RoR: Forum

That also seems specious to me. Ideally an Objectivist government would be funded voluntarily, and the military be comprised only of volunteers (which it is today but not historically). So there would be no such thing as rank and file altruism if the military was used to help foreigners fight wars that served Americans' interests. So instead she thought sending boat loads of weapons was not rank and file altruism, even though in our form of governance forcible taxation funds those weapons. It still seems inconsistent to me why sending weapons as opposed to sending troops are philosophically different. Strategically different I would definitely agree, morally different I don't think so.
(Edited by John Armaos on 5/08, 10:32am)

Post 81

Thursday, May 8, 2008 - 8:07pm

Context? We Don't Need no Stinking Context

Was our action in Vietnam altruistic? Would an Objectivist government fight the Vietnamese War? Vietnam was not about which regime, a corrupt pro-Western or a Dictatorial Chinese puppet ran a faraway exotic South East Asian nation. It was part of the overall context of the Cold War, a true World War III fought by proxy with the stakes no less than a world of (semi-)free states or a world Communist dictatorship. The Berlin Blockade, Vietnam, Afghanistan (part I), The Moon Race, the Arms Race, all part of a five decade struggle to contain communism without igniting a nuclear conflagration.

Who won that contest?

Was Vietnam run just about as tragically ineptly as possible? Did the draft make possible an obscene number of American casualties? Can that war be refought on paper for the next century? Yes, yes, and yes. Was Vietnam, until lost post-facto by the US Congress irrelevant? No.

As for what an Objectivist government would do? In a world where Objectivism was a majority force in American politics, maybe war would be as passe as chattel slavery is outside greater Araby. It's amazing what intellectual backwaters an argument can wander into when one jumps in mid-way, without referring to first principles.

(Edited by Ted Keer on 5/09, 4:32pm)

Post 82

Friday, May 9, 2008 - 1:39pm

Ted I was only trying to make the point that whatever foreign policy actions one advocates they should at least be internally consistent with their logic. If supporting Taiwan and Israel was moral to stop the spread of Soviet tyranny than so should it have been moral to support South Vietnam for the same reason. And I don't see the moral difference between sending troops and sending supplies. As I said strategically different but philosophically not different.

As for what an Objectivist government would do?

I don't think anyone ever asked that question. I brought up the fact that we don't have one, so we can't pick and choose why sending supplies is ok while sending troops is not.

Post 83

Sunday, May 11, 2008 - 12:19am

When I make the time for it, I will retrieve the exact Rand quotes so that we can all see what it was that she was talking about when she said that we should send guns but not men -- in order to "fight" certain wars.

Ed

Post 84

Monday, May 12, 2008 - 7:49am

She probably meant that it wasn't worth the sacrifice of American lives -- that sending weapons was preferable.

- Bill

Post 85

Monday, May 12, 2008 - 10:48am

Bill I don't understand that either. So it was worth the sacrifice of weapons but not the sacrifice of lives? Why would one be considered a sacrifice and not the other? To me this sounds like a matter of strategy. If the outcome of a foreign conflict will have ramifications on our lives, then it would serve our rational self-interests to intervene, and how to intervene is a matter of strategy, not philosophy.

Although the Democrats certainly sought to it that the South Vietnamese got no weapons after they made it illegal for them to receive it after 1975. With no weapons they were quickly overcome with the heavily supplied Soviet proxy of North Vietnam.

Post 86

Saturday, May 17, 2008 - 10:16am

Bill I don't understand that either. So it was worth the sacrifice of weapons but not the sacrifice of lives? Why would one be considered a sacrifice and not the other?

I don't think the word "sacrifice" in this context meant the surrender of a greater value for a lesser one. I think it meant something like cost or expenditure. Of course, Rand didn't believe in ANY "sacrifice" in the former sense of that term.

So, I think it was her position that it was worth the cost of weapons but not the cost of American lives. Some costs are worth bearing; others are not.

- Bill

Post 87

Saturday, May 17, 2008 - 12:54pm

History

The Vietnam War has been described as a nation-building/war-profiteering experiment leading back to 1954, when the Geneva Conference implemented the north-south dividing line at the 17^th Parallel. Government war decisions are often (if not always) planned – for years – like that, rather than being the “needed reactions” that they are so often made out to be. True military genius doesn’t make bad war plans like we did with Vietnam; it doesn’t get us into the position to sacrifice our own soldiers’ lives for the welfare of others somewhere (anywhere).

