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Post 40

Saturday, March 5, 2011 - 4:56pmSanction this postReply
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Dean,

You wrote, "You can't have morality without entities that have goals. No such entities = no morality. Hence there is no universal morality, there is no universal goal that the universe is trying to accomplish. There is no universal goal that all entities are trying to accomplish."

It isn't the universe that is attempting to achieve goals, it is humans. Human nature defines us as goal-seeking entitites. Just as human nature defines us a rational beings. But that doesn't mean that each individual will exercise their goal-seeking capacity, or exercise reason, or exercise them in the same way.

That which is a part of human nature is universal to all humans. Too often people make the mistake of seeing that some people are irrational in some choices, or that some people avoid making choices as much as they can, or seek goals that are strange or conflict and conclude these traits must not be universal. That's wrong, because we share the basic capacity, not the precise usage. Even the worst slug has a never ending stream of goals - they are just variations on not wanting to work. Even the most irrational human is still exercising their rational faculty (poorly) to choose and to justify and to pursue the truely stupid choices they make. Even the most submissive of people still exercises independent volitional choice (however poorly) in choosing who to follow and what to think.

Some goals arise from nothing more than personal preferences - like flavors of ice cream. Others are fundamental, like liberty. Those that are more fundamental can be argued to be objective values, not arbitrary, not culturally determined, and your arguments haven't yet reflected that. You argued that the productive should band together to stop the leeches. You used the word "should" which in this context says that it is the moral preference. The leeches might band together and claim that the producers should share their wealth. The two 'shoulds' conflict. How to decide between them based upon reason is to derive a universal moral code that derives from human nature. That's what Rand did and that's why leeches that attempt to take things by force can be morally condemed at any place or time.

It is the fact that the two systems conflict that those who stand by the standard of reason need to add morality to their side. The leeches can't do that. It is a weapon they can never exercise (a rational universal morality that supports theft).

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Post 41

Saturday, March 5, 2011 - 5:17pmSanction this postReply
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Steve,
I wonder when I read that if you might have a flawed grasp of individual rights in some way, or if you have a good grasp of rights, but it somehow doesn't fit in smoothly with some other basic principle that you have and that principle needs to be examined.
I don't think either of these options are right.  Obviously I don't think my grasp of individual rights is flawed.  But I'm also not suggesting that they don't fit in smoothly with some more basic principle.  I interpret the latter to imply that I think there is something wrong with the principle of individual rights, like if I was rejecting measurement-omission in concept-formation because it appears incompatible with some other principle of reason.

The problem I outlined is simply that the notion "individual rights" is viewed as a kind of placeholder for this whole theoretical system.  It's like trying to express the various principles and implications in a single, concrete form.  By treating these as concrete things, that you "have", it works well as a kind of symbol for the more accurate and detailed arguments.  But these debates that come up always seem to treat it as if this weren't some kind of sloppy shorthand, and instead the entire theoretical basis of this system can be expressed in a single word.  And then when people try to discuss different aspects of this system, while still trying to use the same word, it results in confusion and people arguing over what's the best definition of the word.  Any real disagreements are obscured.

As an example, some people have talked about rights being metaphysical, presumably meaning that we have certain needs as human beings (like the need to be free to act on our best judgment) and these needs are metaphysical facts.  But others (including myself) have argued that there's a moral component as well, since any discussion of rights is also implying that you "should" not violate the rights of others, and that they "should" not violate your own.  When everyone's playing tug-o-war with the term rights, you start having weird disagreements.  I've been accused of saying that rights are arbitrary because I pointed out that they are not simply a description of a metaphysical fact.  But it's possible to argue that they are moral claims, and the morality is based partly on the metaphysical facts.  There have also been arguments over whether rights are a description of what you shouldn't do to people, or whether they are the justification for why you shouldn't do those things.  In discussions where people probably agree on the principles behind the concept of individual rights, they argue about the definition of individual rights.

I mentioned the strangeness of describing individual rights in the form of an analogy that is dependent on rights.  My claim there is that the way these ideas are formulated prevents certain kinds of detailed discussion.  Take a different example, like force (initiation or retaliation).  The concept is formulated as a noun, but it is a description of a kind of action.  When you shoot someone, or steal from them, you are applying force.  Now what if we described it in a different way.  What if we said that each of us has something called "force" that we can give to others.  I can give you "force" in the form of stealing from you.  It's a weird way to think about it, but it could mostly work.  We could say that "force" is not something you should give to someone, unless of course they gave some "force" to someone else first.  Then we might even say that instead of using retaliatory force, we are simply "replacing their force".  We could get the whole system to work out, and get used to describing force in that way.  Would it work as well as describing force in the normal way?  Probably not.  Conceiving it as something you "have" and can "give" to others is strange because it suggests there is an actual thing that is in your possession, and doesn't directly inform you of the morality of "giving" it to others. 

Well, if you think that's odd, that's very close to how individual rights are described.

So I'm not arguing that we should be able to go kill and steal or anything like that.  I'm merely suggesting that the way these ideas are represented potentially makes it harder to discuss.  And since one word is viewed as a placeholder for so many related ideas, it makes breaking it up and discussing the details difficult.


Post 42

Saturday, March 5, 2011 - 5:30pmSanction this postReply
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Steve,

Rand's "universal" is universal among Objectivists. It is not universal among all humans. 100% liberty is not an objective value of leeches. Leeches who's goals are to have a few hours of power succeed in their brief control, where others loose liberty while they maintain... until the hours pass and the victims fight back.

