Evaluating Initiation of Force in Emergency Situations

Bill,

You said, "What I meant by saying that the victim has "a right" to resist the violation is that he is justified in resisting it." When some is 'justified' they have a right - if they have a right they are justified in an action. We are talking about the moral dimension of an act.

You said, "I would certainly agree that the victim does not have an individual right to resist the violation, for that would imply that the violation is itself unjustified." To say that an innocent victim has no individual right to resist an attempt to be killed is bewildering. I'm in a swimming pool and someone panics, thinks they are drowning, and maybe they are. The grab hold of me as the only way they can stay afloat. Their emergency ends my right to my life? That isn't logically defensible.

You said, "In a genuine conflict of interest in which the moral agents' lives are at stake, it is in the self-interest of each party to try to survive at the expense of the other." This doesn't address individual rights. It doesn't explain why individual rights disappear. I maintain that an individual is faced with choosing to survive at the expense of violating the rights of an innocent person. They can't have their cake and eat it too. I face a conflict of interest every day. I can choose to take something that doesn't belong to me because it will enrich me, but if I do, I will be in the wrong. It isn't in my self-interest to live as a thief. This is the difference between survival at any price and living as a man should live.

You said, "You are viewing the principle of rights as an intrinsic absolute that exists irrespective of its value to the moral agent, when in fact it is simply a moral principle that applies within a certain context (i.e., one in which survival by production and trade is possible)." This is really important and deserve a lot of focus. When we use a concept it is understood that we have to be true to many aspects of the concept. For example, when Proudhon said "All property is theft" he was ignoring the fact that property is the genetic parent to theft. When someone says humans aren't rational, they are ignoring their context that makes their statement self-contradictory. When you say that one person's emergency situation can deprive another person of their right to their life, you are ignoring that rights belong to man (the generic 'man') and individuals have rights because they are human. It isn't like brown eye color which I have because of MY genes, it is like rationality, which is mine because I am human. It is about the source of the concept. It isn't that the concept of rights is absolute or not absolute, but that they aren't open to change based upon a concrete specific change in individual circumstances. The word intrinsic is usually used to mean built into or a property of a material unit - like Aristoles idea of 'tableness' being intrinsic to each table so that it could be percieved directly. I don't see anything about my understanding of rights that is intrinsic.

Here is my understanding of individual rights. There are conditions of existence that are required for the survival of man (again, we are talking about the generic man - the concept 'man' - not a specific man. This is a must because we are trying to figure out what are universal rights - the concept - not looking at some specific guy in a normal or an emergency situation.) Those conditions are metaphysical. They apply to all humans at all times and they are part of our human nature because of this approach. Note that these conditions exist even if you are alone on a desert island. Our rights, then are the moral statement that no one has the right to interfere with these conditions of existence. It is the application of our conditions of existence to a social setting.

To say that rights arise on an adhoc basis out specific concrete basis for convienience purposes ignores this much more fundamental understanding. To say that rights are only social and not connected to the conditions of our existence - as man - is to set them adrift as floating abstractions subject to the vagaries of relativism. A given man's self-interest changes minute by minute, but his rights remain unchanged. My self-interest will change based upon my beliefs and the values I've chosen and the conditions I find myself in, but my rights won't change.

Post 81

Sunday, March 29, 2009 - 10:53pm

Steve,

Maybe I can help clarify Bill's position. This topic has come up a few times in the past, and there's always some confusion at the beginning. Let me assure you that Bill's position is actually quite deep, and confusions on the vocabulary are due to his putting serious thought into the issue. But let me try to explain so you don't have to take my word for it.

Let me start with your post #80 to contrast the position. You point out that there are conditions of existence required for man, and these are metaphysical. I note that you don't say rights are these conditions of existence. I assume that was intentional. You then describe rights as:

Our rights, then are the moral statement that no one has the right to interfere with these conditions of existence.

It's a little poorly worded, because you refer to a right to interfere while you're defining rights. But presumably if we change the words to something like "no one can have a moral justification to interfere", it might mean the same? Is that fair enough?

The question is, if rights really are a moral statement, or better yet a moral principle or position, what's the moral justification for the principle? You've described the conditions of existence required for survival, but you didn't describe why other people should avoid violating those conditions. And that's the key to the whole discussion. Simply claiming that you need something doesn't explain why I should provide it.

