Coase v. Rand

Ed,

I don't recall attributing a motive to you - psychologizing, if you will. The harsh tone is from the need to attend to other matters, and this is taking way too long.

You are stuck on a logical mistake. I like you very much and wish for you to see the mistake. But the stuckness borders on the irrational and I am getting to the point of merely repeating myself. I get the impression of argument for argument's sake, a contest, not an attempt to discuss and understand.

Let me be brief. You wrote:

No right can exist, if the right to life doesn't.

Correct, but only under the ethics of rational self interest. Under different ethics (mystical ones or collectivist ones, for instance), other rights do exist. History is full of them. They are not very good rights either. But they have existed and do exist.

I believe I said that a gazillion times already.

As I said, you can deny the existence of rights not based on the ethics of rational self-interest and claim that only the rights of rational self interest exist in all contexts. (Note, you do not say such rights "are not based on truth" - you say "they do not exist.") Please yourself. Exclude the ethical context. I do not. And I repeat, such denial is loudly applauded by statists, who use it very profitably.

In my concept, and that of Rand's as given by the quote I presented, rights as a sub-category are moral principles that are used for social organization. Moral principles can be good and they can be evil. Altruism is an example. Would you say that Altruism does not exist? The same goes for rights. Good and evil rights. (I believe I said that a gazillion times already, too.)

Another thing I said and do not wish to keep repeating, put a phrase like "under ethics based on rational self-interest" before those quotes from Rand that say that rights do not exist and you will see that they are correct. Put the phrase "under ethics based on faith in God" before them and they are not correct. If you read Rand's passages in context, you will see that this phrase, "under ethics based on rational self-interest," is always implicit.

As to the referents thing, this is a bit trickier, as I was incorrectly using "meaning" in the sense of being a synonym for "definition" and even a tad "integration" (Sorry.) But let's examine it and see if we thus arrive at Plato.

The referents for the concept "rights" are not a list of rights, as you claim. (As an aside, what if you forgot one? //;-) The referents, the things that physically exist in reality, are man, his body, his brain, the attributes of these like reason, volition, growth, reproduction, death, etc. Not something like the right to life.

Other human beings also physically exist. The same attributes exist for them. (The possibility of coexisting is why rights are needed - but such possibility is not what rights are based on when formulating them to satisfy that need - ethics are.)

Since you agree that a right is a principle as described by Rand, where does such principle exist as a thing in reality? It is a concept, and the concept rights is an abstraction from such abstractions. That is why merely listing these abstractions is not the same thing as listing the metaphysical referents. The logical chain leading down to the metaphysical referents for a "high" concept like rights is an extremely long and varied one and goes through a huge number of abstractions (integrations).

But if your principles (specific rights) are separate things that exist in reality, and not abstractions of other things, then they are Platonic ideals or categorical imperatives.

Under logic, it is incorrect to call abstractions metaphysical referents, or things that are "out there in existence, in reality."
.

Michael
(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 10/12, 12:53am)

Post 241

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 12:29am

Bill,

Ought to and is are not the same thing. If you say the following phrase you would be 100% correct:

Centuries ago, from the viewpoint of the ethics of rational self-interest, Tribe A violated the inalienable right to life of the members of Tribe B by killing them in their sleep.

Even still, it would be an anachronism. But if you said the following, it would be incorrect:

Under the beliefs of Native Indians, Tribe A violated the inalienable right to life of the members of Tribe B by killing them in their sleep.

That is because no such inalienable right to life existed based on those ethics.

Rights do not exist without ethics. Ethics are chosen, thus rights are also. Man can choose evil. Evil ethics can be chosen. Evil rights can be chosen also (especially ones that violates the rights of others - which do not exist as rights under the ethics of rational self-interest, but do exist as rights under other ethical systems.)

Rights as a general concept is neither good or evil. Just like ethics as a concept is neither good or evil. Specific rights are, though, just like specific moral principles are.

Michael

Post 242

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 1:12am

Michael, I like you too. I hope our disagreement here doesn't ruin further interaction. Regarding this:

============
Let me be brief. You wrote:

"No right can exist, if the right to life doesn't."

Correct, but�only under�the ethics of rational self interest. Under different ethics (mystical ones or collectivist ones, for instance), other rights do exist. History is full of them.
============

In short, I don't recognize DIFFERENT ethics (ie. subjective ethics). Ethics not based on reality (but instead, on whim) -- aren't real ethics to me (they're merely irrational errors -- and reality forbids the irrational). Rand's admonition to ask first: Do we really NEED ethics? Why? -- speaks to this differentiation of what ethics actually is, and what is mere whim-worship (whims masquerading as "ethics").

