, 7:11pm)

(Edited by Nathan Hawking on 5/17, 8:37pm)

Post 138

Wednesday, May 18, 2005 - 1:15am

You must decide for yourself what is a waste of your time.

My rather obvious point is that YOU implied the necessity that one "explain" how volition "breaks free of the properties of chemicals," presumably to establish that volition is possible.

I pointed out that LIFE is clearly possible and few sane epople question its existence. This has a PARALLEL in volition.

Question: Why would we accept the existence of life without explaining how life "breaks free of the properties of chemicals" but refuse to accept that volition exists unless that is "explained"?

You appear to be avoiding that question and muddying the water.

Nathan,

Answer: I think that it is fairly clear that I have not avoided the question. I have answered that no one questions the existence of volition but that the physicalist posits a different explanation for volition from that of a dualist. The parallel for life is the same: a physicalist agrees that life exists, but his explanation for the existence and inner workings of animals is different from that of a dualist.

However, the nature of a physicalist's explanation for life and volition is such that to a dualist, the physicalist's explanations are no more than a denial of what might be called "genuine volition"and are really a defence of "counterfeit volition". The only way to differentiate both, argue physicalists like Daniel Dennett or David Armstrong, is to say what would be consistent with each theory.

"Example: silicon dioxide molecules alone are organized at one level, collections of them in glass are one thing, but a quartz crystal exhibits another level of organization."

This is physicalism.

I'm not sure what you mean by "testable distinction." Are you saying that my position is no different than a determinist's?

If so, perhaps you can specify which brand of determinism you refer to, and define that position?

We can go from there.

Yes, I am saying that.

Any definition of determinism will do, but I will take one from Peter Van Inwagen: "there is at any instant exactly one physical possible future."

If you are referring to aspects of human nature which ARE determined, I doubt you will get much argument. But to extrapolate that into a universal hard determinism is patent nonsense.

More irresponsible rhetoric. You haven't even substantiated the argument in an serious way, and neither has any major philosopher who engages in dialogue with the academic community done so and claimed to have solved the problem of free will. Peter Van Inwagen, a well-regarded defender of libertarian free will, argues for free will from paradox and intuition and not from the claim that hard determinism is patent nonsense (he would of course admit that libertarian free will is paradoxical too). Please, educate me with what you have discovered that improves upon his arguments and those of many others.

If you believe that only parts of human nature are determined, fine. I am waiting for you to substantiate that argument from your physicalist position with more than rhetoric. As Daniel Barnes pointed out, the philosophic consensus after years of debate is that quantum indeterminacy doesn't advance the libertarian position.
Arguing hard determinism from neuroscience and evolutionary biology is arguing that a Boeing 757 and a IBM Blue Gene/L 32,000 CPU supercomputer are the inevitable consequences of our neurology and evolution, and not the products of millions of individual choices and design decisions.
And what is the distinction, if individual choices and design decisions depend upon the structure and organization the matter that underlies them? And what research program can we base upon your beautiful theory?

The word "inevitable" is often abused, and I side with Dennett's treatment of the issue. We have all the free will we need, but unsubstantiated rhetoric disguised as fantastic argument will not advance our understanding of the issues.

What empirical test, we might ask, WOULD one devise to test the hypothesis that humans are volitional agents? You seem convinced that empirical evidence demonstrates the contrary, so what evidence WOULD be compelling in the affirmative?

Unless you are willing to state that, you are clearly arguing from a one-sided perspective.

You keep repeating that volition entails assumption, but refuse to acknowledge what I pointed out in an earlier post, that antivolitional hard determinism is replete with its own assumptions.

Yes, it is replete with assumptions. The only thing left to do is to see which view is more consistent with the empirical evidence in a qualitatively and quantitatively predictive way.

Here are a few things that would help the cause of indeterminism,or at least, the postulation of volition as a causal power more than a clockwork mechanism:

Identical twins differing widely in behavioral traits by power of choice.
People with brain damage regenerating their wills by choice.
People choosing to be one standard deviation more intelligent as measured on their IQ tests than their first IQ test at 5-years old reports.
Changes in mental health taking place without a change in physical brain chemistry.

All the current results of experiments related to the above issues support a physicalist view of volition strongly. And at least, we all know about the revolutions in biological sciences fostered by a paradigm of determinism. Your mysterious view of volition would not have supported an investigation into any of them.

Laj

Post 139

Monday, May 16, 2005 - 12:15pm