Anyway, by 1960, over a billion federal dollars had been earmarked for building/creating “South Vietnam.” By the mid-60’s, this earmarked cash flow for the Vietnam War project grew immensely, to the point that Caterpillar went on record in 1966 saying – regarding their year-to-year record-breaking profits – that the only thing keeping them from even higher profits still, was that they had reached their maximum physical capacity to produce goods. A true Democr-iminal, LBJ gave no-bid contracts to Brown & Root (the precursor of KBR), who had previously “helped” him to get elected.

What’s undeniable (on pain of contradiction) is that there were elite special interests which benefited tremendously from the coercive action that the U.S. took in Vietnam – and that many American lives were lost in the general means to that specific end.

Rand on War

While Rand said that the immature, flower-child, hippie-rant demands for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was “worse than appeasement,” Rand opposed the initial idea of sending U.S. troops to fight to the death in the Vietnam War. Here’s a timeline of quotes somehow relevant to that line of reasoning …

1967

=========

Questioner: If you were Lyndon Johnson, what would you do about Vietnam?

Ayn Rand: … Napoleon was once asked: “Sir, you are the greatest military genius in existence; what would you do in this situation?” The questioner then described a completely hopeless military situation, to which there is no solution. Napoleon replied: “I became the greatest military genius in the world by never getting into such a situation.” – FHF

=========

Recap:

True military genius doesn’t get its own soldiers killed in other people’s wars.

1969a

=========

I am against the war in Vietnam and have been for years. But I am not for the Vietcong or American unilateral surrender. … The Vietnam War is the fault of the same liberals and the same policies that today are at the forefront of the opposition to the war. The war was the product of Johnson and especially Kennedy … -- FHF

=========

Recap:

It was a leftist “New World Order”-mindset that led to our sacrifice – and our injury – from sending our men to fight and die in the Vietnam War.

1969b

=========

As to fighting abroad, let us send all the military equipment that we can spare (without sacrifice) to any fight for freedom, whether it’s against fascism or communism (which are two variants of statism). But let us never sacrifice American lives for somebody else’s freedom.

If you want to help, watch our foreign policy and see to it that no administration, Republican or Democrat, ever puts the United States into this position again. Start of movement for George Washington’s principle of “no foreign entanglements.” – FHF

=========

Recap:

Lives are more important than guns. The right time to risk your life is when your life is on the line, not when somebody else’s life is on the line (though you can still give support to people fighting for their lives – just not “your life” in support of “their fight”). Americans themselves would be guilty, if our American government ever did this again.

1972a

=========

And if people put up with dictatorship—as some do in Soviet Russia, and some did in Nazi Germany—they deserve what their government deserves. Our only concern should be who started the war. Once that’s established, there’s no need to consider the “rights” of that country … -- FHF

=========

Recap:

It’s okay to kill innocent people in a war against aggressors – just as it would be okay to kill a hostage used as a shield, to get to the mass-murderer holding her hostage. Such life-boat scenarios require pragmatism (rather than robust principles) in order to get back to the normal, non-emergency morality by which we should live.

1972b

=========

Are Russia and China monstrous aggressors, whose first aggression is against their own people? Yes. If so, we should certainly maintain superiority over them. At present, we shouldn’t attack them, because we don’t have to. But at the first sign of an attack by them, we should fight them by every means we have, because it is criminal to kill Americans while not using the better weapons we possess. – FHF

=========

Recap:

We should wait to attack folks until we need to (the “just cause” premise of Aquinas’ 3-premise Just War Theory). Also, it’s generally better to use nukes than to use soldiers. It’s perhaps even a punishable criminal negligence to use soldiers, at the expense of nukes – in most cases of war.

