Concepts and Percepts--Are They Different? Are They Certain?

Ed:

As I alluded above to Rick, I'm not sold on the common conception of "percept formation" (ie. from individualized sensations--like building a brick house from several "individual" bricks).

Sold or not, what are your choices?

Each sensation of a large organism is a result of data from individual cells, and must be combined in some meaningful way for the mind, and all differentiations must be integrated. What could that be describing if not "formation"?

"2. A percept attributes identity to a form, which is a slightly different than identifying it."

Again, I find it intellectually unsettling to hear talk of having a percept "attribute" anything.

You apparently don't find it all THAT unsettling, Ed. Just below you state that Rand says percepts tell us THAT it is. In other words, percepts are attributing the fact of EXISTENCE to something.

If that, why not properties and identity?

Rand's insight that percepts tell you THAT it is, and a concept (reason) tells you WHAT it is--is helpful.

If that's Ayn Rand's position, then either percepts do no identification, or percepts behave like concepts, which is my claim.

I believe the senses are directly tied to our conceptual faculties--which are NOT limited to conscious concept formation. Ergo, there are no perceptions without concepts.

And while you do seem to be saying something along those lines with your dog-cliff-master example, I'd argue that "master"--to a dog--is nothing but a memorized percept, not an "identifying" concept used by the dog.

Meaningless particulars--some invoking fear, some invoking anticipation of security, food, or play, etc--that is what aconceptual creatures must experience. Not having concepts about the way things ought to be--dogs don't laugh when you're being goofy and you trip over something (they just get excited; thinking only that you're now down on the ground to play with them). If you have dogs, then try this at home.

If you're claiming that humans are the only conceptual beings, then you are either unaware of the vast and growing body of evidence to the contrary or are unwilling to apply the same standards to nonhuman animals that you apply to humans.

Animals regularly pass tests at the level of skill of 2 to 4 year-old humans.

"3. Basic percept formation is automatic. But percepts also vary in complexity and the more complex ones are learned. (Think about how a dog learns stuff again.)"

I'm not sold that complex percepts are learned. Perhaps there is an equivocation on the word "learned" here (as between acquaintance--which is rote learned; and integrative learning--which is purely conceptual). Dogs learn by rote learning (vulgar association) and memory--ie. aconceptual processes.

That's a straw dog argument, Ed.

First, dogs are not as similar to human cognitive behavior as are other primates and some birds. Nevertheless, they are not limited to "rote learning."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dog_intelligence

Limited by "crow epistemology," a dog can be taught to bark 4 times in a row, but a dog cannot be taught to bark 40 times in a row. Michael, on this same point, do you have a link to the counting-chimp story? I'd sure like to critically analyze it. If that chimp can reliably count to 40, then I'll have to eat my crow epistemology!

Good grief, Ed.

"The wonder of the dancing bear is not how well it dances, but that it dances at all."

We are talking about whether animals form concepts, not whether or not they can explain the Ricci tensor.

Thus we are trying to get him to sound out refrigerator letters, the same way one would train children on phonics. We were doing demos at the Media Lab for our corporate sponsors; we had a very small amount of time scheduled and the visitors wanted to see Alex work. So we put a number of differently colored letters on the tray that we use, put the tray in front of Alex, and asked, "Alex, what sound is blue?" He answers, "Ssss." It was an "s", so we say "Good birdie" and he replies, "Want a nut."

Well, I don't want him sitting there using our limited amount of time to eat a nut, so I tell him to wait, and I ask, "What sound is green?" Alex answers, "Ssshh." He's right, it's "sh," and we go through the routine again: "Good parrot." "Want a nut." "Alex, wait. What sound is orange?" "ch." "Good bird!" "Want a nut." We're going on and on and Alex is clearly getting more and more frustrated. He finally gets very slitty-eyed and he looks at me and states, "Want a nut. Nnn, uh, tuh."

http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/pepperberg03/pepperberg_index.html

Here we have a bird learning phonics, that leaps ahead and, unbidden, applies the CONCEPT of individual sounds to words he already knows.

The odds against this animal's complex and inventive intelligent behavior being rote learning are staggering.

Nathan Hawking

Post 21

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 6:58am

Nathan,

Reason/logic is NOT limited to conscious reasoning.

Er... before we even go on to the rest, it might be a good idea to define our terms. Otherwise we will talk in circles all day about shades of meaning of widely different concepts using the same words.

