The Mind-Body Problem

In Post 6 under the thread "Are certain things knowable," Michael Kelly wrote, "To be fair to Nathaniel Branden, however, you cited a 1963 essay. Here is a quote from his 1997 book, The Art of Living Consciously:

Metaphysically, mind and matter are different. But if they are different in every respect, the problem of explaining their interaction seems insuperable. How can mind influence matter and matter influence mind if they have absolutely nothing in common? And yet, that such reciprocal influence exists seems inescapable...

Without going into details, I will suggest a possible way out. There is nothing inherently illogical—nothing that contradicts the rest of our knowledge—in positing some underlying reality of which both matter and consciousness are manifestations. The advantage of such a hypothesis is that it provides a means to resolve a problem that has troubled philosophers for centuries—”the mind-body problem,” the problem of accounting for the interaction of consciousness and physical reality. If they have a common source, then they do have a point of commonality that makes their ability to interact less puzzling. How we would test this hypothesis, or provide justification for it, is another question.' (Branden 1991, 201-2)

You then commented, "I do not yet have this book. I obtained this quote from an online essay by Diana Hsieh written in 2003 called "Mind in Objectivism, A Survey of Objectivist Commentary on Philosophy of Mind." This explains the "1991" reference at the end. I believe it is a mistake, but I am not able to check to see what she meant yet."

You are correct, Michael. Diana got the year wrong. I have Branden's book, and the copyright is 1997.

You continue, "Obviously Ms. Hsieh thinks this speculation is rubbish (although she doesn't outright say it), given her anti-Branden stance, calling it protopanpsychism and citing a complete lack of evidence for it. She calls the difficulty of establishing such evidence as 'deeply problematic' and she is worried that it 'is merely (property) dualism with an account of mental causation tacked on.'"

I agree with Diana. I don't think Branden's new philosophical views are an improvement over his old ones, even if they do reflect a certain independence from Objectivist orthodoxy! Branden says that this "underlying reality of which both matter and consciousness are manifestations" is something that Rand called "little stuff." It is curious that we never heard her voice that opinion publicly. The standard Objectivist view has always been that consciousness depends on matter--on physical organs of perception and cognition--not that it can exist independently of consciousness as a manifestation of an underlying reality.

One of the biggest problems that I see with Branden's current view is that he posits mind and matter as two separate substances that interact with each other. Hence, the dualism that Diana is referring to. To recognize that consciousness is simply a subjective manifestation of the brain's activity is to reject this kind of mind-body (or mind-brain) dualism. There is no more "interaction" between the mind and the brain than there is between vision and the eyes, or between hearing and the ears; nor could there be, as this would imply that the mind exists independently of the brain, which would, in turn, imply that cognition can take place without any brain or sensory receptors, i.e., without any physical means or method of cognition. The only way that you can have an "interaction" between two things is if they exist independently of each other. You wouldn't say that there is an interaction between the stomach and digestion, for example, because digestion depends on the stomach. Therefore, it should not be surprising, given Branden's view, that he believes in anomalous perception--perception without any observable sense organ(s) to mediate it.

The so-called "mind-body" problem for which Branden posits his "underlying reality" as a solution is only a problem if you accept the false premise that the mind "interacts" with the body (i.e., with the brain). Then you have a problem explaining how this interaction can take place. You can only satisfactorily solve this alleged problem if you check your "interactionist" premise at the door! Consciousness is simply a manifestation of brain activity. That doesn't mean, however, that mind is not efficacious or that mental activity is simply an epiphenomenon of brain activity, which is the conclusion that dualists are prone to draw from this analysis. To say that consciousness is a manifestation of brain activity does not imply that we don't control our mind's activity. Since the mind and the brain are one, to control one's mind is to control one's brain and vice-versa. Mental activity is simply brain activity experienced from an internal, rather than an external perspective.

Perhaps an analogy will help. Because of its appearance in both the morning and evening skies at different times of the year, the Greeks thought the planet Venus was two separate objects, which they named Hesperus and Phosphorus. Eventually, of course, it was discovered that Hesperus ("the morning star") and Phosphorus ("the evening star") were the same celestial body seen at different times and from different perspectives.

Just as "the morning star" (visible in the eastern sky before sunrise) and "the evening star" (visible in the western sky at sunset) are not two different planets, but the same planet identified from two different perspectives, so the mind (identified introspectively) and the brain (identified extrospectively) are not two different organs, but the same organ identified from two different perspectives.

Moreover, just as one can refer to Venus in the morning sky, as "the morning star," while recognizing that it is the same planet that's visible in the evening sky, so one can refer to (a certain part of) the active brain as "the mind," while recognizing that it is the same organ that's visible to the surgeon when he does a craniotomy.

Another analogy which may be helpful is the atmospheric discharge of electricity, which we see as lightening. Thunder was not recognized as lightening, until scientists discovered that it simply is the atmospheric discharge as reflected by the generation of sound waves, which travel slower than light. Today, lightening and thunder are recognized as the same electrical phenomenon identified by different means or from different perspectives.

It is true that one cannot know, simply by looking at a certain part of the active brain (externally), that it is the organ that performs mental activity, just as one cannot know by engaging in mental activity that a certain part of the active brain is the organ performing it. Further study is needed to make the connection, just as further study was needed to make the connection between the morning star and the evening star, or between lightening and thunder. But once having made that connection, it is folly to deny it on the grounds that the brain's activity appears different from a subjective perspective than it does from an objective one.

