| | Ed,
Okay, If what you mean by saying that rights are "metaphysical" is that they are a product of nature rather than of human design, then I think you are correct in the sense in which, given our nature (as rational animals), our survival requires them.
I asked, "Also what about my point that 'what it means to say that someone has a right to something is that others are obligated to respect it (i.e., not to interfere with its exercise). If they are not so obligated, then it makes no sense to say that the person has a "right" to it.'?" Okay, let's take a concrete case because the issue is so easy to misunderstand. Let's take a dude in prison for rape. This dude appears to have lost some of his right to freedom -- otherwise he would not be in jail (or would not be judiciously "jailable"). That's one way to look at the issue -- that, in committing a rape, he surrendered some of his right to freedom. And , no longer having the same amount of the human right to freedom as we do, it is proper to go ahead and put him in jail.
But what about what I say about it? I say that the guy lost circumstantial (or "existential") freedom without losing the right to freedom. That the guy lost something "man-make-able" without losing something metaphysical. I say that the guy had (and has) a metaphysical right to (the full exercise of) circumstantial freedom, but with one limiting rule -- that he does not violate the rights of others. In such cases, I say that he surrenders a portion of the man-make-able (circumstantial) part, the otherwise unfettered exercise, of his metaphysical rights. Well, I don't think there's a valid distinction between the exercise of one's rights and the rights themselves. To say that I have a right to something is equivalent to saying that I have a right to its exercise. What are the criminal's rights in this case? He no longer has the right to live freely outside of jail. Otherwise, by jailing him, one would be violating his rights. Remember, to say that someone has a right means that others are obligated to respect it. So if the criminal has a right to live outside of jail, then the authorities are obligated to respect it; they have no right to put him in jail. Conversely, if they do have the right to put him in jail, then he no longer has the right to live outside of jail. He cannot have it both ways: He cannot have the right to live outside of jail and at the same time justifiably be kept within a jail.
Yes, rights are metaphysical (in the sense that they are required by man's nature for his proper survival), but they only apply to people who respect them. A person doesn't have the right to violate other people's freedom of action while retaining a commensurate right to his own. That doesn't mean that he loses the right to all of his freedom. He still retains a right to that portion of it to which he is entitled. However, if he destroys the freedom of another person entirely by murdering him, then he does lose the right to all of his freedom: he loses the right to his life.
As regards Rand's use of the term "inalienable," here is what she says: "When we say that we hold individual rights to be inalienable, we must mean just that. Inalienable means that which we may not take away, suspend, infringe, restrict or violate -- not ever, not at any time, not for any purpose whatsoever." ("Textbook of Americanism," pamphlet, 12)
When we jail a thief or execute a murderer, we are not taking way, suspending, infringing, restricting or violating his rights. He, the criminal, forfeited (lost) those rights when he committed the crime. The act of jailing or executing him does not take away or violate his rights, because having committed the crime, he no longer possesses them.
(Edited by William Dwyer on 3/04, 12:01pm)
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