Is Rand's take on gender roles in romance part of Objectivism?

Rand's basic idea about gender roles in romance is based on her conception of masculinity and femininity. Here's how I understand it:

The masculine ideal embodies her conception of the heroic: physical and intellectual strength, competentence, high level achievement. The feminine ideal entails a similar level of intellectual capacity as the heroic man, but is softer physically and not inclined to assume a high powered leadership role. The woman engages in "hero worship" of the man. (Given that she described the rape scene in The Fountainhead as "wishful thinking", we can also infer her idea of hot sex).

My question is: are the above views a logical application of Objectivist principles, or is this just Rand's personal preference/opinion which exists outside the scope of her philosophy? From what I detect in the tone of the writing and statements she's made on the subject, it seems as if she was positing what she felt was a universal truth. I'm curious to hear other peoples' thoughts on this.

Post 1

Thursday, December 22, 2005 - 9:26pm

gender = irrelevant (in the context of leadership abilities and whatnot)

Then again, I may be a bit bias... for some unknown reason. ;)

Sarah

Post 2

Thursday, December 22, 2005 - 9:28pm

Then again, I may be a bit bias... for some unknown reason. ;)

Because you're a hermaphrodite? ;)

Post 3

Thursday, December 22, 2005 - 9:57pm

*checks*

Nope, that's not it. :-P

Sarah

Post 4

Thursday, December 22, 2005 - 10:24pm

Sarah,

Can I take your response to mean that aside from the leadership role issue, you agree with Rand's gender role concept?

Post 5

Thursday, December 22, 2005 - 10:34pm

Pete,

No, since you were talking about leadership type things I limited my response to that. Gender's a personal thing, it doesn't have a place in philosophy any more than homosexuality does.

Sarah

Post 6

Friday, December 23, 2005 - 6:19am

I completely agree with Sarah. You can't find anything more individual and personal than the styles or preferences in romance. It shouldn't be generalized.

Post 7

Friday, December 23, 2005 - 6:44am

Gender roles in romance are about mutual pleasure and perhaps, long term flourishing. Hong and Sarah are right on this. But it *is* part of Objectivism in so far as Objectivism speaks to our values, and our rational self interest. And that can be a matter of personal taste and preference. Interesting question Pete.

regards
John

Post 8

Friday, December 23, 2005 - 10:17am

John, Hong & Sarah,

I basically agree with each of you. Gender identity is important in a relationship - indeed it's the essence of attraction - but there is no universal model such as the one Rand put forth.

Getting back to my original question, did Rand view her conception of the male-female dynamic as an absolute standard, or did she feel it was her own personal preference? It seems to me to be the former, as I've never seen her preface her statements on the subject with something to the effect of: "My own personal ideal for romantic relationships is..."

Post 9

Friday, December 23, 2005 - 10:54am

Does it matter?

Sarah

Post 10

Friday, December 23, 2005 - 3:40pm

Pete queried:

"Getting back to my original question, did Rand view her conception of the male-female dynamic as an absolute standard, or did she feel it was her own personal preference? It seems to me to be the former, as I've never seen her preface her statements on the subject with something to the effect of: "My own personal ideal for romantic relationships is...""
I think that is an excellent question. I have wondered myself about many of her statements in Romantic Manifesto...and I won�t claim to be an expert on Rand but I found I had very little trouble if I supplied the context for whether she is speaking as a philosopher or speaking as an artist. They are not the same things. An artist must make specific conclusions and commitments to things, like a love scene, and that will reflect their personal view of the nature of things. Let�s say their personal taste is important. A philosopher on the other hand, I wouldn�t think wants their personal taste to meaningfully influence their judgement.
Michael

Post 11

Friday, December 23, 2005 - 4:15pm

Pete wrote,

Getting back to my original question, did Rand view her conception of the male-female dynamic as an absolute standard, or did she feel it was her own personal preference? It seems to me to be the former, as I've never seen her preface her statements on the subject with something to the effect of: "My own personal ideal for romantic relationships is..."

Sarah asked, "Does it matter?"

It does for her philosophy. If she views it as an absolute standard, then she is holding it as a philosophical position. This issue bears directly on her opposition to a female president, which she bases on her view of what is an appropriate female sexual psychology. When she said that "No rational woman can ever want to be president," this was an expression of her philosophy--of what is psychologically proper for woman qua woman. It was not simply a statement of her own personal preference. As her position on this issue is unacceptable to most educated people, many Objectivists included, orthodox Objectivists have tried to distance themselves from it by arguing that it is not part of Rand's philosophy. You see, you can't be an Objectivist and disagree with any part of Rand's stated philosophy, according to Peikoff. To call yourself an "Objectivist," you have to buy into the whole package. This places many Objectivists in a very difficult position, one which they've solved by declaring that Rand's sexual psychology is not part of her philosophy.