Since mental causation is simultaneously brain causation and brain causation is a physical process, it follows that mental causation is a physical process. Whereas not all physical activity is mental, all mental activity is nevertheless physical, because it is performed by the brain, which is a physical organ. It may be objected that mental activity cannot properly be characterized as physical, because it is understood in contradistinction to the physical. But if one recognizes that mental activity is simply brain activity experienced internally by its subject (rather than by an external observer, e.g., a surgeon performing a craniotomy), one will grasp that this is false dichotomy. The fact that we commonly characterize the physical and the mental in contradistinction to one another reflects our failure to grasp that mental activity is simply brain activity experienced subjectively.

I believe that this mind-body analysis is far and away superior to the one that Branden presents in his book The Art of Living Consciously, since the latter requires the positing of an underlying reality or substratum for which we have absolutely no evidence.

Comments welcome!

- Bill

Post 1

Wednesday, December 7, 2005 - 9:41pm

Bill,

I had a HUGE argument with a person who left SoloHQ about this. This person was positing a "non-physical" existence. This is something that I can only understand as existence that cannot be perceived by any sense organ whatsoever (now existing or possible to be developed).

My view and yours are very similar. I even think that eventually it will be possible to identify the physical form of a concept or memory.

It is fully evident that when a brain dies, the mind within it dies. Also, many regions of the brain have been mapped in terms of mental functioning. That makes the connection pretty conclusive.

One thing you must remember with Branden is that he did use the word "hypothesis," and not even "theory."

My own idea that you and I discussed, that of aspects of reality existing for which we have no sense organ to detect, is more or less what I take to be Branden's "underlying reality."

Evidence is a problem (and it certainly would be if we cannot perceive it), but then again, it is always a problem for hypotheses. That is why they are hypotheses and not facts.

Michael

Post 2

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 12:57am

I'm glad Bill has started this thread. He and I have some history on this issue with Nathaniel Branden. Back in 1997 on the Objectivism-L list, there was a similar discussion of Branden's book The Art of Living Consciously. Ken Barnes kicked off the discussion on September 13 with some brief remarks under the heading "An Underlying Reality." Ken wrote:

...beginning on page 200 Branden gets into a discussion of the ultimate 'stuff' of reality. Briefly, the mystical traditions conclude that this ultimate 'stuff' is consciousness or mind. On the other hand, materialists say that all that exists is matter and its motions, and that all phenomena of consciousness can ultimately be reduced to these motions. To reconcile these positions Branden posits an underlying reality of which both matter and consciousness are manifestations.

Then he quoted the passage Bill also quoted in his post here on RoR.

I was intrigued and posted the following comments on September 17:

I've read this excerpt several times already, and each time I do, I can't
help but note how it smacks of the Lockean conception of a "substance"
(entity) that is like a metaphysical pin-cushion, into which its various
attributes are stuck like pins. But we don't know the pin-cushion, only
the pins! The "manifestations." Of course, Branden and any other
Objectivists that go this route, might reply: oh, but its "manifestations"
are how we know the "underlying reality."

Maybe so, though I suspect that this is an opening big enough for
Kant to drive a Mack truck through. :-) Anyway, the main problem
I have with this view is that it doesn't really solve the problem of the
supposed "interaction" of consciousness and matter. As I have
relentlessly harped over the years, consciousness does not have
causal efficacy--but neither does matter! They are just attributes of
entities, by virtue of which entities have causal efficacy.

It is entities and their parts--which are characterized by material and/or
conscious attributes--that interact, not the attributes. If you like, an
entity's attributes may be regarded as being the causal efficacies
of the entity. But they do not themselves have causal efficacy.
The entity, by virtue of having them, has causal efficacies of various
kinds. So, it is reification of the most misleading kind to regard matter
and consciousness as doing things.

Some Objectivists (I think Rick Minto is working in this direction, but
this is third-hand information, and he is welcome to clarify or object)
want to talk about processes interacting, and since consciousness is
regarded as a process, why not allow for interaction between conscious
processes and non-conscious material processes? We should not
be scared about "process-talk" in discussions of causality. Fine, so
long as we acknowledge that what is really interacting is a part
of the brain that is engaging in a conscious process (along with other,
physical processes, I would maintain)--interacting with a part of the
brain that is engaging in non-conscious physical processes only.
Otherwise, we are reifying--attributes or actions, it doesn't matter.
It is an inductively graspable fact that all entities (so far!) are physical
in nature, and some entities are also conscious in nature, and that
the existence of consciousness is dependent upon the existence of
matter. This doesn't mean that consciousness is matter, however.
So, there is a dualism of attributes. But this is actually irrelevant
to the causality involved.

What is interacting causally is one part of the brain with another.
And just as a living physical entity can interact with a non-living
physical entity, but only by virtue of the physical attributes (matter)
they both possess, so too can a conscious physical entity (or
part) interact with a non-conscious physical entity (or part), but only
by virtue of the physical attributes they both possess. Since it is
always physical entities (or parts) that are interacting, it seems
clear to me that any causal efficacy we attribute to consciousness
is piggybacked on the causal efficacy we attribute to matter--and
that it properly belongs to the entities, in any case!

