Concepts and Percepts--Are They Different? Are They Certain?

Concepts and Percepts--Are They Different? Are They Certain?

Note:

If someone can furnish a link to quotations of Rand's definitions of concepts and percepts, in ITOE or elsewhere, that would be most appreciated.

In another thread we've been discussing the nature of knowledge. This naturally led to the subject of concepts and percepts, which I felt deserved its own thread.

In addition, Objectivists often assert that certitude about knowledge is possible. By this I understand that they mean concepts which could not under any circumstances be incorrect.

Moreover, this certitude is not just applied to the trivial, but is generalized to virtually ALL thinking. The implication is: With the proper thinking, certainty is assured. But is that true?

A seedling, transplanted from the other thread, will illustrate the controversy:

Nathan Hawking wrote:

[Demanding certitude before we call something knowledge] is a fallacy because

1) perceptual certitude is inattainable, and

2) certitude is not requisite for extremely reliable knowledge.

Ed Thompson wrote:

Perceptual certitude is a redundancy (I think you are viewing perception--pardon the pun--as: perceptual judgment; but we only judge via our conceptual faculty, not via our perceptual experiences). Regarding point 2, certitude is not requisite for extremely reliable beliefs--to put a nail in this coffin: conflation of knowledge with merely "reliable" beliefs IS THE PROBLEM my essay [The Veridicality of Conceptual Discernment] was aimed at, Nathan.

NH: You apparently hold that unless something is CERTAIN it is neither a perception, nor a concept, nor knowledge.

If somebody would quote Rand's definitions, or suggest a link, that would get us started.

Nathan Hawking

Post 1

Friday, May 6, 2005 - 8:09pm

Not to throw a wrench into this, but it might be worth to look at Mortimer Adler's THE DIFFERENCE OF MAN AND THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES... in which is postulated 'perceptual abstractions' - something which higher animals have a capacity of, but which are not conceptual, something only self-aware beings [humans] have. This work was cited in Objectivist literature [whether by Rand herself or Branden, do not remember].

Post 2

Friday, May 6, 2005 - 8:55pm

Robert wrote:

Not to throw a wrench into this...

Not to worry, Robert. I consider this thread a toolbox. Wrenches welcome.

...but it might be worth to look at Mortimer Adler's THE DIFFERENCE OF MAN AND THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES... in which is postulated 'perceptual abstractions'...

Feel free to quote any portion you wish or define that term for us.

...something which higher animals have a capacity of, but which are not conceptual, something only self-aware beings [humans] have.

I would not agree that humans are the only self-aware and conceptual animals.

We assume all ordinary humans are in some way "self-aware" by generalizing from a single experience, our own. But we don't live inside anyone else's skin, and are forced to TEST our hypothesis that 'other humans are self aware' by scientific evaluation.

The fly in the ointment of human specialness is that many animals pass exactly the same tests for self-awareness that humans pass.

Perhaps we should define "concept" before debating it, but I would point out that chimpanzees and gorillas can demonstrably reason from analogy, among other conceptual feats.

Primates are not the only animals with conceptual ability. Alex, an African grey parrot, clearly demonstrates an astonishing ability to abstract qualities from groups of objects, among many other abilities.

http://www.alexfoundation.org/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex_%28parrot%29

So, do nonhumans have and use concepts? The evidence is so overwhelming that to deny this one simply has to be uninformed about the research, intransigently dogmatic, or defining concept in such a stringent way that millions of humans would be regarded as nonconceptual.

This work was cited in Objectivist literature [whether by Rand herself or Branden, do not remember].

Yes, Robert. I'm almost sure I've encountered it somewhere.
Thanks for responding.

Nathan Hawking

Post 3

Friday, May 6, 2005 - 9:15pm

Nathan,
You open a very large and tasty can of worms here.

My first, and sincere, recommendation would be to read the entire ITOE monograph yourself first. It's short; this is a reasonable starting point.

Just quoting definitions, and then arguing about their correctness and validity is what leads so many of these discussions to
become rapidly useless and frustrating for all. Alternatively (ideally additionally) Kelley's monograph A Theory of Abstraction
is in order. These are inexpensive and easily obtainable.

