| | I wrote, "When [Rand] says that you should recognize the rights of others if you want your own rights to be recognized, she's saying that you can't demand that others respect your rights, if you're unwilling to respect theirs."
Daniel O'Connor replied, "Well, you can demand it, and if they haven't caught you in your crimes then they'll listen to you just as much as they would if you had respected their rights."
You're missing the point of my statement! By "demand" in this context, I meant that you can't argue that they ought to be willing to respect your rights, if you're (justifiably) unwilling to respect theirs.
I wrote, "The point is that rights are a moral principle and that if it's okay for you to ignore that principle in relation to others, then it's okay for others to ignore it in relation to yourself."
Daniel replied, "What do you mean by 'okay'? What does it mean to say that it's 'okay' for someone to do something? I think that's a meaningless statement."
By "okay," I meant morally acceptable or morally proper. Do you think it's meaningless to say that an action is morally acceptable or morally proper??
You write, "This is similar to an issue Ayn Rand once addressed---which is, what does it mean to say that someone 'should' do something? It makes sense to say, 'if you want to achieve a certain goal, then you should do so and so.' But it doesn't make sense to just say, 'you should do so and so.' I should....in order to achieve what goal? Similarly, it makes sense to say, 'if you want to achieve a certain goal, then it's okay to do so and so.' But it doesn't make sense to just say, 'it's okay to do so and so.'
I agree. Morality is not a set of categorical imperatives. We are not Kantians, after all. So, when I say, "It's okay to do so and so," the implication is that the action does not frustrate one's more important ends or goals.
You continue, "I can violate the rights of others if I want, but I will have to deal with possible retaliation and other negative consequences. Other people can violate my rights if they want, but they will have to deal with possible retaliation and other negative consequences."
I don't think that's the proper justification for rights. The proper justification is: If you want to live in a world in which people's rights are respected, including your own, then you must do what is necessary to achieve that goal: you must respect the rights of others. Notice that this is not a categorical imperative, but a conditional one. IF you want such and such, THEN you must do such and such.
I wrote, "Besides, if that's your only reason for not violating someone else's rights, then there's no reason not to violate them in situations where you're reasonably certain that you can avoid detection and/or retaliation."
You replied, "There are other reasons I've mentioned for not violating someone's rights, that still apply even if you know you could avoid detection or retaliation. I care about most other people and so I don't like to hurt them. Feeding off of other people would make me feel like a parasite, thereby hurting my self-esteem and making me unhappy."
But these are not sufficient to justify a respect for other people's rights. To say that you care about other people and don't want to hurt them is an argument that is based on your subjective feelings. You wouldn't say that someone has "a right" not to be insulted, simply because you wouldn't want to hurt their feelings by insulting them, or that they have "a right" not be fired simply because you don't want to hurt their feelings by firing them. You may not want to do these things, but someone else may not feel the same way. To say that feeding off of other people would make you feel like a parasite begs the question. The question is: why is parasitism against your self-interest? To say that you would be hurting your self-esteem is also question-begging; it presupposes that you already believe the action to be wrong. If you didn't, then it wouldn't adversely affect your self-esteem.
You continue, "There are other reasons too that I haven't mentioned yet. For example, if I committed some bad crime, and got away with it, my friends wouldn't like me anymore; I could only maintain their friendship by fooling them into thinking I was something different than what I am. And that would bother me."
But this too begs the question. If the action isn't wrong to begin with, then your friends would be rejecting you for illegitimate reasons, in which case, why would you want them as your friends? Do you base your ethical values on what your friends view as ethical? Is the approval of others the standard by which you choose your actions? I don't think this justifies rights either.
You wrote, "I believe that I really do try to act in my own self-interest in every situation. Why is it that I don't go around violating people's rights? I don't think it's because I've been brainwashed by a society that tells me that I shouldn't do it. I think it's just because there are certain reasons why violating the rights of others is usually a bad strategy."
USUALLY a bad strategy? This suggest that there there are occasions when it isn't a bad strategy. How is that consistent with a belief in rights? Furthermore, rights are a principle that applies not just when violating them is "a bad strategy," but also when its a "good strategy"--that is, when you can strategically get away with violating them.
I wrote, "But that means that people would only have rights when it's expedient for others not to violate them."
You replied, "I don't see how that follows. I don't expect other people to respect my rights if it's not expedient for them to do so. Why would I? If I were advising other people about what to do, I'd say, "do whatever is best for you." If it really were in their self-interest to violate my rights---it probably wouldn't be, for the reasons I've given, but if somehow it were---then why wouldn't they?"
But that's my point. According to you, rights ought to be respected only when it's expedient not to violate them. Perhaps, you don't understand what the term "expedient" means in this context; it means "immediately advantageous without regard for ethics or concern with consistent principles." (Webster's Collegiate Dictionary) I would certainly expect other people to respect my rights, even when it ISN'T expedient for them to do so, because I would expect them to recognize that it's in their self-interest to adopt a PRINCIPLE of rights and to practice it consistently.
Obviously, if an action were not in their self-interest, they shouldn't do it. That goes without saying. But you need to tell them more than, "do whatever is best for you." The question at issue here is, what principles of conduct ARE best for you as a member of society?
I asked, "And, why, under your theory, should the government refrain from passing a law that initiates force against its own citizens?"
You replied, "In order to create a society where all human interaction is strictly voluntary? That's the kind of society I'd like to live in. Hopefully enough people will come to feel the same way that one day a society like that can come to exist."
I said, UNDER YOUR THEORY, why should the government do this, meaning, why should it do it, if the reason one should respect the rights of others is simply to avoid getting caught and punished. Who is going to catch and punish the government?
You continued, "Who's going to catch and punish the government in such cases?! Well, it's hard to punish the government, but hopefully if the idea of voluntary interaction catches on well enough then reforms can be made."
You're missing the point! I'm saying that respecting other people's rights simply to avoid being caught and punished is not sufficient to justify rights, because it wouldn't apply to the government, the very institution empowered to protect and defend those rights.
- Bill
|
|