Since Objectivist morality is based on self-interest, presumably self-interest is the justification for it. We can go on to show how in normal situations, it's totally in our self-interest to respect these conditions of existence of our fellow human beings. We can show that there's a harmony of interests, and that we gain from the existence of others. We can show how an attack on any person's conditions of existence is disruptive to the harmony of interests, and why we should prevent it or punish it. We can show how treating others as ends in themselves provides us with an orientation towards trade and peaceful cooperation. And on and on.

The question, then, is whether there are ever times where it isn't in your self-interest to respect these conditions. You can imagine in any situation there's a value gained from respecting these conditions of existence (notice I'm avoiding the term "rights" which is the point of confusion), and there's a cost as well. In normal contexts, the gains are astoundingly large (peaceful life in human society is such a significant benefit to human life), and the costs are small (some instant and short-lived gratification). The benefits vastly outweighs the costs. In some situations, the cost-benefit might be the reverse. One that comes up is you're starving in the woods and run into a cabin. Do you break the window and get life-preserving food (with the intention of paying for it all), or do you choose to die?

Some here would claim that morality is disconnected from life, and you should sacrifice your life for the sake of "being moral". Some will use phrases like "life qua man" to rationalize their adherence to a morality that ends with death. I personally prefer Nathaniel Branden's statement:

We need a code of ethics to support our life and well-being. Ethics does not teach us, �At this point, a moral person commits suicide.�

Argue the point if you want, but if you want to understand Bill's position, you have to understand that he sees it pretty much the same way. Morality is about living. And that means there are situations where the normal moral justification for an action or value is no long significant.

Given this position, what does "rights" mean? They're not some fixed rule that demands you act in a certain way regardless of context, even to the extent of throwing away your life. That would be a religious commandment. If rights are moral concepts, then they are justified by self-interest. And if following them would violate self-interest in some context, then it isn't moral in that context.

Bill believes rights are a kind of moral obligation. But in contexts where they don't apply, there is no such obligation. If you view rights as strictly a moral obligation, it makes sense that there is no such thing as rights in those contexts. This is a simple argument. If rights are just referring to moral obligations, then when there is no moral obligation, there is no rights.

Your position is a little less clear. You said:

rights belong to man (the generic 'man') and individuals have rights because they are human.

If rights were just the conditions of existence necessary for survival, then that would be the case. If you needed the freedom to produce in order to live your life, then you have that need and it doesn't change based on the situation. But that need alone does not create the obligation for others to respect the need. So saying individuals have rights (needs would be a better term) doesn't say anything about whether other's should respect those needs. On the other hand, Bill's view that rights are moral obligations is similar to your view I referenced above that said they are a kind of moral statement about how other people should not interfere with them.

Is this clear? You can either being talking about:

1.) A person's needs (or conditions of existence needed for survival)
2.) About the moral obligation of others to avoid interfering with that need.

If you pick the former, you're not making any moral statement. You could say that a person has rights even in emergency situations because they still have the same needs, but you would be making any kind of moral statement about whether those needs should be respected by others. It'd be like saying someone has a need not to be stabbed in order to survive, which applies equally to an innocent person and to a murderer bent on killing you. The need is the same.

The latter, which actually has moral connotations, is how rights are typically discussed. You wouldn't say that the murderer has a right to not be stabbed by his intended victim, for instance. But if you really view rights as moral obligations, then if there are contexts where you aren't morally obligated, then there's no rights in that situation (even if the needs are still there).

This is how Bill can make statements that in an emergency situation you don't have a right to not be killed, while at the same time the other person doesn't have a right to kill you. Survival could pit your lives against each other, where you may be morally justified to kill the other person (or violate his rights in some other more minor way), and at the same time he is morally justified to try to prevent you.

You said:

To say that an innocent victim has no individual right to resist an attempt to be killed is bewildering.

Can you see how this is not exactly what Bill is saying. The innocent victim would be entirely justified in resisting! Absolutely! But that's not the same as saying the other person has a moral obligation. You're using the word "right" in another way here. You're using it to say that the victim is morally justified to act in a particular way. But note how different that is from saying that other's are morally obligated to respect the victim's conditions of existence necessary for survival. One is talking about whether the victim should act that way to promote his own self-interest. The other is talking about whether the other person is promoting his own self-interest by refraining from acting in a particular way.