So, from this, I hope it's clear why I think Branden's quasi-Leibnitzian
view doesn't really explain anything. "Manifestations of an underlying
reality" do not interact. It's not how entities manifest themselves to
us that interacts, but the entities themselves (and their parts) that
do so. The alternative is to abandon the hard-won understanding gained
from the Aristotelian/Randian view that actions are caused by entities,
and thus that interactions are caused by (i.e., between) entities.
They indeed are caused by virtue of various attributes they have,
but the attributes themselves are not the causes or the interactors.
Aristotle, Rand, etc., framed their categories such that the prime foci of
change are entities, and that attributes and actions (or properties and
processes) are to be understood as of entities, and that causality
is the (internal) relation between an entity and its actions. If this is
truly metaphysically basic stuff, then no empirical observations can
overturn it. On the other hand, if there can be processes and causal
relations between events with no entities in evidence, then gee, I guess
Aristotle and Rand are wrong, and that we can go with Hume in talking
about events causing each other.

Assuming, then, that this is an open question, OK, what I have written
is hypothetical and up for grabs. (Hmmm--conditional metaphysics!)
But what I most want to drive home to Objectivists is the full implication
of the stand they are taking with Rand and Aristotle on the Categories
and the nature of causality. If this stance is ontologically solid, then
talk of mind-body interaction and "causal efficacy of mind" is nonsense!
Or, as Gilbert Ryle would have said, category mistakes.

Branden, whose work I admire very much, seems not to have sorted
out the implications of and conflicts between the concepts he wrote
about in The Psychology of Self-Esteem. He, more than
anyone else, taught me the hard-headed Aristotelian-Randian approach
to understanding action and causality as entity-based. Now he does
a "180" and talks of "manifestations" interacting with each other. Huh???

Dr. Branden replied to me briefly on September 18:

For your information, whatever this may be worth (not much), the view I
conveyed re "manifestations" is one that Rand found quite plausible
when I presented it to her. I grant my presentation in the book was
much too brief to adequately convey what I had in mind.

Probably what Branden was groping toward was not some kind of "proto-panpsychism" (as Diana Hsieh opined, in her characteristically over-the-top tendency to put the worst possible negative interpretation on Branden's writings), but instead a way to express what is usually referred to as the dual-aspect theory or dual-perspective theory of the mind-body relation. Kelley wrote about this in the first chapter of The Evidence of the Senses, and some time earlier, I gave a paper eventually published in 1974 in Reason Papers #1, called "A Dual-Aspect Solution to the Mind-Body Problem." Whether you call them "aspects" or "manifestations" or "forms of awareness," though, what is clear is that they are not different things, but the same thing--the conscious, living organism--as we are aware of it in different ways.

In any case, Branden's comments in The Art of Living Consciously did not, in my opinion, represent progress in our understanding of the mind-body problem. It was as if he were saying, "Well, since I believe in the 'causal efficacy of mind,' I will abandon my idea that actions are generated by entities and instead say that they can be generated by capacities or 'manifestations.'" There may be a place for "fuzzy logic," but fuzzy metaphysics???

[Bill Dwyer also posted to Objectivism-L on this topic (with comments very similar to what he has posted here) and received a reply from Dr. Branden, to which I responded at some length. That sequence of events is chronicled in my next post.]

REB

Post 3

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 1:00am

Bill, you wrote:

"Mental activity is simply brain activity experienced from
an internal, rather than an external perspective."

That's classic dual-aspect theory -- i.e., the theory of
a Janus-faced something which is seen as material
from one persective and as mental from the other.
Although Branden's comments are ambiguous, since
he speaks of an "ability to interact," as best I can
interpret the passage quoted from The Art of Living
Consciously, its thrust is also dual-aspect; vide, his
description:

"...some underlying reality of which both matter
and consciousness are manifestations."

Ellen

Post 4

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 1:29am

On September 25, 1997, Bill Dwyer posted comments on Nathaniel Branden's "underlying reality" view to Objectivism-L. His comments were similar in content to what he posted here in this thread. Later that day, he received the following brief reply from Branden:

You would do well to educate yourself concerning the many philosophical
criticisms that have been made against the "double=aspect" theory that
you propose. Rand shared my view, as epxressed in the brief passage in
"Living Consciously," and she called that "underlying reality" by the
name of "little stuff." We did not share the implicit materialist bias
that seems implicit in your remarks. We regarded consciousness as
radically different from matter. The problem is not solved by calling
consciousness "an attribute of matter." For more on this, see chapter
1 of "The Psychology of Self-Esteem." You don't have to agree, of
course, but at least you ought to understand that the view you dismiss
as "nonsensical" was held by AR.

Bill shared this response with me, and the next day (September 26), I wrote the following:

Dr. Branden, what interests me most about this interchange is that not only William Dwyer and I, but also you and Ayn Rand hold some version or other of a "dual-aspect theory." And, ironically, the version of dual-aspect theory that held the most pitfalls, historically, was the kind espoused by you and Miss Rand....

Quoting Jerome Shaffer's article "Mind-Body Problem" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967):

DOUBLE ASPECT THEORIES. Some philosophers have held the view that the mental and the physical are simply different aspects of something that is itself neither mental nor physical. Spinoza is the most famous example. He held that man could be considered an extended, bodily thing and, equally well, a thinking thing, although neither characterization, nor even both taken together, exhausted the underlying substance [compare with your "underlying reality"].....

There are two crucial obscurities in the double-aspect theory. First, what is the underlying unity ["reality"] that admits of the various aspects? Spinoza called it "God or Nature"....Herbert Spencer, calling a spade a spade, referred to it simply as the Unknowable. [And Rand, as you report, had her own special term: "little stuff."] Contemporary philosophers suggest that the underlying unity is the "person." [P.F. Strawson attempted a definition: 'a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable to a single individual of a single type.' Individuals, 1959, p. 102. This is too circular to be of much help.]

