| | GWL wrote, We know we experience phenomena, but not material objects. Your 'access' to that which is outside of you is limited by your sense perception. What you experience as 'reality' can really be simulated through direct brain stimulus. If we don't perceive material objects, then how did we discover what a brain is (which, last I checked, is a material object), or that 'reality' can "really" be simulated through direct brain stimulus. Where did we get the knowledge of brains and of the effects of brain stimulus on conscious experience if not from direct perception?
Moreover, it won't do to say that what we perceive directly is sensory phenomena or sensations rather than material objects. A sensory phenomenon or sensation is not an object of awareness; it is a process or form of awareness; it is how we perceive, not what we perceive. In fact, we are able to arrive at a knowledge of sensations, of mental phenomena, only by first being aware of material objects in the external world and then identifying the process by which we are aware of them. As far as proving things without a reliance upon concepts gleaned from material objects, I would say the following. 1) We cannot be certain about material objects, only phenomena. 2) Mathematics and logic provide us with necessary truths-- truths which hold in all possible worlds. On account of this, it makes little sense to say that necessary mathematical and geometrical truths themselves come from actual phenomenal experience, since experience can only tell us about what is actual, not what is necessary. Well, if experience can tell us what is actual, then it can tell us that there are actual, material objects, which have a certain identity, part of which is their capacity to act a certain way under certain conditions. A red object, because it is red, will necessarily reflect light along a certain wavelength. An ice cube from my refrigerator will necessarily float when placed in a glass of water. Why? Because of what it is, because it is less dense than water.
I wrote, "If cosmological naturalism is not true, then neither is the Objectivist metaphysics. I can live with, because I know that the premise is false -- that cosmological naturalism is true." Bill, are you an infallibilist with respect to knowledge? In other words, do you think knowledge is synonymous with certainty of truth? If so, then you might want to ease up on the rhetoric. You and I both know that you can't prove cosmological naturalism. Well, if by "prove" you mean justify as true, then I can prove it, because all the evidence supports such a view and none contradicts it. There is no more legitimate evidence for supernaturalism -- for gods, devils, angels and other supernatural creatures -- than there is for fairies and ghosts.
GW wrote: "You're skewing the theistic position. Theists believe that existence and consciousness depend on one another; since they are unified in the person of God. As such, theists believe that both existence and consciousness are primary."
I replied, "Well, then, what is God? I thought he was a pure consciousness who created the external world out of nothing. Are you now telling me that this is incorrect -- that there was an external world in existence before God created the universe?" It's misleading to call God a 'pure consciousness'. For, when you think of consciousness, you think of human consciousness, and when you think of human consciousness, you think of the consciousness that emerges from a biological organism. Correction: I don't just think of human consciousness; there are other forms of consciousness besides human. But, as I've said before, consciousness requires a means of awareness, because it must perceive in a particular form, e.g., visually, auditorially, tactilly, etc. It doesn't have to be a human form, but it does have to be some form of awareness. It makes more sense to say God is something akin to a conscious entity, since God has knowledge and will and other (what we understand to be) mental properties, though he does not have them in the same way that we do. First of all, how do you know any of this? You're questioning my right to claim knowledge of material objects. Yet, you feel entitled to claim knowledge of a supernatural being that has no properties that we have any evidence of, let alone understand -- a being who thinks without a mind or a brain and who has knowledge and will without any of the preconditions for such faculties. If this isn't "wanting" to believe something without any justification for it, I don't know what is. For instance, God's knowledge of truth is immediate (not mediated like ours, through mental processes and sense data), and God knows all truths (not just some, as we do). What you are claiming to exist is an entity that possesses knowledge without any basis for possessing it. As I've pointed out repeatedly in my exchanges with you, It is simply impossible for a entity to be conscious and to possess knowledge and will without any means of doing so -- without any mode of consciousness or form of awareness. So not only do you have no material evidence for such a being; the very concept is incoherent. You can't even rationally conceive of an entity that possesses knowledge and awareness while lacking the physical preconditions for it. Next to God, such imaginary creatures as Superman and Santa Claus are a bold exercise in realism. These considerations assure us that making a consciousness/existence dichotomy is pointless. Thus, we ought to let go of the term 'pure consciousness', and instead speak of God as a maximally perfect being, possessing all positive properties-- including mental ones. Please explain to me what you mean by "positive property." Are you now telling me that God does possess physical properties -- that he does have a material body, brain and nervous system? You say he possesses all positive properties. What could that possibly mean? A skyscraper possesses the positive property of being 20 stories tall and made out of steel and glass. A human being possesses the positive property of being 6 feet tall and made out of flesh and blood. Is God 20 stories tall and made out of steel and glass, while at the same time being 6 feet tall and made out of flesh and blood? Aren't these positive properties, and if they are, how can God possess all of them simultaneously?