(I use the word integration here, which already includes differentiation of sensations based on (1) the five senses for five different kinds of data, and (2) the nature of each sense that allows it to distinguish instances of data according to attributes like light waves, etc., and integrate them into gestalt-like mental units to identify different forms/attributes. These mental units are what are called percepts and concepts and they vary according to complexity.)

So anyway, how about the dictionary to start with? Merriam Webster online will do - it is pretty good.

Logic (Definition 2 omitted for not being pertinent):

1 a (1) : a science that deals with the principles and criteria of validity of inference and demonstration : the science of the formal principles of reasoning
(2) : a branch or variety of logic <modal logic> <Boolean logic>
(3) : a branch of semiotic; especially : SYNTACTICS
(4) : the formal principles of a branch of knowledge

b (1) : a particular mode of reasoning viewed as valid or faulty
(2) : RELEVANCE, PROPRIETY

c : interrelation or sequence of facts or events when seen as inevitable or predictable

d : the arrangement of circuit elements (as in a computer) needed for computation; also : the circuits themselves

I am discussing a science (Definition 1 a) here, not the circuit elements needed for computation (Definition 1 d). As science is a branch of knowledge requiring concepts, it requires "conscious reasoning."

Reason (Definition 3 omitted for not being pertinent):

1 a : a statement offered in explanation or justification <gave reasons that were quite satisfactory>

b : a rational ground or motive <a good reason to act soon>

c : a sufficient ground of explanation or of logical defense; especially : something (as a principle or law) that supports a conclusion or explains a fact <the reasons behind her client's action>

d : the thing that makes some fact intelligible : CAUSE <the reason for earthquakes> <the real reason why he wanted me to stay �Graham Greene>

2 a (1) : the power of comprehending, inferring, or thinking especially in orderly rational ways : INTELLIGENCE

(2) : proper exercise of the mind

(3) : SANITY

b : the sum of the intellectual powers

I use this word in discussing epistemology as a "power" or "faculty" (Definition 2 a). It requires a consciousness to be exercised.

This seems a good starting point for the rest.

Ed:

Again, I find it intellectually unsettling to hear talk of having a percept "attribute" anything.

You got me there, dude. I was using a figure of speech, which is not really a good way to talk precisely when you need to talk precisely. Very good observation. I should have said that a percept includes the integration of identity (axiomatic concept) along with sensations.

Also, if you do not use "percepts" as integrated mental units (bricks [percepts] made out of mud, water and heat [sensations] if you will - to stretch an analogy), we are not even in the same ball park.

Michael

Post 22

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 7:32am

Hi Nathan,

Here's my understand of Rand's view.

According Rand, "A 'perception' is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism, which gives it the ability to be aware, not of single stimuli, but of entities, of things." (Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics, Virtue of Selfishness, pg19).

For Rand, human epistemology is a 3-layered hierarchical process: We move epistemically from sensations, to percepts, to concepts. (ITOE, pg5). While she viewed sensation and perception as "automatic," she viewed conception as "volitional." (And because she denied animals volition, she also denied them conception.)

This gets into Rand's ontology as well. For Rand, percepts are automatically retained and integrated because their referrents are real, physical existents, perhaps even metaphysically irreducible. That is, I think she viewed physical existents as irreducible, integrated clusters of attributes because she seemed to opposed atomism and metaphysical reductionsim. So for Rand, lamps, chairs, tables, etc. -- all these exist as things in reality, regardless of whether we are concious of them. What Rand rejected was that these individual things belonged to groups (categories, classes, whatever you want to call 'em) independent of consciousnesses. For Rand, grouping individual objects is a largely volitional process, which she called concept-formation.

Here's how I think Rand thought animals cognized. A dog sees a tree, makes an automatic perception of it, then sees another tree, then another, then another, then another. Each time the dog sees a tree, he's perceiving that particular tree. But never, according to Rand, will the dog conceive a tree. Never to the dog will the tree be a member (or "unit," as Rand would say) of the class "tree."

[edit: so to answer your question: Rand would say that percepts and concepts differ. The former automatically retains in the memory one isolated thing after another while the latter volitionally lumps those isolated things into groups.]

I disagree with Rand's epistemology, but I thought I'd nevertheless share my understanding of it.

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 5/08, 8:06am)

Post 23

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 8:04am

Nathan

Let me address a bit of your other question briefly as well: Are percepts and concepts certain?