Quite frankly, without intending (but probably inevitably) to insult anyone, few on this forum have the background to
properly explain the theory to you, though they can argue specific points very effectively. Best to do some first hand
research up front, rather than try to pick some topic in the middle and argue about it endlessly.

I honestly don't expect this advice will be heeded by anyone, but it needed said.

Post 4

Friday, May 6, 2005 - 10:01pm

Jeff:

Nathan,

You open a very large and tasty can of worms here.

My first, and sincere, recommendation would be to read the entire ITOE monograph yourself first. It's short; this is a reasonable starting point.

I've read it. Many times. I lost most of my library in a move, however, so ask that someone bring the official Objectivist version to the table.

Just quoting definitions, and then arguing about their correctness and validity is what leads so many of these discussions to become rapidly useless and frustrating for all.

But how are we to discuss anything without "quoting definitions, and then arguing about their correctness and validity"? I thought that was inherent in the nature of philosophical debate.

Am I correct in assuming that SOLO is a place where one can debate and explore such issues? Would I be better off somewhere else? (That is, after all, one of my purposes.)

Alternatively (ideally additionally) Kelley's monograph A Theory of Abstraction is in order. These are inexpensive and easily obtainable.

Quite frankly, without intending (but probably inevitably) to insult anyone, few on this forum have the background to
properly explain the theory to you...

Then why would they believe it? Why would anyone consider himself or herself a philosophical Objectivist unless he or she understood the philosophy? (The application is another matter; I understand its appeal even if it had no grounding in philosophy.)

As for needing someone to "properly explain the theory" to me, why would you assume I need that? Does the fact that I disagree with key elements suggest that I must not understand it? Perhaps I understand it VERY well, and that's precisely why I disagree with parts? LOL

(I'm not in the least offended, Jeff, nor do I wish to be offensive. I am, though, sometimes amused by some Objectivists' authoritarian or condescending or presumptious tone or posture, something, I suspect, which derives from Objectivist culture and ultimately Ayn Rand's personal nature. I'm pleased that SOLO is counter-cultural in so many respects.)

...though they can argue specific points very effectively. Best to do some first hand research up front, rather than try to pick some topic in the middle and argue about it endlessly.

It's hard to keep debates productive. But that is not inherent in the nature of debate--more in the nature of many debaters.

I honestly don't expect this advice will be heeded by anyone, but it needed said.

I hope you're right about not being heeded. I'm here (in part) to discuss issues. If I wished to "read a book," I'd read a book--which is not to discourage book recommendations. It IS to discourage book recommendations as a substitute for discussion.

So, let's talk--if you wish. (This subject is of far more interest and importance to me than the philosophy of mathematics, if that's helpful.)

Nathan Hawking

(Edited by Nathan Hawking on 5/07, 12:08am)

Post 5

Friday, May 6, 2005 - 10:39pm

Nathan,
Thanks for responding. I wasn't suggesting one should 'only read books'. And certainly not as a
substitute for discussion. Rather, I thought it would help (in this case) to increase the probability of productive discussion.
Since I now understand you've already read the source, I have a very different view.

My point was that often philosophical discussions proceed by picking a single or
(very few lines) out of some source and then endlessly
discussing the implications, validity, etc of that single (or few) line(s). In my opinion that often leads
to serious misunderstanding of the author's meaning. (This is far from exclusive to Oist discussions
about Oism or any other philosophy.)

By the way, I don't (and don't pretend to) speak for SOLO (or anyone else) in any capacity whatever. I wouldn't
have a clue about whether your goals would be better served by going elsewhere. I can say there are quite a few
very sharp people on this forum, and some have not only an in depth understanding of Oism, but of philosophy
in general. Probably you'll find some engaging discussion partners.

I don't think I assumed you 'need[ed] someone to "properly explain the theory" to [you]. I thought perhaps
you wanted someone to provide you with a 'correct' explication. Almost certainly, I was mistaken, given
your post.

