The Problem of Interaction

THE PROBLEM

The other day somebody suggested that Rand was a "materialist" (a la Hobbs, Democritus, etc...) -- with all of the problematic implications therein. In fact, the more I think about it, I've heard this claim from a wide range of people. I suppose that people link Rand's emphasis that existence has metaphysical primacy (existence comes first) to the notion that consciousness is somehow a "derivative" of existence. Therefore, it follows (they say) that Rand is ultimately a "materialist."

I thought about this, and here is my 10 cents...

THE SOLUTION

I don't think this is a correct interpretation at all. I would refer to Rand as a "dualist" -- that is, she believed that BOTH existence AND consciousness are irreducible axioms. True, for Rand, existence has metaphysical primacy. However, this does necessarily mean that we are not conscious. Even if somehow someone were able to "explain" consciousness by reference to existence -- for instance, by reference to some as-yet-unknown chemical reaction in our brains -- in my opinion, this is a non sequitur. Any hypothetical proof that consciousness is the result of some existential phenomena in no way "disproves" that we are conscious. Explaining something does not negate it. Rand simply observed (correctly, in my view) that both existence and consiousness are axioms because any attempt to deny either is self-refuting/self-contradictory.

I hasten to add that I do not think that it is in the providence of philosophy to "explain" the relationship between existence and consicousness. As a philosopher, one simply observes that all things -- in principle -- exist and that all observation of existence pressumes a faculty observation, i.e., consciousness. I believe that one can only entertain the "problem of interaction" (the relationship between existence and consciousness) through the empirical sciences (physics, chemistry, etc....)

FEEDBACK

What do you all think? Cmon...I know that there are people on this forum who have suggested that Rand is a "materialist!"

Best regards,

Don
:-)

Post 1

Thursday, May 6, 2004 - 7:11pm

That is almost exactly the topic I will cover in my response to Citizen Rat's views. I hope to post it in the next week.

I would add here that consciousness exists also, independently of any experiencer of it--that is, it is not the fact that anyone is aware of being conscious that makes it real. Thus, existence is primary and covers the fact of consciousness just as it covers all other facts.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 5/06, 7:20pm)

Post 2

Thursday, May 6, 2004 - 8:29pm

Rodney, Don,

Rodney said: I would add here that consciousness exists also, independently of any experiencer of it--that is, it is not the fact that anyone is aware of being conscious that makes it real.

Oh, yes, I agree, that is very important. Both physical existence and consciousness exist independently of anyone's awareness or knowledge of them. They are both metaphysical primaries, and not contingent.

Don said: I hasten to add that I do not think that it is in the providence of philosophy to "explain" the relationship between existence and consicousness. As a philosopher, one simply observes that all things -- in principle -- exist and that all observation of existence pressumes a faculty observation, i.e., consciousness. I believe that one can only entertain the "problem of interaction" (the relationship between existence and consciousness) through the empirical sciences (physics, chemistry, etc....)

This is not quite correct, I think. Both Rand and Peikoff spend some time describing the nature of perception, for example, and Kelly wrote a whole book about it. (Unfortunately, while they all correctly argue for the "direct realist" view of perception, and reject the "representational" view, they all make a very serious error about the nature of perception itself.)

Also, the whole purpose of metaphysics, especially ontology, is to discover and define the principles and nature of existence which it must have to be both perceivable and understandable. Part of that is the primacy principle, but also the fact Objectivists take the ontological view that only entities exist as opposed to the "material" (or primal substance) view of existence. I personally think Objectivism suffers from the lack of a thorough-going Ontology.

There is an Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, but sadly, no Introduction to Objectivist Metaphysics. I think that is a mistake. Peikoff attempts to cover that mistake, referring to his chapter on, "Reality," in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, as Objectivist metaphysics. As a treatise on metaphysics, however, it is woefully lacking.

You are right about one thing, Ayn Rand was not a materialist and regarded material existence (that which consciousness is conscious of) and consciousness (that which is conscious of material existence) as distinct, the former existing physically, the latter existing psychologically, but both referents or units of the universal axiomatic concept, existence.

Regi

Post 3

Monday, May 10, 2004 - 7:10pm

Hey, guys. Thanks for taking the time to consider my post...I don't want to say any names, but I was scanning through past messages on this forum, and I saw several instances where people suggested (either directly or indirectly) that Rand was a materialist...yikes!

