The Fallacy of "the Naturalistic Fallacy"

Ed said:

"[...] I can just look at how things are around me, and do the right things then; the things that are going to make me happy; the things that are going to help me make friends again."

Indeed, that is a position perfectly in accordance with metaphysical naturalism. A good slogan of this strictly materialist position could be:

"Morality is in nature. Just sense it."

And here lays the fallacy: morality is not "out there" to be perceived by the senses. (Morality can only be appreciated by moral beings, who, consciously or not, actively "filter" their perceived facts through the moral system --an immaterial entity-- they deem as the true one.)

In this respect, Objectivism is social neo-Darwinism. Epistemological naturalism --e.g., the scientific method-- is a good method for knowing bare facts, but has nothing to do with morality.

Just think about Karl Marx, or about smart scientists eagerly working for the USSR.

Even in human terms, not all that is natural is moral; human nature should always be regulated by morality --you know: even generally moral humans sometimes slip out of morality; human values are always defined and hierarchized with (the embraced) morality --a hierarchy dependent on context and defined by a timeless morality.

As Ed commented, Objectivism defines "happy life" as the highest human value. But what Objectivism does not recognize is that the definition of what is morality is indeed a precondition to giving a status of value to human happiness. (Namely: how can I know if I should pursue happiness without a previously chosen moral status for happiness?.)

Objectivism is intrinsically non-transcendent, and then humanly irrelevant --because, differently to animals, a human needs a sense of transcendence for the pursuit of happiness. Without transcendence only materiality is appreciated, there only remain epicureanism and hedonism, and happiness is easily confounded with tranquility and pleasure.

Ultimately, without a sense of transcendence --and transcendence is, by definition, extra-natural--, there is no meaning for life, and true morality is unattainable. In this respect, Objectivism, as pure ego, is non-transcendent, and thus tends to meaningless solipsism.

As I see it, the goal of life is the pursuit of human fulfillment, which has the necessary condition of morality. As morality is transcendent, the goal of life necessarily involves (the Objectivist anathema of) transcendence of the ego.

P.S.: I wish you a Happy Birthday's week, William Dwyer.

(Edited by Joel Català on 4/10, 11:10am)

(Edited by Joel Català on 4/11, 7:28am)

Post 41

Tuesday, April 11, 2006 - 4:02pm

Joel,

==============
Ed said:

"[...] I can just look at how things are around me, and do the right things then; the things that are going to make me happy; the things that are going to help me make friends again."

Post 42

Tuesday, April 11, 2006 - 10:53pm

Joel Catala writes:

Objectivism is intrinsically non-transcendent, and then humanly irrelevant --because, differently to animals, a human needs a sense of transcendence for the pursuit of happiness. Without transcendence only materiality is appreciated, there only remain epicureanism and hedonism, and happiness is easily confounded with tranquility and pleasure.

Ultimately, without a sense of transcendence --and transcendence is, by definition, extra-natural--, there is no meaning for life, and true morality is unattainable. In this respect, Objectivism, as pure ego, is non-transcendent, and thus tends to meaningless solipsism.

As I see it, the goal of life is the pursuit of human fulfillment, which has the necessary condition of morality. As morality is transcendent, the goal of life necessarily involves (the Objectivist anathema of) transcendence of the ego.

I disagree with your assertion that Objectivism is non-transcendental or anti-transcendental.

This is because Objectivism supports a secular definition of transcendence. The basis of this claim is the fact that Objectivism allows for secular views of spirituality.
It is unfortunate that the Mystics have burdened these two words -transcendence & spirituality- with negative stigma as a result of a great many evils of ignorance abound in contradictory philosophy, faulty cognition and malevolent premises.
Due to such blunders that tore asunder a this-worldly, earthly and practical definition of what is a very natural aspect of human nature, people have been led to believe such aspects of human existence must be super-natural, mystical in nature or other-worldly.

As such, the Mystics have perpetrated a great injustice on all of mankind. Many are not even privvy to it, because not many people excercise their natural capacity to think through the consequences of their actions, of their premises, of their mind. In short, they are conceptually short-sighted. What is this great evil that these blind, ignorant deviates of rationality and reason have committed against humanity? I will answer that question by addressing the ultimate consequence of such injustice: the hindrance, destruction and torture against man's mind.

Ergo, if we are to emancipitate ourselfs from such arbitrary slavery, we must abolish these mystics by annihilating mysticism. What is accomplished to carry out such a feat? One need not excercise force - such would only backfire, not to mention it would be hypocritical and outright defiant of Objectivist philosophy. All one needs to do is Think; doing the right thing is natural leadership, doing things right is natural management.