1975

=========

It was a shameful war … shameful because it was a war which the U.S. had no selfish reason to fight, because it served no national interest, because we had nothing to gain from it, because the lives and heroism of thousands of American soldiers (and the billions of American wealth) were sacrificed in pure compliance with the ethics of altruism, i.e. selflessly and senselessly. …

… a “no-win” war, in which the American forces were not permitted to act, but only to react …

… it was not to establish capitalism or any particular social system—it was to uphold the South Vietnamese right to “national self-determination,” …

… Outside the context of a free society, who would want to die for the right to vote? Yet that is what the American soldiers were asked to die for—not even for their own vote, but to secure that privilege for the South Vietnamese, who had no other rights and no knowledge of rights or freedom. …

… Soviet Russia, who regards men as the property and fodder of the state, did not send soldiers to North Vietnam (she could not trust them to fight, so she sent only military supplies). The United States, whose foundation is the supremacy of man’s right to life, sent soldiers to die in South Vietnam. Soviet Russia, the philosophical apostle of materialism, won the war in Vietnam by spiritual, i.e., moral-intellectual, means: the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong were thoroughly indoctrinated with the notion of the righteousness of their cause. …

… When a national catastrophe, such as the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, has no generally known reason and no clearly perceivable cause, one may find leads to some contributory causes by observing who profits from the catastrophe. …

… The greatest intellectual crime today is that of the alleged “rightists” in this country: with reason, reality, and (potentially) an overwhelming majority of the American people on their side, they are afraid to assume the responsibility of a moral crusade for America’s values—i.e., for capitalism (with everything this necessitates). …

… The Vietnam war is one of the most disastrous foreign-policy failures in U.S. history. …

…Shouldn’t there be an investigation of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, wider, deeper, and more thorough than the investigation of Watergate—with nationally televised Congressional hearings …? The purpose? To discover the causes in order to avoid the recurrence (or the continuation) of the policies that led to Vietnam. …

… Intellectual crimes cannot—and need not—be punished by law: the only punishment required is exposure. …

… Obviously, this is not a task for politicians, it is a task for theoretical thinkers, for intellectuals, for philosophers.

– VOR, The Lessons of Vietnam

=========

Recap:

There were elite special interests which benefited tremendously from the coercive action that the U.S. took in Vietnam. They ought to be exposed by philosophers. This is to prevent a recurrence, or a continuation, of bad policies which inevitably lead to a similar sacrifice of American lives.

1976

=========

When someone comes at you with a gun, if you have an ounce of self-esteem, you answer with force, never mind who he is or who’s standing behind him. – FHF

=========

Recap:

1977

=========

Individual citizens in a country that goes to war are responsible for that war. That is why they should be interested in politics and careful about not having the wrong kind of government. – FHF

=========

Recap:

The harm and loss accrued in U.S. wars is, at least in part, my fault (and yours, too). Only a more careful interest in politics will ever redeem that.

What do other folks here -- John A., especially -- think about these cherry-picked quotes (or my thoughtful interpretations of them)?

[late edit for caught spelling error]

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 5/17, 7:51pm)

Post 88

Saturday, May 17, 2008 - 1:36pm

"Individual citizens in a country that goes to war are responsible for that war. That is why they should be interested in politics and careful about not having the wrong kind of government." – Ayn Rand -- Ford Hall Forum.

What does this mean exactly? Certainly, not every individual citizen in a country that goes to war is responsible for that war. Is Rand speaking of "collective" responsibility here? And if so, why does she use the term "individual citizens"? Moreover, what could collective responsibility possibly mean, coming from someone who rejects the very notion of a collective will or purpose?

If she simply means that those individual citizens who supported the war politically and made it possible for the government to go to war are responsible for it, then I would agree. But is this what she means?

Not according to Ed Thompson, who interprets her remarks as follows: "The harm and loss accrued in U.S. wars is, at least in part, my fault (and yours, too). Only a more careful interest in politics will ever redeem that."

- Bill

Post 89

Saturday, May 17, 2008 - 3:13pm

Ed:

Thanks for posting all of these quotes. While I agree with many of your comments, one jumps out of the background for me. You say:

> It’s okay to kill innocent people in a war against aggressors – just as it would be okay to kill
> a hostage used as a shield, to get to the mass-murderer holding her hostage. Such life-boat scenarios
> require pragmatism (rather than robust principles) in order to get back to the normal, non-emergency
> morality by which we should live.