Post 4

Monday, May 10, 2004 - 7:49pm

Regi:
Thanks for taking the time to give me feedback. Let me briefly elaborate on the statement that you were concerned about in my original e-mail -- "I do not think that it is in the providence of philosophy to "explain" the relationship between existence and consicousness..." -- so that you can better understand what I am saying. Perhaps this will give you an alternative view on this issue (or perhaps erase you misgiving).

Metaphysics deals with the most abstract and fundamental ideas -- from which all other ideas and proofs are derived. As such, I think it is appropriate to delimit metaphysics to discussion of: 1) existence, 2) identity and 3) consciousness -- as well as derivative notions such as the law of causality. For instance, philosophy tells you that everything has identity, but it will not tell you WHAT a particular things's identity is. Philosophy can tell you that every effect has a cause (causality). But, it has nothing to say about WHAT the cause of a particular event is. Philosophy can tell you that your perceptions are valid. But, it can't tell you WHAT you are perceiving...etc...

Let's return DesCartes's infamous problem of interaction -- to stay on topic. How does thought impact matter? Clearly, there has to be a "link" between consciousness and existence. Otherwise, how is it that when I think about raising my right arm, the proper nerve endings are stimulated, and my arm raises? For DesCartes, this was an impossible problem. How can something that is completely NON-material (consciousness) impact something that is ONLY material (my body)? Where/what is the point of "interaction?" Personally, I suspect that consciousness is ultimately the result of a combination of some chemicals in our brains. But, I could be wrong here. Perhaps there's some sort of "energy" as of yet undiscovered. In any case, regardless of whatever science discovers in the years to come, I do know one thing for certain: I am conscious.

Herein lies my point. In my view, it is completely unnecessary to "explain" the nature of consciousness in order to validate it. Nor is it necessarily to know exactly what an entity is in order to know that it 1) exists and 2) it is what it is (the law of identity). That's why I believe the "problem of interaction" is NOT a philosophical problem at all. I don't need to "explain" the relationship between consciousness and existence to know that 1) existence exists and 2) I am conscious. And, any such explanation would be philosophically irrelevant anyhow. Explaining a phenomenon doesn't negate it.

In any case, I'm glad to hear there are a few people who do not reduce Objectivism to materialism!

Thanks for the comments and keep up the good fight...

Don

Post 5

Tuesday, May 11, 2004 - 5:44am

In the next several days I am going to post my reply to our former resident religionist on the thread "The Number of the Beast"--or perhaps I will post it separately--dealing with his arguments for believing that Objectivism ends up materialist in spite of its declarations to the contrary.

By the way, I agree with you that the nature of mind-body interaction is not philosophically important--except those aspects we can know introspectively, which must be integrated to the rest of our views.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 5/11, 5:52am)

Post 6

Tuesday, May 11, 2004 - 6:42pm

Rodney:
My suggestion is to make a separate thread so it'll stand out more!!! That thread entitled "The Number of the Beast" is ridiculously clogged up. You might get lost/ignored in there.

The reason I started this thread was that I have seen a number of instances on this forum where people have either explicitly or implicitly equated Objectivism to materialism. I know you (Rodney) know this, but for those who are silently reading -- in my experience many materialists use (explicitly or implicitly) "the problem of interaction" to deny consciousness. They take matter as fundamental. Then, they demand an "explanation" of consciousness by reference to matter. When they DON'T get an explanation, they take this as proof that consciousness is not real. If/when they DO get an explanation, they can then say that this shows that consiousness is ultimately derived from matter. Either way, they feel secure that all that is is ultimately matter...unless, of course, it is pointed out that there is no philosophical need for an explanation of consciousness.

Anyhow, enjoy your consciousness AND your matter, and I'll look forward to reading your post...

Don

Post 7

Wednesday, May 12, 2004 - 7:41am

Saying consciousness doesn't exist is like saying velocity doesn't exist. Velocity is not a material thing, yet it's causes are rooted in the material world and it can affect the material world. It's the same with consciousness. Perhaps consciousness should be considered an event. I don't think materialists would have a problem with events.

Post 8

Wednesday, May 12, 2004 - 10:02am

I'll likely be submitting it as an article. I have had so much to say on other threads, but I've not contributed because I didn't want to "steal my own thunder."