Rand holds the validity of the senses as axiomatic (ITOE, pg3) because in denying them, one must first assume their validity. She thinks this because she upholds the primacy of existence; if we are to know anything, we must first draw it from out there (existence) and not first from in here (consciousness). So Rand thinks we can, indeed we must, be certain of our sensations' validity, and subequently, our perceptions' validity.

I'm sure Rand would say that we can be certain of our conceptions' validity too, but I'd rather let someone else explain that.

jordan

Post 24

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 8:41am

Nathan, et al,

I regret I haven't sufficient time and brain juice to spare for this fascinating conversation right now.

(I leave the discussion about the capacities of animals to another time, and focus on your main thesis: are concepts and percepts the same.)

I don't have a firm opinion yet on whether you are right or wrong, but want to offer the following for you consideration.

Is not the concept 'percept' used to designate a mental 'thing' correlated with some particular of which I am aware at the present? 'This tree', 'this birdhouse'. (Of course, I can't describe those percepts to you without using the concepts denoted by 'tree', 'birdhouse', etc.)

The next tree or the next time I see the same tree, according to the theory as I interpret it, I have a different percept.

Now mentally I go a step further (after enough neurological development, observations, social interaction, etc) and perform a (series of) mental

operation(s) which designate 'that tree' as a member of a class 'tree' or perhaps 'pine tree'.

In other words, concepts are open-ended, in the manner of algebraic symbols, whereas percepts are constrained to particular times/places,etc.

These considerations suggest to me that there is a need and an ability possessed by humans (and perhaps other animals) to distinguish between 'percept' and 'concept'.

Your thoughts?

Post 25

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 9:27am

Michael, in post 21 you wrote:
------------
"I should have said that a percept�includes the integration of identity (axiomatic concept) along with sensations.

Also, if you do not use "percepts" as integrated mental units (bricks [percepts] made out of mud, water and heat [sensations] if you will - to stretch an analogy), we are not even in the same ball park."
------------

Michael, allow me to backpedal on the whole "percepts attribute things to things / percepts don't attribute anything to things" notion. Nathan really got me good with his criticism above (percepts DO attribute "existence" to things)--thanks Nathan.

Also, I've just added the skeleton* of Gibson's theory on the other thread and darn-it-all if he didn't provide a concept to make me look even more wrong here--affordances. I retract, I retract, I retract.

*skeleton of Gibson's insight

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 5/08, 5:17pm)

Post 26

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 12:01pm

I think Jeff agrees with me, judging from his post 24. A percept corresponds to a thing; a concept, to a group of things. Now we could question whether a "thing" is really just a particular grouping of things (namely either subatomic particles or attributes), a question that wold funnel us through Rand's epistemology and into her ontology, like I was explaining in my post 22. But I'm not sure Nathan wants to go there.

-Jordan

Post 27

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 3:44pm

Michael:

Interesting post.

Nathan wrote:

Reason/logic is NOT limited to conscious reasoning.

Er... before we even go on to the rest, it might be a good idea to define our terms. Otherwise we will talk in circles all day about shades of meaning of widely different concepts using the same words.

Heh. I'm glad I'm not the only one who notices such things.

(I use the word integration here, which already includes differentiation of sensations based on...

Let's not gloss over that fact, though. We can't integrate unless we've differentiated. That has some significance.

(1) the five senses for five different kinds of data, and

Slightly beside the point, but interesting, is that there are more than five for humans. Even more for birds and sharks, who can sense magnetic fields and electrical fields respectively. Humans have nine or ten major senses. (Sense of heat and balance are among those attributed beyond the nominal five.)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senses

(2) the nature of each sense that allows it to distinguish instances of data according to attributes like light waves, etc., and integrate them into gestalt-like mental units to identify different forms/attributes. These mental units are what are called percepts and concepts and they vary according to complexity.)

I think it more accurate to say, not that each sense "distinguishes" the kind of data, but that each sense is aware of the presence/absense and intensity of its particular kind of data.

It is only at the macro level that our senses, collectively, "distinguish." At the level of the individual senses it's only presense/intensity. A sense like sight cannot distinguish between photons and acoustic waves because retinal cells are complete unaware of sounds.

I largely agree with the remainer, and again pose the question: How can anything be "identified" without a concept?