I have argues for years against this "life-boat" concept and the attempt to use this as an argument for the bifurcation of morality into two distinct camps: the normal vs. the emergency situation. I argue that if one defines one's moral code with sufficient precision, then there is no need to hold a separate set of moral principles (or abandon moral principles altogether) in emergency situations. If people are having difficulty deciding what is the correct course of action to pursue when presented with various hypothetical emergency situations, then I would suggest that they have not thought hard enough about their hierarchy of values and how they would apply them in difficult situations, thus leaving them unprepared to respond quickly and appropriately in an emergency. The real point I wish to make here is that the I see any argument for 'pragmatism' as just another example of not having done your homework and worked out your morality in sufficient detail.

Regardless of how much advanced thinking we do, it may nevertheless develop that we find ourselves in a position where we end up having to make a difficult pragmatic choice for failing to have previously considered the type of situation we now face. Despite that, it still remains that pragmatism is no more a valid form of morality under certain circumstances where principles do not apply, than faith is a valid alternative to reason in certain areas of life.

I don't mean to be jumping on you here by reading much more into your statement than was intended, but I think Objectivist ethics has been undermined considerably due to this "life-boat" approach and I feel strongly that it needs to be corrected.

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 90

Saturday, May 17, 2008 - 4:47pm

Well, Jeff, you know that Rand made an exception in the case of emergencies, right? So, if "the Objectivist ethics" refers to Rand's ethics, which it does, then it is indeed contextual. I wouldn't call it "pragmatic," which implies the abandonment of moral principles for the sake of expediency. Making an exception to rights in the case of a "life-boat" emergency is not pragmatic, because one is not, strictly speaking, abandoning a moral principle. The moral principle simply doesn't apply in such a case.

Remember, morality is simply a means to an end; it is not an end in itself. Nor should it be viewed as a Kantian-like categorical imperative. Furthermore, if one's own life is one's highest value, then there can be no moral obligation to sacrifice it for the sake of respecting a moral principle out of context.

Fortunately, under normal circumstances, there are no genuine conflicts of interest -- no conflicts in which one person's interests must be sacrificed for the sake of another's. Only in rare circumstances in which survival by production and trade isn't possible do such conflicts ever arise.

- Bill

Post 91

Saturday, May 17, 2008 - 6:52pm

Bill:

As a broad overview I agree with almost all of what you said. However, referring to this:

> ... then there can be no moral obligation to sacrifice [one's life] for the sake of respecting a moral principle out of context.

I think this gets to the crux of the issue. The context of ethics (i.e., an integrated body of moral principles) is the proper method of sustaining of one's life. So, when faced with life-or-death alternatives, how can moral principles not apply? In other words, what do you mean when you imply that emergency situations are "out of context"? What context?

And by the way, to answer one question that I predict will be raised during this discussion, I offer the following:

In an emergency "life-boat" situation where multiple people face harm or death and there is no clear path where everyone may be saved or rescued with a high degree of certainty, I would argue that under the rubric of Objectivist ethics, there are still boundaries on how one may behave with regards to your fellow man, including a stranger, as one acts to save oneself - even if those limits ultimately lead to one's own death. An emergency does not throw one's value hierarchy out the window and the preservation of one's life is not a moral absolute that exists in a vacuum. One's life may be the highest value, but it is only a value in the context of all of one's other values. I suggest that for a true Objectivist, one would not wish to live if that life were at the expense of one's honesty, integrity and honor. I would rather drown than murder another individual so that I could pull them off a life-raft and take their place. If stranded on a deserted island, I would rather starve than murder a companion so that I could preserve the remaining rations and extend my chances of survival. If the only value I was motivated to preserve by my ethical standards was my life, then these would be the appropriate actions to take under these circumstances. But when one maintains a full awareness of one's integrated value hierarchy, then one comes to different conclusions about just what actions are morally appropriate and what are not.

Now, I think Rand made some unfortunate statements with regards to the ethics of emergencies. I believe, she was focused on establishing a foundation for a new view of morality and considered these "life-boat" cases a distraction, and therefore did not give them much consideration. But if you consider the entire body of her writing, then I think you can build a strong case that she would support my view that Objectivist ethics rests upon rationality which requires maintaining a fully conscious view of one's integrated value hierarchy at all times, and this would include emergency situations. Therefore, morality still applies in those cases. I do not believe that I am proposing anything radical here. This is just a refinement of her ethics applied to an area upon which she really did not elaborate in any serious way.