Post 9

Thursday, May 13, 2004 - 6:10pm

Eddie:

Thanks for your great observation. However, in my opinion, the phenomenon of �consciousness� is NOT analogous to the phenomenon of �velocity.� I do agree that velocity is ultimately rooted in matter -- but, consciousness qua consciousness is not. Consciousness is irreducible. It can only be defined by reference to itself. Let me try to briefly explain to those who may be reading�

If I stick my hand in fire, then I get a sensation of heat. Materialists (such as Thomas Hobbs) will say that consciousness *IS* the sensation of heat, which in turn can be explained existentially by reference to stimulus, nerve endings, etc� In this pattern, materialists will go on to claim that consciousness *IS* a series of �experiences� or �sensations� in the brain -- all of which are just a twitching of nerves and chemicals. Thus, they characteristically refer to consciousness as �matter in motion.�

In my view, Rand would (correctly) reject this entire line of reasoning as a non sequitur. I think one has to differentiate between 1) the sensation and 2) that which is experiencing the sensation. Notice: when *I* put my hand in fire, then *I* get a sensation of heat. Who is the �I� experiencing these �experiences� and �sensations?� The �I� here, of course, is consciousness, and it is something entirely distinct from the sensation itself. If there were no �I,� then who would be around to experience the sensation!? We are aware of reality by means of sensations. We are not the sensations themselves.

In light of this, I would argue that consciousness is entirely NOT material -- and, states of consciousness can ONLY be defined by reference to other states of consciousness. It is futile to try to define consciousness by reference to matter. Try it. How many inches is happiness? What is the atomic structure of self-esteem? What is the texture of hope? Is it smooth? Of course, this is absurd to ask. Similarly it is clear that material things can ONLY be defined by reference to other material things. It is futile to try to define matter by reference to states of consciousness. What is the self-esteem of a rock? What is the psycho-epistemology of a chair? Clearly, these are non-sensical questions as well.

I think the conclusion to draw is that �matter� and �consciousness� are two fundamentally different types of phenomena. This leads to the �dualistic� metaphysics of Ayn Rand -- which I subscribe to completely. I�m really glad you brought this up because it goes straight to the heart of my original post -- Rand is not a materialist.

Kind regards,

Don

P.S. Equating consciousness to sensation is the essence of Thomas Hobbs�s philosophy. And, remember that Hobbs�s line of reasoning ultimately leads to the total skepticism of David Hume. Immanuel Kant desperately tried to make sense of philosophy (on Hume's/Hobb's premises), and failed. Hegel constructed a philosophy from the obvious flaws in Kant, and concluded that there is ONLY consciousness and NO matter! (How paradoxical!) I think if an Objectivist makes the honest mistake of equating consciousness with sensation, then he/she is going to be gradually pushed down this path -- towards absurdity. You want to avoid this! �Otherwise you might find yourself with a honorary Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard!

:-)

Post 10

Thursday, May 13, 2004 - 6:17pm

Rodney:

I'm glad you decided to take your time and make an article about this issue because, in my view, it is absolutely critical to distinguish consciousness from matter in metaphysics. Failing to do this is utterly disasterous, in my view...

I'll be looking forward to your piece. I'm sure you have your own clarifications, but don't hesitate to cut-and-paste from me...I don't want to "steal your thunder." Consider this thread as an appetizer! ...I'm just getting the fans "warmed up" for the main event...
:-)

Don

Post 11

Thursday, May 13, 2004 - 10:38pm

Dear Mr. Firehammer,
I'm curious about some indications you made in this thread.
In Post 2 you stated that Peikoff and Kelley make an error about
the nature of perception. Later in that Post you wrote that the
Objectivist theory of Metaphysics is incomplete.
I would be glad to read a few more details about your ideas. Which
is the "very serious error about the nature of perception itself" you
mentioned? And why is there a need for a "thorough-going Ontology"
in Objectivism? If you have already written something about the issue,
a link to your article would be nice. Maybe a discussion about your
ideas will be interesting for both sides.
Frank R.

Post 12

Friday, May 14, 2004 - 4:28am

Don,

I was just poking around and noticed I never specifically answered this post as I had intended, particularly this:

Herein lies my point. In my view, it is completely unnecessary to "explain" the nature of consciousness in order to validate it. Nor is it necessarily to know exactly what an entity is in order to know that it 1) exists and 2) it is what it is (the law of identity). That's why I believe the "problem of interaction" is NOT a philosophical problem at all. I don't need to "explain" the relationship between consciousness and existence to know that 1) existence exists and 2) I am conscious. And, any such explanation would be philosophically irrelevant anyhow. Explaining a phenomenon doesn't negate it.