The second obscurity in the double-aspect theory is that it is not clear what an 'aspect' is. [You use another term, "manifestation," which seems identical in meaning, if my Webster's unabridged dictionary is any judge.] The point of talking about different aspects...is to suggest that the differences are not intrinsic to the thing [in other words, as Rand frequently stated, that there is no mind-body dichotomy in reality!] but only exist in relation to human purposes, outlook, conceptual scheme, frame of reference, etc. This point is even reflected in Spinoza's definition of 'attribute' (for example, extension or thought) as 'that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance.' (Ethics I, Def. 4)"

Shaffer concludes this section with a very telling point, which seems to echo the point Dwyer and I and others have made regarding your and Rand's concept of an "Underlying Reality": "In general, double-aspect theories fail to improve our understanding of the mind-body relationship."

In general, I would agree. It certainly is true of the version that you and Rand maintained (entertained?). My own version simply sees matter and consciousness as attributes, viz., as capacities for different kinds of action–and that we are aware of these capacities and their activation through different channels of awareness (perception and introspection, respectively). And what they are attributes of is not some mysterious "underlying reality," but simply a conscious, living, material entity–i.e., a human being. Further, since they are capacities, not entities, there is no need to seek after a will-o-the-wisp explanation of how they interact. They do not, because they cannot; they are not the kinds of existents that interact....

Matter is generic, in the Aristotelian sense of capacity, and it is not right to think of it as a kind of stuff that can do things, apart from the entity that does things by virtue of that capacity. There are inanimate physical capacities of entities–"inanimate" being the most common understanding of "matter;"and there are animate physical capacities ("living matter"); and there are conscious physical capacities ("conscious matter"). Thus, as Aristotle defined "matter"–i.e., as potential (to do something)–it is obvious that any attribute, including consciousness, is material. Of course, he was contrasting matter not with spirit, but with form or actualization. And as various people including you and Rand have pointed out, what a thing is (its actuality/form) determines what it can do (its potential/matter). So, again, there is no need to wrack our brains trying to figure out how mind and matter interact, for they do no such thing. Instead, ...they are both matter–i.e., they are both potentials or capacities, by virtue of which various parts of one's physical body interact with one another (or with other entities).

Thus, there are two distinct senses in which one can appropriately have what you refer to as a "materialistic bias" in one's view of consciousness, without getting into the obvious pitfall of reductive materialism:

(1) one can view consciousness as part of the (Aristotelian) matter or potency of certain living organisms to engage in certain actions, and

(2) one can view consciousness as necessarily dependent upon physical matter, but not vice versa. I would like to think that this is a view that all Objectivists, including you (and Rand, if she were still alive) would be comfortable with.
I'll conclude by quoting Dwyer's last paragraph, which I think was very good, and then restate it in terms more compatible with what I've outlined above:

...Mind is the conscious awareness characteristic of certain entities, and matter is the physical capacity for action necessarily characteristic of any entity with conscious awareness. Thus, there can be matter without consciousness–i.e., material entities that are not conscious; but there cannot be consciousness without matter–i.e., conscious entities that are not material.) Any problem in explaining their "interaction" vanishes as soon as one recognizes that they are two aspects of the same entity–and that only the parts (i.e., its cells and organs and systems) of an entity interact, not its aspects. (The aspects of an entity include its attributes– whether its length or weight or density or other material characteristics, or its being percipient or being emotional or being evaluative or being conceptual or being imaginative or other conscious characteristics–and its actions and relationships.)
As I see it, you cannot escape the logic of causality being the relationship between an entity and its actions, something drilled home to me by you and Rand and Peikoff and Kelley and a number of others who were transmitting the Aristotelian view (as against the Humean event-event view). You cited "underlying reality," "little stuff," and interactions between "manifestations" as a model of mind-body held by Ayn Rand. But so is the above model of causality, which sees interactions as being between entities, not "manifestations" or attributes or processes or events or whatever. The two models seem to be incompatible, don't you think? If you can find a way to reconcile them, I'm all ears!

Dr. Branden graciously responded the same day:

I think you gave a very nice answer to my post. When I spoke of "matter" I did so in the contemporary not the Aristotelian sense. With the latter sense I have no argument. As to the rest, I used to think as you do–that mind depends for its existence on a physical body to which it is attached. ("Attached" is obviously a very imprecise term, but I'm in a hurry.) But in the last decade or so I've come across data that puts my own past assumption in question. I am no longer certain that brain activity exhausts the possibilities of mind activity. If mind really is, in some sense, "a separate entity" (Rand's terms)–if this is not merely a figure of speech–then its absolute dependence on a physical body is not axiomatic but becomes an empirical question. I wrestle with this a good deal. I am even willing to admit that sometimes the problem drives me nuts. But something is bothering me about even the "traditional" Objectivist take on all this. I apologize for not being clearer.

That concluded my correspondence with Dr. Branden on the matter. (Bill had some further correspondence with him later in the fall. I'll let him decide whether to share it here on RoR.) I then wrote to Bill, again that same day:

Branden is right that mind's dependence on a physical body is not axiomatic but instead an empirical matter. But jeez, if science hasn't by now adequately established that point–especially for an atheist who rejects the mind/body dichotomy!–when could it ever??