Just about everyone here, myself included, enjoys the 'counter-culture' aspect of SOLO. I know little
about 'orthodox' venues these days -- I haven't participated in any for years. From what I can gather,
mostly second hand, they don't seem to have changed much over the years -- the cause of which we can
speculate about on another thread. That said, I've seen a lot of people assume that Oism (or something like
it) is incorrect because of the behavior of people who label themselves as such. I like to do what I can to
prevent that, but at the same time am generally (overly) sensitive to people who are just looking to 'poke'
holes in it. I don't assume that is your motive.

Now with all that out of the way, back to the subject at hand .... which I'll take up tomorrow.

Post 6

Saturday, May 7, 2005 - 12:41am

Jeff:

Jeff wrote:

My point was that often philosophical discussions proceed by picking a single or (very few lines) out of some source and then endlessly discussing the implications, validity, etc of that single (or few) line(s). In my opinion that often leads to serious misunderstanding of the author's meaning.

There is never a shortage of opportunities to misunderstand or be misunderstood, is there?

Listening to people "interpret" philosophers is sometimes like witnessing Biblical exegesis, chapter and verse.

I don't think I assumed you 'need[ed] someone to "properly explain the theory" to [you]. I thought perhaps you wanted someone to provide you with a 'correct' explication. Almost certainly, I was mistaken, given your post.

No problem. Sorry if I responded too strongly. I did reread what I wrote and noticed that I misspoke--I should have said "amused by some Objectivists' authoritarian" posture.

Just about everyone here, myself included, enjoys the 'counter-culture' aspect of SOLO. ... That said, I've seen a lot of people assume that Oism (or something like it) is incorrect because of the behavior of people who label themselves as such.

I wouldn't succumb to an unwarranted generalization like that.

I like to do what I can to prevent that, but at the same time am generally (overly) sensitive to people who are just looking to 'poke' holes in it. I don't assume that is your motive.

That's good. It isn't.

But my suggestion is to ignore motives and focus upon argument and fact. Religiously.

You've probably noticed that I flatly and consistently refuse to allow anyone to make my motives the issue--questioning motives is the surely way to eviscerate any potential value in discussion.

It's difficult not to get frustrated with people we suspect are being evasive or outright dishonest, but when did accusing someone of evasion and dishonesty ever move them to honesty and intellectual integrity? I can't think of a single instance in my experience.

Not that long ago I was very blunt with someone who was clearly, in my view, trying to drown the truth in verbiage and avoid the simple fact that he was mistaken. He responded to my bluntness by stating that he would not discuss anything with me in the future. Now, I have a very low tolerance for bullshitters, and didn't feel any great sense of loss--but I fault myself for not handling this as graciously as I could have.

Live and learn.

Nathan Hawking

Post 7

Saturday, May 7, 2005 - 7:22am

Nathan,

Could I make a practical rhetorical suggestion? Please do not be offended.

There is a type of writing that I call a variation of the "I Said You Said" approach. How it works is that a person will post something like:

Point A. Opinion 1. Point B. Offhand comment. Opinion 2. Point 3.

Then an "I Said You Said" response will be something like:

Point A.

Well, you see, that is not what I meant by what you said. I was making some minor point or other.

Opinion 1.

This is where we disagree.

Point B.

This is actually a point well taken. I especially like the part about B.

Offhand comment.

I don't understand why you say that. Could you please explain what offhand is?

Opinion 2.

We mostly agree here. I just use the word 2 to mean something more like two.

Point 3.

That is completely wrong. You didn't take 4 into account at all.

When this kind of discourse gets long, I normally skip over it. Sometimes I actually want to follow a train of thought or a new idea, but I don't see one being developed like that - just refutation and commentary point-by-point without any prioritization.

I have tried to follow some of your thoughts. I have even wanted to join in, but this is where I get hung up. On skimming your posts, I see a phrase jump out at me once in a while that I think would be interesting to comment on. I am especially interested in epistemology, so I think there is much to be gained from discussing it. I just find the above kind of back-and-forth too time-consuming and unstructured hierarchy-wise to bother with.