I agree that is it not the task of philosophy to discover and describe the physical nature of material existence, or the psychological nature of consciousness and volition, which are the tasks of the physical and "observational" sciences.

But it is certainly the task of philosophy to provide the metaphysical and ontological principles which define what is and is not legitimate science, and even to provide the framework within which the various sciences are integrated.

With regard to the problem of interaction, for example, even your disavowal of philosophy's role in answering the apparent dilemma is part of the philosophical answer. Your points, 1 and 2 are part of the answer, because while many are approaching the question of interaction by asking, "is volition possible in a strongly determined universe," a correct philosophy says, "that is the wrong question!" It is wrong to ask if what we already know is true is possible. We already know we are conscious volitional beings, or we could not be asking any questions. The question is not if consciousness and volition are possible, but how they are possible.

I also think philosophy is required to provide part of the answer to the question, "how." It must delineate, if nothing else, the kind of reality that sciences must operate within. Science, for example, cannot conclude that volition (or an other aspect of reality) is impossible. If it comes to that conclusion, it is mistaken, and philosophy must show why it is mistaken, because science cannot.

I also think the reason philosophers do not attempt to find the philosophical part of the solution to the question is because they have mostly despaired of finding one. This I think is a mistake.

If you haven't already seen the Has life always existed? thread, you might find it interesting since it discusses many related issues. If nothing else, please see my "Cause, Determinism, and Life" post which deals with so-called "interaction" problem, and, I think, points to a very simple and rational solution.

Regi

Post 13

Friday, May 14, 2004 - 12:08pm

Hi Don,

I missed your reply entirely before I posted something regarding this topic in another thread. I was refering to "ideas" in another thread but the argument there seems to apply to consciousness here.

I do think consciousness could eventually be reduced entirely as a process occuring within the material universe.

You're right about the velocity analogy. It's not the same thing. In another thread, I proceeded to compare ideas with driving. Driving is not an extent, but an observed phenomenon between a host of extents, like me and my car and all the constituent parts involved. Consciousness is much the same way: a process that occurs when the nervous system behaves in a certain way. That is, you have multiple extents interacting with each other.

Another thing, too, is the standard Objectivist line that Consciousness must be conscious of something. Given that context, consciousness has no existence in and of itself, because it is predicated upon the interaction of two or more things. Consciousness is a fleeting action, not a permanent extent.

However, consciousness also has the unique feature that it is inescapable to us, and while it is not an extent, as such, it is dependant upon the properties of various materials within the universe.

The solution is to accept consciousness as necessarily an axiom, for there is no alternative. I'm not completely satisfied with this compromise and I still looking for a better approach, but your declaration of consciousness as completely separate from the material world is not satisfying either.

Eddie

Post 14

Friday, May 14, 2004 - 3:55pm

Hi Frank R.

I did not intend to arouse anyone's curiosity, but I suppose I should have realized it was inevitable. You asked if I had written about these subjects, and I have, but they are not yet published--thus some of my reluctance to answer fully. I should have kept my mouth shut (my keyboard still?).

I will at least provide one point about both subjects, so you won't think I'm just spouting. But, before I do, I have a question. What did you have in mind by. "Maybe a discussion about your ideas will be interesting for both sides."

Both sides of what, and which side are you on?

Here are your questions: Which is the "very serious error about the nature of perception itself" you mentioned? And why is there a need for a "thorough-going Ontology" in Objectivism?

My promised revelations:

1. Mistakes about perception

There are several, but I am only going to point out one and briefly describe the problem. (You'll have to read my book for the solution.)

Consider these statements about perception--

"A 'perception' is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism, which gives it the ability to be aware, not of single stimuli, but of entities, of things."
---Ayn Rand The Virtue of Selfishness, Page 19.

"Perception is thus the awareness of entities as such, and the discrimination of objects requires a great deal of integration on the part of our sensory apparatus."
---David Kelley, The Evidence of the Senses, Page 47.