And now for the old saw: Select any emergency situation of you own choosing that you think pushes the limits of one's moral code. Then imagine Howard Roark or Francisco in these situations. How do you think they would behave? Do these examples have any bearing on how you yourself think you should behave in these situations?

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 92

Saturday, May 17, 2008 - 8:09pm

Bill, regarding being responsible for war:

In the context to which Rand was referring, the question had been raised about what to do -- in case of war with Russia -- about the "innocent" Soviet citizens who'd likely get killed. So, she says that the Soviet citizens can be held responsible for this hypothetical war started by the evil communists. Holding them responsible in this manner allows us to kill them -- in the process of overthrowing their aggressor government. It's an argument against libertarian pacifism.

When Rand said that ordinary folks are responsible, she just meant that their lives don't trump our self-defense (that it's okay to kill them if we have to -- in our efforts to protect ourselves from something much more evil than ugly-but-moral "collateral damage").

Ed

Post 93

Saturday, May 17, 2008 - 10:52pm

Jeff,

Regarding your Post #91, the following is from an interview with Nathaniel Branden:

"Ayn Rand was once asked about the following hypothetical: if your wife got sick one night and would die without a certain medication from the pharmacy, and if the pharmacy was closed, would it be permissible to break in and take it? She said yes, so long as the repairs and medication were paid for the next day. Remember context. We need a code of ethics to support our life and well-being. Ethics does not teach us, “At this point, a moral person commits suicide.” Context, context, context."

The following is a partial transcript of a radio interview, given by Ayn Rand, in the early 1960s at Columbia University. This interview was one of a series of interviews, billed as "Ayn Rand On Campus." The interviews were produced and broadcast by radio station WKCR.

In this interview, titled "Morality, and Why Man Requires It," Rand explains how it is proper, under certain emergency conditions, to initiate force against innocent men. Gerald Goodman from the Columbia School of Engineering asked her the following question:

Goodman:
"Miss Rand, then you would say that a person who was starving, and the only way he could acquire food was to take the food of a second party, then he would have no right, even though it meant his own life, to take the food."

Ayn Rand:
"Not in normal circumstances, but that question sometimes is asked about emergency situations. For instance, supposing you are washed ashore after a shipwreck, and there is a locked house which is not yours, but you're starving and you might die the next moment, and there is food in this house, what is your moral behavior? I would say again, this is an emergency situation, and please consult my article 'The Ethics Of Emergencies' in The Virtue Of Selfishness for a fuller discussion of this subject. But to state the issue in brief, I would say that you would have the right to break in and eat the food that you need, and then when you reach the nearest policeman, admit what you have done, and undertake to repay the man when you are able to work. In other words, you may, in an emergency situation, save your life, but not as 'of right.' You would regard it as an emergency, and then, still recognizing the property right of the owner, you would restitute whatever you have taken, and that would be moral on both parts."

(Edited by William Dwyer on 5/17, 10:55pm)

Post 94

Sunday, May 18, 2008 - 12:06am

> Ethics does not teach us, “At this point, a moral person commits suicide.” Context, context, context."

Bill:

Your response in post #93 shows some confusion over what I have been saying.

I do not disagree with the actions taken in either of these examples given by Rand that you quote. Based upon your comments in post #90, you appear to believe that these are examples where moral principles do not apply and decisions must be made in an ad hoc fashion outside of a moral code. I could not disagree more. And this type of confusion is precisely where my concern arises about Objectivist ethics being undermined; a point which I raised in my initial post #89.

I contend that in both of Rand's examples, the proper decision as to how to act is not ad hoc, but instead depends upon a rigorous application of a moral code that is capable of weighing the costs and benefits to oneself as well as the other party and arriving at an appropriate decision. I agree with you that there are no Kantian moral absolutes. For example, the precept "Thou shalt not steal" is generally accepted by most Objectivists, not as a moral commandment, but as an action generally appropriate to living the type of life that supports the type of person we choose (or for you, are necessitated :-)) to be. However, in the emergency situations given, when a life is at stake and alternative courses of action are precluded, then it becomes necessary to take actions that one would not consider under other circumstances - such as stealing.