As I said, I do not wish to offend. There are probably others who have the same restriction as I do, though. So please take this as food for thought only. Not even criticism. If you are comfortable with this method and do not agree, by all means stay with it.

Michael

Post 8

Saturday, May 7, 2005 - 5:32pm

Michael S.K. writes:

Could I make a practical rhetorical suggestion? Please do not be offended.

Your comments are appreciated, Michael. Fire away.

There is a type of writing that I call a variation of the "I Said You Said" approach. How it works is that a person will post something like:

Point A. Opinion 1. Point B. Offhand comment. Opinion 2. Point 3.

Then an "I Said You Said" response will be something like:

[SOLO screenplay snipped.]

When this kind of discourse gets long, I normally skip over it.

I sympathasize. I have the same reaction to long, unbroken dialogue exchanges in literature.

Sometimes I actually want to follow a train of thought or a new idea, but I don't see one being developed like that - just refutation and commentary point-by-point without any prioritization.

That's one of the drawbacks to what I call "interlinear debate"--it tends to meander.

On the other hand, my eyes also glaze over for long, bloated paragraphs of philosophicalese. The alternative to interlinear debate, "debate by monologues," can also have its drawbacks.

I have tried to follow some of your thoughts. I have even wanted to join in, but this is where I get hung up. On skimming your posts, I see a phrase jump out at me once in a while that I think would be interesting to comment on. I am especially interested in epistemology, so I think there is much to be gained from discussing it. I just find the above kind of back-and-forth too time-consuming and unstructured hierarchy-wise to bother with.

Perhaps you would feel it rude not to adopt the general format of a discussion?

I wouldn't see it that way, not in the least. I can't speak for anyone else, but if you feel like commenting on just a few things I've written, feel entirely free to delete or ignore everything else and format your reply any way you see fit.

As I said, I do not wish to offend. There are probably others who have the same restriction as I do, though. So please take this as food for thought only. Not even criticism. If you are comfortable with this method and do not agree, by all means stay with it.

You've mentioned tedium and lack of structure. Is it also possible that interlinear debate feels too aggressive to some? Too picky or pedantic? Something else?

Perhaps it would help to mention that I don't consider my debate posts the end product. I'm working on articles--perhaps eventually a book--and online discussions are, in part, a means to that end.

Nathan Hawking

Post 9

Saturday, May 7, 2005 - 6:26pm

I'll try Nathan, but frankly these kind of posts are too long and disconnected for the time I have. It seems that they are really useful when you wish to talk only to one person.

For myself, many times I may not even agree with either position, so wading through a bunch of arguments on two different positions I don't favor just to get to one or two ideas that do interest me takes too long and requires too much focus on side issues. Especially when there are so many concise well reasoned posts (or even ridiculous ones that need trouncing) competing for my attention.

But that's me. A capitalism thing maybe?

//;-)

Michael

Post 10

Saturday, May 7, 2005 - 8:17pm

Nathan Hawking Gets Concise

I'll try Nathan, but frankly these kind of posts are too long and disconnected ... when there are so many concise well reasoned posts ... competing for my attention.

But that's me. A capitalism thing maybe?

A values thing, Michael.

You want concise? How about this:

Except for the source of the data, there is NO demonstrated fundamental difference between concepts and perceptions.

Enlarged:

Ayn Rand's description of concepts is far too narrow, and incorrect or misleading in places. For example:

Concept formation is not limited to conscious mental action, but also takes place unconsciously.
Words are not the only tools for concept formation (i.e., nonverbal entities also use concepts).
Primitive concepts can be innate (i.e., babies are not born tabula rasa).
The most primitive concepts involve only differentiation, and occur all the way down to the cellular level (e.g., 'Is a photon present or absent?').
Sensory concepts (percepts) entail both differentiation and integration. Note the following, from SOLO's Objectivism 101 page:

Perception is an integration of stimulus. It combines different sensory effects over time into a single unified whole. The result is the awareness of entities. We don't see a mass of different colors and brightness. Instead we see a computer monitor, a book, or a cup of grape kool-aid. We see things.

http://solohq.com/Objectivism101/Epistemology_Perception.shtml

Careful readers will note that perceptions integrate. Integrate what? Differences! Not an undifferentiated mass of colors and brightness, but "We see things." (Integration and differentiation are two key components of higher-level concept formation.)

