Word as capstone of concept

Doug, rather than complain that I didn't use the exact same words you did, why not just put all speculation to rest and provide three clear concrete examples of what you mean?

Post 41

Saturday, March 20, 2010 - 11:59am

1) Because it is unnecessary. I've already reached the understanding I wished. 2) Because, before entering a new and possibly enlightening discussion with you, I want proof that you are worth discussing with. You are providing evidence to the contrary, so I offer nothing.

Please reread my posts for hints of what I want of you first.

Post 42

Saturday, March 20, 2010 - 12:52pm

Let me see if I understand what you just said.

You already have what you want. So you want more, specifically for me to provide counterexamples to examples which you refuse to provide, as proof that I am "worth discussing with."

Does that constitute your example of three concepts you use for which you do not have words? To me it sounds like two self-contradictions and a demand for an a priori sanction of arbitrary nonsense.

You have made the claim, whatever it is. The burden is upon you to provide examples. (If you reread the thread you will see that I am not the only one who has asked for them.) I quote Leonard Peikoff:

�Arbitrary� means a claim put forth in the absence of evidence of any sort, perceptual or conceptual; its basis is neither direct observation nor any kind of theoretical argument. [An arbitrary idea is] a sheer assertion with no attempt to validate it or connect it to reality.

If a man asserts such an idea, whether he does so by error or ignorance or corruption, his idea is thereby epistemologically invalidated. It has no relation to reality or to human cognition.

Post 43

Saturday, March 20, 2010 - 5:11pm

You failed to understand me on multiple levels. A hint, Ted, if you think you've read a contradiction so obvious, read again with more attention. It might never have been there.

Your claim that I have made an arbitrary claim meets your given definition of arbitrary (see post 36). This is the claim you are asking evidence of. Why should I offer evidence in favor of something I'm not defending? Anything that is implicit to my stance is implicit in yours, because I used it to come to my resolution.

I have the understanding I sought in posting this thread. What I want from you is different. Get ready Ted:

A person worth talking to can observe and acknowledge his own error (at least over the course of days). Are you worth talking to? Prove it.

Post 44

Saturday, March 20, 2010 - 6:46pm

Steve,

Our issues are still not joined. You said:

Then you talked about "...losing a "negative" right opens up a flood bank." Two points on that: It is a matter of degree - there is a difference between a little boy who steals a comic book from a store and Hitler who orders genocide. The difference is a measure of the rights violated determines the measure of the rights relinquished, which relates to the measure of punishment that is proper ...

But a just punishment doesn't violate rights -- it doesn't violate them, it doesn't reduce them, it doesn't temporarily abandon them, it doesn't relinquish them (though it relinquishes the free and unfettered exercise of rights).

This is where we differ. For you, it seems, when a comic book thief (or any kind of a 'hitler, big or small) gets punished -- you say they get their rights relinquished. They specifically lose a specific right called "the right to be free from punishment." In doing so, they become -- for a time -- only partially "human" (because humans have full rights to be free from punishment -- but they "lost" theirs). Not being fully human, it would not be inhumane to beat, rape, or kill them -- as long as we think they deserve it.

This is the flood bank. When you say that someone has lost the right to be free from initiated violence, you are saying that they are less human and that they can (or should) be treated that way. The scenario extends to Nazi experimentation camps where all manner of tortures are freely hoisted onto folks. It's a flood bank where anything goes.

Ed

Post 45

Saturday, March 20, 2010 - 7:15pm

Ed,

You said, "...a just punishment doesn't violate rights -- it doesn't violate them, it doesn't reduce them, it doesn't temporarily abandon them, it doesn't relinquish them ..."

We agree on that. But we disagree with the 'why.' It isn't the punishment that reduces rights. It is the criminals choice to engage in an act that violates the rights of another that reduce his own rights.

You said, "...when a ...thief ... gets punished you [Steve] say they [thieves] get their rights relinquished. They specifically lose a specific right called "the right to be free from punishment."

