Word as capstone of concept

... or were you referring to the fact that "street justice" can be observed in humans as early as in a nursery school?:

One toddler takes a toy from another, only to be "punished" (attacked) an observing, third-party toddler who, immediately, understands that a "wrong" has just been committed (and lashes out against the 'predatoddler').

Ed

More reading:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11805825

Post 21

Saturday, March 13, 2010 - 10:08am

However, this "costly punishment" does not have the same 'justice-promoting' effect in communist nursery schools (or, at least, in communist universities) where folks have an ... overwhelming sense of absolute "equality" (read: entitlement). In Beijing, students cooperated less when punishment (for non-cooperation) was an option! The victim-mentality of the Chinese pobably led them to say in their minds "YOU are only cooperating with me because you will be punished if you don't. YOU are not worthy of my cooperation."

Ed
From:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19805085

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/13, 10:11am)

Post 22

Saturday, March 13, 2010 - 9:36pm

Re:

Rand talked about 'crude associators ... Rand even went so far as to claim that they have not yet learned to speak.

If what they do with their brains, nerves, and vocal tracts
(that they would call "speaking") actually isn't speaking,
then what is the proper word for what they're doing?

Re:

I guess you could say that they (e.g., folks who champion 'economic justice') "think" like an animal does.

If some people can be conclusively demonstrated to "think" like animals (associationally and/or otherwise incoherently) --

particularly if some of these people make evident by their words and actions that
/a/ they do not at all wish to to think like humans
and/or
/b/ that they do not accept and/or can't conceive that there even is such a thing as "thinking like humans" which differs from what they do themselves --

could one make a case that such entirely associational thinkers, proponents of "economic justice" and the like (who are using their brains and nervous systems like animals instead of like people) may correctly be treated as animals? Why, or why not?

Post 23

Saturday, March 13, 2010 - 10:13pm

Kate, you said, "could one make a case that such entirely associational thinkers, proponents of "economic justice" and the like (who are using their brains and nervous systems like animals instead of like people) may correctly be treated as animals? Why, or why not?"

No, they shouldn't be treated as animals. Our individual rights are derived from belonging to the human race - not from behaving in a particular way at a particular time. We logically derive the existence of these rights from human nature - from the conditions of existence pertinent to the survival of man as man.

We examined human nature and then apply the principles to all that are human. Some humans choose to function at lower than optimal levels, but they aren't non-human. We have all behaved irrationally at some point, that isn't the same as saying we stopped being human. Our rights don't flit in and out of existence as be make stupid statements or use 'associational thinking.'

(A person can forfeit their rights, but only by violating the rights of another, or entering a contract that reduces their rights. That's a different story.)

The implied logic that our right arise out of our individual state of rationality is mistaken. People might think it is okay to kill a baby because it doesn't yet exercise rational behavior, or that a mentally retarded individual has no rights. Or that a person that is in a coma can be killed (different from being allowed to die). No, in these cases they don't exemplify the mature, optimal expression of the human capacity to reason, but they aren't some other species.

The conservatives say that rights come from the creator. And in a fashion, they are right. Not some mystical creator but rather evolution in that it produced a living creature with marked by the capacity of volition and reason.

(Edited to add that people can forfeit rights by contract as well as by violating the rights of another).
(Edited by Steve Wolfer on 3/14, 11:40am)

Post 24

Sunday, March 14, 2010 - 9:09am

Perhaps it would be helpful if Doug could list the six most important concepts he finds useful for which he does not have words?

How do you expect Doug to list them? Post pictures or videos? :-)

I am beginning to wonder if there are any Objectivists (that is, people who believe that words have actual meanings) in this discussion. Doug has provided us with an archetypical arbitrary claim, that he has "concepts" for which he does not have words. By this claim he might mean two things. He could mean he has implicit concepts he hasn't yet put into words. That's fine. Then he can expend a little effort and do so, and we can discuss what he's talking about. Or perhaps he means he has concepts that can't be put into words under any circumstances, in which he might as well be saying that he has direct knowledge of the existence of a god whom he cannot describe in any worldly terms.

Why is this nonsense being taken seriously?

The burden is on Doug to provide examples of what he is talking about. Sure, he can do this with whatever media he likes. But if it turns out that he cannot express himself that doesn't mean that like some high priest with mystical revelations he is then immune from disproof, it means there is no reason to take him seriously at all.

Post 25

Sunday, March 14, 2010 - 11:09am

Kate,

If what they do with their brains, nerves, and vocal tracts
(that they would call "speaking") actually isn't speaking,
then what is the proper word for what they're doing?

