| | Michael,
I think you are missing the point of my argument. Let me try again. I wrote, "If we understand 'ethics' as a 'code of values,' i.e., as a system of moral principles that is recognized and accepted, then yes, these must be 'drawn up and chosen. But if we understand it simply as conduct required for man's survival qua man, then it does not presuppose man's recognition and acceptance... I agree that the concept of 'rights' does not refer to 'things' in the sense of physical existents, but it does refer to a fact of reality - to the fact that people are entitled to be free from the initiation of physical force."
You replied, "In the first instance, the conduct you refer to is based on causality. Requirements alone (you must do such-and-such action or die), and metaphysical alternatives alone involving causality (this-and-that results in living while such-and-such results in dying) are not ethics. Volition is missing."
But you are ignoring what I said between the elipses, wherein I wrote, "Ethics can be understood as the kind of conduct that people ~should~ engage in ~if~ they are to survive and prosper, even if they fail to recognize it. We can say, for example, that people should adopt a certain principle of conduct - e.g., the principle of rights - even if it has yet to be adopted (i.e., drawn up and chosen), because it is in their interests to adopt it, which is simply another way of saying that people's rights should be recognized and respected, even if no one actually does recognize and respect them. Accordingly, an Indian tribe that attacks another tribe and slaughters its members violates their rights."
It is true that this conception of ethics is predicated on causality, but it is final, not efficient, causality. I.e., ~If~ you want to achieve your values, ~then~ you "ought" to make certain choices and perform certain actions. See in this connection, Rand's essay, "Causality versus Duty" in _Philosophy: Who Needs It."
At any rate, instead of the above quoted statement, I could have said: "Ethics can be understood as the kind of conduct that people ~should CHOOSE~ to engage in ~if~ they are to survive and prosper, even if they fail to recognize it. We can say, for example, that people ~should CHOOSE~ to adopt a certain principle of conduct - e.g., the principle of rights - even if it has yet to be adopted (i.e., drawn up and chosen), because it is in their interests to adopt it..."
I could have said this without changing the meaning of my original statement, but I thought it was understood.
You wrote, "I choose to use my mind in a conceptual manner based on reality" is an extremely moral thing to say. Merely having a mind that works in a conceptual manner based on reality is not morality. The concept of ethics arises with the choice to use it."
I wouldn't say that the concept of ethics arises with the choice to use it. Doesn't the concept have to exist prior to the choice to use it? How can you make a moral choice, if you don't know which choice is moral?
You continue, "Thus 'conduct required for man's survival qua man' is not a code of values (which are chosen)."
I agree. If we have not recognized the rights of others and chosen to respect them, then we have not adopted the Objectivist ethics as a code of values. The point I was making is that those whose rights we have not recognized and chosen to respect would still HAVE these rights and would still be ENTITLED to have them respected, because it would still be the case that we OUGHT to respect them.
You continue, "It is a list of requirements that may be used as the basis for drawing up such a code or rejected. The truth or falsehood of the moral code is determined by what it is based on (including causality, i.e. identity, or not)."
I agree, but the code of ethics is simply a description of those requirements and of the ultimate goal for which they are required. To say that I ought to choose certain actions if I want to survive is simply another way of saying that those actions are required for my survival - that they are a necessary means to my survival, which is my ultimate goal. In that respect, every prescriptive statement is nothing more than a descriptive statement, because it simply describes the necessary means to the achievement of your values by telling you what is required for their achievement. To say that I "ought" to do X, ~if~ I want to achieve Y is simply to say that, ~given my desire for X~, Y is the necessary means to its achievement.
You continue, "The same thinking goes for rights. Entitlement of anything does not exist as a metaphysical fact."
I don't know what you mean by "metaphysical" in this context. I wouldn't say that all facts are ~metaphysical~ facts, unless by "metaphysical," you simply mean "pertaining to reality," in which case, "metaphysical" is redundant, because all facts are facts of reality. But I would certainly say that an entitlement to freedom of action exists as a fact of reality, because it exists even if no one recognizes it. In other words, it does not exist merely as an idea in someone's mind, if that is what you're suggesting.
You write, "There are facts based on causality that will result in metaphysical alternatives (living or dying) - and there is nothing anyone can do about them. No volition is involved. These facts are not rights, though. They are metaphysical requirements."
But the point I was making is that a right, understood as freedom from the initiation of force, does not refer simply to the fact that such freedom is required for man's proper survival; it also refers to the fact that man has an obligation to respect that freedom, if he wishes to achieve his values. In other words, my point was that this moral obligation exists regardless of whether or not anyone recognizes or respects it.
You write, "So he looks at his own nature and the nature of existence, sees the requirements for living and thriving and chooses a moral code to guide his choices so that meeting such conditions is the goal of actions chosen. Then he decides that living and thriving is a good thing for everybody, so he chooses moral principles that involve other men that can be applied to all men (and obligate them to refrain from doing certain actions). He calls these principles rights."
He may or may not choose such a moral code, and he may or may not choose to respect the freedom of others, but even if he doesn't, other people are still "ENTITLED" to have their freedom respected. In other words, it is still the case that he "OUGHT" to respect their freedom, ~if~ he wants to achieve his values.
You continue, "The need for a right (a chosen principle of social conduct) to ensure that one of the metaphysical alternatives is attained (survival) is not the right in itself. Other alternatives are available (death, for instance). A need or requirement is merely a need or requirement. It is not a right. A right - the entitlement - comes with volition. It is chosen."
No, the entitlement is not chosen; it is recognized or identified. You are writing as if rights were created rather than discovered.
You continue, "Men choose to entitle each other with a moral rule that guarantees that other men will not pose a threat to their existence - in addition to the normal threats imposed by raw nature."
Here you are using "entitlement" in a legal sense, whereas I was using it in a strictly moral sense, as the ~basis~ for a legal entitlement. It is true that legal entitlements are a product of our choices, because they involve laws that we choose to pass, but the moral entitlements on which these laws are ~supposed~ to be based do not arise because of our choices. On the contrary, these entitlements involve the inescapable fact that ~if~ we want to achieve our values, then we ~ought~ to respect each other's freedom of action. And this is true, even if we happen to choose a legal system that abrogates our freedom. Our right to freedom does not depend on the choices that we happen to make; it is a fact of reality that is independent of those choices.
- Bill
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