Leeches live off of the entitlement services provided by the state. You sit in you ivory chair and claim that economic freedom is the way to their success, while they ignore you, and use the products of your labor to reproduce, feed their children, and multiply. They are successful. Do you not see that to them, leeching is virtuous?

Humans, by genetic definition. Leeches, by moral position and economic function.

Edit: Maybe the issue here is a purity issue. You guys think "If everyone was a leech, then everyone would die." and "If everyone was a producer, then we'd all be really prosperous". So then you claim that everyone should be producers, since that's the best solution for humanity as a race, and for us as producers. But you do not consider the mix, where there is enough production by producers that leeches are very successful. In the mix, producers are successful, but could be more successful if it weren't for the value loss due to the leeches, and the leeches are successful. So to producers, to "their nature" in Rand's words, respecting property rights is universally good to them. And to leeches, to "their nature", providing for the leeches needs and them getting their "human dignity" by having some standard of living by mob rule ignoring the property rights is good for them.
(Edited by Dean Michael Gores on 3/05, 6:27pm)


Post 43

Saturday, March 5, 2011 - 5:43pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

I don't like your counter-factual example because it is nonsensical.  If your point was to show why you can't have this kind of discussion hiding behind the word "rights", then point made.  But it didn't sound like that was where you were going.

Discussing creates with "half of the rights" shows the problem with trying to reify rights.  If they are actual objects, that you hold in your backpack, you can say that one person has half of the others.  But what does it mean to have only half of a right to life?  I can only kill you halfway?

If my advice were ever taken, we'd try to discuss these issues without referencing these "things" called rights.  We'd instead discuss the principles behind them.  We would point out that a harmony of interests is possible between human beings because we can choose to live our own lives without interfering with the lives of others, and require that all interactions be voluntary.  If I don't want to deal with you, I don't need to.  But if you make it worthwhile to me, we can choose to interact, such as through trade.  We could point out that being able to choose whether to interact with people is what's required to ensure the harmony of interests, and when that choice is removed, it opens the door to harmful interactions.

You might be tempted to try to describe the fact that interactions should be voluntary.  You might be tempted to come up with a word that describes the areas in your life where you have control (meaning you don't need the assent of others), and where if someone wants to interact with you, your agreement is required.  And you might call this area of control your rights.

But now what would it mean to say that someone has half of these rights?  Isn't it all or nothing?  Either people need your permission to interact with you, or they don't.  Either your assent is necessary, or it isn't.  Using the term 'rights' might make your example sound possible, but only because that term gives the impression that these things exist as "things" that you can divide up.  But you can't divide freedom like that.  You either have control over your life, or you don't.  Either others need you to agree to interact with them, or they don't.

When you take away the nebulous wording, the example doesn't make sense.  Why would it be okay for people to force interactions on these "dumans".  Why would we say that it's okay to force certain kinds of interactions on them, like imprisoning them?  Clearly something is so significant that the whole harmony of interests doesn't apply to them at all.  What exactly is that?  And if it doesn't apply at all, why would you say that they have "rights".  Presumably that means that you can't do certain things to them or the government is justified in imprisoning you.  But that would be an initiation of force, wouldn't it?

That's why I say the whole thing is nonsensical.  Only the use of the term "rights" allows you to imagine the scenario is meaningful.


Post 44

Saturday, March 5, 2011 - 5:58pmSanction this postReply
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Joe,

You wrote, "So I'm not arguing that we should be able to go kill and steal or anything like that."

:-) Joe, I knew that!

I agree with what you said. I agree that there is too much difficulty in describing rights even though we really agree on them in practice. That is, we all agree that no one has the right to initiate force against someone and kill them. But we don't agree about how to describe the rights that make this so - at least not when we get into the tight corners.

My mind is a bit fuzzy right now, but let me ask if anyone has an example of other concepts that arise from a metaphysical base and end in the moral arena? Or any area of thought that involves categorizing the relations between men. And it is more complex than that, because the metaphysical base is really an abstraction - elements of human nature - some things about man as man that is universal to all men. Yet we apply rights to individual actions of individual men. Is that the area to examine? I know that I can bring a little more clarity to the issue of property (pulling from Bastiat) but I'm not sure that takes us far enough.

Post 45

Saturday, March 5, 2011 - 6:20pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Steve,

Can't blame me for being careful!

As possible examples of what you were asking for, how about virtues and moral principles?  Principles identify cause-effect relationships, which is really identify facts of reality.  Honesty, for instance, revolves around the principle that acting on false information leads to failure.  The virtue would recognize that when you provide bad information to others, and consequently their actions result in failure, they'll be upset about it.  So these facts about reality can lead you to conclusions about how you should act, based on your moral standard.


Post 46

Saturday, March 5, 2011 - 11:43pmSanction this postReply
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Dean,
Morally equivalent from who's viewpoint? God's (doesn't exist)? The universe's (non living, does not have goals)? A productive man's? A leech?
This was addressed in Alasdair MacIntyre's 1988 book: Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. If you look at people who use God to evaluate morality, or people who use Gaia (Mother Earth) to evaluate morality, or people who use the identity/nature of man and reality to evaluate morality, or people who use short-sighted, narrow-minded, predatory, concrete-bound, whim-driven gains to evaluate morality ... then what you have is a slew of rival -- or you might even say: "alien" -- moral traditions. The wiki-essay on MacIntyre says this about the book:
MacIntyre argues that despite their incommensurability there are various ways in which alien traditions might engage one another rationally - most especially via a form of immanent critique which makes use of empathetic imagination to then put the rival tradition into "epistemic crisis" but also by being able to solve shared or analogous problems and dilemmas from within one's own tradition which remain insoluble from the rival approach.