============
(Note, you do not say such rights "are not based on truth" - you say "they do not exist.") Please yourself. Exclude the ethical context. I do not. And I repeat, such denial is loudly applauded by statists, who use it very profitably.
============

How, Michael, utilizing my objectively correct definition of rights (post 236) -- can statists "use it very profitably"?

============
Moral principles can be good and they can be evil. Altruism is an example. Would you say that Altruism does not exist?
============

Truly moral principles -- are good and NOT EVIL. An evil moral principle is not moral. Altruism exists, but it is not moral (it only masquerades as morality).

============
Since nature does not provide man with an automatic form of survival, since he has to support his life by his own effort, the doctrine that concern with one's own interests is evil means that man's desire to live is evil--that man's life, as such, is evil. No doctrine could be more evil than that.

Yet that is the meaning of altruism." ("Introduction," VOS)
============

As morality is anti-evil, altruism is anti-moral (ie. it is not REALLY a morality).

============
Altruism is incompatible ... with individual rights. (Man's Rights)
============

And that which is incompatible with rights, is incompatible with ethics (altruism is not REALLY ethical -- it only masquerades as being so).

============
Another thing I said and do not wish to keep repeating, put a phrase like "under ethics based on rational self-interest" ...
============

There are no real ethics, besides rational self-interest ethics. These doctrines claiming to be ethics, aren't. They're mere criminal action, masquerading as ethics (see above).

============
If you read Rand's passages in context, you will see that this phrase, "under ethics based on rational self-interest,"�is always implicit.
============

As well it should be (see above).

============
Since you agree that a right is a principle as described by Rand, where does such principle exist as a thing in reality?
============

When folks trade to mutual benefit (as they "should").

============
The logical chain leading down to the metaphysical referents for a "high" concept like rights is an extremely long and varied one and goes through a huge number of abstractions (integrations).
============

So what?

============
But if your principles (specific rights) are separate things that exist in reality, and not abstractions of other things, then they are Platonic ideals or categorical imperatives.
============

They are things entailed by man's nature. If you want to call them categorical imperatives, then I think you're right about that. The rights -- but not necessarily the exercise of them (e.g. convict example) -- are categorically imperative, because they derive from the immutable nature of man.

Ed

Post 243

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 1:59am

Ed,

We have to agree to disagree. Unfortunately you must cut out about half of Rand on morality but not so much on rights. She used "morality" at times to mean exclusivly rational self-interest morality - especially when she used the terms "moral" and "immoral" as value judgments. But I clearly remember her stating that Altruism engendered morality (in the broader sense, as with rights). From The Ayn Rand Lexicon:

What is the moral code of Altruism?

["Faith and Force: The Destroyers of the Modern World," Philosophy: Who Needs It, 74; pb 61. My emphasis.]

Now there is one word - a single word - which can blast the morality of altruism out of existence and which it cannot withstand - the word: "Why?"

["Faith and Force: The Destroyers of the Modern World," Philosophy: Who Needs It, 74; pb 61. My emphasis.]

Observe what this beneficiary-criterion of [the altruist] morality does to a man's life. The first thing he learns is that morality is his enemy...

["Introduction," The Virtue of Selfishness, xi; pb viii. My emphasis.]

The social system based on and consonant with the altruist morality - with the code of self-sacrifice - is socialism...

["Conservatism: An Obituary," Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, xi; pb viii. My emphasis.]

America's inner contradiction was the altruist-collectivist ethics.

["Man's Rights," The Virtue of Selfishness, 127; pb 95. My emphasis.]

I could go on, Ed, but obviously Rand was not stating that altruism was a false morality. She was stating very clearly that an altruist morality existed. She called it evil.

Based on your comments, you differ from Rand in this respect. You deny the existence of an altruist ethics - calling it false.

There are other quotes where she calls altruism "immoral." Those times must always be understood as being within the context of Objectivist ethics, using "moral" as a synonym for good and "immoral" as a synonym for evil.

I will do this with rights later, maybe.

However, in light of this kind of evidence, if you still maintain that altruism does not exist as a moral code, then we have nothing more to say because we completely disagree. And the evidence weighs heavily in my favor - at least about what Rand thought.