We apparently can tell the difference between one "thing" and another from infancy. Not only that, we can tell one thing from another! In short, we IDENTIFY.

"Concepts integrate particulars," we are told. That is precisely what is happening in the act of perceptual identification. How, we're forced to ask, would it possible to identify something without some rudimentary (even if nonverbal) concepts? Concepts like:

Something is present.
This is where the thing begins and ends.
Everything between the edges of the thing is the thing.
There can be more than one thing.
Things with substantially different properties (like location) are different things.
This thing is the same thing even if it changes some of its apparent properties.
This thing is unique in properties x, y, and z.
If another thing comes between me and the thing, the thing will still be there.

The list goes on. Like the story of the world resting on the back of a giant turtle resting upon another and another, it's concepts all the way down. In the conscious, the unconscious, all the way down to the sensate/perceptual level.

Cognitive features are added at higher levels of mental functioning, and words offer a higher level of possible abstraction and an additional tool, but the fundamentals remain the same.

Nathan Hawking

Post 11

Saturday, May 7, 2005 - 8:58pm

Nathan,

It is not concepts all the way down - but integration all the way down.

My turtles integrate.

The way I understand it (er... my library is still in Brazil, so I too will probably have to buy another copy of ITOE if I want to keep on talking about these things), the chain goes from raw sensations (existence), to perception (identity), to concepts (reason).

The integration of sensations on up to the chain to reason gradually integrates the axiomatic concepts. On another thread I gave a brief breakdown of axiomatic concepts, if you find that helpful.

I have done a bit of reading over the years about this and I agree about the possibility of nonverbal concepts - especially musical ones (I was a professional musician and composer for a good art of my life, hence my interest in discovering the principles of a musical vocabulary). Lot's of notes on this are in Brazil - one day I hope to even produce a work on musical epistemology.

I especially like some gestalt studies I have read on integrating visual and aural forms.

In a later post in the same thread I wrote: (Percepts only will give you cows. Concepts will give you human beings.) However, there was a fascinating news report I saw on TV a few months ago about a chimpanzee that was able to add numbers and choose the right answer, time after time.

This demonstrates that concept formation may not be exclusive to human beings, but it is the higher form of integrating knowledge so that reason may be engaged.

This post is a really very tiny, slight surface scratch of a long, long conversation.

btw - Thank you for making a "straighter" answer. But, you don't really need to use title formats. Now it makes the post kinda look like a Christmas tree. //;-)

Michael

Post 12

Saturday, May 7, 2005 - 9:15pm

Nathan,

The fundamental difference between percepts and concepts is that percepts are metaphysical and concepts are epistemological. What you are referring to as 'concepts' is not what Ayn Rand is talking about.

Percepts integrate sensations. Certain sensations are differentiated from other sensations and integrated into perceptual entities. This is an automatic, physical process.

Distinguishing one thing from another is quite a bit different from identifying something. To identify something is to state (some of) its characteristics, specifically those characteristics that differentiate it from other things.

Yes, concepts integrate particulars, but in a special way. Concepts are man's means of reducing the many into a manageable unit.

I don't recall if you've said that you've read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology but if you're going to discuss the Objectivist theory of concepts then it is essential that you actually read it. Working from something like the "Objectivism 101" on this site is really not adequate.

A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted. (ITOE)

Since it's crucial and since it's a point that you seem not to have noticed, I'll repeat: Concepts are epistemological. They are not given by reality but are man's means of understanding reality. They are not arbitrary but neither are they necessitated. They are determined by the facts of reality and man's purposes.

Post 13

Saturday, May 7, 2005 - 10:28pm

Rick,

Many thanks for that definition. I had it in mind, but did not want to rely on my memory and possibly misquote a word or two. Whew! What a relief.

We almost agree on everything, believe it or not. There are just three points.

1. All integration of knowledge is epistemological. That is what the study of knowledge covers. Existence - and what exists - is metaphysical. Both percept formation and concept formation fall under epistemology.