MacIntyre's account also defends three further theses: first, that all rational human inquiry is conducted whether knowingly or not from within a tradition; second, that the incommensurable conceptual schemes of rival traditions do not entail either relativism or perspectivism; third, that although the arguments of the book are themselves attempts at universally valid insights they are nevertheless given from within a particular tradition (that of Thomist Aristotelianism) and that this need not imply any philosophical inconsistency.
And what this means is that even though there are anti-thetical moral theories out there -- there is a dialectic path toward moral superiority (i.e., a way to prove the moral superiority of Objectivism). Any two moral systems can be contrasted regarding their differential ability to solve shared problems. And this is key: the reason that one moral system solves problems better than the other is because it fits better with the identity/nature of man and reality. And just because it's seen to fit better from within one tradition, doesn't imply argumentative inconsistency (or one-sidedness).
 
Think of a problem we share with welfare-statists. We both want poverty to decrease. We may have differing reasons, but it's a shared problem, nonetheless. Now think of the range of offered solutions. For instance, one group of professors says that poverty in Africa can be fixed within a decade by a redistribution of wealth. Another group says that only property rights and an objective, transparent rule of law would fix the problem. What happens when we try each of them out, Dean?

One of them turns out to be superior. What happens when we try it again (say, somewhere else)? Same result. Again? Same result. Again? Same result. What is it that allows for us to continually get the same superiority of one moral theory over another in solving this problem? The nature/identity of man and reality. Can we change everyone's mind overnight? No, it's a process requiring more time than that. Does that fact make it a bad idea for us to champion? No.

Objectivists are those who wish to be productive men. They have a particular set of values. I'm not sure what your point is, agree given what an objectivist's goals are, their values make sense.
I'm talking about an objective theory of values. At the online Ayn Rand Lexicon, the entry for objective theory of values says this:
The objective theory holds that the good is neither an attribute of "things in themselves" nor of man’s emotional states, but an evaluation of the facts of reality by man’s consciousness according to a rational standard of value. (Rational, in this context, means: derived from the facts of reality and validated by a process of reason.) The objective theory holds that the good is an aspect of reality in relation to man—and that it must be discovered, not invented, by man. ... An objective theory does not permit ... the separation of ... man’s actions from reason.

The objective theory of values is the only moral theory incompatible with rule by force. Capitalism is the only system based implicitly on an objective theory of values ...

If one knows that the good is objective—i.e., determined by the nature of reality, but to be discovered by man’s mind—one knows that an attempt to achieve the good by physical force is a monstrous contradiction which negates morality at its root by destroying man’s capacity to recognize the good, i.e., his capacity to value. ... A value which one is forced to accept at the price of surrendering one’s mind, is not a value to anyone; the forcibly mindless can neither judge nor choose nor value. An attempt to achieve the good by force is like an attempt to provide a man with a picture gallery at the price of cutting out his eyes. Values cannot exist (cannot be valued) outside the full context of a man’s life ...

The free market represents the social application of an objective theory of values. ...
And what this means is that, because of our common human nature (and because reality has identity), the good is ultimately objective. This is true because values cannot really exist (cannot really be valued) outside of this specified context. The reason that folks persist in attempting to value things outside of this specified context -- i.e., attempt to value contradictions -- is largely because of nothing other than poor on non-existent moral education (something ultimately "fixable").

Now, admittedly, not everyone can be reached. Some will prefer to fight as the spread of human reason grows. Just because something is perfectly reasonable and sufficiently enlightening, doesn't mean it will ever become unanimously accepted. Unanimous acceptance is too high of a standard. Man is reasonable, but not perfectly and totally reasonable. So the point is to use our minds enough to get only the reasonable ones on board. We can do this by demonstrating (by argument and experience) moral superiority.

In your terms, the alternative to doing that would be a net loss for us.

Ed


Post 47

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 12:15amSanction this postReply
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Joe,

This'll be short and quick because it's late and I'm tired. Thank you for the response.

I don't like your counter-factual example because it is nonsensical.  If your point was to show why you can't have this kind of discussion hiding behind the word "rights", then point made.  But it didn't sound like that was where you were going.

Discussing [creatures] with "half of the rights" shows the problem with trying to reify rights.  If they are actual objects, that you hold in your backpack, you can say that one person has half of the others.  But what does it mean to have only half of a right to life?  I can only kill you halfway?
I agree that it's nonsensical to speak of rights-bearing creatures as ever having only a certain portion, or a certain percentage, of rights -- rather than to speak of them as either always fully having them, or not having them at all. That was a key point of my analogy.

If my advice were ever taken, we'd try to discuss these issues without referencing these "things" called rights. ... We could point out that being able to choose whether to interact with people is what's required to ensure the harmony of interests, and when that choice is removed, it opens the door to harmful interactions.

Okay. But I want to stress that "what's required to ensure the harmony of interests" isn't something that we only sometimes require -- rather, it is something that we always require. In that respect, you could say that it is somewhat, if not totally, like a "metaphysical" requirement. You could also say that it is somewhat, if not totally, like an "inalienable" requirement. It's like we are stuck with this requirement whether we like it or not -- and we remain stuck with it to the same degree -- regardless of our prior conduct. 