Michael

Post 244

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 2:43am

Michael,

===========
Rand was not stating that altruism was a false morality. She was stating very clearly that an altruist morality existed. She called it evil.
===========

"[E]xisted" psychologically (ie. in the whims of men), but not EVER metaphysically. Rand and I, on this, are clear.

===========
Based on your comments, you differ from Rand in this respect. You deny the existence of an altruist ethics - calling it false.
===========

The false, believed, is the evil. Evil is militant ignorance of the true. Evil is evasion. This is an aspect of reality that both Rand and I, individually, recognize.

===========
There are other quotes where she calls altruism "immoral." Those times must always be understood as being within the context of Objectivist ethics, using "moral" as a synonym for good and "immoral" as a synonym for evil.
===========

Moral is always a synonym for good (and immoral a synonym for evil) -- when you are talking about life on earth. Objectivist ethics are objective (ie. the same for everyone).

===========
... if you still maintain that altruism does not exist as a moral code, then we have nothing more to say because we completely disagree. And the evidence weighs heavily in my favor - at least about what Rand thought.
===========

"She called it evil."

"There are other quotes where she calls altruism 'immoral.'"

When what is evil and immoral is "maintain"-ed as a "moral code" -- then we have reached the cult of moral grayness, Michael. You continually speak of me giving up something to -- hell, even emboldening-- the evil statists. Yet your very statements do just that very thing. You claim that existentiality equals actuality (that rights thought to exist -- by enough people in power -- then DO actually exist).

Morality (which depends on value for a life) is one thing, altruism another.

Ed

Post 245

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 6:31am

Michael,

The last time I posted on this thread you appeared to agree with me that one needs to distinguish among three different concepts of rights: legal rights, natural rights, and normative rights. Now I come back and I find you writing again as though the concept of legal rights were the only relevant concept of rights, and being responded to in terms of natural rights and normative rights, with predictable confusion. I repeat my suggestion that you, and everyone on this thread, make clear which of the 3 concepts of rights you and they are writing about in each case. As a reader, I just don't have the time to spend figuring out who means what where, when with a little attention you could have, and you should have, written what you mean out in so many words.

Post 246

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 10:05am

Adam, I'm arguing for natural rights (the inalienable kind).

Can somebody fill me in on normative rights? Is that simply the formal name for common law (unlegislated law)?

And Michael, what I was trying to say above is that an immoral morality (e.g. altruism) is not a true morality, it can't exist as that kind of a thing because of the contradiction. This is also true of "white-less white", "ungood good", etc. And I think that granting altruists epistemic permission to continue to incorporate/employ this contradiction -- is the problem.

The solution is to blast the contradiction wide open -- for all to see.

Ed

Post 247

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 10:09am

Adam,

I have some considerations on your three categories (or concepts, if you don't like the word "category") of rights, however I do believe that rights can be divided into categories (in the loose meaning). I would like to go into each of your categories (which from now on I will include to also mean differing concepts when used for rights), but I am finishing a long overdue article on another matter. Any discussion of your division of rights will probably entail a long drawn out discussion of natural law and I wish to reserve that for the article, so I will give my categories of rights here - which coincidentally are three:

1. Moral principles "defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context."

2. Legal entitlements.

3. Metaphysical ideals or existents.

All uses of the term "rights" I have come across falls into one of these three categories, even the exclusive manner that Rand sometimes used (type one).

I hold that the third is not only false, it is evil because it is irrational. I also hold that when the second is not based on the first, it is also evil (and sometimes it is evil even even when based on the first, depending on the nature of the ethics), as it is arbitrary, thus irrational. The first will be determined by the ethics that it is based on, so if it is based on an evil and irrational ethics, the rights derived will be evil and irrational.

Also, a right that is merely defined as a moral principle but not implemented as a legal entitlement is theory without practice. A full definition and use of a right includes both moral principle and legal entitlement.

I also hold that the "true believer" mentality that negates the category or concept qua category/concept steps outside reason and thus undermines the rationality of his own position and ends up falling into category three. It is like stating that the word definition only exists for a specific definition and all other "definitions" are not definitions in themselves, but are false constructs or whatever. It would get silly if it were not so widespread.

Rand always kept her context clear in her usage, albeit not explicit. This has led others to swallow her usage whole, dismiss her context, and thus transform her words into something they are not. Peikoff got her meaning absolutely right on this in OPAR.

I hate holding up another poster, especially one whom I like so much, but notice that Ed keeps his "true believer" mentality going even in the face of a string of quotes that Rand wrote, and he simply ignores them or implies that she didn't mean what she wrote. (Rand always meant what she wrote.)