No, not at all. They gave up their right at the time they committed the theft. It is logical that one cannot have the right to violate a right (Rand). I could not punish a crook if in fact they still had their full set of rights. But they cannot claim the moral sanction of their rights when they violate the right of another. That is the mechanism by which they voluntarily reduce themselves of some rights. And it is because of that that they can be punished without having to violate their rights. It is that mechanism that lets us make objective judgments of how much and what kind of punishments are appropriate (why the saying, 'let the punishment fit the crime' makes moral sense).

Humans are bipeds but if a fellow loses a leg he is still a human. When someone gives up some of his rights by stealing or using violence and in doing so give up his rights, they are still humans. A human that voluntarily gave up some rights by violating rights.

I'm sorry, Ed, but you are way off base with saying that this scenario extends itself to Nazi experimentation. And you ignored my observation that your position is identical but just with some different words. How do you justify imprisoning a criminal (a guilty thief) if he still has a full set of rights? You have to say that he can't exercise his rights? The Nazis could have said the same thing - they were just not allowing the exercise of certain rights.

Post 46

Saturday, March 20, 2010 - 7:32pm

Ed,

First, thanks for your answer way back from post 19.

I think I understand you debate with Steve, I'm interested in seeing which way it resolves. I'm suspicious of a category error. If rights are ethical principles, do you think you are treating it as you would other principles. ie do you lose other principles, or just the free and unfettered exercise of them?

Steve,

Thank you as well for your answer and thoughts back from post 16. I did not consider that interpretation of floating abstraction. I also suspect you're right that words enable a mind to go beyond crow-style thought. However crows are remarkably clever as far as animals fare. I'm tempted to say that they are working with fleeting concepts, thereby never getting very far at all - without words.

Post 47

Saturday, March 20, 2010 - 8:24pm

You have failed to make yourself clear on any level, Doug. And I have already told you that I am concerned only in fully concretized examples of whatever it is that you think you mean, not assertions of my duty to disprove a nullity, vague arbitrary claims, or sophomoric hints. It might also benefit you to reread ItOE, which you said in your first post you don't remember. Until then I am not interested.

Post 48

Sunday, March 21, 2010 - 8:48am

Steve,

I could not punish a crook if in fact they still had their full set of rights.

Yes you can, because there is no such thing as the specific "right to be free of punishment" or the "right to be free of justice" -- or the "right to be free from jail" -- to use Bill's words on the matter -- or the "right to be free from reality" for that matter.

It is this specific kind of listing of positive rights to things with which I disagree. We do not have the right to anything, we only have rights against something (i.e., initiated force).

How do you justify imprisoning a criminal (a guilty thief) if he still has a full set of rights?

Because real rights are negative -- rights against initiated force -- and imprisoning a criminal (or guilty thief) is not an initiation of force ... it is a retaliation.

Ed

Post 49

Sunday, March 21, 2010 - 9:03am

Doug,,

If rights are ethical principles, do you think you are treating it as you would other principles. ie do you lose other principles, or just the free and unfettered exercise of them?

Interesting question. Let me see if I can answer it. I'll first try using the principle of parsimony which states that all else being equal, simpler explanations are superior to complex ones postulating myriads of levels of causality (e.g., Descartes' demon).

Do we ever give up or "lose" this principle (of parsimony)? On first glance, it appears we do, but we do not. Instead, we restrict or refine the application of the principle by thoroughly examining and evaluating the context in which it is applied. In others words, we have to always remember that it only applies to explanations that are otherwise equal -- and, sometimes, the more complex explanation is actually better, because it explains results better than the simpler one does.

Applying this to the rights discussion, we never lose rights, but sometimes we adjust the application (i.e., the "exercise") of them in order to make them fit with justice and reality. We have to always remember that rights, being negative only, only "apply" in situations of initiated force -- and that they do not "apply" (do not morally proscribe an action) in situations of retaliations of force ... such as a jurisprudent incarceration. The differing levels of application are simply differing levels of the "rightful exercise" of rights.

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/21, 9:04am)

Post 50

Sunday, March 21, 2010 - 9:12am

Ed,

When someone who committed a crime, perhaps years ago, is hunted down and imprisoned, that isn't a delegation of self-defense in the strict sense of the phrase. It is not defense because it is after the fact and the justice system knows this, because they don't attempt to establish current or future threat as the reason for incarceration, they stay focused on the crime in the past. It is the crime of the past that they convict on. Removing a possible future threat to others is an added benefit, but not the heart of the issue.