Ed


Post 48

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 12:16amSanction this postReply
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Hi Joe,

You wrote,
Consider the fact that 'rights' are expressed as if they are things. That works if you're talking about moral claims, which are also things. But it makes it difficult to say talk about the fact that other people shouldn't infringe on your life or liberty.
I don't follow you. Why can't a right simply refer to a moral claim against that infringement?
Saying that you have X does not normally imply that others should treat you in a particular way.
Why not? Doesn't saying that you have a house imply that others shouldn't burglarize it?
Also, consider that they are described as something you own, that belongs to you. Think about that. It is using an analogy of ownership to describe them, but ownership is dependent on the concept of rights in the first place. You can say that you 'have' or 'own' a right, that it belongs to you, like the right to speak your mind, and like other things that belong to you, others shouldn't be able to take it away from you. But why shouldn't people be able to take away what belongs to you? Because of rights! Why can't they take those rights from you? Because they belong to you!!!! Isn't that circular?
Now wait a minute! To say that you "have" a right to freedom of action doesn't mean that it "belongs" to you or that you "own" the right, as you own a piece of property; it simply means that others shouldn't interfere with your freedom -- that they are obligated to respect it. Nor does the concept of rights imply that others shouldn't "take away" your rights, because rights are not something that can be taken away, although they can be violated, forfeited or lost. A criminal doesn't "take away" your rights; he violates them; after he violates them, you still have them. And when the criminal himself is jailed or executed, his rights are also not "taken away"; it is the criminal himself who forfeits or loses them. In short, a right is not something you own that can be taken away, like a piece of property. The property itself can be taken away, but not the right to it.

However, I think I know what may be bothering you about the concept of rights. Even though we say that we "possess" rights, we don't really mean that we are in possession of an object; we simply mean that we are entitled to be treated a certain way by other people -- that in dealing with us they ought to follow certain principles of conduct, i.e., abstain from initiating force or fraud against us. But we don't simply say that everyone should adhere to the non-aggression principle, and leave it at that. We express the idea in terms of rights and entitlements. The reason for this may be that the concept of rights originated with the concept of rightfully owned property, so that it was relatively easy to extend the idea of possessing a piece of property to the possession of rights in general.

Rand appears to form a transition from the concept of "what is right" to the concept of "a right" in Galt's speech, when she says: "If man is to live on earth, it is right for him to use his mind, it is right to act on his own free judgment, it is right to work for his values and to keep the product of his work. If life on earth is his purpose, he has a right to live as a rational being: nature forbids him the irrational." (For the New Intellectual, p. 229)


Post 49

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 2:03amSanction this postReply
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Ed and Bill,

First Ed.  I agree that we can talk about these needs that we have as being there all of the time, instead of just some of the time.  You can even talk about the requirement as if it were metaphysical, meaning that it is simply a fact.  I need food to live.  I need freedom to live.  Both are descriptions of reality.  As I've mentioned many times, there's no disagreement by anyone here that the foundation of this topic rests on factual claims about the world.  But moral claims go a step further, applying a moral standard, and tell you that you "should" act in a particular way, or others "shouldn't" act to violate your freedom.  The factual statements provides a means of determining the likely consequences of acting in one way or another.  It becomes a moral claim when you determine that those consequences are good or bad, and that you should or shouldn't act that way.

Bill, I half expected you not to be able to follow me.  That's because you are comfortable with the way the terminology is used, possibly to the point that you can't see the problems.  I was expecting most people to not see it.  You're used to looking beyond the terminology to some extent and seeing the bundle of ideas it represents.  The awkwardness of the phrasing become less noticeable as you get used to it.
I don't follow you. Why can't a right simply refer to a moral claim against that infringement?
Let's try it out. 
My version: "Other people shouldn't initiate force against you."
The 'rights' version:  "I have a moral claim that you shouldn't initiate force against me, and the presence of that claim implies you shouldn't initiate force against me."

Which sounds better?  Is there a reasonable way to express this as something you have, that still implies that they shouldn't act in a particular way.  Try it!  Seriously.  "I have X which means you shouldn't do Y because of Z".  Fill in the blanks.  And then show what benefit there was in saying the "I have X" part of it.  Isn't it easier and clearer if you just say "You shouldn't do Y because of Z"?

When trying to say how other people should or shouldn't act, the "rights" approach has to say that somehow you possess something.  It would further have to show that this something implies that other people should or shouldn't act.  It's convoluted, and make it difficult to make a straightforward statement.
Now wait a minute! To say that you "have" a right to freedom of action doesn't mean that it "belongs" to you or that you "own" the right, as you own a piece of property; it simply means that others shouldn't interfere with your freedom -- that they are obligated to respect it.
Sometimes the process of quoting and responding makes you miss the entire point of what I was saying because you disconnected two statements and tried to treat them out of context.  I said earlier that saying that you have X does not normally imply that others should treat you in a particular way.  You responded by talking about burglarizing a house.  But if you saw that statement as connected to my next statement, you'd realize they go together.  Rights are described as things that you have, and saying that you have something does not normally imply anything about the actions of others.  The only reason there is ever a connection between you having and me acting is when the connection is the concept of property rights, which you're trying to describe in the first place!