2. A percept attributes identity to a form, which is a slightly different than identifying it. It makes that form unique instead of simply a bombardment of light waves, sounds, smells, tastes and/or tactile sensations. A simple example is a dog who stops at the edge of a cliff (attributing identity) as opposed to jumping for joy when its master arrives (identifying).

3. Basic percept formation is automatic. But percepts also vary in complexity and the more complex ones are learned. (Think about how a dog learns stuff again.)

I also really need to brush up on ITOE and I agree with your advice to Nathan - it is essential reading to discuss this topic intelligently from an Objectivist viewpoint.

Michael

Post 14

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 12:36am

Michael:

It is not concepts all the way down - but integration all the way down.

My turtles integrate.

They also differentiate. What is there to "integrate" unless it is first differentiated?

The way I understand it (er... my library is still in Brazil, so I too will probably have to buy another copy of ITOE if I want to keep on talking about these things), the chain goes from raw sensations (existence), to perception (identity), to concepts (reason).

That's an artificial distinction, Michael. Reason/logic is NOT limited to conscious reasoning. There are forms of reason (logic) used all along the line from sensations to higher conscious conceptual processes.

At the lowest level, say a cell on the retina, the logic is simplest, like an electronic gate receiving a true or false signal. At the level of pattern recognition, the logic is much more complex--but be assured that there IS logic at work there.

And that logic codes concepts necessary for perceptual cognition.

Ask yourself: How can a percept identify anything without a form of logic and without concepts of some form?

The integration of sensations on up to the chain to reason gradually integrates the axiomatic concepts. On another thread I gave a brief breakdown of axiomatic concepts, if you find that helpful.

The subject of axiomatic concepts is far more complex than "existence exists."

Ask yourself: What sort of foundational concepts would I have to program into a machine to make it intelligent? (Or, what would nature have to give a baby so it could even get off the ground intellectually?)

"Existence exists" alone doesn't even come close. Have another look at my post--I give a list of eight, and I only scratched the surface!

I have done a bit of reading over the years about this and I agree about the possibility of nonverbal concepts - especially musical ones (I was a professional musician and composer for a good art of my life, hence my interest in discovering the principles of a musical vocabulary). Lot's of notes on this are in Brazil - one day I hope to even produce a work on musical epistemology.

Glad we agree. Nonverbal humans and animal studies demonstrate this beyond any reasonable doubt, as I see it.

In a later post in the same thread I wrote: (Percepts only will give you cows. Concepts will give you human beings.) However, there was a fascinating news report I saw on TV a few months ago about a chimpanzee that was able to add numbers and choose the right answer, time after time.

See my post 2 in this thread:

Nathan H. wrote:

Perhaps we should define "concept" before debating it, but I would point out that chimpanzees and gorillas can demonstrably reason from analogy, among other conceptual feats.

Primates are not the only animals with conceptual ability. Alex, an African grey parrot, clearly demonstrates an astonishing ability to abstract qualities from groups of objects, among many other abilities.

http://www.alexfoundation.org/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex_%28parrot%29

So, do nonhumans have and use concepts? The evidence is so overwhelming that to deny this one simply has to be uninformed about the research, intransigently dogmatic, or defining concept in such a stringent way that millions of humans would be regarded as nonconceptual.

Thanks for your reply.

Nathan Hawking

Post 15

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 12:51am

Rick, I really liked your post 12, but have some comments ...

"The fundamental difference between percepts and concepts is that percepts are metaphysical and concepts are epistemological."

I agree.

"Percepts integrate sensations. Certain sensations are differentiated from other sensations and integrated into perceptual entities. This is an automatic, physical process."

While I agree that perception is an automatic process, I'm not yet convinced that sensation-differentiation, and sensation-integration, are the correct way to think about perception. It is natural and intuitive to try to explain a whole by means of its parts--but I believe that fallacies of composition, and fallacies of division, ought to be given special attention in talk of perception.

"Distinguishing one thing from another is quite a bit different from identifying something. To identify something is to state (some of) its characteristics, specifically those characteristics that differentiate it from other things."

