Warren, you wrote:
Joel Catala writes:
Objectivism rejects the existence of immaterial entities. [...]
Objectivism, as a rational and logical philosophy, cannot deny the existence of immaterial entities that have some form of inter-relation to material entities.
If by you refer to free will or consciousness, Objectivism of course cannot deny their existence.
If you mean immaterial entities divorced from any material; i.e., any essence completely divorced from substance, then yes, Objectivism indeed rejects this concept. Objectivism does not accept the existence of any immaterial substance. This is the central point.
A first thing that happens here is that the Objectivist definitions of free will and consciousness are lame and contradictory. Objectivist definition of consciousness:
"Consciousness is the faculty that perceives that which exists."
It says nothing about the origin and attributes of this "faculty." Is it material? is it immaterial?
Now, the Objectivist "description" (not even a definition) of free will:
"[...] people do have free will."
Apparently, agreed.
"This means that they do make choices [...]"
Tautologically correct.
But now, beyond trivial definitions, problems arrive:
"There is never something created from nothing -- [...]; it is all a rearrangement of what was previously there."
This is a denial of free will: if free decisions are not created from no-thing, but "it is all rearrangement of what was previously there", how can free will be free?
Of course, this Objectivist description of free will destroys the same concept of free will. Objectivism is, according to its own distorted definition of "free will", determinist.
There is something about consciousness in the link about free will:
"Within the context of your mind, your consciousness is not a bunch of atoms held together in a particular way [...]."
Apparently, agreed (we will see later that the Objectivist position on consciousness --assuming it is a mental entity-- is inconsistent.)
Do you honestly think Objectivism as a philosophy would reject the existence of our vision? No.
My contention is that the existence of the soul and (genuine) free will is denied by Objectivism. That was part of my point with John Armaos.
And on a sidenote, here is an Objectivist site which discusses the metaphysical existence of immaterial entities:
http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Metaphysics_MentalEntities.html
You will see that this side note will prove to be useful for my argument of seeing Objectivism as metaphysical materialism (i.e, "only matter really exists").
Again, we will content with the Objectivist definition(s) of consciousness.
By referencing this link, I understand that you Warren mean that Objectivism states that
A.- human consciousness is a (strictly) mental entity, and that
B.- there are immaterial "mental entities."
But in this link it is not accepted the existence of immaterial mental entities, but only of material mental entities (namely, chemical reactions.)
About "mental entities" it is stated:
“Mental entities are products of chemical reactions within our brains. This is the level of abstraction that they physically exist.”
But what about immaterial mental entities? by omission, Objectivism denies their existence.
If points A and B are indeed advocated by Warren, then Warren is actually embracing the materialist metaphysics of Objectivism.
If my point A is wrong, and according to Objectivism consciousness is not a mental entity, what is it, a para-mental entity? Objectivism rejects that last, so the only remaining option is that Objectivism denies the existence of immaterial mental entities.
“The important thing is that their physical existence is different from their content."
But I can’t imagine how consciousness or other "mental entities" could be the "content" of electrochemical reactions. In the brain, there are only electric impulses, and no "content", namely, information.
What Objectivism does not tell us --it would be its self-destruction-- is that it is the mind and not the brain which establishes a conventional code for the identification of specific groups of electrochemical impulses as information.
The human mind requires an immaterial component to form that "mental image" --which is ultimately information.
"A mental image of a triangle doesn't exist as a triangle in one's head, for instance.”
Yes. And here Objectivism has the problem: 'where' the "mental image" exists? 'Outside' the brain? Where is that information?
“Mental entities do exist, though, and so they have identity.”
Again, that cute tautology that provides us no information about the attributes of consciousness.
As I said, Objectivism is metaphysical materialism. Let’s face it.
Quite differently, my position is that
A.- (Human) consciousness produces reactions within the brain. (Confirmed by science; accepted by Objectivism.)
B.- Consciousness is not an entity within the brain. (This is a deduction; inimical to Objectivism.)
---
C.- I reject metaphysical naturalism, which is metaphysical materialism, the Objectivist metaphysics. Warren, more discussion will be probably unfruitful until you study the two links I provided you at the end of post #170. Related to the orthodox Objectivist position of Ed Thompson and William Dwyer, honest & smart individuals (& possibly, scientists) as in example Cal and Bob Mac got the point. Regards, Joel Català
(Edited by Joel Català on 5/02, 7:58am)
|