"Perception is our normal mode of experience. It is the normal result of using our senses, and the basis for our ordinary judgements about the objects around us. ... Further, the perceptual awareness of entities is direct. Entities are given as such. The perceptual integration necessary to achieve this awareness is physiological."
---David Kelley, The Evidence of the Senses, Pages 49
.
"The integration of sensations into percepts, as I have indicated, is performed by the brain automatically."
---Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Page 54

The most significant problem of the objectivist view of perception is that it attributes to the brain or neurological system some kind of mystic a priori knowledge. If the brain was actually responsible for "integrating" sensory data, or sensations, or even simple percepts (the terms are frequently interchanged) the brain would require prior "insight" or "knowledge" of which sensory data to integrate into which entities and which sensory data to integrate into background.

Leonard Peikoff, at least, seems to be aware of this difficulty and attempts to get around the problem by suggesting this ability of the brain to integrate sensory data into entities is learned. But his explanation is problematic.

"The reason you see an entity is that you have experienced many kinds of sensations from similar objects in the past, and your brain has retained and integrated them: it has put them together to form an indivisible whole. As a result, a complex past mental content of yours is implicit and operative in your present visual awareness. In the act of looking at a table now, your are aware of its solidity--of the fact that, unlike brown water, it will bar your path if you try to walk through it; of its texture--unlike sandpaper, it will feel smooth to your fingertips ...."
---Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Pages 52-53

This is very confusing. In the first place, the awareness of a table's solidity, its surface texture, or other characteristics of a table that cannot be directly seen, if there is such awareness at all, when only seeing a table and not touching it, would have to be attributed to concepts, not percepts. Percepts are immediate and only of what is available to be perceived. The feeling of a table's surface is only perceived so long as one is touching the table. If one concludes that a table "looks smooth," that is conceptual, not perceptual.

If this awareness is being attributed to the brain, "retaining and integrating them," it makes the development of concepts "automatic" and "physiological," both of which objectivists flatly and rightly deny. Concept formation is purely volitional, not an automatic function of the brain or anything else.

Then what is the point of mentioning them in relation to experiences of "sensations from similar objects in the past," which the, "brain has retained and integrated?" Since this is a description of how the ability to integrate sensations into percepts of objects is developed, how does the brain "know" to "retain and integrate" sensation from similar objects before it has learned to recognize objects at all?

The whole thing is impossible, of course, and the result of attempting to assert the validity of perception based on the false premise that sensory data requires some kind of special integration, a subtle mistake resulting from an inadvertent adoption of Kantian heresy.

2. Need for Ontology

The main reason a thorough-going ontology is needed in Objectivism is to make it complete, or at least, more nearly complete. Right now, there is no ontology at all, and questions that would normally be addressed by ontology, when addressed by Objectivists, if at all, are done piece-meal and not very satisfactorily. There a number of important questions which philosophy must address about the nature of material existence which are specifically ontological.

There is one question, for example, that Objectivism does not answer, and desperately needs to, because it is foundational to Objectivist epistemology. The is the question of the identity or nature of material existents. Objectivism emphasizes, A is A, a thing is what it is. But what is a thing, and what is its identity. All of Objectivist epistemology rests on the assumption that everything has an identity, but Objectivism does specifically address the question of what identity is.

Interestingly enough, once the actual nature of identity is made explicit the problem of perception I referred to is automatically solved. So one reason an ontology is needed is to prevent mistakes in other branches of philosophy.

I'm sorry I can not now be more specific. I will be glad to listen to questions, but do not promise to answer them to everyone's satisfaction.

Regi

Post 15

Friday, May 14, 2004 - 9:59pm

Regi,

This is a comment: Perhaps I'm missing something here, but please be prepared to defend against my evolutionary criticism of your criticism.

If you remember the debate we had with Jaume last year: you had mentioned the perception issue and I retorted with an appeal to evolution as an explanation of the incredible functionality of perception in this world.

In short, hearts that don't pump right don't allow their organisms to procreate well (no gene propagation). The same argument - perhaps even a stronger one - would pertain to the perceptive faculties. Perception that doesn't work is a contradiction in "evolutionary" terms.

Again, and perhaps I'm still missing a larger point here, but - and this could also be said for the physics concept of gravity - I don't feel that a "complete, mechanistic understanding" of perception will increase its validity beyond that which is already known.

Regarding the issue of gravity mentioned above, understanding more about its mechanics will most likely not make me more "certain" of its existence (I'm speaking of a measurable increase in certainty and - to be pedantic about it - an increase with existential relevance for humans living in this universe).