Rick, this is tricky, and my recent article dealt with it somewhat. If there were only one thing, could you identify it? My answer is no. All that we "know" is relational. As you said above, "to identify something is to ... differentiate it from other things."

Taking this point to its logical conclusion then, the need for which concepts serve is to deal with contrast--ie. the differences in the world. In order to hold these differences in focus, we use concepts as tools--to "think straight" about relatively-similar perceptibles and about imperceptibles (justice, rights, etc).

Ed

Post 16

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 1:18am

Michael, I think we differ in our conceptions of the particulars of epistemology (though we agree in a general sense).

"Both percept formation and concept formation fall under epistemology."

As I alluded above to Rick, I'm not sold on the common conception of "percept formation" (ie. from individualized sensations--like building a brick house from several "individual" bricks).

"2.�A percept attributes identity to a form, which is a slightly different than identifying it. It makes that form unique instead of simply a bombardment of light waves, sounds, smells, tastes and/or tactile�sensations.�A simple example is a dog who stops at the edge of a cliff (attributing identity) as opposed to jumping for joy when its master arrives (identifying)."

Again, I find it intellectually unsettling to hear talk of having a percept "attribute" anything. Rand's insight that percepts tell you THAT it is, and a concept (reason) tells you WHAT it is--is helpful. And while you do seem to be saying something along those lines with your dog-cliff-master example, I'd argue that "master"--to a dog--is nothing but a memorized percept, not an "identifying" concept used by the dog.

Meaningless particulars--some invoking fear, some invoking anticipation of security, food, or play, etc--that is what aconceptual creatures must experience. Not having concepts about the way things ought to be--dogs don't laugh when you're being goofy and you trip over something (they just get excited; thinking only that you're now down on the ground to play with them). If you have dogs, then try this at home.

"3. Basic percept formation�is automatic. But percepts also vary in complexity and the more complex ones are learned. (Think about how a dog learns stuff again.)"

I'm not sold that complex percepts are learned. Perhaps there is an equivocation on the word "learned" here (as between acquaintance--which is rote learned; and integrative learning--which is purely conceptual). Dogs learn by rote learning (vulgar association) and memory--ie. aconceptual processes.

Limited by "crow epistemology," a dog can be taught to bark 4 times in a row, but a dog cannot be taught to bark 40 times in a row. Michael, on this same point, do you have a link to the counting-chimp story? I'd sure like to critically analyze it. If that chimp can reliably count to 40, then I'll have to eat my crow epistemology!

Ed

Post 17

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 1:48am

"Counting" Apes--Conceptual prowess? Or mere "rote learning" (vulgar association and memory)?
�
------------------------
Beran, M. J., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (2001). "Constructive" enumeration by chimpanzees (Pan� troglodytes) on a computerized task. Animal Cognition, 4, 81-89.

Two chimpanzees used a joystick to collect dots, one-at-a-time, on a computer monitor, and then ended a trial when the number of dots collected was equal to the Arabic numeral presented for the trial. Both chimpanzees performed substantially and reliably above chance in collecting a quantity of dots equal to the target numeral, one chimpanzee for the numerals 1 to 7, and the second chimpanzee for the numerals 1 to 6.
------------------------
From:
http://www.geocities.com/mjberan/counting_pub.html

------------------------
Easy as 1,2,3
by Rob Shumaker

Since cognitive research began at Think Tank in 1995, the work has focused mainly on language, using a vocabulary of abstract symbols with English syntax to explore how orang utans learn and understand language. They can now use symbols consistently from the verb, food-name, and object-name categories with greater than 90 percent accuracy.

[break]

I was anxious to recreate these experiments with orang utans Azy and Indah, cognitive research subjects at Think Tank. Each was presented with two choices and, again, choosing the smaller quantity resulted in a larger reward. In this case, the choice was grapes and they were presented with all fifteen possible paired combinations of one through six. Early in the study, Azy chose the smaller quantity only about 50 percent of the time. However, in session eight; his score jumped to 85 percent and, from then on, never dipped below 80 percent. (He was 100 percent accurate in session 21.) Indah didn�t break through until session 14 when she reached 70 percent accuracy, scoring at or above 80 percent through the end of the study.