The "data" Branden refers to that supposedly puts this assumption of necessary mind-body connection in question is alleged instances of people having little or no cerebral cortex nonetheless walking out among the rest of us in society, with seemingly no easy way of distinguishing them from people with intact brains. (I believe the phrase he used at lunch with me and my wife several years ago was "a thin, almost microscopic layer of cortical cells.") I have yet to hear of anything remotely like this from anyone else. Sounds more like a thought-experiment than something real! If you know anything about it, or could find out, it would really help me in laying this (I think) pseudo-objection to rest.

As I recall, this particular point was never resolved (although there have been recent reports of single neurons being associated with a particular thought or memory). What Bill and I both came away from this phase of the discussion with was a sense of how odd it was that Branden would advocate the form of dual-aspect theory he did, while claiming to be familiar and in agreement with the criticisms of that theory.

REB

(Edited by Roger Bissell on 12/08, 1:33am)

(Edited by Roger Bissell on 12/08, 1:35am)

Post 5

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 2:31am

Oh, the "Mind-Body Problem" again...You seldom hear people talking about "The Software-Hardware Problem". Yet this is the same kind of two ways of looking at the same thing: from a low-level physical description (the nuts and bolts), and from a higher level of abstraction, in which you look at the structural aspects of the interaction between the hardware parts. The latter method gives us a better understanding, as it distills the functional aspects of the system which emerge from the bewildering amount of interacting gates, and it is those functional aspects that we're interested in and that we can grasp. But a microscopic, low-level description gives in fact the same information, it is only very hard to digest for us (try reading a binary dump for example). Finding the for us interesting information is somewhat like determining the eigenvalues of a big matrix to capture the important information in a few values from a large amount of data.

Therefore the so-called Mind-Body Problem is an imaginary problem, just as the Volition-Determinism Problem, that seems to baffle many Objectivists, is an imaginary problem. Both are caused by a persistent failure to understand the notion of describing a certain system at different levels of abstraction. Once you understand that, you'll see that there is really nothing mysterious about it.

Post 6

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 10:46am

"...some underlying reality of which both matter
and consciousness are manifestations."

It might be of interest that the idea of universal "stuff" was brought forward by William James in the 1900's.

Post 7

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 11:16am

I wrote, "Mental activity is simply brain activity experienced from an internal, rather than an external perspective."

Ellen replied,

That's classic dual-aspect theory -- i.e., the theory of a Janus-faced something which is seen as material from one perspective and as mental from the other. Although Branden's comments are ambiguous, since he speaks of an "ability to interact," as best I can interpret the passage quoted from The Art of Living Consciously, its thrust is also dual-aspect; vide, his description:

"...some underlying reality of which both matter and consciousness are manifestations."

You're right, Ellen; Branden's position is ambiguous, because how can matter and consciousness interact if they are simply manifestations of a third underlying reality? It makes no sense to say, for example, that the heat and light from a fire interact with each other; they are simply two manifestations of the same thing. I would not, however, characterize my position as "dual-aspect," at least in the way that Branden's position might be so characterized, in which both matter and consciousness are aspects or manifestations of some third, more fundamental substance. I don't view the mind and the brain as two aspects of a third substance, because the question then becomes: what is that third substance, to which the answer is: blank out! That is the problem with Branden's view: There is no evidence of a third substance or of an underlying reality.

As I see it, there is only one entity--the material brain, of which the mind is the form in which we are aware of it "subjectively," and its visual appearance, the form in which the surgeon is aware of it "objectively" when he does a craniotomy. Just as there is only one planet, Venus, viewed before sunrise in the eastern sky and at sunset in the western sky, so there is only one organ, the material brain, viewed subjectively by its owner and objectively by the surgeon. It is for this reason that I don't regard the mental and the material as two separate, mutually exclusive substances in the way that Branden does, thereby necessitating an explanation for their supposed "interaction." Nor do I view them as two manifestations of the same thing, in the way that heat and light are two manifestations of fire, since there is no evidence of an immaterial entity or substance. In my view, the mental is simply the subjective form in which we experience the material brain.

- Bill

Post 8

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 11:27am

Bill,

Your "subjective form of experience" needs a bit more defining. Especially what you mean by "subjective."

It sound an awful lot like other words for "mind." According to your premise, there would have to be a physical manifestation of such subjectivity that can be measured as some kind of element (maybe energy), otherwise it goes right back to the starting gate, but with other words.

Michael

Post 9

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 11:33am

Calypterx Splendens indicates that the idea of "levels of abstraction"
as applied to describing computer hardware versus software is the
same idea as "dual-aspect" theory. No, it's not. The "levels of
abstraction" idea is closer to what's called "supervenience,"
the idea that consciousness "emerges" as a phenomenon that
"supervenes" upon the interactions of the physical constituents
of the body.

Correctly to analogize "dual-aspect" theory to computer
functioning, one would have to say that the computer, from its
internal perspective, is experiencing what's seen from an
external perspective as electrical impulses. There are those,
prominently David Chalmers, who propose this idea. Chalmers
ends up, following the logic of his own views, with panpsychism.

Re the usage "levels of abstraction": Thus far I haven't
encountered anyone who thinks that this idea takes care of
the mind/body problem who addresses the problem of what
"abstraction" actually means in this usage. Is "abstracting"
a conceptual activity, or what? If yes, then you've already
included, have you not, the notion of consciousness as
something other than the physical? Thus, you have as a
hidden premise in your explication the pre-supposed reality
of the very consciousness which you're saying is explained
by calling it a "level of abstraction."

