| | In the Dissent thread, "Tossing Around A Tautology," originally conceived as a discussion on the the law of identity, several side issues have emerged, among them the common contention (common in the philosophical profession, at any rate) that ethical naturalism is fallacious. British philosopher G.E. Moore (1873-1958), author of Principia Ethica coined a term for this view; he called it "the naturalistic fallacy," and students of philosophy are sure to encounter it in their ethics courses. The view can probably be traced to David Hume's classic argument that one cannot get an 'ought' from an 'is.' Joel Catala has echoed Hume in a recent reply to Michael Kelly in the above named thread: "I read and analyzed the Objectivist view of morality. My position is that morality cannot be based on sensory data, as you seem to assert. The philosophical name given to your fallacious view is 'naturalistic fallacy', and it is based on the intrinsic independence of ought and is. It was once described by David Hume." It is a testament to the bankruptcy of modern philosophy that Moore's faux fallacy has acquired the kind of currency it has, for contrary to Catala, the misnamed "naturalistic fallacy" is itself a fallacy. All meaningful statements, which refer to reality, are factual statements. If I say, "Murder is bad," that is a factual statement. I am saying something about reality, namely, that murder is in fact bad. That assumes, of course, that "bad" is not a floating abstraction -- that it is anchored to concrete reality. "Bad" in this context means immoral, and "immoral" refers to actions that one ought to avoid. What do we mean when we say that one "ought" to avoid a particular action? We mean that the action frustrates a valuable end or goal. Similarly, if we say that one "ought" to take a particular action, we mean that it serves a valuable end or goal -- that it is a means to that which one values. So a "prescriptive" statement is simply another kind of "descriptive" statement.
Consider, for example, the following propositions: "I ought not to smoke, if I want to avoid cancer and heart disease." [Translation: Not smoking is a means to health and longevity, which is a value.] "I ought to look for a job, if I want to make money." [Translation: Looking for a job is a means of making money, which is a value." "People ought to respect each other's rights, if they want to live in a free and peaceful society." [Translation: Respecting each other's rights is a means to a free and peaceful society, which is a value.]
In brief, all normative statements are factual statements. Contrary to Hume, an "ought" statement is simply another kind of "is" statement.
The origin of Hume's is/ought dichotomy probably lies in the implicit assumption that "ought" statements are ultimately unconditional and categorical -- that they do not depend on any antecedent values, which they are intended to serve. Such a view was subsequently made explicit by Kant, who defended categorical imperatives as against purely hypothetical ones. In fact, of course, the idea of a categorical -- or unconditional -- imperative is itself a floating abstraction. To say that one ought to do something just because one ought to do it makes no sense.
If, for example, someone tells me that I ought to drink eight glasses of water a day, it would be reasonable for me to ask him "why." What I would be asking is: "for what purpose?" If he cannot answer me -- if he says that I ought to drink eight glasses of water a day simply because I ought to -- for no reason whatever -- then his statement is a meaningless prescription with no normative content. In order for me to take him seriously, he has to give me some reason for accepting his advice. He has to tell me what I have to gain by following it.
So, the idea that morality cannot be based on facts -- on actual human needs and values -- owes its origin to the bankruptcy of modern philosophy -- to the legacy of Hume and Kant, and their lesser progeny, G.E. Moore. But if ethical naturalism is viewed as a fallacy, what's left? You guessed it: supernaturalism, as exemplified in Joel Catala's view that morality requires the commandments of a supreme deity. Perhaps, we should christen this view "the supernaturalistic fallacy"!
- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 3/27, 8:28pm)
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 3/27, 8:30pm)
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