In Boysen�s tests, where choosing the smaller of two quantities of candy resulted in receiving a greater reward, chimpanzees chose the smaller quantity 27 percent of the time.

However, in otherwise identical trials that used numerical symbols rather than candies, they were able to choose the smaller quantity 66 percent of the time.
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From:
http://nationalzoo.si.edu/Publications/ZooGoer/2002/4/orangcount.cfm

Post 18

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 2:11am

Rick:

The fundamental difference between percepts and concepts is that percepts are metaphysical and concepts are epistemological.

I can think of no way that statement makes sense to me, Rick.

Most people use "metaphysics" to describe the study of the fundamental nature of reality. Many include epistemology as a subset of metaphysics, which makes some sense.

In any event, epistemology is the study of "the nature, origin and scope of knowledge" and generally includes everything from the nature of the senses to the nature of higher concepts.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology

What you are referring to as 'concepts' is not what Ayn Rand is talking about.

I hope not. I think her definition of concepts is too narrow.

Percepts integrate sensations. Certain sensations are differentiated from other sensations and integrated into perceptual entities. This is an automatic, physical process.

I agree that it's almost entirely automatic.

I disagree that it's a "physical" process, unless you are willing to define higher, conscious concept formation as "physical" also. (All mental processes, after all, are processes borne of a physical body.) I would not recognize an arbitrary, reductionistic distinction, either in mental/physical or in percept/concept.

Distinguishing one thing from another is quite a bit different from identifying something. To identify something is to state (some of) its characteristics, specifically those characteristics that differentiate it from other things.

Distinguishing is just one step. Did you read my list of eight examples fundamental concepts in post 10? I'll repeat it here:

Something is present.
This is where the thing begins and ends.
Everything between the edges of the thing is the thing.
There can be more than one thing.
Things with substantially different properties (like location) are different things.
This thing is the same thing even if it changes some of its apparent properties.
This thing is unique in properties x, y, and z.
If another thing comes between me and the thing, the thing will still be there.
Etc.

Even infants have these cognitive abilities.

Yes, concepts integrate particulars, but in a special way. Concepts are man's means of reducing the many into a manageable unit.

I think we need to lay that "man's means" notion to rest.

Even Pepperberg's grey parrot Alex, when shown four objects which differ in color and asked, "What's different?", says "color." There are many colors, but ONE CONCEPT color, and Alex's walnut-sized brain has "reduc[ed] the many into a manageable unit" for color, shape, material, and much more.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex_%28parrot%29

Furthermore, this is not just a feat of higher cognition. It is a requirement at EVERY cognitive level above sensory cells. Very young infants can identify their mothers. The only way this can happen is that the infant brain has "reduc[ed] the many [sensations] into a manageable unit" it knows as "mother," even if not by name.

I don't recall if you've said that you've read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology but if you're going to discuss the Objectivist theory of concepts then it is essential that you actually read it. Working from something like the "Objectivism 101" on this site is really not adequate.

Many times. I have no personal copy at this time, though. As for my quotes, I needed something to get the discussion rolling. Feel free to quote ITOE or anything else.

A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted. (ITOE)

I agree, but believe that to be only one form of conceptual thinking.

Since it's crucial and since it's a point that you seem not to have noticed, I'll repeat: Concepts are epistemological.

I'm not sure what you believe you're informing me of. Of course concepts are epistemological--by definition!

They are not given by reality but are man's means of understanding reality.

They are EVERY living thing's means of understanding reality, to the degree that particular entity understands reality. Do you imagine that lions and elephants have no comprehension of reality?

They are not arbitrary but neither are they necessitated.

You are referring to higher verbal concepts, much of which is volitional and optional. But higher concepts are built on more primitive concepts, and these primitives are necessary for even basic mental functions. These are not arbitrary but they ARE necessary.

Thanks for raising these points, Rick.

Nathan Hawking

Post 19

Sunday, May 8, 2005 - 2:40am