Ellen

Post 10

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 12:04pm

Bill wrote:

"As I see it, there is only one entity--the material brain, of which
the mind is the form in which we are aware of it 'subjectively,'
and its visual appearance, the form in which the surgeon is aware
of it 'objectively' when he does a craniotomy."

And what is this being "aware," this subjective experiencing
(see a quote below), of which you speak, Bill? Is the
awareness identical to the motion of microparticles? Or what?

Re your analogy of Venus as morning and evening star:
That's an inaccuarate analogy that I wish you would drop,
since it isn't helpful to precision. *Both* the perspective
on Venus as morning star and as evening star are
seeing an object external to us, viewed "objectively"
as you're using "objectively" here.

Re your comment:

"Nor do I view them as two manifestations of the same thing,
in the way that heat and light are two manifestations of fire,
since there is no evidence of an immaterial entity or substance."

Why do you load the nature of the hypothesized --
in dual-aspect theory -- underlying substance by
describing it as "immaterial"? The underlying substance
per such a theory would have to be something that produces
on the one hand a materially measurable aspect
and on the other an experiential but non-materially
measurable aspect.

Also, if you aren't proposing dual-aspect theory, then I'd
suggest not leaving yourself wide open to misinterpretation
by writing sentences such as:

"Mental activity is simply brain activity experienced
from an internal, rather than an external perspective."

Ellen

Post 11

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 12:59pm

Michael wrote,

Bill, Your "subjective form of experience" needs a bit more defining. Especially what you mean by "subjective."

I didn't use the phrase "subjective form of experience." Experience is, by definition, subjective; so, "subjective form of experience" would be redundant. What I said is that "the mental is simply the subjective form in which we experience the material brain. " In other words, the mind is the brain experienced in a certain form (introspectively rather than extrospectively).
You continued,

It sounds an awful lot like other words for "mind." According to your premise, there would have to be a physical manifestation of such subjectivity that can be measured as some kind of element (maybe energy), otherwise it goes right back to the starting gate, but with other words."

Of course, mental experience is sui generis; it's understood ostensively and cannot be defined in terms other than itself. So, yes, "subjective" or "introspective" are themselves mental concepts. But I don't see the problem with the idea that mind activity is brain activity observed introspectively (in contrast to a scientist's observation of it extrospectively on a computer screen, for example.) I don't know what you mean when you say "there would have to be a physical manifestation" of subjectivity or mind. The mind is itself physical; it is the physical brain's awareness of itself introspectively.

- Bill

Post 12

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 1:34pm

Bill,

I'm sorry, I don't get your meaning. Are you saying that there is a subjective form in which we experience something, but there is no subjective form of that experience? I am confused.

Also, the physical form of the mind I refer to is what can be measurable. For instance, how would you physically measure a concept? Or focus? Or anger? We can measure brain waves and things like that so far, but we have yet to measure what a word looks like inside a brain (at least I have not come across that yet).

I want to repeat, I believe that this physical measurable form of awareness exists. I also believe that it will be measured as a component of the brain. We merely have not charted those waters and arrived at the new world yet.

Michael

Post 13

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 3:16pm

Ellen:

Correctly to analogize "dual-aspect" theory to computer
functioning, one would have to say that the computer, from its
internal perspective, is experiencing what's seen from an
external perspective as electrical impulses. There are those,
prominently David Chalmers, who propose this idea. Chalmers
ends up, following the logic of his own views, with panpsychism

AI still has a long way to go, so today's computers don't "experience" in the same way as human beings experience the functioning of their brain. You'd probably better compare it to the "experiencing" by an insect for example. Just like an insect a computer can't reflect on its own thoughts, it has no self-awareness (yet). Consciousness comes in many forms, from the most sophisticated like human consciousness to such rudimentary forms of consciousness in primitive animals that most people wouldn't use the term consciousness at all. But the division is arbitrary, there is a gliding scale from quite primitive to highly sophisticated. To attribute consciousness to inanimate matter is meaningless however, as inanimate matter can't have a purpose, so panpsychism is nonsense.

Is "abstracting"
a conceptual activity, or what? If yes, then you've already
included, have you not, the notion of consciousness as
something other than the physical? Thus, you have as a
hidden premise in your explication the pre-supposed reality
of the very consciousness which you're saying is explained
by calling it a "level of abstraction."

I don't understand this argument. If I use the term "abstraction" it is my description of the system, not that of the system itself. You might also call it "higher-order structure", i.e. not the individual neurons firing, but combinations of neurons and combinations of combinations of neurons, etc. In computer terms: it is not the individual bits, but combinations of bits to form elementary commands, combinations of commands to form subroutines, combinations of subroutines to form higher-order subroutines etc. It is this process that I call "abstraction". It is by this process of abstraction to higher levels of description that we can discern a meaning and a purpose in the system, in what Dennett calls "the intentional stance". It is at this level that we speak about thoughts, ideas, choices, purpose and consciousness.

Further it isn't clear to me what you mean by saying that I have included the notion of consciousness as something other than the physical. Is the structure of a crystal something other than the physical?

Post 14

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 4:56pm

I wrote: "As I see it, there is only one entity--the material brain, of which the mind is the form in which we are aware of it 'subjectively,' and its visual appearance, the form in which the surgeon is aware of it 'objectively' when he does a craniotomy."