Since in normal, everyday situations there is a harmony of interests, these distinctions don't matter much. If I'm morally justified to act in a particular way, you're morally obligated to not interfere with me. If I have a right to produce, you don't have a right to interfere with my production. If I have a right to live, you don't have a right to kill me. In normal contexts, there's an expected symmetry that allows you to refer only to one of the participants. You can talk about something being "morally justified", and it doesn't matter if you are using one person's self-interest to justify it, or another person's. If I'm morally justified to act in a particular way, in normal situations that means you are not morally justified to interfere with it. That gives the impression that morality is a kind of criteria outside of the particular interests of any individual. An emergency situation makes you focus more clearly on each individual's actual needs and self-interest. Instead of thinking about morality as a set of universal rules, you can more clearly focus on morality as a standard to weight costs and benefits of choices for a specific person.

I hope that sheds some light on this topic.

That being said, my position is similar to Bill's in many ways, and radically different as well. We've gone over it several times, so I don't intend to argue it out with him again, but this is for your benefit.

My view is that rights are moral principles, and that moral principles are primarily cognitive. They tell you the likely outcome of your actions in terms of the effect on your life. They are about understanding the likely outcomes of your choices so you can make informed choices. They are not moral obligations or rules. If they were, you end up with Bill's position that they simply disappear in an emergency situation. And how do you define emergency situation? It's a situation where the costs of obeying these moral rules is greater than the value.

Instead, I view rights as a principle of understanding. They highlight the fact that each person has these conditions of existence necessary for survival, and that if you violate these conditions, you are pitting your own life against another. And further, the principle of rights highlights the fact that putting yourself at war with another person can put you at war with all other peaceful people. Initiating force means you're the one who's disrupting the harmony of interests, and can't be trusted by anyone.

In my view, rights qua moral principles don't disappear in emergency situations. The facts are still true. The relationships are still true. If you attempt to violate these "conditions of existence", you should recognize that you are pitting your life against another, and you should expect them to act appropriately. And you should also be aware that there are long term consequences. If your actions were not recognized as absolutely necessary (and therefore understandable and forgivable), others may view you as a threat to the harmony of interests. Also, if you are able to make amends for your rights violations afterwards, you would still be required to (in cases where it is possible, like breaking into a cabin to get food).

For me, moral principles are just cognitive tools to foresee consequences. They don't obligate you to act in some way, even in normal situations. They only shed light on the likely outcomes. It's your standard of value, life, that creates the obligation. It's the massive and overwhelming benefits of peaceful living in human society, which would be all thrown away with an initiation of force, that morally requires you to respect rights. But in some situations the benefit isn't available. If your very survival is at risk, you don't get to add that to the benefit ledger. Without life, the values of human society are not possible. I don't need special "emergency situations", which we'd have to go and try to define, to explain the different results. Only by believing in moral rules/obligations do you need to account for exceptions by arguing that a category of situations are just different. For me, it's the same approach every time. Use these cognitive principle to understand the likely results of your actions, and choose based on which one promotes your real self-interest.

Bill, as always, if you disagree with my restatement of your position, speak up. I know that you disagree with my evaluation of your position, specifically the latter part of this post that deals with my own position and differences with yours. But if the first part was off, please let everyone know.

Post 82

Sunday, March 29, 2009 - 11:59pm

Steve wrote,

You said, "What I meant by saying that the victim has "a right" to resist the violation is that he is justified in resisting it." When some(one) is 'justified' they have a right - if they have a right they are justified in an action. We are talking about the moral dimension of an act.

You're not understanding me. Consider: If I have a right against your interfering with my freedom, then you are not morally justified in interfering with it. Correct? But if so, then if you are morally justified in interfering with it, which you would be if your survival requires it, then I do not have a right against your interference. In other words, if the premise is that if there is a right against being interfered with, then the interference is not justified, then by the principle of modus tollens, it follows that if the interference is justified, then there is no right against being interfered with. To put the argument in formal logic, if it is the case that if R then not-J, then it is the case that if J then not-R. Symbolically: (R --> ~J) --> (J --> ~R) In other words, denying the consequent denies the antecedent.

You said, "I would certainly agree that the victim does not have an individual right to resist the violation, for that would imply that the violation is itself unjustified." To say that an innocent victim has no individual right to resist an attempt to be killed is bewildering. I'm in a swimming pool and someone panics, thinks they are drowning, and maybe they are. The grab hold of me as the only way they can stay afloat. Their emergency ends my right to my life? That isn't logically defensible.