That is the hallmark of the "true believer" mentality. They cannot see because they shut their eyes, not because there is lack of light.

As I said, statists love this stuff. It poses no threat to them whatsoever. They can treat it like the Hare Krishna or Holy Pentecost of reason and dismiss it outright while paying lip service to it, like they do to all who propose THE ONE TRUE WAY which does not rationally highlight the evil of what they are doing, but merely claims that they are not actually doing what they are doing - that maybe it is "somehow" evil because of whatever, but their acts have no basis in (the true believer's) reality.

Statists certainly don't have to worry about arguing individual rights from true believer Objectivists/Libertarians, either. Statists win hands down by default. Their true believer enemies walked off the playing field right from the start. They oppose the statists in form but not content, thus they hardly ever convince reasonable people who have mixed premises. Statists can then present hand-out goodies and appeal to the immediate self-interest of voters without having to worry about morality. This is not the whole story, but it is a good portion of it.

I submit modern government as evidence of the result.

Michael

Post 248

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 10:11am

Adam Reed wrote,

"Michael, The last time I posted on this thread you appeared to agree with me that one needs to distinguish among three different concepts of rights: legal rights, natural rights, and normative rights. Now I come back and I find you writing again as though the concept of legal rights were the only relevant concept of rights, and being responded to in terms of natural rights and normative rights, with predictable confusion. I repeat my suggestion that you, and everyone on this thread, make clear which of the 3 concepts of rights you and they are writing about in each case. As a reader, I just don't have the time to spend figuring out who means what where, when with a little attention you could have, and you should have, written what you mean out in so many words."

Michael has already cited Rand's definition of a right, viz., "A moral principle defining and sanctioning man's freedom of action in a social context," as the one he is referring to. So, we are here talking about the normative definition. It is my position that man's freedom of action should be respected regardless of whether or not anyone recognizes that it should. Apparently, Michael disagrees with this (unless he has changed his mind). Am I correct, Michael, that according to you, it cannot be the case that man's freedom of action should be respected, if no one recognizes that it should?

- Bill

Post 249

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 10:23am

Bill,

Of course man's freedom should be respected - always. I am not arguing against that.

I am arguing against the mentality that states that nothing else exists or has existed under the name or concept of "rights."

For example, I consider that any man who initiates force against another (except for emergency things like keeping a person in panic from destroying himself) is committing an evil act.

But then again, my ethics are based on rational self-interest.

The "true believer" argues that those who formalize a moral principle based on the initiation of force are not being moral - thus not forming a moral principle whatsoever. That is mere word games. That is using the term "moral" in two different meanings in the same sentence.

Evil morality does exist. It needs to be fought, not ignored.

Michael

Post 250

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 10:43am

Michael, what about restating your final statement above into this:

=============
Counterfeit (ie. immoral) morality does exist. It needs to be fought, not ignored.
=============

As I would agree to this restatement, would that then save me from being a "true believer" (as you have charged)? And if it doesn't, what would?

You say Rand meant everything she said. I agree. You say that some of the definites about rights (the big 3 that I quoted to show that Rand meant that natural rights supercede any and every other kind of rights that will ever exist) need to be integrated with anything indefinite, that she wrote (and that this integration will take the piss out of the big 3). I argue that this contradicts the statement that she meant everything she wrote; that you cannot -- except by evasion of what the big 3 mean -- hold out for a less definite stance on rights.

You're using a wise tool for understanding, which started with Hegel, and was adopted by Peikoff: "The Truth is the Whole." I'm using this tool, too (surprise!), I'm just including man's nature in this Whole -- and reading Rand while integrating that into it. Doing so leaves me feeling clear-headed about rights. If you're sure that this makes me a "true-believer" than I'm begging you, please try to persuade me away from this stance -- I don't want my mind to shut down, like true-believer's minds always do. It's okay to be closed-minded about some things, but not to be passive-minded, or to have an inactive mind.

Ed

Post 251

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 10:47am

I wrote, "It is my position that man's freedom of action should be respected regardless of whether or not anyone recognizes that it should."

Michael replied, "Of course man's freedom should be respected - always. I am not arguing against that."

Okay. Then I think we're getting somewhere. So let me ask you another question: would you say that one may properly defend one's freedom against being violated? If you would, then I think we are in full agreement. For when I say that man's right to freedom of action should always be respected and may properly be defended, I am saying in so many words that he has "a right" to freedom of action, because to say that he has "a right" to freedom of action is just a shorthand way of saying that his freedom of action should always be respected and may properly be defended. That's all that "a right" means in this context.