Ellen replied,

"And what is this being "aware," this subjective experiencing (see a quote below), of which you speak, Bill? Is the awareness identical to the motion of microparticles? Or what?"

I would say that the awareness is identical to the motion of microparticles, in the same way that the morning star is identical to the evening star, or a sub-atomic particle identical to a wave (depending on the experiment used to identify it). Again, it is the same thing viewed from different perspectives.

Ellen continued,

Re your analogy of Venus as morning and evening star: That's an inaccuarate analogy that I wish you would drop, since it isn't helpful to precision. *Both* the perspective on Venus as morning star and as evening star are seeing an object external to us, viewed "objectively" as you're using "objectively" here.

Ellen, the point of the analogy was not to illustrate the idea of something being observed both from a subjective and from an objective perspective (since it is obvious that there is nothing else sufficiently similar to consciousness to serve that purpose), but simply to illustrate the idea of something being observed from different perspectives.

I wrote, "Nor do I view them as two manifestations of the same thing, in the way that heat and light are two manifestations of fire, since there is no evidence of an immaterial entity or substance."

Ellen replied,

Why do you load the nature of the hypothesized -- in dual-aspect theory -- underlying substance by describing it as "immaterial"? The underlying substance per such a theory would have to be something that produces on the one hand a materially measurable aspect and on the other an experiential but non-materially measurable aspect.

But that doesn't mean that the substance itself is material. Indeed, the whole point of positing an underlying substance was to explain the supposed interaction between the material and the mental, the assumption being that the two are so radically different, there is no common basis for any kind of interaction between them. An underlying substance that is itself material would defeat the very purpose of the explanation.

She continued,

Also, if you aren't proposing dual-aspect theory, then I'd suggest not leaving yourself wide open to misinterpretation by writing sentences such as: "Mental activity is simply brain activity experienced from an internal, rather than an external perspective."

I don't think I'm leaving myself open to any misinterpretation, except by people who don't understand what a dual-aspect theory is. According to John Hospers, such a theory holds that mental and physical events are merely two aspects of the same underlying substance, which is generally conceived to be unknowable by human beings. (See his An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, p. 398) This is Branden's view, not mine. I hold that all that exists is the physical brain, which can be identified either extrospectively or introspectively. My position is better characterized as an "identity theory," according to which mental events simply are brain events (See again Hospers, p. 398).

It may be objected that mental events cannot simply be brain events, because the two have different meanings. But they have different meanings only to the extent that people are confusing the perspective or method of apprehension with what is being apprehended. In the same way, one could say that the morning star is not identical to the evening star, because the two have different meanings. But different meanings notwithstanding, the morning star is identical to the evening star. They are the simply same thing apprehended differently. Similarly, "the brain" is identical to "the mind." They too are simply the same thing apprehended differently.

- Bill

Post 15

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 5:07pm

AI still has a long way to go, so today's computers don't "experience" in the same way as human beings experience the functioning of their brain.

That's because a brain has intimate survivalness tied up with the enviroment - it senses pleasure/pain in effect, unlike a computer which is like a brain in a bottle...

Post 16

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 5:41pm

Michael wrote,

I'm sorry, I don't get your meaning. Are you saying that there is a subjective form in which we experience something, but there is no subjective form of that experience? I am confused.

You have every right to be. What a stupid rejoinder! I really spaced on that one, didn't I?! If there is a subjective (i.e., introspective) form in which one experiences the brain, then there is certainly an objective (i.e., extrospective) form in which one experiences it. Duh!

You wrote,

Also, the physical form of the mind I refer to is what can be measurable. For instance, how would you physically measure a concept? Or focus? Or anger? We can measure brain waves and things like that so far, but we have yet to measure what a word looks like inside a brain (at least I have not come across that yet)."

Well, a (verbal) thought, or mental effort or strong emotion would simply appear to a neuroscientist as brain waves, right? That's how they would look to him, if he were to examine your brain at the time you were experiencing them. Of course, there would probably be no point in his measuring them, unless it served some medical or scientific purpose.

- Bill

Post 17

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 8:16pm

This is a post concerning method of approach to mind/body
issues.

I see that Calopteryx Splendens has referred to the work of
Daniel Dennett. I was expecting that, soon, C.S. would begin
talking about Dennett. Thus far, without exception, every
time I've encountered a poster on an elist who declares that
"the mind/body problem" isn't a problem and that "levels
of abstraction" is key to seeing past the supposed difficulty,
the poster has turned out to have been reading Dennett.

As it happens, Roger Bissell and I are hoping to engage in
a structured analysis of Dennett's views (and of Searle versus
Dennett; also of Steven Pinker's *How the Mind Works*) after
New Year's. Roger has a busy December scheduled, and I'm
going to be busier this month than I'd anticipated being
(typically, November is my worst month from the standpoint
of elist discussions). Meanwhile, Robert Campbell is still
recuperating from his accident in which he broke both wrists;
plus he probably has a lot of backlog to catch up on with
his academic work.

So I'd like to recommend that we wait to probe Dennett et al.
till later when we can attempt a more rigorous and systematic
approach. Obviously, just because the subject's inconveniently
timed for me, and Roger, and probably Bob Campbell too, doesn't
mean that others won't be hot to pursue it now. However...
I'll put it this way: I'm going to make my best effort at
keeping my mouth shut (for which read, fingers inactive)
at this time, in hopes of circumstances proving favorable
after the holidays for a structured discussion.