My point is that far from falling outside of a moral code, the ability to make the correct decision as to how to act specifically requires the application of a highly developed moral code that is capable of responding to the context of the situation precisely because it integrates a crystal clear understanding of one's value hierarchy with the intellectual tools that allow these values to be evaluate under varying circumstances. But that's no different from what a moral code is supposed to do under normal circumstances. Thus my argument that there is really no difference in kind between normal and emergency situations. The difference is simply a matter of degree. We encounter normal circumstances on a routine basis and become familiar and comfortable with our manner of responding to them. On the other hand, emergency situations are rare, and people often find themselves unprepared to deal appropriately with them for the simple reason that they failed to to the requisite thinking when there was sufficient time for reflection. The more comprehensive and clearly understood one's moral code, the better prepared one will be to properly respond in an emergency. I think Rand's detailed response to the second example is the expression of a highly refined moral code and not some pragmatic response to an unanticipated situation.

As a final note, I would like to point out the gymnastics that Rand plays with this subject of the ethics of emergencies. In the second example quoted by Bill, please notice that Rand did not actually answer the question posed.

> "Miss Rand, then you would say that a person who was starving, and the only way he could acquire
> food was to take the food of a second party, then he would have no right, even though it meant
> his own life, to take the food." [emphasis added]

Rand responds by proposing a scenario where the life of the person being robbed is not an issue! Why? This is what I mean about her not really having addressed this issue in sufficient depth. So what about a comprehensive answer to the actual question? Does Objectivist ethics provide any guidance here? Do the choices to act fall outside moral boundaries or is it a moral question of the highest order? Would you steal food (their property) from another individual to save your own life, knowing that this would in all probability cause the death of that person?

Regards,
--
Jeff

(Edited by C. Jeffery Small on 5/18, 7:02am)

Post 95

Sunday, May 18, 2008 - 12:46am

Jeff, I never said it was ad hoc. If you go back and read my earlier posts, you'll see that I said the opposite -- that it was wrong to characterize as pragmatic the kind of behavior that is appropriate in emergency situations.

In Post #90, I wrote, "I wouldn't call it 'pragmatic,' which implies the abandonment of moral principles for the sake of expediency. Making an exception to rights in the case of a 'life-boat' emergency is not pragmatic, because one is not, strictly speaking, abandoning a moral principle. The moral principle simply doesn't apply in such a case."

Note that I wasn't saying that no moral principles apply; I was saying that the principle of rights doesn't apply.

You ask,

Would you steal food (their property) from another individual to save your own life, knowing that this would in all probability cause the death of that person?

Good question. If the person were a close friend, it would very difficult for me to do, although if I were capable of it, it would not violate the morality of egoism, which is the key issue here. If it were a total stranger, I think that I probably would steal the food, even if it meant the other person's death, because if I have to choose between his survival and my own, I would choose my own. If it were my wife or significant other, I don't think I could do it.

- Bill

Post 96

Sunday, May 18, 2008 - 7:23am

Bill writes:

> Making an exception to rights in the case of a 'life-boat' emergency is not pragmatic, because one is not,
> strictly speaking, abandoning a moral principle. The moral principle simply doesn't apply in such a case.

Bill:

Thanks for taking the time to clarify more exactly the nature of our disagreement. Regarding your statement above, I find this an interesting view. Rather than stating that one decides to violate the principle of one or more rights extended towards others in favor of a higher moral calculation, if I understand you correctly, you appear to be proposing that rights, or at least some of them, simply do not apply (i.e., do not exist?) in life-boat situations. Can you explain your theory of ethics to me so that I can understand how this conclusion is supported since I fail to see how rights can exist/not exist or apply/not apply based upon a varying context?

Also, do you think that this is Rand's view on the matter? It doesn't seem to me to be the case, based upon the example you quoted in post #93:

> I would say that you would have the right to break in and eat the food that you need, and then when you
> reach the nearest policeman, admit what you have done, and undertake to repay the man when you are able
> to work. In other words, you may, in an emergency situation, save your life, but not as
> 'of right.' You would regard it as an emergency, and then, still recognizing the property right of the
> owner, you would restitute whatever you have taken, and that would be moral on both parts.

