Objectivism and Atheism

Theists argue that God is perfect. Does perfection include having unnecessary attributes? A conscious god is like a gilded lily - imperfect by overkill.

I call a perfection every simple quality which is positive and absolute, i.e. which expresses whatever it expresses without any limitations.

But since such a quality is simple, it follows that it is unanalysable, i.e. indefinable; for if it is definable, it will either not be one simple quality, but an aggregate of many; or if it is a single quality, it will be defined by its limitations, and hence will be understood through negations of further progress; but this goes against the initial assumption, which was that it is purely positive.

From this it is not difficult to show that all perfections are compatible with each other, i.e. that they can co-exist in the same subject.

For let there be a proposition of the following sort: A and B are incompatible (understanding by A and B two simple forms of this sort, i.e. perfections; and it is the same if more than two are taken simultaneously). It is obvious that this proposition cannot be proved without analysing either or both of the terms A and B; for otherwise what they are would not be taken into account in the process of reasoning, and incompatibility could equally well be demonstrated of any other things as of them. But (ex hypothesi) they are unanalysable. Therefore this proposition cannot be demonstrated of them.

But if it were true, it certainly could be demonstrated of them, because it is not true by itself. But necessarily true propositions are either provable or known by themselves. Therefore this proposition is not necessarily true — in other words, it is not necessary that A and B are not in the same subject. Therefore they can be in the same subject, and since the same reasoning is valid for any other qualities of this sort you might choose, it follows that all perfections are compatible with each other.

Therefore there is, or can be understood, the subject of all perfections, or a most perfect being.

From which it is obvious that he also exists, since existence is included in the number of perfections.

(The same can also be shown of forms compounded from absolute ones, provided there are such.)

Counterexample: Perceptions can be induced to replicate sensations from the external world by means of direct stimulation of brain tissue. These simulated perceptions do not count as awareness of the external world, yet they are perceptions.

This is false on its face. It is logically possible that (given a purely materialistic conception of mind) one could recreate your brain composition, perhaps by cloning the necessary tissue. This twin brain would share all of your mental content without needing any experience of the external world.

Plainly false. Mathematical and basic logical propositions, though they may be grounded in perception, are not conceived in the form of any sense.

But I would go even further, and ask how it is that sheer perception can be assimilated and understood without recourse to preexisting, latent mental concepts. Abstraction from perception, for example, presupposes an ability to differentiate properties, since abstraction amounts to isolating certain properties of an empirically given object.

Thoughts are not completely causally dependent on the brain, for thoughts, like propositions or desires, can actually cause further mental action and hence can elicit a response from the brain. For example, in mathematical proofs, certain conclusions are drawn from prior axioms qua axioms. These axioms themselves, and the analysis of their influence and relationships, cause and determine the nature of the conclusion drawn from them.

By virtue of the knowledge of His creative activity. God perceives possibilia (all possible worlds) in himself and thus knows by nature all true propositions--both necessary and contingent truths-- in himself.

How?

God knows things in the actual world insofar as he continually produces them and is aware of all of their activities by merely perceiving their a priori individual concepts, which are instantiated through creation.

God, understood atemporally, transcends process, and knows and wills all things immediately, i.e. eternally.

This is actually false. Certain bodily processes (like the pumping of the heart) can continue for a time even after the person is dead. But this is beside the point.

I would take issue with the idea that it is necessarily true that death amounts to a cessation of consciousness. Perhaps God immediately provides the soul with a new hylomorphic compound after its bodily host dies out, but this hylomorph exists in a parallel universe, such that we assume that consciousness ceases since in our universe, empirically speaking, it does.

You've not shown that there is no such thing as an immaterial substance, though you admittedly have become quite adept at tirelessly repeating this assertion, as if its cogency might accrue from mere repetition.

You've not shown that conscious is merely a property or faculty of a physical organism, though you admittedly have become quite adept at tirelessly repeating this assertion, as if its cogency might accrue from mere repetition.

Adducing vision as a subjective manifestation of the function of the eye does not work as an analogy to understanding mental activity as a subjective manifestation of the function of the brain. Why? For the simple reason that vision itself is a form of mental activity, which is precisely what you were attempting to provide an analogy for.

It's still a failed analogy. Visual sensations can be created without the eye by directly stimulating the brain.