Ellen

Post 18

Thursday, December 8, 2005 - 9:23pm

I think it is a very risky thing to overwork the term "subjective," as Bill has in characterizing mind as the "subjective" form in which we are introspectively aware of the brain.

I know what he is trying to say. He is equating "subjective" with "introspective" and "objective" with "extrospective." He is trying to say that whereas the neurosurgeon's approach to gaining extrospective awareness of the brain is something that is publicly shareable and thus "objective" in that sense, while the armchair reflecting person's approach to gaining introspective awareness of the brain is something that is private and unshareable and thus "subjective" in that sense. But this is not the way in which Objectivism has ever applied the terms in any area of philosophy except (perhaps) in the distinction between "objective law" (publicly specified crimes) vs. "subjective law" (unspecified crimes, applied at the arbitrary, private whim of an autocrat).

The way I think we should use the terms "objective" and "subjective" in regard to the mind-body problem is the same way they are used in regard to the trichotomy. Intrinsic means the "out there" apart from consciousness, subjective means the "in here" apart from reality, and objective means the "out there as we are aware of it in here." In other words, the objective is relational, whereas the intrinsic and the subjective view existence and conscious out of relationship to one another.

This model is easily applied to perception. (See second paragraph below.) Although, incredibly, Peikoff, who so clearly laid it out for us in his Modern Philosophy lectures in the early 1970s, abandoned it just several years later at Rand's behest. This is detailed in Peikoff's much later lectures "Objectivism: the State of the Art." He related how Rand told him he was making it sound like perception was objective; but perception, she said, being automatic and non-volitional, could not be objective. This, of course, is a totally different use of the term "objective." It describes an act of awareness that adheres to reality, and it also unnecessarily narrows that description to the volition. Rand argued to Peikoff that we are being "objective" if we volitionally adhere to reality, and perception automatically adheres to reality, so perception can't be objective in that sense.

Apparently it never occurred to Rand or Peikoff that adherence to reality per se is adherence to the object of awareness, whether it is volitional or automatic, and that this usage of "objective" pertains to the act of awareness. However, "objective" in the relational sense, the trichotomy sense, pertains to the content or form of awareness, so Rand, by an apparently inadvertent act of misdirection, sent Peikoff off on a major detour, one that discarded much of the fine work he had done on the issue known as "the ontological (or metaphysical) status of sense data." (Yes, I regard this as a serious error in the Objectivist philosophy. Objectivity is a dual aspect phenomenon. It pertains ontologically to the content of awareness and epistemically to the form of awareness. They are both present in every form of cognition, but they are distinct aspects of objectivity and must be carefully distinguished from one another, which Rand and Peikoff failed to do. The consequences of the error are not apparent in the discussion of sense data, because Peikoff manages in OPAR to convey all the essential points even without the important characterization of sense data as relational = objective or adherent = objective. Where the error really comes home to roost is in the Objectivist philosophy of mind, except in the writings of certain renegade--i.e., independent--Objectivists. :-)

In regard to sense data, redness, for instance, is real, but not something existing independently from perception. It is a form in which we are aware of, say, an apple. Redness is a relational existent; it is a content of awareness that exists when someone perceptually adheres to (i.e., perceives) an apple. That content is the form in which we perceive the apple. The redness is an objective content of awareness; and our act of perceptually adhering to the red object is an objective act of awareness--even though not volitional. (An intrinsic view of redness views it as something that exists apart from anyone who is perceiving a red object. A subjective view of redness views it as something that exists in our awareness apart from any red object that might be perceived.)

Now, here's the special twist of the trichotomy for the mind-body problem, or what we might call "the ontological (or metaphysical) status of mind." An intrinsic view of mind views mind as something that exists even if no one is aware of it; that is, your mind exists even if you are not introspecting. (The notion of the "subconscious mind" is an intrinsic view.) A subjective view of mind views mind as the content of our introspective awareness, but which does not really exist; even if you are introspecting, your mind does not really exist. (I can't imagine who would hold this view, or why, but perhaps someone more well read than I in philosophy and psychology could supply an example.) An objective view of mind, however, views mind as the form in which we are aware of what our brains are doing; the mind exists while we are introspecting what our brains are doing.

The mind is real, but not something existing independently from introspection, just as the color red is real, but not something existing independently from perception. They are forms in which we are aware of entities. The entity which we are aware of in the form of the mental when we introspect is the brain. The entity which we are aware of in the form of redness when we perceive is (for instance) an apple. Forms of awareness are relational existents; that is why Objectivism regards them as objective, rather than intrinsic or objective. Redness does not exist intrinsically apart from perception, nor only as a subjective experience divorced from reality (say, an apple) -- and the mental does not exist intrinsically apart from introspection, nor only as a subjective experience divorced from reality (i.e., the brain).

Now, some will say that the mind exists even if it isn't being "perceived," i.e., introspected, even as some will say that redness exists even if it isn't being perceived. After all, what about the subconscious mind? (Not to mention "the unconscious"!) Well, undoubtedly the brain often functions in certain ways that we are not directly aware of; and sometimes the results of that functioning raise to the level that we are aware of them. But if we restrict our use of the term "mind" to referring to the human form of awareness, then we cannot use it to refer to brain functions that are below the level of awareness. In other words, the term "subconscious mind" is a contradiction in terms. The "subconscious" simply refers to the brain functions that are below the level of awareness; we talking about not the "subconscious mind" but the subconscious part of the brain.

REB

Post 19

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 1:54am