Look at murder. Once the victim is dead, there is victim to defend. You would be left with the ugly sounding defense of going after the criminal for the good of the people.

So, it is not retaliation in the sense of self-defense. The aspect of individual rights that allows us to justly imprison someone who violated the rights of another is that they have lost the moral right to assert rights they have violated - because logic won't let them have their moral cake and eat it too. If they violated the rights of another, then they cannot use the existence of individual rights as their defense.

If this were not the case, if they had not impaired their own rights in committing a crime, then we would not have the moral sanction for punishing them. How could we say our justice system was based upon defending rights and at the same time say person x still has rights but we will choose to deny them the exercise of those rights. If they have rights, then they have the right to exercise those rights and we would not have the right to impede the exercise of those rights. You must see the criminal as damaging their own rights, of their own free will, by the very act of committing the crime, or you cannot have a moral system of justice - you just end up with dictatorial decrees - some benign some not - but all morally arbitrary.

Post 51

Sunday, March 21, 2010 - 2:06pm

Ed wrote,

Because real rights are negative -- rights against initiated force -- and imprisoning a criminal (or guilty thief) is not an initiation of force ... it is a retaliation.

I think I finally see where you're coming from, Ed. You're right that imprisoning a criminal -- a guilty thief -- is not a violation of his right to liberty, because it does not constitute the initiation of force; it is strictly retaliatory.

But here is where I disagree with you. Just as jailing the criminal does not violate his right to liberty, so neither it does not limit its exercise. The only way it could limit its exercise is if jailing him constituted an initiation of force, for it is only the initiation of force that can limit the exercise of one's rights. Retaliatory force does not and cannot limit the exercise of one's rights, since one does not have a right against retaliatory force.

What about retaliatory force that is excessive -- e.g., killing someone for stealing a pencil? I would say that this constitutes a form of the initiation of force, because a person who is guilty of simply stealing a pencil still has a right to life. Killing him would violate that right, just as it would interfere with its exercise.

So I still maintain that there is no valid distinction between respect for a right and respect for its exercise. If you interfere with the exercise of a thief's right to life by killing him, you violate that self-same right.

As for rights being strictly negative, I don't see how that's true. Aren't the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness positive?

- Bill

Post 52

Sunday, March 21, 2010 - 3:45pm

Steve and Bill,

Rights come from what you are, not what you do. Another way to say this is that they are Metaphysical, and not Man-Made. Another way to say this is that rights are inalienable, and not (even temporarily) alienable.

However, you guys are currently in a position of arguing that rights come from what you do -- if you do the right things, you have rights. You only have the right to do what's right. You might not go so far as to say that rights are Man-Made inventions, but you would have to say they are Man-Maintained things (in order to avoid contradictions).

This issue was addressed in a book whose name escapes me ("The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand"?) by an author whose name also escapes me ("Eric Mack"?). The author's compelling conclusion is that rights aren't just rights to do right (or, rights to do the right thing), but can also be used in order to do wrong. I'll post more on this when I find the book ...

Bill,

As for rights being strictly negative, I don't see how that's true. Aren't the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness positive?

No, only in the sense that they are morally good (e.g., they make me feel positive and set me up for success, which is positive, in living as a human being). It's possibly a case of the dreaded colloquiallism -- where something is referred to in a certain way, but that (that way of referring to it) is not the proper way to think about it.

If I say "Wow, I'm beat!" I don't mean that my rights have been violated (by having been physically beaten), I just mean that I'm tired.

And when I shake my fist at Obama when he signs a bill for Socialized Medicine and I shout: "I have the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, you evil, rights-infringing Marxist!", I just mean that Obama does not (nor does anyone) have a right to initiate force on me like that -- as if I were a slave in a dystopic, slave-society or something. I'm not really saying what it is that I have a right to -- I'm forcefully reminding him of what he doesn't have a right to (i.e., my life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness).