No, that's not what I'm saying. This is a bit tricky, so bear with me. What I'm saying is that he has a "moral right" to resist it (i.e., that he is morally justified in resisting it), but that he does not have an individual right to resist it, because that would imply that his attacker must honor that right (which would mean that the attacker is no longer justified in attacking him.

Look at it this way: If a criminal initiates force against me unjustifiably, I not only have a moral right to defend myself; I have an individual right to do so, because his act of aggression isn't justified to begin with. You see, to say that a person has an individual right to take a particular action means that others must allow him to take that action -- that they aren't justified in interfering with it. So, if I have an individual right to defend myself against your attack, then you must not interfere with it, which means that you must stop attacking me, and moreover that you were not justified in attacking me in the first place. So, if you were justified in attacking me, because your life depended on it, then it would follow that, while I have a moral right to defend myself against your attack, I do not have an individual right to do so, for if I did, then you would not be justified in attacking me. I hope that's clear.

You said, "In a genuine conflict of interest in which the moral agents' lives are at stake, it is in the self-interest of each party to try to survive at the expense of the other." This doesn't address individual rights. It doesn't explain why individual rights disappear.

Hopefully, my previous discussion provides the explanation. They "disappear" (i.e., do not apply in that situation), because each party is justified in interfering with the other's freedom, which means that neither party, therefore, has a right against such an interference, for if he did, then the interference would not be justified.

I maintain that an individual is faced with choosing to survive at the expense of violating the rights of an innocent person.

Not violating their rights; violating (or interfering with) their freedom.

They can't have their cake and eat it too. I face a conflict of interest every day. I can choose to take something that doesn't belong to me because it will enrich me, but if I do, I will be in the wrong. It isn't in my self-interest to live as a thief.

I agree, because you can survive quite well without such thievery.

This is the difference between survival at any price and living as a man should live.

Well, it's not survival at any price, if having survived, one can then return to a satisfactory life in a relatively free society. The term "survival at any price" refers to survival at the price of one's freedom. Obviously, one's freedom is worth fighting to protect, if the alternative is to live as a slave.

- Bill

Post 83

Monday, March 30, 2009 - 7:38am

Bill and Joe,
Thanks for a breath of fresh air.
Glenn

Post 84

Monday, March 30, 2009 - 4:29pm

Joe, Bill,

I'm working on my response and it will take a bit of time. Thanks.

Steve

Post 85

Tuesday, March 31, 2009 - 10:04pm

Bill,

We have argued before on the justifiability of offing innocents to preserve one�s life. To start with a point of agreement, let me give an example that I could go along with: If a gunman is shooting at my innocent self with innocents kept around him by force, and my position stinks so that I am a sure goner (I can neither retreat nor make well-placed shots,) then I am going to open fire toward him even if I know I am less likely to hit him than the innocents. I know you would agree.

You have written that it is right, in an emergency, to value your own life higher than another�s and to act appropriately. You quoted Prof. Smith saying that �your life� includes your limbs, etc. So, what if your leg, but not your whole life were on the line? As I understand you and Joe, it would be justifiable to sacrifice innocent life for the sake of one�s leg. Do you agree? How many innocent lives per leg? Does the number matter�so that if one is justified than so are one million? What about fingers instead of legs?

I can�t see a way around falling into subjectivity with your conception of rights: I may be sedentary and therefore unmotivated to sacrifice any lives to preserve my leg, you may be of such a disposition that life without a leg is worse than death and as a result you would be willing to sacrifice several lives, while yet another person may so value their legs they would readily sacrifice any number of lives. The right to life of our hapless victims will obtain or not depending upon which of us is seated next to them when disaster strikes.

If you respond to only one point, please make it this following. I have brought it up before and no one seems very interested in responding to it.

Why can�t we experiment on babies (if you think we cannot, justifiably)?

Say I open a lab. I offer $10,000 per newborn. Parents come in and both sign a contract. They get the $ and I get the baby and a waiver against whatever. I know, I know, it�s a violation of the baby�s right to life. But is it!? As you and Joe would have it, the baby�s �right to life� is a question hinging upon the value that you, and I and everyone else who votes places upon that baby�s life. You hold that �X has a right� is just shorthand for �it is in my self-interest to refrain from violating X. And when it isn�t in my interest to so refrain, then X has no right.�

Imagine the benefits. Decades of research and years of trials shortened by the introduction of test subjects of the relevant specie. Anti-cancer efficacy tests. Organ harvesting. Arthritis cures.