- Bill

Post 252

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 11:22am

Ed,

You wrote:

You say Rand meant everything she said. I agree.

Then Rand said that altruistic morality exists. Several times. I quoted her directly.

If you can accept those statements as Rand meaning what she said, then you might want to ask why she did that.

Then, if you are able to reinstate "category of intellectual consideration" (like moral principles, for example) into your thinking about rights, later you will be able to argue against a statist that his concept of rights is evil because of xxxxxxxxxxx. Not that his concept of rights does not exist. (You could, though, argue that under your philosophy, such evil rights are not recognized as legitimate, i.e. based on reason.)

If you argue that his concept of rights does not exist, he will (as he does) pat you on the head, say "Sure, sure, sure, that is a very interesting point," and then go on about his business of winning votes and staying in power. Nobody takes that line of reasoning seriously except true believers.

I am not saying that truth and falsehood do not exist. I am saying that even the judgment of truth and falsehood need a philosophy behind them.

A "category of intellectual consideration" exists precisely so we can exercise our faculties of volition and reason.

I find that Rand's shifting context in the use of the word "rights" and "morality" led to more confusion than persuasion.

Bill,

A right qua moral principle is a bit more sophisticated than a simple reaction against an attack. Any animal whatsoever will defend itself against an attack, not because it has a right to life, but because it wants to live and the metaphysical reality of death (or being maimed) is the only alternative judged to be the case at the moment - even on the perceptual level of animals.

The formulation of a moral principle that impacts on society needs to be founded on some kind of ethics. I would state my position as this. If a man attacked me or a loved one out of the blue, I would have no hesitation in kicking the shit out of him and asking questions later. I would not do that because of any right. I would do that to preserve the things I love, which are temporary enough as things stand in existence.

If such a man attacked me within a social context, I would still kick the shit out of him, then sue his ass based on violation of rights. I would also denounce him morally based on the same. But the shit kicking would not be based on any right as a primary consideration. Rights would come later. Preservation - very selfish and even unthinking preservation - would be that motive.

Michael
(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 10/12, 11:23am)

Post 253

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 2:54pm

I get it.

Michael was worried that if I didn't grant 'any' identification to the wrong rights and immoral moralities that people have believed in and talked about and tried to implement -- if I were to stay totally silent on them, or always mentally dismiss them in knee-jerk fashion -- then I'd be feeding the demon I'm fighting. The question: Is altruism a form of morality? Is indeed a loaded question. It depends on how you're conceptualizing 'morality'. There are 2 main senses:

1) A morality is an adopted code of action that folks attempt to live their lives by (ie. there is such a thing as thug-morality -- though it can't be practiced without victims; ie. human sacrifices).

2) Morality is a demonstrative science whose aim is human good.

In the first sense given above, we're able to enter into the discussion of 'comparing moralities' -- but this seems contradictory to me, as we could only REALLY compare them, using some sort of extra-moral standard (something like an intrinsic value, or a Kantian 'otherworld').

In the second sense given above -- where moral premises could be shown to be demonstrably true or false -- discussion is not of comparing 'moralities' with each other, but of rationally comparing hypothetical codes of action against reality.

On a related note, there is a group of folks who believe the earth is flat (the Flat-Earth Society). They claim they're 'scientific', too. To settle discussion with them, we look at the earth -- answers to disagreements will be discovered by looking at reality. Science -- and I mean: 'existing science' here -- doesn't grant the flat-earthers the 'approved' stamp -- science hasn't taken them under its wing.

If values are objective, and hence discovered, then morality is a science. Rand was clear here (caps replace italics)

================
The OBJECTIVE theory holds that the good is neither an attribute of "things in themselves" nor of man's emotional states, but AN EVALUATION of the facts of reality by man's consciousness according to a rational standard of value. ... The objective theory holds that THE GOOD IS AN ASPECT OF REALITY IN RELATION TO MAN--and that it must be discovered, not invented, by man.
================

================
... an attempt to achieve the good by physical force is a monstrous contradiction which negates morality at its root. ... A value which one is forced to accept at the price of surrendering one's mind, is not a value to anyone; the forcibly mindless can neither judge nor choose nor value. ... Values cannot exist (cannot be valued) outside the full context of man's life, needs, goals, and KNOWLEDGE.
================

And how would it change things in this discussion, if we were to explicitly recognize this aspect of reality (morality is a science)? That's my curiosity.