Rand appears to be saying just the opposite here, albeit with some imprecision*. As I read it, she is stating that you, the thief, have "the right to break in and eat the food that you need" as a matter of moral principle, while at the same time the victim retains his full "property rights" against your trespass and theft, obligating you to make restitution for the crime. I don't see this as an example of the moral principle of rights not applying in any sense. Instead, Rand appears to be stating exactly what I have outlined in my previous posts, that in a situation like this, when weighing the benefits of the moral principle of sustaining one's life against the costs of violating the moral principle of respecting the property rights of another person, the answer becomes clear that one should act in service of one's life and then, when possible in the future, act to minimize the harm that one has done. It seems clear to me that ethics is in full play during this sort of analysis (with Rand agreeing: "and that would be moral on both parts.") and that there is no issue of variable rights or rights somehow not applying in some way during the course of the emergency.

When Rand speaks of the ethics of emergencies, she points out that they often bring into conflict within oneself one's moral principles which would not be in conflict under normal circumstances. In this example, the principles of survival and that of property rights conflict and require that an appropriate decision be made on the spur of the moment. Under normal circumstances, there would be no such conflict, as one's survival would not depend upon violating the property rights of another. It is for this reason that she was adamant that emergency situations were not the appropriate place to define one's moral code. However, I contend that Rand should not have then ignored this area, for emergency situations can be very useful in refining and testing the suitability and comprehensiveness of that code. Her failure to tread into this territory has left Objectivist ethics with a huge hole that now leads large numbers of "Objectivists" to feel comfortable in supporting the torture of enemies and considering the genocide of entire populations by nuclear annihilation - all in the name of "emergency". This is something that must be addressed, or Objectivism as an ethical philosophy is never going to gain a foothold in any culture.

Regards,
--
Jeff

* Note that Rand says, "you would have the right to break in ..." and then shortly after that she states "you may, in an emergency situation, save your life, but not as 'of right.'". So which is it? Rand was responding live to a question and I don't fault her for this imprecision in an off-the-cuff remark, but it is an example of how she has caused her own confusion on this subject for many of her readers. Based upon a careful reading of the overall response, I think the interpretation I give above is the most sensible and aligns best with the remainder of Rand's writings on ethics.

Post 97

Sunday, May 18, 2008 - 8:45am

The moral principle simply doesn't apply in such a case.

A code of morals is a code of values, more specifically viable values, to guide one thru life - given that, and values means with regarding choices, how can there not ever be moral principles regarding actions of a human?

Post 98

Sunday, May 18, 2008 - 9:46am

I wrote,

> Making an exception to rights in the case of a 'life-boat' emergency is not pragmatic, because one is not,
> strictly speaking, abandoning a moral principle. The moral principle simply doesn't apply in such a case.

Jeff replied,

Thanks for taking the time to clarify more exactly the nature of our disagreement. Regarding your statement above, I find this an interesting view. Rather than stating that one decides to violate the principle of one or more rights extended towards others in favor of a higher moral calculation, if I understand you correctly, you appear to be proposing that rights, or at least some of them, simply do not apply (i.e., do not exist?) in life-boat situations. Can you explain your theory of ethics to me so that I can understand how this conclusion is supported since I fail to see how rights can exist/not exist or apply/not apply based upon a varying context?

Well, sure. Rights are a moral principle defining and sanctioning man's freedom of action in a social context. If it's moral to steal food in an emergency, then in doing so, one is not "violating" the moral principle of rights, because in that case one is not morally obligated to respect it. In order to violate a moral principle, one must be morally obligated to respect it. The moral obligation to abstain from stealing the food doesn't apply in that case.

Another example is the principle of honesty. If a kidnapper asks you where your child is, you are not obligated to tell him the truth. In lying to him, you are not violating the moral principle of honesty, because in that case, you are not morally obligated to respect it. The obligation to tell the truth doesn't apply in that case.

Also, do you think that this is Rand's view on the matter?

Yes.

