| | Ellen wrote, Do you see no inconsistency between claiming on the one hand (and using Dennett's way of expressing this) that "consciousness is what the brain does" and on the other hand that there is an "I" which "acts"? No more so than claiming that thinking is what the brain does and that it is I who thinks. There is no dichotomy between mental activity and brain activity. I engage in mental activity through brain activity. This is not epiphenomenalism; thoughts are not simply a byproduct of brain activity; they are brain activity--brain activity that I engage in. The mind does not exist apart from the brain, nor does it act independently of the brain. Suppose I said that running is leg activity, and that I engage in running by moving my legs in a certain manner. To say this is not to say that my legs do it instead of me; it is only to say that my legs are that part of the body that performs that particular activity. ("The entity that performs *my* thoughts is who? It is *I*," you say, but on the other hand: "Consciousness [...] is simply the subjective manifestation of (a certain part of) the brain's activity.") Yes, consciousness is a manifestation of (a certain part) of the brain's activity, but that is not inconsistent with saying that a person engages in the activity.
- Bill
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