This, like many matters, can easily devolve into semantics and sophistry. After all, isn't every positive merely the negation-of-a-negative??? Notice how a negative isn't the positive of a positive, though -- notice how what you start with alters the discussion (and prevents insight into the origin and validation of individual rights). The right idea is to not ever lose sight of the "why and how" of rights (as that's how you go awry). The "why" is:

We have rights because of what kind of creatures we are (not necessarily what kind of actions we take). We're a kind of creature who is willfully productive and self-determining (i.e., the kind of creature where rights "fit" with their nature).

The "how" is:

As the purpose of rights is to limit oppressive or predatory behavior among humans (note: this behavior is "natural" to animals) so that they can best live as the kind of creature they are (which includes producing value and trading value) -- so the demarcation or objective outline of one's rights will always be moral prescriptions against initiating force on others (and the rational acceptance of -- rather than feeble attempts to thwart -- justice). The reason that thwarting justice is wrong -- i.e., the reason you don't have a right to escape justice -- is because initiated violence has to be "dealt with" because of the way reality is.

If reality were something other than it is, then it would be possible to succeed (in general) as a human by being unjust to others -- but that is not the case.

Ed

Post 53

Sunday, March 21, 2010 - 5:19pm

Ed,

You said that rights are because of what we are and not what we do. That isn't strictly so. It is both and it is about our nature as humans, not me or you or someone in particular.

For example, the right to life is the right to self-sustaining, self-initiated actions that are appropriate to man's life qua man. Notice that life itself is a process and that a process is composed of actions that share a functional theme. Notice that not any action done by a man, or by all men will fit the definition either... it must be appropriate to man qua man.

Metaphysical elements of man's rights = actions, those required to survive, but of those survival actions, only those appropriate to survival of man as man (not as a jungle beast or a dependent slug).

The joining of an individuals justification to act in accord with what is proper to survive as a man is the conversion of the is to the should. It is where a standard of valuation arise for an individual. To the extent that it is formulated from statements that would be true for all men, it is a universal moral code.

The joining to the moral realm to the political realm does not come into play until there are more people involved. I can not rail about having my rights violated by a storm, only by another man (or organization of men). If a man were to scream at a storm that he has a right to fight for his life, it could be taken as his assertion of his will to live, of the rightness of his living, of his valuing his life. And there are moral elements in those in that they relate to value, but they do not get into "Individual rights" - into what one can not do.

It is right that I live (actions). It is right that all men live (actions). It is right that I value my life. This is so for all men. All men should value their lives. Actions taken by one man in pursuit of his life might cost another man his life. The logical boundary for human action that makes living together is the awareness that contradictions can not exist and that rights cannot violate rights.

That which I have a right to is positive in terms of myself alone on that proverbial island. I have a right to go about looking for coconuts for example, but it is a moot point as a political assertion till there are other men that are contesting my eating a coconut that I picked up.

Post 54

Sunday, March 21, 2010 - 7:26pm

Steve,

I agree with most of your post 53, especially this:

If a man were to scream at a storm that he has a right to fight for his life, it could be taken as his assertion of his will to live, of the rightness of his living, of his valuing his life. And there are moral elements in those in that they relate to value, but they do not get into "Individual rights" - into what one can not do.

I agree with the 'normative' view that you take when you say that there are general actions proper to man and that rights are based on those general kinds of actions (or on what metaphysically would allow for a man to live as a human).

However, to press the issue in order to squeeze out even subtle differences that we may still have, I would say that a human baby has rights ... even though that baby may have never even thought about taking any kind of an action that is proper to man.

Another way to say this is that rights are 100% derived from your nature, and 0% derived from your (specific) actions -- even if they can, in retrospect, be alternately derived (or validated?) from the general actions that men do take, and absolutely need to take, in living their lives.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/21, 7:28pm)

Post 55

Sunday, March 21, 2010 - 8:18pm

Ed,

Our rights do derive (originate) 100% from human nature, however, remember the aspect of human nature that the rights arise from ARE actions - life is action, pursuit of our values is action, making a choice is an action, use of our property is an action, etc.

But the fact that this special subset of actions originate with human nature, does not mean that they don't come with a built in limitation. No one can have such a thing as a right that contains the right to violate rights. Think of a right as containing a clause that says, "this right is null and void should an individual violate a right of a similar level of importance."

Post 56

Sunday, March 21, 2010 - 8:33pm