Ed

Post 16

Saturday, May 15, 2004 - 4:10am

Ed,

Your question is a legitimate one, in light of the fact I did not provide much detail. My intention is not to cast doubt on the nature of perception. The Objectivist have taken the correct position on that. However, they undercut their own position by adding the very thing you have pointed out is unnecessary, and attempt to explain how it works, i.e. the physiological aspects of man have some unidentifiable faculty that somehow integrates sense data, or the senses into percepts. Adding that is their mistake.

You said, "In short, hearts that don't pump right don't allow their organisms to procreate well (no gene propagation). The same argument - perhaps even a stronger one - would pertain to the perceptive faculties. Perception that doesn't work is a contradiction in "evolutionary" terms."

That is absolutely correct. I would add an even stronger argument, that if perception did not work absolutely, no animal could survive, because that is all they have. If they did not perceive the world as it actually is, none of their actions and responses to it would be correct. Perception is all the animals have. Perception definitely, "works."

Unfortunately, the Objectivist description of "how it works," is incorrect, and introduces an unnecessary problem. Just how does anything know what data belongs to what percepts and how it ought to be integrated before it knows what sensory data comes from or pertains to which entities? Evolution does not explain that because evolution would have to prepare the mystical faculty of integration with knowledge of every possible entity the organism was ever going to encounter. There other problems with this view as well.

But no explanation is necessary if that is not how it works. What I will show is the integration explanation is completely unnecessary. How perception actually works is much simpler and requires no kind of mystic, a priori, ability to integrate sense data into percepts. Perception is much more direct than that.

[I certainly do no expect you to accept the last part of this, since I have not provided my explanation. I only added it to indicate what I intend, which is not to repudiate perception, but to remove all possible philosophical doubts about its veracity.]

Thanks for comments. I know I have left myself open to criticism, which I gladly accept. I always learn from good criticism, and am always entertained by the other kind.

Regi

Post 17

Sunday, May 16, 2004 - 12:47pm

Dear Mr.Firehammer,
when I wrote "both sides", I meant that we could discuss
your ideas and that both people involved in the discussion could
learn something. I was not writing about different opinions about
this issue. There was a time, when I thought about the integration
of sensory data, but I haven't formed a theory about it yet.

Your post reminds me of something I heard a few months ago:
Every year in Japan different teams of robots play soccer
against each other and the best team will win a prize. I
know someone, who is designing one of this teams. The data
from the camera are just pixels and he had to write a program
to decide, which pixels belong to the ball, to other robots
or to the background. Of course man is not a robot and he is
certainly not programmed, but it seems to me that man is facing
a similar problem. When I look at an multi-colored object, I see
different pieces of color and I have to decide, that they belong
to the same object. When I thought about the problem, my first
idea was, that you are learning in the first months of your life
how to integrate the sensory data. Later this process becomes
automatic. This is something you can prove or disprove, if you
look at the behaviour of young babies. Unfortunately I don't
know enough about the development of children to prove my idea.

Your theory is different from mine, since you say that
there is no need for an integration process. I don't know, if your
theory is right, but I see your point. If my idea is right, than
the integration of sensory data would indeed be conceptual and
not perceptual. You doubt, that concept-formation is possible, if
you see only "pieces of color" instead of objects. If there is a
kind of integration process or if concept-formation is possible
in the situation described above, is something I simply don't know,
although it is interesting to think about it.

Perhaps it doesn't make much sense to discuss the details of this
issue unless you have published your book. The points I made above
are just some thoughts I had and no well-developed theory.

Frank R.
P.S.: I hope everything I write is understandable, since I'm not
a native speaker.

Post 18

Sunday, May 16, 2004 - 8:08pm

Frank, Regi;

With regard to Frank's hypothesis of "learned perception," there is evidence of infants correctly perceiving "object permanence" and "identity permanence" in S. Pinker's book: "How the Mind Works."

In the book, Pinker mentions infants shown a ball that passes behind a screen. When the screen is pulled away however, either 0, 1, 2, or many balls (or even other objects) will be seen by the infant.

The "surprise factor" of the infant is then estimated by how long the infant stares (purportedly in "disbelief"!). It's interesting research and validates other research I've found that suggests that children tend to be objectivists regarding moral issues (that is, until they get educated otherwise!).

Ed

Post 19

Monday, May 17, 2004 - 4:45am