A predictable objection at this point: �People will learn what a despicable brute you are and they will hurt you, so it can�t be in your self-interest as it will surely get you killed.�

This objection will not wash, however. No one would attempt to argue with a straight face that Exxon would be immoral to dig for oil in the Amazon because the natives will surely attack and kill and whatever gets you attacked and killed cannot be in your self-interest and therefore cannot be moral. No, they would say that the natives have no right to attack and kill and their inclination to do so has no bearing at all on the question of the morality of the activity that inflames them.

Joe wrote about the costs vs. the benefits. He said that rights obtain because and only because it is in one�s self-interest to respect them and that when it isn�t, they don�t. What is the cost to finally allowing my baby lab? A potential trading partner is eliminated? No. Millions of abortions are performed every year. The baby lab would simply incent thousands to carry full term and get the $10K instead of aborting, that�s all. I never would have had those trading partners anyway. And thousands from millions is one tenth of one percent.

I anticipate one response: There�s no emergency, so no, I can�t open my baby lab. But that won�t wash either, because your conception of rights and their applicability does not hinge on emergencies. Instead, you and Joe hold that rights are, in all contexts, about a cost-benefit to the actor. I could make a good life for myself from my lab (big benefits, low costs) and so, as your conception of rights would have it, the unwanted and purchased babies don�t have any rights against me in a normal or any other context.

Without resorting to any intuitive safe grounds, but sticking with your conception of rights, isn�t my baby lab moral?

Post 86

Tuesday, March 31, 2009 - 11:03pm

Well put, Jon.

Wednesday, April 1, 2009 - 1:16am

Jon wrote,

You have written that it is right, in an emergency, to value your own life higher than another�s and to act appropriately. You quoted Prof. Smith saying that �your life� includes your limbs, etc. So, what if your leg, but not your whole life were on the line? As I understand you and Joe, it would be justifiable to sacrifice innocent life for the sake of one�s leg. Do you agree? How many innocent lives per leg? Does the number matter�so that if one is justified than so are one million? What about fingers instead of legs?

A finger is not a limb. Smith was referring to major dimensions of a person's life, like his eyesight or his limbs. I doubt she would include a finger. You ask whether it is justified to sacrifice a million people to save your own life or limbs. Remember, we are talking about an emergency here, which is a temporary condition distinguished by a sudden, unexpected event that demands immediate action. What emergency did you have in mind that would require the sacrifice of a million people just to save your own life or limbs?

If you respond to only one point, please make it this following. I have brought it up before and no one seems very interested in responding to it.

Why can�t we experiment on babies (if you think we cannot, justifiably)?

Say I open a lab. I offer $10,000 per newborn. Parents come in and both sign a contract. They get the $ and I get the baby and a waiver against whatever. I know, I know, it�s a violation of the baby�s right to life. But is it!? As you and Joe would have it, the baby�s �right to life� is a question hinging upon the value that you, and I and everyone else who votes places upon that baby�s life. You hold that �X has a right� is just shorthand for �it is in my self-interest to refrain from violating X. And when it isn�t in my interest to so refrain, then X has no right.�

Imagine the benefits. Decades of research and years of trials shortened by the introduction of test subjects of the relevant specie. Anti-cancer efficacy tests. Organ harvesting. Arthritis cures.
. . . .
I anticipate one response: There�s no emergency, so no, I can�t open my baby lab. But that won�t wash either, because your conception of rights and their applicability does not hinge on emergencies. Instead, you and Joe hold that rights are, in all contexts, about a cost-benefit to the actor. I could make a good life for myself from my lab (big benefits, low costs) and so, as your conception of rights would have it, the unwanted and purchased babies don�t have any rights against me in a normal or any other context.

Without resorting to any intuitive safe grounds, but sticking with your conception of rights, isn�t my baby lab moral?

Ask yourself why respect for individual rights (within a normal social context) is to our benefit in the first place. The answer is that it's to our benefit to have our own rights respected. We can't demand that others respect our rights, if we're not willing to respect the rights of others.