So anyway, how about the dictionary to start with? Merriam Webster online will do - it is pretty good.

Logic (Definition 2 omitted for not being pertinent):

1 a (1) : a science that deals with the principles and criteria of validity of inference and demonstration : the science of the formal principles of reasoning
(2) : a branch or variety of logic <modal logic> <Boolean logic>
(3) : a branch of semiotic; especially : SYNTACTICS
(4) : the formal principles of a branch of knowledge

b (1) : a particular mode of reasoning viewed as valid or faulty
(2) : RELEVANCE, PROPRIETY

c : interrelation or sequence of facts or events when seen as inevitable or predictable

d : the arrangement of circuit elements (as in a computer) needed for computation; also : the circuits themselves

Good. Let's see where you're taking us.

I am discussing a science (Definition 1 a) here, not the circuit elements needed for computation (Definition 1 d). As science is a branch of knowledge requiring concepts, it requires "conscious reasoning."

Reason (Definition 3 omitted for not being pertinent):

1 a : a statement offered in explanation or justification <gave reasons that were quite satisfactory>

b : a rational ground or motive <a good reason to act soon>

c : a sufficient ground of explanation or of logical defense; especially : something (as a principle or law) that supports a conclusion or explains a fact <the reasons behind her client's action>

d : the thing that makes some fact intelligible : CAUSE <the reason for earthquakes> <the real reason why he wanted me to stay �Graham Greene>

2 a (1) : the power of comprehending, inferring, or thinking especially in orderly rational ways : INTELLIGENCE

(2) : proper exercise of the mind

(3) : SANITY

b : the sum of the intellectual powers

I use this word in discussing epistemology as a "power" or "faculty" (Definition 2 a). It requires a consciousness to be exercised.

This seems a good starting point for the rest.

I know this is how you're using it. But I'm unwilling to restrict logic/reason to this definition for the purpose of discussing concepts.

Why? Because one of my theses is that cognitive processes which can properly be called concepts can also be unconscious, i.e., that much of our conceptual faculty IS exercised unconsciously, and as such, requires logic/reason even though it too is not being exercised consciously.

In other words, I am unwilling to allow you to define the validity of my thesis out of existence by stipulating that consciousness and reason are conscious.

How can concepts and reason not be conscious? Glad you asked.

In one sense, even the "unconscious" cognitive activity is still conscious, which is to say, the part of our mind engaged in that thinking is conscious of that thinking. It is simply that the consciousness out of which our central awareness operates is largely unaware of those subminds.

Our main consciousness is not unlike the operating system of a multitasking computer, which may only be dimly aware of other programs running in parallel with it. Our minds are not just multiTASKING but multiPROCESSING, so the disconnect between superconsciousness and subconsciousnesses may be even greater.

Nathan Hawking

Post 28

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 5:01pm

Michael:

I negelect the remainder of one post.

Ed:
Again, I find it intellectually unsettling to hear talk of having a percept "attribute" anything.
You got me there, dude. I was using a figure of speech, which is not really a good way to talk precisely when you need to talk precisely. Very good observation. I should have said that a percept includes the integration of identity (axiomatic concept) along with sensations.

"Attribute" is actually a good word. Our senses/perceptions are active processes, not passive or static thing.

The "integration of identity" is another way to say "identification," which is a form of conscious (at that level) attribution.

Which leads me back to the question I will keep asking until someone addresses it: How can a perception identify ANYTHING (even if only that something is a metaphysical unit) without a concept?

Answer that and you'll be a step closer to understanding how perceptions ARE conceptual processes.

Also, if you do not use "percepts" as integrated mental units (bricks [percepts] made out of mud, water and heat [sensations] if you will - to stretch an analogy), we are not even in the same ball park.

That was my point about his objection to "formation," Michael. They are NOT raw sensory data. They ARE, as you say, integrated mental units.

Further, they use the many of same fundamental mental processes that more abstract conscious conceptualization uses.

Ask yourself this: If perception involves identification, as does conscious conceptualization, which is more likely, that we would evolve entirely different mechanisms to handle perceptual and higher conceptual tasks, or that we reuse and extend existing cognitive abilities?

Nathan Hawking

(Edited by Nathan Hawking on 5/08, 6:43pm)

Post 29

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 5:30pm

Jordan:

Thanks for providing the quotes.

Here's my understand of Rand's view.