Of course we do. But this says nothing conclusively about the mechanism responsible for the emergence of sentience.

Yet another poor analogy. We know that a sphere is made of two hemispheres and can roll. Similarly, we know that animals possess consciousness, but we do not know whether animals are wholly material substances.

This is the definition of an emergent property -- a property possessed by the whole that none of the parts possesses.

If conscious organisms are wholly material substances then they must follow the laws of physics.

In a wholly materialistic universe, all laws--including biological or psychological laws--reduce to physics. Cf. grand unification and string theories.

A swift refutation of the rock analogy:

Given that you define a rock as a material object having a certain set of properties--among them the privative property 'lack of consciousness'-- the conclusion does follow that all rocks are inanimate.

The conclusion is not that all rocks are inanimate; it is that all rocks are non-sentient. The premise is that all rocks are inanimate.

However, the rational structure of the above argument is not followed in making the following argument: A conscious being (based on exceptionless empirical evidence) is an animal, i.e. a physical organism. Hence, (by induction) all conscious beings must be physical organisms.

The problem is that organs don't "experience," they are simply matter in motion passively responding to antecedent causes.

You admit that consciousness is material. Therefore, it is nothing more than an effect of matter in motion, it is necessarily determined by antecedent causes, as is everything else (according to the basic propositions of your worldview).

But, you also want to say that there is something that is not necessarily determined, so you introduce, Ad Hoc, phrases that are meaningless to the material, such as "qua conscious," "experiential manifestation" and "subjective manifestation."

Are you saying that any "manifestation" is something other than an effect necessarily determined by material antecedent causes?

Here is another meaningless term to the material, "awareness." Is not "a property" just another word for "effect?"

And is not "combination of parts" just another phrase for "antecedent causes?"

If so, then is not "awareness" just the necessarily determined effect of antecedent causes?

Your example of water as an emergent property fails the test. The wetness of water is necessarily determined by its antecedent causes. It could be no other than it is. It is completely mechanistic, and necessarily determined by antecedent causes. Is that what you mean by "consciousness?"

By "emergent property" you want to imply that there is something in consciousness that is not mechanistic and not necessarily determined, yet all the examples of emergent properties you give are mechanistic and are necessarily determined. I fail to see their value.

There seems to be a black box here. You stuff purely mechanical and necessarily determined matter in one side of the box, and you magically get non-mechanistic and non-deterministic "consciousness" out of the other side.

Not exactly. Conscious organisms didn't evolve directly from inanimate matter, but from non-conscious organisms.

And just as a magician offers the phrase "Alakazam" as the magic phrase that does the job, you offer the equally meaningless phrase, "emergent property" as the phrase that does the magic. When pressed for the meaning, all you can come up with is completely mechanistic and totally determined examples.

You recognize and experience independence in yourself. The basic propositions of your worldview necessarily implies the denial of that independence.

Independence from what? I don’t exist independently of antecedent causes, if that’s what you’re implying.

So, you keep jumping back and forth between your experience and your worldview. Since you believe in atheism and you believe in independent thought, therefore, you believe they both must be true and compatible. But they are not.

The jumping back and forth is an attempt to avoid admitting the necessary contradiction between the two. So, you are forced to have a consciousness that is purely material in one paragraph and not purely material in another paragraph.

You may want to say that is not in the same sense. But then why bring it up? I don't care about equivocations, if you mean something else, simply use different words.

All your causes are mechanistic

Not true.

and necessarily determined,

True.

and your worldview tells us that all mechanistic and necessarily determined causes yield mechanistic and necessarily determined effects.

Not true.

Yet when it comes to consciousness, you insist it is an effect that is not mechanistic

True.

or [not] necessarily determined,

Not true.

even though all its antecedent causes are mechanistic and necessarily determining. A real contradiction does in fact exist.

Wait a second Bill, isn't your view of consciousness a direct denial of the law of causality?

What do we mean by causality or cause and effect? Don't we mean that given named causes, certain effects must follow?

But in your view of consciousness, even if you know all the causes (the physical organs and their states), the effect (the conscious decision) can be different each time.

According to Objectivism, yes, but not according to my own view of causality.

You deny that knowledge, consciousness and free thought are mechanistic and necessarily determined, but the law of causality says just that: it says that ALL effects are mechanistic and necessarily determined by the antecedent causes.