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 10/12, 2:57pm)

Post 254

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 3:24pm

Ed,

Not silence. That is not my concern. My concern is that you dismiss the existence of the whole fields of rights and ethics and limit them to specific principles and theories.

Once you do that, EVERYTHING you say about them is construed as silence by those holding other views based on other philosophies. You do not construct a logically defined position. You merely decree and proclaim.

If you do that within the context of coming from a specific school of thought, OK - but it is a very dogmatic approach. To do that wholesale is a mistake that others will and do capitalize on - to dismiss the existence of the truth of your position. And I still repeat, Rand referred to altruistic ethics. Period. You accept that or you don't.

You say you agree with her in one sentence, then deny it in another. I am seeing a complete lack of consistency here in your position on Rand.

You mentioned a great example for illustration, though. The flat earth theory.

Those flat earth proponents have a knuckleheaded theory that has been proven as false. It is still a theory, though. Saying it isn't a theory would be just as irrational as they are. It would prove nothing and would even grant validity to their claim by showing a need for evasion.

That same observation goes for the fields of rights and ethics.

btw - The word "science" used to describe morality is the same sense as "science" used for other branches of philosophy, i.e. based on reason. It is not used in the same sense as the physical sciences based on trial and error studies and experiments, with repeatability as the standard, etc. Philosophy is more axiomatic than what is normally called science.

Michael
(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 10/12, 3:30pm)

Post 255

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 4:30pm

Michael,

=================
Rand referred to altruistic ethics. Period. You accept that or you don't.

You say you agree with her in one sentence, then deny it in another. I am seeing a complete lack of consistency here in your position on Rand.
=================

Michael, the apparent inconsistency stems from a subtlety in Rand's own line of reasoning -- whenever she talks about altruism being a 'negation' of morality (things that negate themselves can't continue to be there). Now how the hell am I supposed to integrate that with what you're arguing, Michael? Though, see my last paragraph here, before getting upset with me.

And here's a side-point, one of distinction, which may -- or may not -- prove relevant in this thread: Objectivist ethics is the only victimless ethics.

I understand your admonishment to always keep an opponent's psychological and philosophical reference points in mind, when attempting to persuade him. I understand that, operationally, just being right -- and shouting it -- won't win debates. There's the way reality is, and the subtle way it should be talked about with others. To my mind, it just seems like you have blurred this distinction by over-validating the other views on morality -- and, in the beginning, I couldn't contextually choke down the idea that wishing for something (a morality) makes it so.

Ed

Post 256

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 4:46pm

It's been awhile since I've done any chest-beating grandstanding in this thread. Here's 2 grandstanding points, which overarch or underpin, my latest position on the matter:

1) Individual Rights (defined):
In the objective concept of rights (ie. the one applying to everybody, because it's not "subjective"), Individual Rights are moral principles; principles which the conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival -- always and everywhere entail.

and

2) Counterfeit rights & moralities (wrong rights & immoral moralities) do exist. They need to be fought, not ignored.

Ed

Post 257

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 4:54pm

Ed,

Am I to understand from what you stated that Ayn Rand's "apparent inconsistency" in usage of the terms "rights" and "morality" stems from a subtlety in her reasoning that leads her to flat out contradict herself?

What subtlety are you talking about? You deny the existence of a philosophical framework that uses the word "rights" and "morality" as general terms that include other specific rights and ethics based on other schools of thought.

Also, how on earth can you now talk about Objectivism being the only victimless ethics? According to you, there are no other ethics.

Michael

Edit - Our posts crossed. Now you admit "counterfeit" ethics and moralities do exist. Does that concept "counterfeit" apply to periods of history before the USA and/or Objectivism were born? How can there be "counterfeit" without a concept of "legitimate"? However, by qualifying your statement with "in the objective concept of rights," this is now starting to become much more precise. The next step is to arrive at a concept of a "framework" word ("rights" and "morals") that includes both objective and non-objective rights and ethics - and understand that it has been used throughout history like that.

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 10/12, 5:02pm)

Post 258

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 5:31pm

Michael,

=========
The next step is to arrive at a concept of a "framework" word ("rights" and "morals") that includes both objective and non-objective rights and ethics
=========

I nominate the word "Theory" (Altruist Theory of Ethics, Objectivist ..., etc).

Ed

Post 259

Wednesday, October 12, 2005 - 5:37pm