The Problem of Interaction

And not just that it exists, but is also a specific object, that is, it has identity. I don’t have any problem with the idea that babies probably pick up basic concepts of everyday objects by observation, although I’m not sure in what way implicit concepts can be recognised by the infant mind, since recognition implies adult introspection. But I think your word “operationally” is closer to the mark when it comes to foundational concepts.

What I mean by that is that the operation of our minds seems to pre-suppose the possession of certain concepts. Another way of stating this is to say that our ability to gain knowledge seems to be logically dependent on some foundational concepts.

Rand proposes three primary concepts as her foundation, although others such as entity, unit and existent also seem to be foundational, as does causality and, possibly, the validity of the senses. But whatever the number, the primary issue is the logical nature of these concepts: are they derived from observation or in some other way? Since they are foundational, and are required for all subsequent knowledge, they would appear to be logically prior to observation, in other words a priori, even though Rand denies a priori knowledge.

Brendan

Yes, but this implication is derived by a human mind. It doesn’t exist “out there” in the animals’ perception.

Rodney: “By implication, [the baby] understands the idea of existence. That's what seeing is, the apprehension of an object's existence.”

In that case, perception involves at least the concept of ‘object’.

Rodney: “It is a "concept" forced upon any conscious being if it wishes to use its consciousness at all. There is no question but that such a being must recognize the fact of existence in some form (but not as a concept).”

Rodney, this is what in my country we might call a “Clayton’s Concept”, the concept you have when you’re not really having a concept. If you mean that existence, which in this context seems to mean something like ‘the external world’, impacts unmistakably on any conscious being, I agree. But that’s a quite different understanding to the axiomatic concept ‘existence exists’, where existence includes consciousness.

Where I think some of the difficulty arises is in Rand’s sharp distinction between the passive, automatic nature of perception, and the active, volitional nature of concept formation. It’s clear enough why she does this, in order that perceptions arrive clear and undistorted into the mind. But in deriving at least her basic concepts she unavoidably brings concepts back into perception, as you show: “…the implicit concept of existence is …part of the very nature of any specific act of observing”.

When I say that Rand’s concept of existence is "logically prior" to observation, I don’t mean temporally prior, that one has to have the concept in mind before one can observe. What I mean is that the act of observing logically pre-supposes the concept ‘existence’. I think we’re pretty close in our understanding, and the main difference is the terminology.

Brendan

That’s a whole other story; what’s it like to be a bat etc. In regard to your three-point characterisation of knowledge, I’m mostly in agreement, except for the third point.

To quote: “To know something, three things are required: 1) You believe something to be true; 2) The thing you believe really is true; 3) Your belief is based on a valid cognitive process.

The standard line for (3) is that one has evidence that the belief is based on reality, that is, some fact in the ‘external’ world. This third point is essential to grounding one’s knowledge in the ‘facts of reality’, whereas your third point appeals to consciousness, and by doing so, merely begs the question.

Brendan