I wrote, "Hmm. I think you've got me there, GW. While I would still maintain that the concept of lines, angles and plane figures must ultimately be arrived at by a process of abstraction from sensory evidence, I think you are correct that the premises of every true argument do not themselves require verification by direct perception. But at some point in the chain of premises and conclusions, you must arrive at premises that are verified by direction perception." 1. Please tell me what "direct perception" is. You can know it ostensively by direct experience. A scientific definition would be "a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism." 2. Give a story of how sub-cognitive direct perception transforms itself into propositional knowledge. First of all, direct perception is not sub-cognitive; it is part of the cognitive process; propositional knowledge is not the only kind of cognition. My cat engages in a process of cognition, but she does not have abstract or propositional knowledge; her cognition is confined to the perceptual level. Direct perception is the basis for concept formation. I've discussed in previous posts how concepts are formed from direct perception. I won't revisit that here. Suffice it to say that once a child is able to form concepts, he can organize these concepts into propositions, a process which enables him to express a complete thought. 3. Once you realize you can't do this, consider whether it could be that perceptions only take on meaning after having passed through an active intellect. Of course, they only take on conceptual meaning after passing through an active intellect, but that does not mean that perception does not constitute an awareness of objects in the external world. My cat is certainly aware of me, when she sees me walk through the door.
GW wrote: "It is OK to believe [in material objects], but not OK to assert [them] as certain. It is impossible to prove the existence of material objects."
I replied, "Now here I disagree with you, assuming that by 'proof' you simply mean the correct identification of reality. 'Proof' is often taken to mean a valid inference from direction perception, so that direct perception cannot, in that sense of the term, be 'proved,' which is not to say that it doesn't entail a knowledge of reality. Since it is the ultimate foundation of knowledge, if perception is unreliable, then so are all of the abstract ideas based upon it." Of course ideas, or perceptions, or sensations, or whatever you want to call them are necessary ingredients for knowledge. But none of these are material objects. They're phenomena. Again, perceptions and sensations are not the objects of direct awareness, they are the form of direct awareness or the process by which we are directly aware of material objects. Thus, we ought not to say that perceptions are only reliable if based on material objects. A direct perception cannot be mistaken; our senses can only perceive what is out there, and they do so in a particular form that is determined by the nature of our sensory apparatus. If a color-blind person perceives a car as gray that a normal person perceives as red, he or she does not perceive incorrectly. Gray is simply the form in which the color-blind person (or dichromat) perceives the car. His or her vision does not provide the same degree of discrimination that a normal person's (or trichromat's) vision does, but that does not make it incorrect or unreliable. Some animals, that are tetrachromats or pentachromats, are able to make finer color discriminations than normal human beings or trichromats are, but that doesn't render human vision unreliable. We should rather say that perceptions are reliable so long as they are appropriately based on, and consistent with, experienced phenomena, whatever that may be. You're talking about perceptual judgment or identification rather than simple perception. How do I know that the cat I see when I get home from work today is the same cat that I saw yesterday? That's an issue of identification not of perception. And, yes, I must integrate all of the relevant factors -- the entire context -- in order to make the appropriate judgment.
- Bill
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