The folks who don't integrate their thoughts, but merely absorb random associations by "emotional osmosis" (by using their feelings in order to believe whatever they want to) are attempting to communicate with others when they open their mouths to form words. You could say, more literally, that they are speaking -- but that they are speaking jibberish.

If some people can be conclusively demonstrated to "think" like animals (associationally and/or otherwise incoherently) --

I pretty much agree with Steve's answer to this (except for the part where he presumes that folks have the metaphysical power to "forfeit" their rights). There are 2 things to think about with this: (1) someone's rights and (2) the exercise of someone's rights.

We can't actually take rights away from folks, and we can't give rights back to folks (such as folks in prison who get set free). Another way to say this is that people can't forfeit and then take (or earn) back their rights. People can't forfeit or take back "gravity" either (even if, by flying in an airplane, they "defy" or "thwart the exercise of" gravity) -- and for the same reason.

Ed

Post 26

Sunday, March 14, 2010 - 12:02pm

Ed,

In response to my statement, "(A person can forfeit their rights, but only by violating the rights of another. That's a different story.)", you said, "I pretty much agree with Steve's answer [post 23] to this [see post 25] (except for the part where he presumes that folks have the metaphysical power to "forfeit" their rights). There are 2 things to think about with this: (1) someone's rights and (2) the exercise of someone's rights.

We can't actually take rights away from folks, and we can't give rights back to folks (such as folks in prison who get set free). Another way to say this is that people can't forfeit and then take (or earn) back their rights. People can't forfeit or take back 'gravity' either (even if, by flying in an airplane, they 'defy' or 'thwart the exercise of' gravity) -- and for the same reason."

Ed, I edited my post in response to you disagreement - I realized that there are two ways in which a person can forfeit their rights. By choosing to enter into a contract, or by violating the rights of another. It is true that the person does not change the basic metaphysical conditions of existence that define human survival, but the context of the moral relationship can change by one's voluntary actions. For example, one of my freedoms includes saying what I want, but I can give up some portion of that if another pays me to shut up about something. I can give up the use of my house for a period of time, when I choose to rent it out. And there because there can be no such thing as a right to violate a right, no one can retain the right to take actions that would violate the rights of others. And we can imprison some one only because they voluntarily give up their right to be free when they violate the rights of another. They might not thing about, and they might deny that it was done voluntarily, but logic is implacable and won't admit a contradiction. If you violate the rights of another, to that degree you abandon the rights of your own. You can not claim for yourself what you refuse to grant another.

In one way, rights would become like floating abstractions if we never applied the concept to the actions that occur - not just to the generalized actions that are referred to in their definitions as moral principles arising out of conditions of existence proper to human nature of man qua man. There is freedom of action that exists as a principle of a particular kind of individual right. My every action in a social context is either a violation of that right of another or not. Everyone else's actions that are within my context are either actions that violate my rights or not.

Post 27

Sunday, March 14, 2010 - 1:37pm

Ed wrote,

There are 2 things to think about with this: (1) someone's rights and (2) the exercise of someone's rights.

Ed, I realize that we've discussed this before, but I want to point out once again that I think this is a spurious distinction. Consider the right to freedom of action. What sense would it make to say that you have a right to freedom of action but no right to exercise that freedom? A right to freedom of action is, by definition, a right to exercise it. If you don't have a right to exercise freedom of action, then you don't have a right to freedom of action!

A person who is justly convicted of a crime and jailed for it has no right to be free from jail. It isn't that he has a right to be free from jail, but no right to exercise that freedom. That wouldn't make any sense. If he had a right to be free from jail, then he'd have a right to exercise that freedom, in which case, the criminal justice system would have no right to jail him. What's not to understand?

- Bill

Post 28

Sunday, March 14, 2010 - 8:53pm

Steve,

For example, one of my freedoms includes saying what I want, but I can give up some portion of that if another pays me to shut up about something.

My answer is that rights are inalienable and "all-or-nothing." That what you gave up was merely some of the exercise of your right to free speech -- you did not give up even a portion of your actual right to free speech.

I can give up the use of my house for a period of time, when I choose to rent it out.

No, you are not giving up any portion of your property rights when you rent your house to someone -- you are trading some of the free and unfettered exercise of your property rights by renting.

If you violate the rights of another, to that degree you abandon the rights of your own. You can not claim for yourself what you refuse to grant another.