According Rand, "A 'perception' is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism, which gives it the ability to be aware, not of single stimuli, but of entities, of things." (Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics, Virtue of Selfishness, pg19).

Yes, that's my understanding of her position.

For Rand, human epistemology is a 3-layered hierarchical process: We move epistemically from sensations, to percepts, to concepts. (ITOE, pg5).

My difference with her is that I extend the notion of concepts all the way down to the unconscious and perceptual level. This is not to say that there are no additional cognitive requirements for conscious conceptual thinking--it is to say that the fundamentals are the same.

While she viewed sensation and perception as "automatic," she viewed conception as "volitional." (And because she denied animals volition, she also denied them conception.)

That's my understanding of her view. I agree that perception is largely an automatic process. (I say "largely" because conscious thought can influence our perception.)

I would agree that there is a volitional COMPONENT to conceptual thinking, in that portion which is conscious. Obviously, if some conceptual activity is unconscious as I claim, that would not be volitional.

I disagree with Rand's view that animals are without volition and conceptual faculties. The evidence is overwhelming.

This gets into Rand's ontology as well. For Rand, percepts are automatically retained and integrated because their referrents are real, physical existents, perhaps even metaphysically irreducible.

I concur with the "real, physical" part. I'm not sure what you mean by "metaphysically irreducible," though.

That is, I think she viewed physical existents as irreducible, integrated clusters of attributes because she seemed to opposed atomism and metaphysical reductionsim. So for Rand, lamps, chairs, tables, etc. -- all these exist as things in reality, regardless of whether we are concious of them.

What Rand rejected was that these individual things belonged to groups (categories, classes, whatever you want to call 'em) independent of consciousnesses. For Rand, grouping individual objects is a largely volitional process, which she called concept-formation.

I'd say that depends upon what we mean by "group" and "classes." If we define these as cognitive processes alone, then there are no classes without a classifier. If we define them as entities which share common characteristics, then groups and classes can exist independent of a classifier.

Here's how I think Rand thought animals cognized. A dog sees a tree, makes an automatic perception of it, then sees another tree, then another, then another, then another. Each time the dog sees a tree, he's perceiving that particular tree. But never, according to Rand, will the dog conceive a tree. Never to the dog will the tree be a member (or "unit," as Rand would say) of the class "tree."

Animal experiments clearly demonstrate this view to be incorrect, as I see it.

[edit: so to answer your question: Rand would say that percepts and concepts differ. The former automatically retains in the memory one isolated thing after another while the latter volitionally lumps those isolated things into groups.]

I disagree with Rand's epistemology, but I thought I'd nevertheless share my understanding of it.

I'm glad you did. Thanks. I agree with important elements of her explanation, and consider that portion a reasonable subset of a broader epistemology.

Nathan Hawking

Post 30

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 5:45pm

Jordan:

Let me address a bit of your other question briefly as well: Are percepts and concepts certain?

Rand holds the validity of the senses as axiomatic (ITOE, pg3) because in denying them, one must first assume their validity.

First, I'm using certitude in the total sense, not the weaker sense.

Second, the evidence is overwhelming that our senses CAN be invalid, i.e., that we can "sense things" which are not really there. For anyone to deny this evidence is, in my view, nothing short of dogma.

Is this to deny the "validity of the senses"? No. It is to deny their infallibility.

Our sensory experience is largely reliable, and provides a normally efficacious way to build a useful representation of the real world.

She thinks this because she upholds the primacy of existence; if we are to know anything, we must first draw it from out there (existence) and not first from in here (consciousness). So Rand thinks we can, indeed we must, be certain of our sensations' validity, and subequently, our perceptions' validity.

I agree with the first, but the second doesn't follow. It is a Perfectionist Fallacy.

Sure, if we define knowledge as certitude, then we must have certitude of sense and perception. But I don't, and we needn't.

Thanks.

Nathan Hawking

Post 31

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 5:59pm

Nathan,

Mr. Occum just stopped by.

I see you talking around in many circles in order to re-arrive at what has already been thought about, except with different words.

What is wrong with using the traditional ones like "integrate" for the process of forming mental units from sensory data and other already integrated mental units instead of trying to force the word "concept" in that role in order to eliminate the word "percept"?

(And yes, integration traditionally occurs in the subconscious also.)

Or "agent" for the perceiver and conceiver?

Or, or, or...???

You know...

