| | I wrote, "Perception, by its nature, always takes a particular form, which is determined by the organ of perception, e.g., vision through the eye, hearing through the ear, smell through the olfactory nerve, etc. Formless perception is nonsensical and inconceivable." Obviously an immaterial consciousness would not be the sort of thing capable of the sort of perception we have. It would only perceive, strictly speaking, its own mental content. If God could only perceive his own mental content, then all he would be capable of is introspection. How then could he be aware of reality -- of the external world? And this is hardly "nonsensical and inconceivable." We do it all the time. You don't perceive your own mental content; you introspect it. Perception is not introspection; it's extrospection, which is an awareness of the external world. Moreover, in order to be aware of your own mental content, you would first have to be aware of the external world, from which you acquire the sensory basis for the content. You cannot have any mental content without some sensory input, which always takes the perceptual form of that input (e.g., visual images, auditory impressions, etc). Imagination presupposes perception. In other words, your memories, dreams and mental images are always experienced in the form of one of your five senses, which indicates that they are based on your perceptions of the external world. An immaterial consciousness could have no mental content, because the content would have no sensory form.
I wrote, "Similarly, we know that thought is an activity of a material organ, the brain, which depends on its proper functioning." No, we don't. All we know is that thoughts are affected and/or influenced by the brain. Thoughts are merely "influenced" by the brain?? In that case, thought could take place independently of the brain. But thought does, in fact, depend on the brain, just as vision depends on the eye; hearing, on the ear, etc.
I wrote, "Could thought exist without such an organ? I don't see how. There has to be something that does the thinking-- that processes the sensory input." The immaterial substance would do the thinking.
Nothing would have to process such a substance's sensory imput, as it would not have sensory imput by virtue of its immateriality. Then how could it be aware of the external world -- by what means and in what form? The answer is, there wouldn't be any means or form of external awareness, in which case, it could have no mental content to be aware of introspectively.
I wrote, "In short, to say that consciousness activity can exist without a body, brain and physical sense organs is like saying that digestion can exist without a stomach, walking without legs, or respiration without lungs." No it isn't. The activity of digestion is possible without a stomach. Give me a beaker and the appropriate chemicals (e.g. Coca-cola). The activity of locomotion is possible without legs. Give me a set of wheels. The chemical process of respiration is possible without lungs. Again, give me the appropriate chemicals and the right laboratory set-up. Although I was referring to a human being's digestion as requiring a stomach, the main point is that digestion requires at least some material vehicle. You say locomotion is possible without legs. Of course, but I was referring not to locomotion in general but to walking in particular. As for respiration, I meant the process of human respiration, not simply respiration in general. The main point of these examples was simply to illustrate that you cannot have a process without an entity to perform it. I see no reason, then, why conscious activity is impossible without a body. In fact, I'd be interested in knowing how conscious activity is possible without an immaterial component. Well, I've already explained why consciousness requires physical organs for its existence and operation. As for its immateriality, a mental phenomenon is called "immaterial" only in the sense that it differs from things that one can see and touch. One is aware of its existence only introspectively.
I wrote, "An immaterial consciousness is an action without an entity, which is a metaphysical impossibility. The entity is the immaterial substance. If you believe the existence of immaterial substances is impossible, this is more indicative of a dogged commitment to materialism than a conclusion drawn from a serious philosophical objection. I'm sorry, but I don't understand an immaterial substance. Consciousness is an attribute or property of a material organism, not a stand alone entity.
I wrote, "Everything acts according to its nature." Right, and since natures are primarily known by actions, this is question begging. How is it question-begging? It is simply a fact; how a thing behaves depends on the kind of thing it is. For example, birds fly, because flying is part of their nature. Horses gallop, because galloping is part of theirs.
I wrote, "A law of nature is simply a description of how things characteristically act or behave. It is by no means limited to the laws of physics." So causality is not a law so much as a description, which means that 'Everything acts according to its nature' (which you derive from causality) cannot be accorded the dogmatic status of metaphysical law. No, it's a law, if we assume that all of the relevant conditions remain the same. The law of causality is a corollary of the law of identity. Since there is no Lockean "substratum" underlying and uniting its characteristics, a thing just is all of its characteristics. If it exists under the same conditions, it will possess the same characteristics, including the same action.