The language is pointless and cumbersome.  We don't need to use the phrase "individual rights".  We can talk about the causal principles and the moral conclusions just fine without them.  So what benefit is there to trying to put those ideas, that are able to be expressed in a different way (not just a different term, but an entirely different way), in to the form of "things" that we "have".  Why not simply say that others shouldn't initiate force, for instance.  What benefit is there in talk about this same idea, but expressing it as "we have these things".  The only benefit I can see is that you can use the analogy of property and say that since you have these things, other people shouldn't be able to mess with them or take them away.

The key point that you have to accept is that it is unnecessary to express the ideas in this way.  If it were necessary, then we could argue till we were blue in the face over what's the best definition of rights.  But if we can express is in other ways, then we get to ask whether expressing this set of moral ideas as if they were things that we possess is fruitful.

Look again what you said: 
Now wait a minute! To say that you "have" a right to freedom of action doesn't mean that it "belongs" to you or that you "own" the right, as you own a piece of property; it simply means that others shouldn't interfere with your freedom -- that they are obligated to respect it.
If it simply means that others shouldn't interfere with your freedom, then why not say it that way?  Why phrase it like you have something in your possession?  We both understand the concept of rights and what it implies.  But how these ideas is presented is not neutral.  Saying that you have something, these 'rights' is phrasing it in terms of something that you have in your possession.  Saying that someone else shouldn't interfere with your freedom is phrasing it in terms of how others should or shouldn't act towards you.  These are radically different ways of expressing it!  And the latter is clearly focused on what others shouldn't be doing to you, while the former is focused on you and something you possess.  Even if you recognize that they are trying to express the same thing, you can't deny that they are expressing it in wildly different ways!
However, I think I know what may be bothering you about the concept of rights. Even though we say that we "possess" rights, we don't really mean that we are in possession of an object; we simply mean that we are entitled to be treated a certain way by other people -- that in dealing with us they ought to follow certain principles of conduct, i.e., abstain from initiating force or fraud against us. But we don't simply say that everyone should adhere to the non-aggression principle, and leave it at that. We express the idea in terms of rights and entitlements. The reason for this may be that the concept of rights originated with the concept of rightfully owned property, so that it was relatively easy to extend the idea of possessing a piece of property to the possession of rights in general.
Your last statement may be close to the truth, and it's what I was saying earlier.  There is potentially something useful, at least in some vague discussions, in describing rights as things that you possess much like property, and by analogy other people are morally limited in their options just like they are limited in stealing from you.  But as I said, it is circular.  It relies on the concept of a right to property to then create the analogy that rights are sort of like property, and your possession of them implies others can't interfere with them.

And even though the analogy is circular, it's readily understood.  And it's even useful to some extent.  It's convenient to talk about the kinds of things you should control, instead of talking about the kinds of things other people shouldn't interfere with without your permission.  But there is plenty of confusion too.  Saying you should control it might be saying that it would benefit your life to control it, but that isn't quite the same as saying that other people should respect your control.  If you did try to say that it includes the fact that other people shouldn't interfere with it, what about emergency situations where they might steal from you but they need to in order to live?  Maybe it is simply describing what areas you should control and others shouldn't or the result would be a disharmony of interests?  There are many possibilities, and plenty of confusion.  My point was that some of this confusion is due to the way rights presents these moral ideas as if they are things that a person possesses.  Even if there are some advantages to using that terminology some of the time, it seems that a more detailed discussion of the underlying principles cannot start with this view and terminology.  You can't start by asking what are rights.  You have to start by describing the principles, such as the harmony of interests, the concept of force, and why people should act on these principles.  The concept of rights is then a way of expressing the conclusions, and not always the best way.


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Post 50

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 10:40amSanction this postReply
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Joe,

Okay, so you're saying that our reasoning is typically as follows: You shouldn't steal my property? Why? Because I have a right to it. Why do I have a right to? Because you shouldn't steal it. Gotcha! Clearly, such reasoning is circular. As a fundamental reason against your stealing it, I can't simply invoke my right to it, if my right to it is based primarily on your obligation not to steal it. I could in a less fundamental sense give my right to it as a reason for you not to steal it, if you already accepted the principle of rights and the issue were simply whether or not it is in fact my property. In short, the concept of a right depends on the moral obligation of others not to violate it, rather than the other way around.

Of course, as I say, a right is not exactly like a piece of property, because I can dispossess you of your property, whereas I cannot dispossess you of your right to it.

I think Rand uses the concept of "rights," because it's already part of our political heritage, and is a key part of our founding documents like the Declaration of Independence and The Constitution. She could simply have ignored it, and started fresh without using any rights-based terminology, but if she had, her philosophy would not have resonated with the average person, who may not have seen the connection between what she was saying and what the Founding Fathers were saying. The fact that she identified the key moral principle behind these "rights"-- the non-initiation of force -- is important because it provides a justification for an idea that many people had already implicitly accepted without fully grasping its real meaning and justification.

(Edited by William Dwyer on 3/06, 10:42am)


Post 51

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 1:04pmSanction this postReply
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Bill,

In short, the concept of a right depends on the moral obligation of others not to violate it, rather than the other way around.
Well put.
I think Rand uses the concept of "rights," because it's already part of our political heritage, and is a key part of our founding documents like the Declaration of Independence and The Constitution. She could simply have ignored it, and started fresh without using any rights-based terminology, but if she had, her philosophy would not have resonated with the average person, who may not have seen the connection between what she was saying and what the Founding Fathers were saying.
Great point.