Looked at another way, you can (and we often, legitimately, do). We refuse to grant a criminal the free exercise of his rights (even though we claim that for ourselves). This is because, as you say, he did it to himself (and justice demands his incarceration).

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/14, 9:08pm)

Post 29

Sunday, March 14, 2010 - 9:07pm

Bill,

A person who is justly convicted of a crime and jailed for it has no right to be free from jail. It isn't that he has a right to be free from jail, but no right to exercise that freedom. That wouldn't make any sense. If he had a right to be free from jail, then he'd have a right to exercise that freedom, in which case, the criminal justice system would have no right to jail him.

If a person in jail truly lost his right to freedom, then he could be treated as a slave in jail. Instead, he still has (some) freedom. He has the freedom to take naps when he wants, to sit or stand at will, to eat or not eat, etc. etc. Now, if he lost his right to freedom, where did he get the freedom he does still have and still does exercise? That's what wouldn't make sense.

Think about it in terms of having the right to free speech, but not being able to exercise that right in the context of yelling "fire" in a theater. Theaters aren't "rights-violating" entities. They are these crazy, wacky things with the metaphysical power to take away a human being's rights. Instead, what is limited in a theater is the exercise of one's right to free speech, the right is the same, regardless.

Past philosophical thinking on rights, such as is illustrated by the sentences:

"No one is free to yell 'fire' in a theater!"

... and ...

"A hungry man is not free!"

... and ...

"A poor man is not free to dine at the Ritz!"

... are all wrong ways to think about rights, and lead to terrible confusion which stymies human progress and allows for evil dictators and semi-dictators to rule the day. It's wrong to think of rights as equivalent to "the exercise of" rights. It leads to what Rand referred to as an inflation of rights (where bad rights drive out good ones).

Ed

Post 30

Sunday, March 14, 2010 - 9:50pm

Ed,

The way you separate a right from the exercise of the right doesn't make sense to me. What about the right to exercise the right... or the right to exercise the right to exercise the right?

Your treatment of the right is like it were intrinsic - like it was a thing that resided inside the person, and then there is something you call an exercise of that right... but how is that stopped without violating a right? If someone violates your exercise of your right to live and they pretty much violate your right... correct?

You said that if a person in jail truly lost his right to freedom, then in jail he could be used as a slave. That's right. And he could be electrocuted which would pretty much be the end of him as an example. You end up having to say that putting a person guilty of initiating violence in jail is rightfully violating his exercise of right to his freedom, but that he still has freedom?

We know where got his right to freedom. It is from being born a human being. And we know where he lost it - by violating the rights of someone else (Where did their freedom go?).

Rights are moral principles defining actions. You can have your rights but be unable to exercise that right - like if someone is falsely arrested. You could loose your right yet exercise the same action as someone who is able to act by right.

Post 31

Monday, March 15, 2010 - 6:16am

Steve,

Your treatment of the right is like it were intrinsic - like it was a thing that resided inside the person ...

I would say inherent and inalienable. Remember Rand's warning: she said the notion of rights was still in its infancy (i.e., not common knowledge or understanding) -- but that the Declaration of Independence was almost fully correct in it's view of rights.

You said that if a person in jail truly lost his right to freedom, then in jail he could be used as a slave. That's right.

I disagree. Prisoners aren't under the same obligations as slaves.

If someone violates your exercise of your right to live and they pretty much violate your right... correct? ...

... You end up having to say that putting a person guilty of initiating violence in jail is rightfully violating his exercise of right to his freedom, but that he still has freedom?

The rights are the only things that ever get violated. The restricted exercise of rights -- such as when laws are passed prohibiting yelling "fire" in a theater, or that you have to go to jail after you commit a crime -- aren't violations. Thinking of them as "violations" -- because of conflating rights with their exercise -- is essentially conflating liberty with license.

You can have your rights but be unable to exercise that right [- like if someone is falsely arrested.]

That's what I'm saying: that the right and its exercise are two different things. In the case above (false arrest), there was a rights violation. In the case of the criminal, there wasn't.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/15, 6:29am)

Post 32

Monday, March 15, 2010 - 11:18am

I wrote, "A person who is justly convicted of a crime and jailed for it has no right to be free from jail. It isn't that he has a right to be free from jail, but no right to exercise that freedom. That wouldn't make any sense. If he had a right to be free from jail, then he'd have a right to exercise that freedom, in which case, the criminal justice system would have no right to jail him."