But in a life-threatening emergency in which a person will die or suffer serious irreparable harm unless he violates that principle, the benefits of adhering to it are outweighed by the benefits of violating it. What do you have to gain by adhering to a principle of rights, when death or a miserable life is the result? The principle is worth adhering to only as a way of life where life is worth living. If the price to be paid for respecting other people's rights is death or a life that isn't worth living, then the price is too high. The purpose of moral principles, after all, is to enable you to achieve your values. When a moral principle doesn't serve that purpose, then it is no longer worth adhering to.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 4/01, 1:19am)

Post 88

Wednesday, April 1, 2009 - 8:47am

Bill,

Can�t you imagine a man for whom a finger is a major dimension of life? Such as a concert pianist? Of course you could.

You�re not trying. I don�t need to give you another a scenario where more than one person would have to be sacrificed. If you wanted to answer the questions, you could and would do so. If one swimmer tossed into the shark�s mouth is justified, then how about all twenty of your fellow swimmers? The gist of the question is no big challenge. Your balking can only mean you don�t intend to answer.

Same for the baby lab. I pleaded with you to address it and you haven�t, unless �We can't demand that others respect our rights, if we're not willing to respect the rights of others� is your response. But I know that you know that babies cannot disrespect my rights, so the reciprocal argument fails utterly.

I don�t plan on reading any further responses from you on this topic.

If Bill engages genuinely, someone let me know and I will take a look.

Post 89

Wednesday, April 1, 2009 - 2:46pm

I would like to register the fact that I agree with Jon here -- but that I'll keep reading Bill to see if he more-directly engages the offered, baby-lab conundrum.

Ed

Post 90

Wednesday, April 1, 2009 - 4:53pm

For what it's worth, there's a difference between whether a right exists versus whether a right should be respected. If a right is not worthy of respect, then don't respect it -- that's nearly tautological. And if the moral agent's self-interest is diminished by respecting that right, then the moral agent should not respect that right -- that's nearly tautological, too. This might happen during emergency situations. It might happen elsewhere.

Jordan

Post 91

Wednesday, April 1, 2009 - 5:22pm

Jordan,

Bill�s approach doesn�t require making any distinction between exists and should be respected. Joe explained Bill�s approach above very well. Bill says that when it needn�t be respected, it doesn�t exist. (I don�t happen to have any great explanation for why I would start shooting in the shoot-out scenario I gave. I suppose I would say the innocents� right to life is still what it always was, and has been violated, not be myself when I shoot them while trying to shoot the gunman shooting at me, but violated by the gunman.) My thinking as of today is that one is justified in sacrificing others only when that �real� violator can be identified, because otherwise, guess who the �real violator� is?

Post 92

Wednesday, April 1, 2009 - 6:54pm

Jon wrote,

Can�t you imagine a man for whom a finger is a major dimension of life? Such as a concert pianist? Of course you could.

Okay. Good point, Jon. I can certainly imagine a concert pianist who was captured and told that if he doesn't kill another human being, they will cut off his fingers. If he had good reason to believe them, it would be difficult to fault him for complying with the threat.

You�re not trying. I don�t need to give you another a scenario where more than one person would have to be sacrificed. If one swimmer tossed into the shark�s mouth is justified, then how about all twenty of your fellow swimmers? The gist of the question is no big challenge. Your balking can only mean you don�t intend to answer.

I didn't mean to evade your question, and should have answered it directly. My apologies. I would say that if sacrificing all 20 were necessary to save your life, then you would be justified in doing it, if you felt you could live with the result. My view is that you would have a moral right, but not a moral obligation, to do it. That doesn't mean, however, that you couldn't be justifiably prosecuted for the murders (under extenuating circumstances, of course). I will say that the example is somewhat unrealistic, as I cannot conceive of a situation under which it would be necessary to feed all 20 of my fellow swimmers to a shark in order to save my own life.

Same for the baby lab. I pleaded with you to address it and you haven�t, unless �We can't demand that others respect our rights, if we're not willing to respect the rights of others� is your response. But I know that you know that babies cannot disrespect my rights, so the reciprocal argument fails utterly.

Well, if you're justified in violating the rights of the babies, then why aren't they justified in violating your rights when they grow up and are able to do so? And if babies are fair game, then why aren't older children and adults, who are themselves justified in making you fair game?

I don�t plan on reading any further responses from you on this topic.

Fair enough, Jon. I look forward to not hearing from you. ;-)

- Bill

Post 93

Wednesday, April 1, 2009 - 7:26pm

�I look forward to not hearing from you. ;-)�

This expression of your preference pretty well sealed your not getting your preference!

Thank you for the very direct answers on fingers and multiple sacrifices.