Bringing these two points together, then: It's not like we can wake up tomorrow and starting calling the Ayn Rand Center for Individual Rights ("ARC") in Washington, D.C. ...

the Ayn Rand Center for the Moral Obligation of Others
:-)

Ed


Post 52

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 1:29pmSanction this postReply
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Joe,

In post #49 , near the bottom, you wrote, "...in describing rights as things that you possess much like property, and by analogy other people are morally limited in their options just like they are limited in stealing from you. But as I said, it is circular. It relies on the concept of a right to property to then create the analogy that rights are sort of like property, and your possession of them implies others can't interfere with them."

What if the problem is not how we are using the term "rights," but in how we are using the term "property"?

From Rand, all rights apply to action, "The concept of a 'right' pertains only to action—specifically, to freedom of action. It means freedom from physical compulsion, coercion or interference by other men."

She goes on to say, "The right to life is the source of all rights—and the right to property is their only implementation."

I'm going to argue that this is where the problem exists. That it makes no sense to say we have a "right to property," because property IS a bundle of rights relating a person to an entity - they are a set of actions that we have the moral sanction to exercise in relation to some entity. This bundle of rights define the boundaries of actions relative to the entity. If I have leased a car, I have acquired a bundle of rights related to that car. They are very specific, time-limited in this case, and define the actions for which I have moral sanction. Knowing those boundaries empowers me - I can do anything I want within them - I don't have to work up complex reasonings from basic principles before doing anything with that car. My energies are liberated.

It is the common usage of the word 'property' that is the problem in this issue, not the word 'rights'.

The equivocation in the last statement of Rand's that I quoted is the mixing the meanings of property as a bundle of rights with the meaning of property as the entity itself, be it a car, or a hammer, or a copyright to a novel.

I am claiming, as did Rand, that rights can only apply to actions. The actions are always relating the person entitled to take that action to an entity upon which the action would fall. I have the right to breathe (action taker = me, action=drawing a breath, entity=my body). I have many more rights related to my body, a whole bundle of them. I possess them, they are my property.

So, is my body my property? No. The way I believe we should use the term property is that we do not own things - we only own rights to things. That which we can morally do with an entity is defined by that bundle of rights that represent our moral relationship to that thing, and that bundle is what we own - that bundle is our property in that thing.

A woman can sell her hair to a wig-maker, or some of her blood to a blood bank. She can do this morally because she has a right to sell these things, because these are two items in the bundle of rights that relate to her body. The law may define terms of a contract to protect the exchanges of the values represented by these transactions - a law that legally sanctions what is morally sanctioned. If a law is passed that prohibits her from selling her blood, it is immoral because it interferes with an action that has moral sanction and that is primary to the law.

Here is a quote from Rand on rights and property: "The right to life is the source of all rights—and the right to property is their only implementation."

We understand exactly what she means, but if I were to rewrite it to strictly conform with a defintion of "property" as a bundle of rights, it would be something like this, "The right to life is the source of all rights—and property is their only implementation." I find that awkward. And it is a problem that property can refer to the entity, to the bundle of rights in that entity, or in all entities, or all rights that can be associated with all entities, to the idea that things can be owned, to the assigned or implied possession and/or title of an entity... etc. (not counting the use of word to mean 'land' or real estate)

"Ownership" is our relationship to a specific bundle of rights. I "own" a collection of rights relative to an entity.

All of this is awkward and tedious and makes it clear why common usage would fall to saying 'property' means the object, and 'ownership' means possession and/or title of the the object, and that wealth is a collection of objects. But awkward or not, this concept of a bundle of rights takes care of the circular reasoning problem.

Here is quote from Bastiat's Law where he uses "property" as I have described, "As long as it is admitted that the law may be diverted from its true purpose—that it may violate property instead of protecting it—then everyone will want to participate in making the law, either to protect himself against plunder or to use it for plunder. Political questions will always be prejudicial, dominant, and all-absorbing. There will be fighting at the door of the Legislative Palace, and the struggle within will be no less furious."

(Side Note: Doesn't that fit so well what we see in politics today?!?!)

Here is another item to consider: I lease the use of a car for this next month. I have acquired a bundle of rights relative to the car (and Avis retains some of their bundle of rights in the car, as well as a transfer of my bundle of rights in some money to them). I now have the right to drive the car to the grocery store next Tuesday. But, I was not born with that specific right. My human nature isn't about driving rental cars. But it is also NOT a just a legal right, or a right granted by statute. It is an expression of my right to participate in voluntary exchanges - to take any action that does not violate the rights of others, and that does have a basis in human nature (and become a moral principle in presence of others). All moral rights will be directly inferred from my nature, or will be derived as logical extensions of those fundamental rights.

Some moral principles arise even on a Island inhabited by a single person - it would be immoral to lie to myself about the reality of my situation; it would be immoral to not take those actions my survival requires in this context. Other moral principles only come into being when there is the possibility of the actions of the person on the island effecting others or of their actions effecting him. If there are no others, there are no rights, no bundle of rights, no property in the sense of a bundle of property, no property in the sense of ownership. The base of rights is human nature, but the rights as moral sanction of actions require the existence of other in a context where a boundary between actions might exist such that we could violate their rights or they could violate ours without those boundaries.