Ed replied,

If a person in jail truly lost his right to freedom, then he could be treated as a slave in jail. Instead, he still has (some) freedom. He has the freedom to take naps when he wants, to sit or stand at will, to eat or not eat, etc. etc. Now, if he lost his right to freedom, where did he get the freedom he does still have and still does exercise? That's what wouldn't make sense.

You've conveniently sidestepped my argument. I was very specific. I spoke of his right to be free from jail. Is it your view that he has a right to be free from jail but no right to exercise that right? Yes or no? And if your answer is no, then is it your view that he has the right to complete freedom of action (consistent with respect for the rights of others) but no right to exercise that right? Logically, your answer would also have to be no, for if he is in jail, it makes no more sense to say that he has the right to complete freedom of action than it does to say that he has a right to exercise complete freedom of action. Of course, as you point out, he has some freedoms, but in that case, he also has a right to exercise them. In short, there is no dichotomy between a right to a freedom and a right to exercise that freedom.

Think about it in terms of having the right to free speech, but not being able to exercise that right in the context of yelling "fire" in a theater. Theaters aren't "rights-violating" entities. They are these crazy, wacky things with the metaphysical power to take away a human being's rights. Instead, what is limited in a theater is the exercise of one's right to free speech, the right is the same, regardless.

Ed, yelling "fire" in a crowded theater does not constitute the exercise of the right to free speech, because the right to free speech does not include the right to yell "fire" in a crowded theater, any more than it includes the right to interrupt a speaker against the wishes of the theater owner. The right to free speech does not include a right to violate the rights of others.

Past philosophical thinking on rights, such as is illustrated by the sentences:

"No one is free to yell 'fire' in a theater!"

Yes, in the sense that no one has the right to yell fire in a crowded theater. But this does not interfere with either the right or the exercise of free speech.

... and ...

"A hungry man is not free!"

This is a different issue. A hungry man is still free to choose his actions to the extent that he is not enslaved or coerced. A hungry man is not free to be fed by others against their will; he is not free to enslave, as this would violate both the right to freedom of action and its exercise.

... and ...

"A poor man is not free to dine at the Ritz!"

Again, you're mixing apples and oranges. A poor man is not free to dine at the Ritz without the consent of the owner, because he is not free to violate the owner's property rights.

... are all wrong ways to think about rights, and lead to terrible confusion which stymies human progress and allows for evil dictators and semi-dictators to rule the day. It's wrong to think of rights as equivalent to "the exercise of" rights. It leads to what Rand referred to as an inflation of rights (where bad rights drive out good ones).

Again, what is truly a right (which does not include yelling fire in a crowded theater or being fed by an unwilling provider) would also include a right to exercise it. A right to an action, and a right to exercise it are indeed equivalent. A right to an action that does not include a right to exercise it is a contradiction in terms.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 3/15, 1:54pm)

Post 33

Monday, March 15, 2010 - 5:57pm

Ed,

You said, "...the right and its exercise are two different things. In the case above (false arrest), there was a rights violation. In the case of the criminal, there wasn't."

I agree that the exercising of a right is different from the right as such. But I disagree with the way you address this. You have said that the right stays "inherent" and, presumably, unchanged. You say that there is a rights violation when an innocent person is imprisoned. We agree. And we agree that he has his rights, as he did before he was arrested. And we agree that he cannot exercise all of his rights because he is locked up.

We agree that a criminal who initiated violence and is locked up does not have his rights violated. You would say, correct me if I'm wrong, that his exercise of his rights is not being permitted. And then your position is that he still has rights. He has rights, you say. They are not being violated, by being locked up, you say. And, finally you say they are not being permitted to exercise their rights.

My position is that rights, as defined, are principle for all humans. But the individual person has an instance of those principles that they may or may not lose depending upon their actions. That criminal lost a portion of his rights - they were voluntarily relinquished when he initiated the violence - therefore, from my position, he doesn't have the right to liberty and it is not denying his the exercise of a right he still owns. Liberty isn't a right for a person that has initiated violence against others. We attempt to make our legal system with its definitions, descriptions, procedures, rules and penalties match the appropriate moral principles as closely as possible.

Post 34

Friday, March 19, 2010 - 7:26pm

Ted,

You belittle all when your comment is presumably aimed at me. You discern two possible meanings of my query, the first "fine" the second, mystical. Then immediately decide the second must be my choice, and proceed to waste your time. You also apparently missed that I was gone for a week, and have only barely read your responses.

Your challenge isn't worth response as is. In fact, it isn't worth responding to at all, as you've somehow missed that I've already agreed with you. I would be wasting my time.