I wrote, "You mention an alleged 'leap' from inanimate to animate, as if life were to be explained by some principle other than the organization or arrangement of its material constituents. However, the evolutionary record suggests that life did indeed arise from inanimate matter. It is true that an entity often exhibits properties that the parts by themselves do not possess, but this does not imply the existence of some supervening principle of order or entelechy. It can be explained by the arrangement of the parts themselves." I accept the evolutionary record. I also accept the notion of emergent properties. But the idea of immaterial properties emerging from material entities seems a bit strange to me. Yet the idea of disembodied spirits does not? I find that a bit strange. We know that consciousness is a property of a physical organism and that it does not exist outside of that context. When the organism dies, its consciousness ceases to exist, just like all of its other bodily processes. To call consciousness "immaterial" is, therefore, a bit misleading, because it suggests that consciousness has a non-physical existence -- an existence independent of a physical organism. Granted, the idea of a stone is not the same as a stone itself, which is why we call an idea "immaterial," but there is no such thing as an immaterial substance. Consciousness is a property or a faculty of a physical organism. It is a subjective manifestation of the function of the brain in the same way that vision is the subjective manifestation of the function of the eye. Just as vision does not exist in isolation from the organ of perception which makes it possible -- the eye -- so thought does not exist in isolation from the organ of cognition which makes it possible -- the brain. We know from evolutionary science that sentient forms of life emerged from a new and more complex arrangement of non-sentient forms, just as living entities emerged from a new and more complex arrangement of non-living entities.
I wrote, "In his book, The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts, Harry Binswanger gives the following example: '[I]magine that we are presented with two hemispherical pieces of wood, each having a sticky substance on its flat side. Alone, neither hemisphere can roll; when joined to form a sphere, the whole can roll. Rolling is thus an emergent form of action completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement. Obviously the whole formed by uniting the two hemispheres is, in a sense, "greater than its parts" -- but it is just as obvious that this "extra something" of the whole (its ability to roll) is not to be explained by the supervention of a "principle of order" or "entelechy." There is no "transcendence" of the natures of the parts nor of the laws governing their behavior.'" (p. 22) Anyone can clearly see that two hemispheres joined together along their flat surfaces can roll-- because two hemispheres so joined amount to a sphere, and spheres can roll.
William takes from this:
Life, consciousness and rationality can thus be explained as "emergent" properties, completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement.
In the first case, you go from two material entities forming a composite third material entity which undergoes an action whose description is explainable in terms of a series of physical movements. In the second, however, you want to go from interacting material entities (of whatever variety-- neurons, quarks, electrons, etc.) to immaterial effects like thoughts. This is problematic, for it seems to violate your beloved (and absolutely vacuous without further explanation) 'A is A' principle, which here I might take to mean that 'x is y iff x has the same properties as y'. What I'm saying is that just as the sphere in Binswanger's example comprises two hemispheres that lack the ability to roll while the sphere itself possesses that ability, so an animal comprises constituents that lack the faculty of awareness, while the animal itself possesses that faculty. This is the definition of an emergent property -- a property possessed by the whole that none of the parts possesses.
I wrote, "It is matter in motion (i.e., material organisms) that are bound to follow the laws of nature (i.e., to act according to their nature as conscious organisms)." But didn't you earlier concede that conscious organisms possess an immaterial part? Not an immaterial "part" in the sense that conscious organisms are composed of both a material and immaterial substance, each of which can exist independently of the other. Consciousness is a property or an attribute of a physical organism, not a "part" of the organism in the sense that that term is normally used. Besides, my point was not that conscious organisms are bound to follow the laws of physics (such as Newton's first law of motion); clearly, they are not. All I was saying is that conscious organisms are bound to follow the laws of nature that apply to them, which are biological and psychological. Not all laws of nature are laws of physics.
- Bill
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