As infants we have no sense of rights and act as if we had the right to any action we want. Childhood is partly about learning restrictions - learning that we can't hit or take things away from our playmates, that we shouldn't touch things that don't belong to us without permission and so forth. When we have learned that, we, hopefully, have enough self-esteem to pursue our ambitions vigorously which means taking a wide and assertive range of actions in pursuit of our goals (within the boundary of rights). Through childhood we restricted our actions as we acquired an understanding and acceptance of rights, and in adulthood we expand our actions within those boundaries - we reap the benefits of being able to act in an environment of rights (to the degree that they are recognized legally and culturally).

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Post 53

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 2:36pmSanction this postReply
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Bill, I think you got it, as expressed in your first paragraph.  And I agree with your second paragraph, that the analogy isn't perfect because they can't steal your rights, only infringe them.  And I agree with the last paragraph too.  It makes sense to use the common language.  I'm not quite advocating getting rid of the language of rights.  I'm more of pointing out their limitations in precision, and suggesting we set them aside when discussing more detailed issues.

A similar thing could be said for the discussion of initiation of force vs. retaliatory force that spawned this thread originally.  There was a legitimate question about what counts as retaliatory force.  Is it any force that happens in response to an initiation of force?  Are there limits?  But these are, to some extent, derivative concepts as well that capture the conclusion of a larger argument.  Instead, we could talk about a harmony of interests between people, and a moral ideal where each person controls his own life and others must seek voluntary agreement from him if they want some kind of interaction.  The initiation of force is a violation of this moral ideal, and a disruption to the harmony of interests.  And retaliatory force is not simply force that comes after.  It is force that undoes the damage of the initiation of force and restores the harmony.  You may have a different way of expressing it, but the point is we can always look at the underlying justification to get our answers, instead of trying to manipulate the definition of a term to make it work in all cases.

So instead of asking whether murderers have a right to life, we could probably get to an agreement rather quickly.  We could acknowledge that a use of force against him will undermine his own choices, and so he'll certainly resent it.  We can see that his act of murder disrupted the harmony of interests, and therefore pitted him against the interests of others.  We can see that one of the key justifications for not using force against others is because of the important of the harmony of interests, and that his actions set himself outside of that justification.  And we can see that because of the value of a harmony of interests, restoring that harmony is a significant moral need.  And finally, we can recognize that the use of force is need to restore that harmony.

Again, you might quibble over some parts of it, or whether there is a better way to express it all, or whether there are even more important considerations I left out, but all of that is possible because we left behind the notion of rights and looked more deeply at the underlying moral arguments.


Post 54

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 2:58pmSanction this postReply
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Steve,

You said quite a bit, and there is a lot to potentially agree or disagree with.  The point that property rights should be about the things that you are free to do instead of the objects themselves is important, and can be lost along the way.  I'm not sure that really addresses the points I was making, though.  The circularity still exists.  Saying that you possess or have rights would be an empty statement if it didn't include the implication that when you own something, others cannot interfere with it.  And that implication is a product of rights.

It might be true that if you were more careful with how you talk about property rights, the error would be more obvious.  Then you'd say something like "I have the property right to choose how I want to act in utilizing my rights".  So while your approach may have merit, it doesn't solve the concern I have.
I am claiming, as did Rand, that rights can only apply to actions.
The way I see it, the concept of rights is trying to define some kind of moral boundary between yourself and others.  Within that boundary, you have control, and they are not allowed to interfere.  Ignoring the strange way that rights are described (as things that you possess), it's a legitimate thing to describe.  The interesting part is that there are two halves to it.  There are your own actions and choices, and there are the actions or choices of others.  The concept of rights tries to focus on your half, but inevitably it's only useful if there's the implication that their half is constrained.  But if we look at it, you can imagine talking about the right not to be murdered or maimed.  It isn't an action on your part, really.  But it is still describing that moral boundary where others can't interfere.  So saying that rights only apply to actions is debatable.  You might try to twist it to suggest that being murdered or maimed ultimately limit your choices of actions, but I don't see the need to be so indirect.


Post 55

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 3:38pmSanction this postReply
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Joe,

We can see that his act of murder disrupted the harmony of interests, and therefore pitted him against the interests of others.  We can see that one of the key justifications for not using force against others is because of the [importance] of the harmony of interests, and that his actions set himself outside of that justification.  And we can see that because of the value of a harmony of interests, restoring that harmony is a significant moral need.  And finally, we can recognize that the use of force is need to restore that harmony.
Very well put. I couldn't agree more -- a "natural" moral need to restore an objective value (harmony of interests) via means which, though forceful, are already justified by that moral need in this first place.

Ed


Post 56

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 3:39pmSanction this postReply
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Joe,

You said, "The way I see it, the concept of rights is trying to define some kind of moral boundary between yourself and others."

Yes - that is the functional heart of rights - the end goal. A boundary is a 'line' that has two side. The boundary of my rights is also the boundary of everyone else's rights. With universal rights, the boundary defined in an identical fashion - we all have those same rights. It has to be a moral boundary since it isn't physical - that is, a criminal can cross it physically, but not morally. When someone takes my car it can be a crime, or I loaned it to them, or an accident where they thought I loaned it to them for two day, but I thought it was for only one day (civil instead of criminal).

I can go up to that boundary and so can others, coming from their side. It is the same boundary seen from different sides. It is a moral fence between me and my neighbors.