I am surprised at your lack of imagination regarding this: �Well, if you're justified in violating the rights of the babies, then why aren't they justified in violating your rights when they grow up and are able to do so? And if babies are fair game, then why aren't older children and adults, who are themselves justified in making you fair game?�

Do you really imagine that I would allow any of them to get anywhere near the age of understanding what was happening to them?

The answer to the second question should be clear. Older children and adults are CAPABLE of making me fair game, but I don�t intend to touch any of those.

If you meant that older children and adults other than my lab subjects could try to hurt me, I addressed that in post 85. You will find it a little past halfway, in the para where Exxon and the Amazon are mentioned.

The baby lab, according to your approach applied consistently, is moral.

Post 94

Wednesday, April 1, 2009 - 8:41pm

Jon,

Perhaps you can clarify your own view of morality. You seem to be arguing against self-interest as the standard of morality. You don't try to argue that it isn't in our interests to have a baby lab or to murder people to keep our fingers. It's not an argument, nor a rebuttal. It may be an emotional appeal, but that would only matter if emotions were the true test of morality. Is that your position?

The funny thing about morality is that you can't argue against a moral system by arguing its effects are negative. To describe the effects as negative, you have to evaluate them based on a moral standard. If you're using the moral standard of the system you're arguing against, it wouldn't be viewed as a negative. Only by resorting to an alternative moral standard can you even imply that it's negative.

Take for instance altruism. We could look at a man who gives up all of his possessions to help the poor starving children in Africa. We could see him giving up his own happiness and being forced to live a significantly more miserable life because of it. But an altruist will judge the actions and outcome by an altruistic standard. We might think it is bad, by our own standard, but by the altruist's standards it is optimal.

Your scenarios are always an attempt to introduce a different standard to evaluate it. If the outcome really is in the best interest of the person, then highlighting the result doesn't do anything. Yes, it's terrible that the piano player had to kill 20 people in order to keep his fingers. But the alternative was worse by the standard of self-interest, you're not really showing that the decision was wrong. Note that this judgment can be argued even by the standard of self-interest, but that's not your goal and if it was argued, you look for another example.

So what is the moral standard that you are trying to introduce? And why do you think it trumps self-interest?

The way I see it, there are a few choices for how people reject self-interest here.

First, there's the approach of formulating moral rules in one context and applying them in others even though they don't apply. This is a popular way of viewing morality. Traditionally, morality is a set of rules we must always obey. When the rules conflict with our lives or self-interest, the rules must win. Morality is something we serve, instead of serving us. A moral life is a life of sacrifice. This same approach is often applied to Objectivism. Objectivism is seen as a better set of rules.

The problem with this approach is if the standard of morality is really life, then how can it justify creating rules and demanding that we practice them even when it conflicts with life? Life stops being the standard once you create the rules. And rules act like intrinsic values, where there's no longer a way to measure the importance of them or the relative priority of them if they conflict. Life is at best a rationalization for these rules, since they exist regardless of their relationship to life.

A different approach is to try to change the moral standard to something else. Like "flourishing" or "life qua man". In particular, these phrases are used to add other (intrinsic) values into the standard. Someone might claim that "flourishing" must include being honest at all times, or that "life qua man" means that you always obey the law. You can add anything you want to these. You can say that smoking cigarettes is part of flourishing, or that sex with many partners is life qua man.

Real values don't need to be added to the moral standard. They're derived from it. If we just look at survival, we can recognize that food is needed, but so is the ability to produce value to trade for food. Knowledge improves our survival capability. So does entertainment. And romance. And art. And fine foods. And wealth. And integrity. And the list goes on. We can show how these things improve our survival capability, for instance. We can see how each of these things improves our capability to survive (survival as a standard does not mean aiming at bare survival...it means measuring values by whether they make our survival more likely or less likely).

So if real values don't need to be lumped into the moral standard, we're left with other things we happen to want and wish were moral. Wishing that it was moral to never violate the rights of another, even in an emergency situation, is one possible example. So instead of showing how this is derived from life or survival, we can just say "oh...that's part of life qua man". Anything is moral if you feel strongly enough about it. You can even make altruism moral by saying that life qua man means sacrificing for others. Anything goes!

A last approach used to vary from self-interest is to argue by emotional appeal. You can construct scenarios that feel offensive. But arguing by emotional appeal doesn't show that a position is right or wrong. Most likely, the emotions are based on altruistic notions of morality. Even if they are based on self-interested morality, it's likely the emotions are responses to normal contexts. You might feel that killing someone is always unnecessary and wrong, because it usually is. But applying those emotions to these bizarre circumstances doesn't prove anything except that emotions are not tools of cognition.