Post 43

Thursday, April 13, 2006 - 2:36pm

Joel I believe you have used a strawman argument against Objectivism. Objectivism does not say Morality is in nature, just sense it. In fact I think this is more accurate a description of subjectivism, either Mysticism or Relativism. It says morality is derived from the "is" and then gives us the "ought". Our objective reality defines what we "ought" to do.

I'm probably over simplifying the philosophy (this is a forum so there's only so much time and space I personally can devote) and I don't profess to be an expert on Objectivism, any objectivists can correct me if I'm wrong.

E.g. Because a wild beast "is" attacking me, in order for me to survive I "ought" to kill the attacking beast.

Also it sounds like you are substituting "supernatural" for "extra-natural". What's the difference?

(Edited by John Armaos
on 4/13, 2:38pm)

Post 44

Thursday, April 13, 2006 - 2:57pm

There isn't any - if it is not natural, it doesn't exist.....

Post 45

Thursday, April 13, 2006 - 8:32pm

Yes I know. It was a rhetorical question.

Post 46

Friday, April 14, 2006 - 12:42pm

Hi William, thanks for your post. My friend John Armaos and I spent some time discussing this over dinner yesterday and I am left a little confused. Now I also am by no means an expert in objectivism but I can’t say that I understand how an ‘ought’ could be consider equivalent to a ‘fact’ or an ‘is’. I do not see how one could get an ought from an is without an intervening value or philosophy. When IS = objectivie reality, and my value = my life, then my ought follows from that, I ought to act in a way that furthers my life based on objective reality, i.e. that I need food and water to survive. But you say that “murder is bad” is a ‘factual statement’. How is that a ‘factual’ statement about ‘reality’? You seem to me to be giving a moral value to an action, not describing the way the universe acts. To me, a ‘fact’ is the mass of a proton, or the gravitational constant of the universe, a formula describing the interaction between two particles; or a fundamental axiom. How do you or does Objectivism tend to define a ‘fact’?

When you say

“Similarly, if we say that one "ought" to take a particular action, we mean that it serves a valuable end or goal -- that it is a means to that which one values. So a "prescriptive" statement is simply another kind of "descriptive" statement.”

I am unable to follow the leap from a prescriptive statement to a descriptive one, as the descriptive interpretation of this still depends on an intermediary philosophy or set of values between the IS and the OUGHT.

I see how a prescriptive statement could be considered factual based on objective reality combined with a value set, but the value set is still chosen. That is, assuming my value includes life, then “I ought to acquire food in order to sustain life” is a factual statement, because as part of objective reality food is required to sustain life. However, that my life is of value to me is not an IS, it is a choice, isn’t it? Thus, saying I ought to acquire food is only factual if my value includes sustaining life.

Looking at it as a logical chain of reasoning I see

Axiom – Objective reality requires eating food to live

Premise – I want to live

Conclusion – therefore I ought to eat food.

Fact: You ought to eat food (if you want to live)

Conversely, if I wanted to die (my friend Rosalie is a Hospice nurse and one of her patients was dying from Anorexia)

Axiom – Objective reality requires eating food to live

Premise – I do not want to eat food

Conclusion – If I do not eat food, I will die

Fact: You ought to not eat food (if you want to die)

By this logic, both of these are facts and they are oughts, but they are contradictory, so they can not possibly be objective descriptions of reality. That is, one can not say “murder is bad” and call it a fact without comparing against a chosen value system.

Now, let me add that I do not *like* this interpretation, since this seems to imply to me morality is a prescribed behavior based on a chosen set of values derived from objective reality, that which is chosen being arbitrary as some people can choose other values (death) and their morality would prescribe destructive and violent behavior. To say that the objectivist code of morality is one that is merely arbitrarily chosen seems to weak, it seems to have more value (of value to whom?) intrinsically than any other codes of morality or choices of values; but I can not reason it out any other way and to me your argument does not give it that extra value I do think it deserves.

Michael

(Edited by Michael F Dickey on 4/14, 12:44pm)

Post 47

Friday, April 14, 2006 - 11:02pm

Michael, thanks for your thoughtful post. Let me see if I can address your concerns. You wrote:

I do not see how one could get an ought from an is without an intervening value or philosophy.

You cannot get an "ought" from an "is" without an ultimate end or goal, which is something that you already value for its own sake, because to say that you "ought" to take a certain action simply means that the action is ultimately a means to your final end or purpose, which is your own life (and happiness).