Let's discuss ideas instead of semantics. Let's see what you've really got. (Maybe starting with that thing of 9 or 10 senses instead of 5. That's actually a pretty good start to tell the truth.)

Michael

Post 32

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 6:29pm

Jeff:

Glad you could join the discussion.

I don't have a firm opinion yet on whether you are right or wrong, but want to offer the following for your consideration.

Is not the concept 'percept' used to designate a mental 'thing' correlated with some particular of which I am aware at the present? 'This tree', 'this birdhouse'. (Of course, I can't describe those percepts to you without using the concepts denoted by 'tree', 'birdhouse', etc.)

"Thingness" would only be one aspect of perception. As the word is usually used in cognitive science:

A percept is the resultant of perceiving. It is the representation of an external event that affected the senses and which--by perceptual processing--caused the activation of a certain category in the mind, i.e., the percept.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percept

You can see that categorization is also involved, according to this definition. It is my thesis, in part, that the act of categorizing repeatedly involves identification, which is a conceptual act.

The next tree or the next time I see the same tree, according to the theory as I interpret it, I have a different percept.

If the Wikipedia definition is correct, as the word is generally used, no, you would again perceive "a tree." In a sense, the same percept. (Not that I limit perception to class--one would also have a sense of THIS tree.)

Now mentally I go a step further (after enough neurological development, observations, social interaction, etc) and perform a (series of) mental

operation(s) which designate 'that tree' as a member of a class 'tree' or perhaps 'pine tree'.

I'm more inclined to think that perceptual ability (which recognizes class) alone is enough to get you to a nonverbal "pine tree" on the basis of visual distinction, smell, etc. Nonverbal animals have no difficulty classifying in rather refined ways.

But bear in mind that I hold this perceptual differentiation and integration, classification, as a CONCEPTUAL activity--even if it is nonverbal. It is identification, and for my money identification requires conceptual processes.

In other words, concepts are open-ended, in the manner of algebraic symbols, whereas percepts are constrained to particular times/places,etc.

Bing! And what constrains perceptions "to particular times/places, etc."?

THE SOURCE OF THE DATA!

Which takes me back to the statement I made in post 10 of this thread, one of my themes:

"Except for the source of the data, there is NO demonstrated fundamental difference between concepts and perceptions."

These considerations suggest to me that there is a need and an ability possessed by humans (and perhaps other animals) to distinguish between 'percept' and 'concept'.

You can see that I DO make a distinction.

Perceptions: Conscious representations of unconscious conceptual processes whose source of data is external to the mind.*

*It is somewhat more complicated that that, but that definition should suffice for the moment.

Thanks for walking through this with me, Jeff.

Nathan Hawking

Post 33

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 6:39pm

Ed:

Michael, allow me to backpedal on the whole "percepts attribute things to things / percepts don't attribute anything to things" notion. Nathan really got me good with his criticism above (percepts DO attribute "existence" to things)--thanks Nathan.

My pleasure.

Moreover, if you check my reply to Jeff you'll see that according to rather widespread use of "perception," percepts also attribute class/category to perceived existents.

Also, I've just added the skeleton* of Gibson's theory on the other thread and darn-it-all if he didn't provide a concept to make me look even more wrong here--affordances. I retract, I retract, I retract.

*skeleton of Gibson's insight

Thanks for posting that link. I've encountered Gibson's affordances notion, but will have to study it further to draw any conclusions. "Affordances" aside, my preliminary view is that Gibson and I are far apart in some important ways.

Nathan Hawking

Post 34

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 6:52pm

Jordan:

I think Jeff agrees with me, judging from his post 24. A percept corresponds to a thing; a concept, to a group of things. Now we could question whether a "thing" is really just a particular grouping of things (namely either subatomic particles or attributes), a question that wold funnel us through Rand's epistemology and into her ontology, like I was explaining in my post 22. But I'm not sure Nathan wants to go there.

My post to Jeff, 32, proffers both a common and my own limited definition of percepts.

Per those, percepts go beyond the recognition of something as a "thing" (no small feat in itself) to "what kind of thing."

As for ontology, if you feel something is relevant to this subject, by all means bring it up.

Nathan Hawking

Post 35

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 7:13pm

Michael:

I see you talking around in many circles in order to re-arrive at what has already been thought about, except with different words.

Can you to point to one circular argument I've made?