'til a productive opportunity, Ted.

(Edited by Doug Fischer on 3/19, 7:28pm)

Post 35

Friday, March 19, 2010 - 10:53pm

Asking you to provide an example of what you are talking about, i.e., taking you seriously, Doug, and at your word, is in no way out of bounds, but rather the essence of the Objectivist method. It's called concretizing. Merlin is the one who seems to think that in asking you for your evidence I was joking. No. Objectivists take evidence seriously.

I have answered you in good faith and certainly more fully than anyone else here. We do have ideas in the form of implicit propositions. Thought is the process of making the implicit concepts that link the subject and the predicate of a sentence explicit. That's the significance of looking for the right word and having it on the tip of your tongue.

Six examples of concepts you use for which you do not have words are not necessary. Three, or even just two, if they are good, will do. Honestly, I don't think you can do it. Not because there is anything wrong with you, but because, like I said, unless you have actually come up with six absolutely new concepts you will find that there already exist words for your ideas. Even Rand didn't create more than half a dozen new concepts and coin words or phrases for them But if you are thinking clearly then I am sure you can prove me wrong. Simply provide us with the definitions for the concepts you hold without words so we can know what you are talking about. There is no need for you to expect us to take you on faith.

Post 36

Saturday, March 20, 2010 - 12:16am

Ted,

Looking over my own posts, I realized your challenge has nothing to do with my argument.

You say in post 24:
"Doug has provided us with an archetypical arbitrary claim, that he has "concepts" for which he does not have words."

Tell me where I say this explicitly.

You say in post 17:
"An unnamed concept may be an implicit concept, right up to the point at which you name it."

Unless you don't mean to say that an implicit concept is a concept, (albeit far less functional and more apt to escape memory) we have no disagreement.

Post 37

Saturday, March 20, 2010 - 8:57am

Bill,

You've conveniently sidestepped my argument. I was very specific. I spoke of his right to be free from jail.

And you've "conveniently" missed my point. We don't have rights to specific things -- e.g. 1) a right to be free from jail, 2) a right to be free from hunger, 3) a right to affordable housing, 4) a right to healthcare, etc.. That's the wrong way to think about rights. Instead, when we examine how our rights apply to situations, we discover that initiated force provides the objective boundary of our rights.

Is it your view that he has a right to be free from jail but no right to exercise that right? Yes or no?

See above.

The right to free speech does not include a right to violate the rights of others.

Right.

Yes, in the sense that no one has the right to yell fire in a crowded theater. But this does not interfere with either the right or the exercise of free speech.

See above.

A hungry man is still free to choose his actions to the extent that he is not enslaved or coerced. A hungry man is not free to be fed by others against their will; he is not free to enslave ...

Right.

A poor man is not free to dine at the Ritz without the consent of the owner, because he is not free to violate the owner's property rights.

Right.

A right to an action, and a right to exercise it are indeed equivalent.

Again, real rights are only "negative" (rights against initiated force or coercion) -- they are not rights to specific actions or to specific "anythings."

Ed

Post 38

Saturday, March 20, 2010 - 9:09am

Steve,

We agree that a criminal who initiated violence and is locked up does not have his rights violated. You would say, correct me if I'm wrong, that his exercise of his rights is not being permitted. And then your position is that he still has rights. He has rights, you say. They are not being violated, by being locked up, you say. And, finally you say they are not being permitted to exercise their rights.

See my post above to Bill. Criminals have the same rights as victims (the right against initiated force, violence, or coercion). It's not correct to talk about a "right to be free from jail" (or "a right to be free from hunger," etc., etc. etc.).

That criminal lost a portion of his rights - they were voluntarily relinquished when he initiated the violence - therefore, from my position, he doesn't have the right to liberty ...

Just to make sure you understand it, do you see how losing a "negative" right opens up a flood bank? If a human lost his right against force, violence, or coercion -- then he could be "rightfully" beaten, raped, and killed. My question to you and Bill is:

Do you think it's okay to beat, rape, and kill criminals (at least "as okay" as it would, hypothetically, be to do with a 'rightless' slave)?

Now, in anticipation of a potential counter-point -- i.e., that there is some arbitrary "portion" of negative rights (rights against initiated force, violence, or coercion) which were "lost" only to be "given back" by "society" after "society" has deemed it "appropriate" to grant someone their rights again -- there is no objective mechanism (nor metaphysical power) for such a thing.

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/20, 9:18am)

Post 39

Saturday, March 20, 2010 - 9:39am