When IS = objective reality, and my value = my life, then my ought follows from that, I ought to act in a way that furthers my life based on objective reality, i.e. that I need food and water to survive. But you say that “murder is bad” is a ‘factual statement’. How is that a ‘factual’ statement about ‘reality’?

Well, either murder is bad or it isn't, and if it is, then can't we say it's a fact that murder is bad?

You seem to me to be giving a moral value to an action, not describing the way the universe acts. To me, a ‘fact’ is the mass of a proton, or the gravitational constant of the universe, a formula describing the interaction between two particles; or a fundamental axiom. How do you or does Objectivism tend to define a ‘fact’?

The closest Rand came to a definition is the following:

Now, "fact" is merely a way of saying, "This is something that exists in reality" -- as distinguished from imagination or misconception or error. So you could say, "That the American Revolution took place is a fact," or, "That George Washington existed is a fact." (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pp. 241,242)

Similarly, you could say "That murder is bad is a fact," which is another way of saying, "That murder destroys a value is a fact."

When you say,
Similarly, if we say that one "ought" to take a particular action, we mean that it serves a valuable end or goal -- that it is a means to that which one values. So a "prescriptive" statement is simply another kind of "descriptive" statement.”
I am unable to follow the leap from a prescriptive statement to a descriptive one, as the descriptive interpretation of this still depends on an intermediary philosophy or set of values between the IS and the OUGHT.

Well, the descriptive statement depends on an ultimate end or goal that the moral agent already values. To get an OUGHT from an IS, you have to begin with a natural, pre-existing value, which the moral agent desires for its own sake, as an end in itself. That value is the moral agent's own life and happiness. We value our own lives and happiness, because they are inherently valuable to us.

I see how a prescriptive statement could be considered factual based on objective reality combined with a value set, but the value set is still chosen. That is, assuming my value includes life, then “I ought to acquire food in order to sustain life” is a factual statement, because as part of objective reality food is required to sustain life. However, that my life is of value to me is not an IS, it is a choice, isn’t it? Thus, saying I ought to acquire food is only factual if my value includes sustaining life.

No, you don't choose to value life, any more than you choose to value happiness. Happiness is inherently a value to the person experiencing it, just as suffering is inherently a disvalue. Similarly, (unless you are suffering so much that you would rather be dead), life is inherently a value, because it is only through life that one experiences happiness.

Looking at it as a logical chain of reasoning I see

Axiom – Objective reality requires eating food to live
Premise – I want to live
Conclusion – therefore I ought to eat food.
Fact: You ought to eat food (if you want to live)

Conversely, if I wanted to die (my friend Rosalie is a Hospice nurse and one of her patients was dying from Anorexia)

Axiom – Objective reality requires eating food to live
Premise – I do not want to eat food
Conclusion – If I do not eat food, I will die
Fact: You ought to not eat food (if you want to die)

By this logic, both of these are facts and they are oughts, but they are contradictory, so they can not possibly be objective descriptions of reality. That is, one can not say “murder is bad” and call it a fact without comparing it against a chosen value system.

Now, let me add that I do not *like* this interpretation, since this seems to imply to me morality is a prescribed behavior based on a chosen set of values derived from objective reality, that which is chosen being arbitrary as some people can choose other values (death) and their morality would prescribe destructive and violent behavior. To say that the objectivist code of morality is one that is merely arbitrarily chosen seems too weak, it seems to have more value (of value to whom?) intrinsically than any other codes of morality or choices of values; but I can not reason it out any other way and to me your argument does not give it that extra value I do think it deserves.

As I indicated, the ultimate values of life and happiness are not arbitrarily chosen; they are inherent in our nature as human beings. That doesn't mean that some people cannot act in ways that are self-destructive -- that are inimical to their highest values. But that is a psychological issue that needs to be dealt with by a psychologist or psychotherapist. People (such as your friend's anorexic patient) can become trapped in pathological behavior, which is against their self-interest. But we recognize it as pathological only because we see that it is against their real values -- only because we realize that it isn't getting them what they truly want -- that it isn't conducive to their happiness and wellbeing. Whereas the value of happiness is self-evident, the means of obtaining happiness is not. That is where philosophy and ethics enter the picture. It is the task of ethics and of moral virtue to tell us how to achieve our values - how to achieve happiness - in other words, how to live well. According to Objectivism, one achieves happiness by satisfying one's physical and psychological needs as a certain kind of living organism, i.e., by living as one's nature requires.