So instead of offering more insane scenarios, perhaps you can explain what your moral standard is that trumps self-interest. I'd be happy to hear you try to defend it explicitly.

One other small question. For kicks, I was thinking of reversing the burden on one of your scenarios. The piano player has to kill a thousand people to save his finger. But what happens if it's the other way around? The thousand people, in order to live, must cut of the piano players finger. Are they justified in violating his rights? What if it were a million?

Post 95

Wednesday, April 1, 2009 - 10:21pm

After declaring, "I don�t plan on reading any further responses from you on this topic," Jon Letendre immediately read my further response, and replied to it. Jon, I love your sense of resolve. It shows such character.

I am surprised at your lack of imagination regarding this: �Well, if you're justified in violating the rights of the babies, then why aren't they justified in violating your rights when they grow up and are able to do so? And if babies are fair game, then why aren't older children and adults, who are themselves justified in making you fair game?�

Do you really imagine that I would allow any of them to get anywhere near the age of understanding what was happening to them?

You're not grasping the argument. It isn't that you'd incur their wrath and make yourself an object of retaliation once they grew up. The argument is that, based on your morality, any baby (who reaches maturity) and anyone else would be justified in sacrificing you for personal gain if he or she could get away with it. Why?

Because once you grant that sacrificing another rights-bearing person is morally justified if it suits your purposes, you've conceded that you're justified in sacrificing anyone if it suits your purposes, in which case, the principle of sacrificing others to oneself wouldn't apply just to you (unless, of course, you believe in double standards). It would apply to others as well, in which case, you would then become a legitimate target of their sacrificial exploits.

You can't properly discriminate against a particular class of rights-bearing persons (e.g., babies) in the way that you're suggesting, because the discrimination is arbitrary. If you were justified in discriminating against babies, you'd be justified in discriminating just as well against any other group of rights-bearing persons (e.g., pre-teens, teens, handicapped, blacks, Asians, etc.).

Individual rights are necessarily equal and universal. In a normal social context, they deserve to be respected without exception.

- Bill

Post 96

Thursday, April 2, 2009 - 8:50am

Bill,

�Jon, I love your sense of resolve. It shows such character.�

Why are you even mentioning my character? You responded in the way I asked and I reacted appropriately. If you hadn�t, I wouldn�t have. What�s the problem?

It is you who is failing to grasp my argument. The rights status of unwanted and purchased babies is precisely what is at issue. You cannot introduce their having rights into the argument.

My contention is that your approach, applied consistently, leads to the conclusion that the lab subjects do not have rights. I am not saying that your approach allows for violating the lab subjects� rights, but that your approach implies they don�t have any rights from the start.

If you wish to say the lab subjects have rights, then you have to show that your approach to rights supports that conclusion. I have shown that your approach does not support that conclusion, but rather it supports the conclusion that they have no rights and therefore the lab is moral.

Do you see that your entire last post is moot? No one has the right to interfere with the activities at the baby lab, if the lab subjects don�t have rights. If you want to say that some stranger has the right to hurt me, you first have to show that the lab subjects have rights, and you have to stick with your approach in reaching that conclusion.

�It would apply to others as well, in which case, you would then become a legitimate target of their sacrificial exploits.�

No, I wouldn�t. Bill, if someone suggested that organ harvesting from aborted fetuses is moral, would you entertain for a moment the notion that it can�t be moral because logical consistency requires that if abusing fetuses is OK, then adults are also justified is abusing me? They are NOT so justified, unless fetuses have rights. Same for our debate.

Post 97

Thursday, April 2, 2009 - 9:02am

Joe,

You and Bill have a well thought-out approach to rights. In the spirit of intellectual exploration, I have noted that your approach implies the morality of the baby lab. If I am correct about that, just say so. If I am not correct, then show me how.

But it won�t do at all to dodge the whole affair by trying to put it back on me to show how my way is better. My way has nothing to do with the tough issues that your approach presents. You have to grapple with those, not me.

Post 98

Thursday, April 2, 2009 - 12:10pm

Hey Bill,

Jon said:

Bill�s approach doesn�t require making any distinction between exists and should be respected.

Is that true?

Jordan

Post 99

Thursday, April 2, 2009 - 12:37pm