But it needs to start with the metaphysics of the applicable elements of human nature as a base, then go to the fundamental moral rights that apply when more than one person exists (society), and that becomes the foundation from which finer parsing of moral rights in more complex or detailed situations can be examined, and then for any properly parsed out moral principle the best statement of law can be crafted the defines where boundaries set in a given context.
------------------

You said, "The circularity still exists. Saying that you possess or have rights would be an empty statement if it didn't include the implication that when you own something, others cannot interfere with it. And that implication is a product of rights."

I'm not sure about that. To say that I have rights is to say that there is a moral boundary that defines my permitted actions. My rights each address those actions that can be exercised towards the entity the right addresses. There can be no right to violate a right and because of that no other person can have a moral boundary that overlaps with my moral boundary. To say that I "own my rights" or I "possess rights" is just an assertion that I'm claiming something on moral or legal grounds. I would treat that as an idiomatic use of the language rather than an empty statement or an example of circularity. We grew up having to learn to grasp abstractions and we often use concrete forms of expression to 'short-hand' or symbolize things. I'd say that is what we do with property when we think of it as the object and not the rights to the object. Then we shift to doing the same with rights, thinking of them as objects instead of a moral principle defining actions related to an object.

Other people can interfere with what I own, but if they do so without my permission they did so immorally. Again, it is a boundary that separates my moral sphere from their moral sphere - neither can cross the line. I get to breathe, they don't get to stop me. I get to sell my car, they don't. One boundary works both ways as long as it is understood that there can not be rights to violate a right - neither can step over the boundary without leaving the only sphere of morality they have. We abandon our rights in some fashion by the nature of the act in which we step over that boundary.

Post 57

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 4:19pmSanction this postReply
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Ed, thanks.  Note also that it isn't simply that the use of retaliatory force is justified, like it was a necessary evil.  The foundation for why people shouldn't use force is in order to create or maintain that harmony of interests.  Once someone disrupts that harmony, refusing to use force would no long support the harmony....it would support the disharmony by encouraging and protecting the perpetrator.

Steve,
To say that I have rights is to say that there is a moral boundary that defines my permitted actions.
Just notice how radically different those two ways of saying it are structured.  "I have rights".  "There exist a moral boundary".  One is presented as a kind of possession.  The other is presented as pointing out something exists.  You can say they are equivalent, but not in form, focus, or connotation.  These are not identical, even though they may both be trying to present the same basic idea.

Any discussion of what rights "really means" just ignores the problem.


Post 58

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 5:07pmSanction this postReply
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Joe,

I agree that they are not the same thing. I'd say that the moral boundary is what we are striving for. That is the fence we hope to use to make it easier for us to be better neighbors... but that to get to that point we need to build from the 'right to exist', carefully adding each layer to keep it logical and justified. The final product is a right which can be seen as a moral boundary as long as we remember that it has a hierarchical structure and a base in metaphysics and it becomes a floating abstraction without those.

Maybe it is that Possession isn't always moral. If someone steals my car they possess it, but not lawfully... When I say I have rights, I'm saying my rights to the actions in question are moral (i.e., I have moral sanction in this context - just a thought).

Or, a criminal could say, "I have rights" but based upon his crime he might not have the rights he once had. That is all in the language of "possession" - and it makes perfect sense. More and more I'm thinking that there isn't any real circularity of logic here, but rather an idiomatic use of terms denoting possession as a way of asserting that someone has violated their rights or isn't recognizing their rights. Or a short-hand way of spelling out the full reasoning behind a claim to be morally sanctioned in a context.

I sign a contract with someone for a longterm lease on a car, and the lease doesn't prohibit me from subleasing to someone else. I have bought some rights from the leasing agent and possessed them, and then I can sell some of them to the person that subleases from me. I have a right to buy own and sell those contractual rights. The person who owns the copyright of book has a value if that book is popular. I'm having more and more difficulty seeing the circularity.

Post 59

Sunday, March 6, 2011 - 6:29pmSanction this postReply
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Joe,

Note also that it isn't simply that the use of retaliatory force is justified, like it was a necessary evil.  The foundation for why people shouldn't use force is in order to create or maintain that harmony of interests.  Once someone disrupts that harmony, refusing to use force would no long support the harmony....it would support the disharmony by encouraging and protecting the perpetrator.




I'm again in complete agreement.

Imagine using force against a criminal and then saying to him: "I'm really sorry, man, but I've got to lock you up for a while" -- as if you should be sorry to do that (sorry to express the virtue of justice)! That's not something to be sorry for (like a necessary evil, or something). Instead, it's something to look forward to. In fact, criminals should jump into their cells with glee, the moment they are opened up -- knowing that what they are doing is helping to restore a harmony of interests among men!

:-)

I was a criminal once (a vigilante), if I were caught now within a statute of limitations, and put in jail, and then offered a deal to get out of half the time of my sentence -- I feel like I would stay in jail on purpose, in order to ensure that there is a harmony of interests when I get out. I feel like I would not seek the unearned, and that my jail sentence was what I had earned. There is this criminal, Ian Brady (the "Moors Murderer"), jailed in Great Britain somewhere. They offered him early parole (or just, a parole) and he said "no," he said that he doesn't deserve any kind of parole, ever. I can respect that.

If I were Ian, I would say that -- even though, as a human, I have an inalienable right to life and liberty -- that my having those rights never included the possibility of being set free after being caught for murder. That would contradict the foundational principle -- harmony of interests -- on which rights rest.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/07, 11:42am)


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