I hope this helps to explain my position a little more clearly. Thanks for the insightful questions and thoughtful analysis.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 4/14, 11:11pm)

Post 48

Saturday, April 15, 2006 - 1:03am

Good points, Bill.

Ed

Post 49

Saturday, April 15, 2006 - 10:20am

Thanks, Ed.

I want to expand on a point that I made in Post 47, in which I wrote,

As I indicated, the ultimate values of life and happiness are not arbitrarily chosen; they are inherent in our nature as human beings. That doesn't mean that some people cannot act in ways that are self-destructive -- that are inimical to their highest values. But that is a psychological issue that needs to be dealt with by a psychologist or psychotherapist. People (such as your friend's anorexic patient) can become trapped in pathological behavior, which is against their self-interest. But we recognize it as pathological only because we see that it is against their real values -- only because we realize that it isn't getting them what they truly want -- that it isn't conducive to their happiness and wellbeing.

Of course, people can also adopt a false morality, like altruism, and hold something other than their own life and happiness as their highest moral purpose. In this case, the problem is philosophical not psychological; they are failing to recognize that that they "ought" to choose a particular action only if it is a means to their highest value, which is their own happiness. But that doesn't alter the fact that they do value their own happiness above everything else; they simply believe that it is moral for them to sacrifice their highest value for the sake of someone else's highest value - their happiness for the sake of someone else's happiness. The contradiction here should be obvious. If their own happiness isn't worth pursuing, then why is someone else's?

And, again, although the value of happiness is self-evident, the means of obtaining it is not. That is where a code of morality or a set of moral principles is relevant. It is the task of moral virtue to tell us how to achieve our values - how to achieve happiness.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 4/15, 10:21am)

Post 50

Saturday, April 15, 2006 - 12:03pm

It is the task of moral virtue to tell us how to achieve our values - how to achieve happiness.

That is - "how" in the sense of a guidance, an understood, not as a set of commandments obeyed for an arbitrary sake.

Post 51

Saturday, April 15, 2006 - 6:53pm

I wrote, "It is the task of moral virtue to tell us how to achieve our values - how to achieve happiness." Robert replied,

That is - "how" in the sense of a guidance, an understood, not as a set of commandments obeyed for an arbitrary sake.

Of course. But, Robert, that goes without saying, doesn't it? In what sense could it be construed as a commandment to be obyed for the sake of an arbitrary end or goal? For one thing, the end is not arbitrary, as I already explained. Secondly, an ethical prescription is simply a means to an end - like I want to go from San Francisco to Los Angeles, so I consult a map, and the map "tells" me which highway I "ought" to take. The map isn't commanding me to take the highway; it's simply telling me "how" to get to Los Angeles from San Francisco, assuming that's my destination. It's no different for a morality, which is simply a set of directions for achieving your highest values, your destination in life.

- Bill

Post 52

Saturday, April 15, 2006 - 8:11pm

Oh quite agree - but most folk are used to morals as something in which ye be told how to live, not guided......

Post 53

Tuesday, April 18, 2006 - 7:18am

John Armaos said:

Also it sounds like you are substituting "supernatural" for "extra-natural". What's the difference?

Yes, there is no fundamental difference. I mean "in the ambit of non-physicality".

Post 54

Tuesday, April 18, 2006 - 7:20am

That is, one can not say “murder is bad” and call it a fact without comparing against a chosen value system.

Yes, Michael F Dickey, I agree with you.

Morality is a metaphysical condition; that's why animals can't have any, and why wicked humans choose a wrong one.

(Edited by Joel Català on 4/18, 7:24am)

Post 55

Tuesday, April 18, 2006 - 7:27am

Warren Chase Anspaugh said:

The basis of this claim is the fact that Objectivism allows for secular views of spirituality.

I never read anything close to that in Objectivism. Could you elaborate your concept of "secular spirituality"? Be aware that the terms spirituality and transcendence are linked to immateriality, and so, inimical to Objectivism. Thanks.

All one needs to do is Think; doing the right thing is natural leadership, doing things right is natural management.

Not agreed. The real point is that evil deeds are part of nature and are necessarily wrong at the same time.
(Edited by Joel Català on 4/18, 8:41am)

Post 56

Tuesday, April 18, 2006 - 8:10am

Ed said [Ed's words in white boxes]:

Joel,
==============
Ed said:

"[...] I can just look at how things are around me, and do the right things then; the things that are going to make me happy; the things that are going to help me make friends again."
Indeed, that is a position perfectly in accordance with metaphysical naturalism. A good slogan of this strictly materialist position could be:

"Morality is in nature. Just sense it."