- Bill

Post 12

Friday, December 23, 2005 - 6:45pm

On the female President issue, I think it's interesting that Rand created a female heroine who admriably runs a major railroad corporation (and maintains her femininity - she's Rand's ideal woman after all), yet somewhere in the status continuum between corporate CEO and President of the United States there's apparently a line that get's crossed where a woman isn't acting in accordance with her proper nature. I'd be very curious to hear what her thoughts on that were; would it be proper for a woman to be a Mayor? Governor? Senator? Cabinet minister?

Post 13

Sunday, December 25, 2005 - 7:24pm

Bill,

You see, you can't be an Objectivist and disagree with any part of Rand's stated philosophy, according to Peikoff.

And he's right... why?

Sarah

Post 14

Monday, December 26, 2005 - 12:47pm

I wrote, "You see, you can't be an Objectivist and disagree with any part of Rand's stated philosophy, according to Peikoff."

Sarah replied, "And he's right... why?"

Is it that "Objectivism" is the name Rand gave her entire philosophy and therefore, you can't call yourself an "Objectivist" unless you agree with every part of it? In that case, what do people call themselves if they agree with everything except Rand's views on a female president? It certainly wouldn't do for them to say that everything Rand presented as her philosophy (except her views on a female president) is their own personal philosophy, without acknowledging Rand as the source. Even Rand would have characterized herself as Aristotelian, even though she didn't agree with every part of Aristotle's philosophy. She was an Aristotelian, because she agreed with Aristotle's basic approach (as against that of Plato). What's wrong with calling oneself an "Objectivist," even if one has certain minor disagreements with Rand's philosophy, so long as one is in fundamental agreement with it? Doing so would at least indicate that one's basic philosophy is Objectivist (as against Christianity, Humanism, Existentialism, etc.)? I don't think that someone is going to infer from that one agrees with every last philosophical conclusion that Rand enunciated, any more than someone who calls himself an "Aristotelian" would be viewed as agreeing with all of Aristotle's ideas.

- Bill

Post 15

Tuesday, December 27, 2005 - 12:56pm

Bill wrote:

What's wrong with calling oneself an "Objectivist," even if one has certain minor disagreements with Rand's philosophy, so long as one is in fundamental agreement with it? Doing so would at least indicate that one's basic philosophy is Objectivist (as against Christianity, Humanism, Existentialism, etc.)?

This is key. Proper thought requires effective distinction -- which is always contextual. In the context of the catalogue of philosophies, I am an Objectivist -- even if I have subtle disagreements with the totality of Objectivism. I am in more agreement with Objectivism than with any other existing philosophy -- and this "makes" me Objectivist.

Also, because objective metaphysics and epistemology necessarily lead to values that can, post facto, be traced back to their source (they can be literally deduced from fundamental premises), there will be some fundamentals requiring ascent -- before one may call herself an Objectivist. For instance, you can't, simultaneously, hold a skepticist view of epistemology -- and also be an Objectivist. This diversion is not allowed.

The reason that the topic of this thread is still relevant, is due to the mere infancy of psychology as a science -- and not to any untoward deficiency of Objectivist fundamentals.

Ed

Post 16

Tuesday, December 27, 2005 - 4:35pm

Bill,

Complete sidestep of my question.

Ed,

Also, because objective metaphysics and epistemology necessarily lead to values that can, post facto, be traced back to their source (they can be literally deduced from fundamental premises)...

According to the Objectivism 101 sections, if I understand them correctly, we have subjective perception of an objective reality and we verify accurate interpretation of our perceptions through reason. However, since we are not omniscient how do you justify saying that objective epistemology necessarily leads to certain values?

Sarah

Post 17

Tuesday, December 27, 2005 - 6:06pm

Sarah, you asked:

... since we are not omniscient how do you justify saying that objective epistemology necessarily leads to certain values?

Objective epistemology is, pretty much, about 3 things: perception, reason, and identity. Because humans have a nature (identity), it is possible to find objective values -- values good for all humans because they are human. Omniscience is not required for a correct generalization. The view that it is required is steeped in a faulty (though very common) view of induction: that it is but a process of mere enumeration. This wrong view of induction is what intellectually-crippled otherwise ingenius philosophers such as Hume.

What is needed for incorrigible generalization is an understanding of the given mechanism of property attribution. The simplest example is probably chemistry. Once an atomic number of an element is known, it's ionic coupling with some elements, but not with others, becomes deducible -- because ionic coupling (ie. the sharing of valence electrons) is an understood mechanic. The presence/absence of the property of salt-formation can be predicted successfully (an incorrigible generalization) from atomic numbers.

Humans are often trickier than atoms and ionic compounds -- but they have identity too.

Have I sufficiently answered your curiosity here?
Ed

Post 18

Tuesday, December 27, 2005 - 6:58pm

Ed,

Yes, I agree (although to pick a nit, "because they are human" sounds a bit intrinsic-y to me, but I got what you're saying). Incidentally, I've found this point to be a commonality among many systems of thought, even those typically labeled as subjectivist by Oists. I think it's a good spring board (beachhead?) for further, productive discussion.

Thanks,
Sarah

Post 19

Tuesday, December 27, 2005 - 8:09pm