What is wrong with using the traditional ones like "integrate" for the process of forming mental units from sensory data and other already integrated mental units instead of trying to force the word "concept" in that role in order to eliminate the word "percept"?

Because "integrate" alone amounts to a wave of the hand. It is a way to say PART of what happens, but to ignore the rest.

I submit that integration is one fundamental component of concept formation, and that saying "percepts are fundamentally concepts with an external source of data" is to say far more than "integrate."

(And yes, integration traditionally occurs in the subconscious also.)

Or "agent" for the perceiver and conceiver?

Or, or, or...???

You know...

Let's discuss ideas instead of semantics. Let's see what you've really got.

That cuts both ways. Saying that mental units arise because percepts "integrate" is to say exactly what?

(Maybe starting with that thing of 9 or 10 senses instead of 5. That's actually a pretty good start to tell the truth.)

That's a rather offensive way to phrase that, Michael. I suggest you avoid getting personal.

Here's the link again.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senses

If you disagree, I suggest you take it up with cognitive scientists, or at least be specific about your objections. "Tell the truth" doesn't get us far here.

Nathan Hawking

Post 36

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 9:46pm

Nathan,

There was no offense meant where you got offended. None. I was actually interested for real - and I found that issue to be much more interesting than trying to redefine the words we use to mean the same concepts. (That, by the way is the talking in circles I mentioned - another term I use for splitting hairs over semantics and not issues.)

I'm sorry if saying all this is offensive, but I don't know how to get away from all this talking about a word that means one thing - and all of a sudden it takes on another meaning or meanings in the middle of a discussion. I want to get to the real ideas.

For example, you wrote:

Saying that mental units arise because percepts "integrate" is to say exactly what?

To start with, a percept does not integrate anything. A brain integrates. A percept is the name of one of the units that occur when a bunch of sensations are integrated and it is a mentally usable unit. It exists inside of a brain.

So what I am saying? Nothing more that these mental units exist. If I remember Rand's words correctly, they exist as "some sort of ideas."

What we call them is not really that big of an issue. Objectivist epistemology has traditionally called them percepts and concepts. And they both have specific natures and meanings - and they both range from the simple to the complex. They are held in the brains of "agents." Some are automatically formed and some are subject to volitional formation and handling.

If you don't wish to admit that these mental units exist at all, that there is only one overall process you call "concept" that works as a catch-all for both integration and the units themselves (which may or may not exist), that despite being one overall process, it is much more complex when you try to pin it down, that the word "integrate" is limited and whatnot, frankly that is not what I am interested in discussing.

I am happy with the definitions of the words that are traditionally used and I have seen nothing in any arguments so far that make me want to replace them or give them new meanings.

I would like to add to the knowledge I have, though. That is where I thought we might be heading. That is why I joined this discussion.

(Hence my real interest in 9 or 10 senses, for example - I had not heard of that before. And I intend to read that Wikipedia article tonight or tomorrow. Memory is also another interesting issue.)

But if we are wasting each other's time, it is probably time to quit while we are both ahead.

Michael

Post 37

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 12:53am

Michael:

There was no offense meant where you got offended. None. I was actually interested for real ...

Sorry I misread that. The missing comma threw me. You wrote: "That's actually a pretty good start to tell the truth," instead of "That's actually a pretty good start, to tell the truth."

(I only spell this out in detail because I'm a student of ambiguity in writing, and find it interesting if nothing else. It certainly doesn't let me off the hook for not seeing a kinder interpretation.)

- and I found that issue to be much more interesting than trying to redefine the words we use to mean the same concepts.

I don't believe we're talking about the same things in different words. I've made a number of the important distinctions between my position and Rands VERY clear, and I don't arrive at my conclusions by shifting the meaning of words. My position has some consequences which are strikingly different from hers.

Let me ask you this: How long did it take you to understand Ayn Rand's epistemology?

Presumably more than an hour. Expecting an alternative to make sense after a once-over is not reasonable. You have already alluded to your predisposition to skip over details in discussion like these. Maybe the article will make more sense to you.

(That, by the way is the talking in circles I mentioned - another term I use for splitting hairs over semantics and not issues.)

No, Michael, discussing the meaning of words is not inherently circuitous. I believe one of Ayn Rand's favorite expressions was: Define your terms.

If you can point to a single instance of were I'm being logically circuitous, please do. I don't believe you can.