It doesn't seem to me to be the case, based upon the example you quoted in post #93:

> I would say that you would have the right to break in and eat the food that you need, and then when you
> reach the nearest policeman, admit what you have done, and undertake to repay the man when you are able
> to work. In other words, you may, in an emergency situation, save your life, but not as
> 'of right.' You would regard it as an emergency, and then, still recognizing the property right of the
> owner, you would restitute whatever you have taken, and that would be moral on both parts.

Rand appears to be saying just the opposite here, albeit with some imprecision*. As I read it, she is stating that you, the thief, have "the right to break in and eat the food that you need" as a matter of moral principle, while at the same time the victim retains his full "property rights" against your trespass and theft, obligating you to make restitution for the crime. I don't see this as an example of the moral principle of rights not applying in any sense.

What I meant by "the moral principle of rights not applying" is that you are not obligated to respect the person's rights in that circumstance by abstaining from stealing his food. You would, under normal circumstances, be morally obligated to abstain from stealing it. You wouldn't have the right to steal it just so long as you paid him back. However, in the emergency situation, you would. That's what I meant by the principle's not "applying" in that case.

However, you would still be obligated to make restitution, because the emergency entitles you to the value of the food only for the duration of the emergency; it does not give you an unqualified right to it. You must still pay it back when you are able to. It is that moral principle that continues to apply, which I think is what Rand meant when she said "In other words, you may, in an emergency situation, save your life, but not as 'of right.' You would regard it as an emergency, and then, still recognizing the property right of the owner, you would restitute whatever you have taken, and that would be moral on both parts."

Instead, Rand appears to be stating exactly what I have outlined in my previous posts, that in a situation like this, when weighing the benefits of the moral principle of sustaining one's life against the costs of violating the moral principle of respecting the property rights of another person, the answer becomes clear that one should act in service of one's life and then, when possible in the future, act to minimize the harm that one has done. It seems clear to me that ethics is in full play during this sort of analysis (with Rand agreeing: "and that would be moral on both parts.") and that there is no issue of variable rights or rights somehow not applying in some way during the course of the emergency.

Well, they don't apply in the sense that you are obligated to respect them by not stealing the food. Normally, you would not be justified in stealing the food; in the emergency, you would, which means that, in that case, the owner would not have a right against your stealing it. He would, however, have a right to be repaid when you were able to do so.

When Rand speaks of the ethics of emergencies, she points out that they often bring into conflict within oneself one's moral principles which would not be in conflict under normal circumstances.

Where does she say that in an emergency they "bring into conflict within oneself one's moral principles"? That's your interpretation, but she never says that, and I don't think that's her position. There is no "conflict" of moral principles in an emergency. I am not conflicted over the principle of honesty, when I lie to the kidnapper about where my child is. I do it with a clear conscience and a full sense of moral rectitude. There is no moral conflict here. The same is true of stealing the food in order to survive. There is no moral conflict. In that situation, I am not obligated to abstain from stealing the food; in normal circumstances I am.

In this example, the principles of survival and that of property rights conflict . . .

No, they don't. The principle that prohibits you from stealing the food doesn't apply in that case.

. . . and require that an appropriate decision be made on the spur of the moment. Under normal circumstances, there would be no such conflict, as one's survival would not depend upon violating the property rights of another. It is for this reason that she was adamant that emergency situations were not the appropriate place to define one's moral code.

They were not the appropriate place to define one's moral code for normal living conditions.

However, I contend that Rand should not have then ignored this area, for emergency situations can be very useful in refining and testing the suitability and comprehensiveness of that code. Her failure to tread into this territory has left Objectivist ethics with a huge hole that now leads large numbers of "Objectivists" to feel comfortable in supporting the torture of enemies and considering the genocide of entire populations by nuclear annihilation - all in the name of "emergency". This is something that must be addressed, or Objectivism as an ethical philosophy is never going to gain a foothold in any culture.

Do you think that dropping the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was immoral? The overwhelming majority of the dead were civilians. Yet, it has been argued that many more people would have died, if the war had continued, and that this was not only justified from standpoint of self-defense, but also from the standpoint of minimizing the casualties which would have occurred from continuing the war.

- Bill

Post 99

Sunday, May 18, 2008 - 10:42am