And here lays the fallacy: morality is not "out there" to be perceived by the senses.
===============

You don't perceive morality with sense-perception, even though you can know (not merely believe) that it exists. The mind is not a passive, sense organ.

Until you achieve a sufficient understanding of THAT aspect of reality -- you will continue to be hoodwinked into setting up this materialism-sensory straw-man that you have. This false dichotomy that fails to integrate -- without contradiction -- the conceptual powers (NOT the perceptual powers) of awareness of humans.

Yes, the mind is not passive. But my point is that the mind (at least in part) deals with immaterial entities. According to Objectivism, the opposite must be true: the mind only deals with material entities: remember the Randian categorical assertion that "only concretes exist." I assume we can agree that Objectivism is bare materialism.

Now, let's take an example. When an Objectivist says "infinite", to what concrete is that person referring? from what material existent an Objectivist forms the concept of "infinity"? Obviously, to none, and from none.

A referent of the concept "infinity" is not a concrete, but an immaterial entity. That immaterial entity referent of the concept "infinity" must somehow exist to make possible the formation of the same concept.

The same logic applied to concepts as "immateriality" or "falsehood" are perhaps more enlightening: when a person says "immateriality" from what concrete he forms the concept "immateriality"? When he says "falsehood", from what false concrete (always in the Objectivist sense of "concrete") he forms the concept of "falsehood"?

I see the Objectivist (and Ed's) position as definitely untenable.

Immaterial entities --no "concrete" entities-- may be "in" two places at the same time, so the epistemologies departing from metaphysical naturalism, which deny the existence of immaterial entities, are necessarily wrong. (BTW, the fact that Karl Marx and the majority of leftists defend the same brand of metaphysical materialism as Objectivism perhaps should make you think it twice.)

Comprehension of reality requires entities both "out there" and "in your mind." That's why I said "out there": all existing entities, wherever or whatever they are, are potentially explainable, namely, eventually understood in the context of an intelligible overarching system in which they are seen necessary.

The same could be said about the universals related to morality --the starting issue of this thread.

Morality should be recognized as fundamentally a question of metaphysics. But Objectivism says that morality can be deduced from epistemology (Again, the similarities between Marxist ethics and Objectivist ethics are pretty revealing.) From here arises the Objectivist moral short-sightedness, in where every individual must define his own ethics, thus blocking the embrace of a truly universal standard of morality for all mankind.

(Edited by Joel Català on 4/18, 8:32am)

Post 57

Tuesday, April 18, 2006 - 8:40am

Joel,

===========
According to Objectivism, the opposite must be true: the mind only deals with material entities: remember the Randian categorical assertion that "only concretes exist." I assume we can agree that Objectivism is bare materialism.
===========

Nope. I assume you refer to this ...

================
Abstractions as such do not exist: they are merely man's epistemological method of perceiving that which exists--and that which exists is concrete.
================

A talking point regarding the above is this universal rule of correct human thought: No floating abstractions. On materialism, she wrote ...

================
A body without a soul is a corpse, a soul without a body is a ghost. ... Do you observe what human faculty that doctrine was designed to ignore? It was man's mind that had to be negated in order to make him fall apart.

... the spiritualists and the materialists, those who believe in consciousness without existence and those who believe in existence without consciousness. Both demand the surrender of your mind, one to their revelations, the other to their reflexes. No matter how loudly they posture in the roles of irreconcilable antagonists, their moral codes are alike, and so are their aims: in matter--the enslavement of man's body, in spirit--the destruction of his mind.
================

Ed

Post 58

Tuesday, April 18, 2006 - 8:43am

Straw-men aside, then tell me, Ed:

Assuming that Objectivism denies that all existing entities are matter, according to Objectivism, what is the "nature" of the soul? Is immaterial, or a mixture of matter and immateriality?

Now, for the (metaphysical) materialism point. I said:

"I assume we can agree that Objectivism is bare materialism."

And Ed replied:

Nope. I assume you refer to this ...

================

Abstractions as such do not exist: they are merely man's epistemological method of perceiving that which exists--and that which exists is concrete. [Ayn Rand quote.]
================

Ed, with "concrete" Ayn Rand could only mean material concrete. Her only alternative is... yes, a "floating abstraction": an immaterial entity.

Objectivism can only be metaphysical naturalism, bare materialism, and it is wrong. All alternatives include some "spiritualism", namely, to admit that immaterial entities exist.

You can't have the (materialist) cake and eat it, too.

(Edited by Joel Català on 4/18, 9:02am)

Post 59

Tuesday, April 18, 2006 - 9:17am