I'm sorry if saying all this is offensive, but I don't know how to get away from all this talking about a word that means one thing - and all of a sudden it takes on another meaning or meanings in the middle of a discussion. I want to get to the real ideas.

I'm not offended, but I'd suggest that you be more patient.
You did the right thing by trying to clarify definitions early in the discussion.

But be careful that you aren't asking for both concision and detailed list of meanings in the same breath. You can't have it both ways. Sometimes these things take time to unfold.

For example, you wrote:

Saying that mental units arise because percepts "integrate" is to say exactly what?
To start with, a percept does not integrate anything. A brain integrates. A percept is the name of one of the units that occur when a bunch of sensations are integrated and it is a mentally usable unit. It exists inside of a brain.

Now THAT is semantic confusion and hair-splitting. I leave it for you to discern where.

So what I am saying? Nothing more that these mental units exist. If I remember Rand's words correctly, they exist as "some sort of ideas."

I can accept that use of "ideas."

What we call them is not really that big of an issue. Objectivist epistemology has traditionally called them percepts and concepts. And they both have specific natures and meanings - and they both range from the simple to the complex. They are held in the brains of "agents." Some are automatically formed and some are subject to volitional formation and handling.

It's not their names I'm discussing. It's their nature. You are entirely mistaken if you believe I'm simply renaming things--you need to read my posts more carefully.

If you don't wish to admit that these mental units exist at all...

Where did I say that perceptual processes and perceptions do not exist? Where did you get that idea?

... that there is only one overall process you call "concept" that works as a catch-all for both integration and the units themselves (which may or may not exist), that despite being one overall process, it is much more complex when you try to pin it down, that the word "integrate" is limited and whatnot,

I don't think I can untangle your interpretation of what I'm saying.

I'm saying that perception and conceptualization use the same fundamental processes, but differ in the source of their data. Beyond that, further explication of the general nature of concepts is necessary, and of the different types of concepts.

... frankly that is not what I am interested in discussing.

That's fine. I'm not sure why you're telling me this. If you're not interested in discussing something, just don't discuss it.

I am happy with the definitions of the words that are traditionally used and I have seen nothing in any arguments so far that make me want to replace them or give them new meanings.

That's fine too. I don't expect to persuade everyone, or anyone overnight.

I would like to add to the knowledge I have, though. That is where I thought we might be heading. That is why I joined this discussion.

(Hence my real interest in 9 or 10 senses, for example - I had not heard of that before. And I intend to read that Wikipedia article tonight or tomorrow. Memory is also another interesting issue.)

But if we are wasting each other's time, it is probably time to quit while we are both ahead.

Senses are interesting, indeed.

As for wasting time, you must be the judge of that for yourself. I'll respond to any reasoned argument you wish to offer or question you wish to put to me so long as I have the time.

Nathan Hawking

Post 38

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 8:42am

Hi Nathan,

My difference with her is that I extend the notion of concepts all the way down to the unconscious and perceptual level. This is not to say that there are no additional cognitive requirements for conscious conceptual thinking--it is to say that the fundamentals are the same.

Ok. What are those same fundamentals? It seems you think that both identification and categorization are present throughout cognitive processes.

Also, I see what some other discussers are saying about your word/definition choice. Rand's use of "percept" and "concept" differ from their common usages and from your uses of them. For Rand, a "percept" is just a physical thing as retained by the brain, while a "concept" is a category as retained by the brain. Rand would argue that we can't retain a category until we identify at least two or more things that would be members of that category. (ITOE, pg 10). I guess she rejected the idea that categories could have only one member, but I don't see why. Let's just give her the benefit of the doubt and assume she would allow categories so long as at least one member of the category is identified first. Rand would say that we first identify a thing, then categorize it -- that identification and categorization don't happen simultaneously, and that categorization doesn't precede identification. I think for your view to work, every physical thing as retained by the brain would also have to be simultaneously retained by the brain as a member of a category. I don't have any big quips with this view; I'm just not sure how to test it.

Second, the evidence is overwhelming that our senses CAN be invalid, i.e., that we can "sense things" which are not really there. For anyone to deny this evidence is, in my view, nothing short of dogma.

Sure. Sometimes senses screw up. Rand should've said that some senses have to be valid some of the time. But she overstated her case.

As for certainty. I don't know what you're arguing for or against.

Jordan

Post 39

Monday, May 9, 2005 - 9:05am