Existence as the Value

Brendan, please clarify:

B: “The choice of happiness, duty, wisdom etc as a standard is not necessarily arbitrary. One can see some worth in making such choices.”

What worth? How are these not arbitrary as an ultimate end?

B: “The argument you appear to be making here is: life is the ground for human values (factual premise); therefore life is the standard of value (normative conclusion).”

Life is the standard of value; and this is first and foremost a factual premise. Rand goes to great pains to discuss life in general. At that point she is being descriptive – not proscriptive. Except for man, there are no proscriptions. Only man is volition and needs normative guidance. Life is far more general. “Goal directive” does not mean consciously chosen purposes. Value is a broader concept than human ethics. I’ll come back to this but first let’s address the following:

B: “At face value, the conclusion might follow from the premise, until one considers the meaning of the term life. If life refers to “man’s life”, the argument merely begs the question – the conclusion is contained in the premise. Your phrasing above illustrates this: you say that life is a value.”

I was wondering for years when someone would ask this question. Look at Rand’s definition of life: “self-generating, self-sustaining action”. Notice the word “action”. Action is goal direction; action is the pursuit of ends. Values are that which one acts to gain and or keep; they are the ends of actions. Few people have commented on Rand’s definition. This is an inductive generalization. It is not circular because it is not deduced. Rand avoids the “naturalistic fallacy” because she is not proposing a deduction. This is the reason Rand went to pains to describe “life” in general. Even her description can only hint at the viability, fundamentality and power of this concept. One correction: I’m not saying that life is a value (although it is) but that fundamentally life is valuing (in the sense described above).

Now, each living entity has a specific identity that makes its life a life of that specific kind. As Joe reviewed, the means of survival of each kind of living being is (potentially) different. Again, this is an inductive generalization. Man’s identity is that of a conceptual (rational, volitional) being. Thus, being descriptive, we identify reason as man’s means of survival. We can see that each being has the capacities required for its survival within the context that it is fit to survive. Man’s method is a volitional one: reason. It is factual to say that man’s wellbeing and health are enhanced by his use of reason. It is factual to say that man’s life requires the pursuit of a healthy cognitive development. It is factual to say that this value is an end that man’s life requires. It is factual to say that only the correct choice will be consistent with the need’s of man’s life: reason. Thus, facts determine values. Life requires that certain conditions be met. It’s a fact that a living being’s life requires that values must be gained or kept. Given man’s identity, this means a rational life must be chosen if the conditions of his life are respected.

Now, I’m not finished but is any of the above objectionable to you? Are you against reason? Do you think reason is superfluous to man’s life?

Post 21

Tuesday, October 21, 2003 - 2:44am

Rick, you’ve also come up with a lengthy post, so I have to confine my comments to a few points.

B: “The choice of happiness, duty, wisdom etc as a standard is not necessarily arbitrary. One can see some worth in making such choices.”

R: “What worth? How are these not arbitrary as an ultimate end?”

B: Take happiness. I may decide, on introspection and observing the lives of others, that a state of true happiness is a state of wellbeing that coincides with other positive qualities: greater confidence, sense of self-worth, greater ability to weather hardship etc. So such a goal is worthy of pursuit.

R: “Life is the standard of value; and this is first and foremost a factual premise.”

Again, I draw you attention to the equivocation over the term life, to which you have now added another: value. If the above statement means that human beings should act in a certain way, then it is a normative statement, and on Rand’s fact/value integration must be a conclusion. Of course it can also be used as the premise to a further argument, but that premise will be normative.

On the other hand, if the statement merely means generic life and includes non-human values, if such can exist, then it’s a factual statement, but ethically anything goes. As for induction and question begging; inductive arguments are by their nature a form of question begging.

R: “We can see that each being has the capacities required for its survival…Man’s method is a volitional one: reason. It is factual to say that man’s wellbeing and health are enhanced by his use of reason.”

The initial premise here is survival; the second premise and distributed term is volitional reason; the conclusion is man’s wellbeing. Survival may be a valid factual premise, and wellbeing a valid normative conclusion, but what about volitional reason? Isn’t this a vital component of “man’s life”? But man’s life (wellbeing) is the conclusion to your argument; it’s what’s you are trying to prove. You’ve smuggled your conclusion into one of your premises.

R: It is factual to say that [man’s life requires the pursuit of a healthy cognitive development]. (My brackets)

B: The statement in brackets posits a requirement for achieving man’s life. But “man’s life” is a normative claim. It’s the type of life Rand thinks we ought to live. Therefore the statement is normative, not factual. The same applies to your other so-called factual claims.

Brendan

Post 22

Tuesday, October 21, 2003 - 6:19am

“A state of true happiness is a state of wellbeing” - B

Do you mean that happiness will contribute to or cause wellbeing? Or do you mean that they are the same? You say it coincides with other positive qualities - but how? Is it a side effect, cause, means or purpose of these other qualities? I can answer these questions but then I wouldn’t be considering your viewpoint (except if we happen to agree).

B:“As for induction and question begging; inductive arguments are by their nature a form of question begging.”

Wow! Since question begging is a fallacy, you’ve just tossed out induction! This had been apparent in the nature of your argument - one that continually complains that Objectivism fails to deduce ethics owing to the point Hume makes: if a normative statement is absent in the premise, it can’t be supported in the conclusion. We have to move into epistemology to continue our argument.

Several of your posts seem to imply a separation between existence and identity. Life (existence) and man’s life qua rational being (identity) are not separate in man. Existence means existence of a certain kind. Human existence (as opposed to vegetable existence) means functioning as a rational being. Now you accuse me of trying to prove that reason contributes to man’s well being using circular arguments. Actually, I wasn’t trying to prove it at all. I assumed it and expected that you’d share such a viewpoint. Shall I assume you don’t share our respect for reason?

Overall, Brendan, you seem to hold my comments to the standard of deductive reasoning when, in fact, I’m arguing inductively, making an abstraction, or not arguing at all. At times I don’t feel you are considering what we are saying (perhaps you feel the same). I don’t mind your grinding the Humean axe. However, our discussion has been ambitious given this venue. A wider epistemological discussion, while needed, is too much for now.

Let me appreciate your desire to include “confidence, sense of self-worth, greater ability to weather hardship” as part of the description of wellbeing. I sense we might agree on important descriptive aspects of living well, even if we don’t agree on the epistemological structure and logical foundation. We may see your approach as “knee-deep in Stolen Concept territory” – as Jeremy puts it. But at least you’re in the right territory.

Rick

Post 23

Wednesday, October 22, 2003 - 7:00pm

Well, this has turned into an interesting debate!

"Do you mean that happiness will contribute to or cause wellbeing? Or do you mean that they are the same? You say it coincides with other positive qualities - but how? Is it a side effect, cause, means or purpose of these other qualities? I can answer these questions but then I wouldn’t be considering your viewpoint (except if we happen to agree)."

I don't know about Brendan, but *I* would like these questions answered, if you don't mind. :) This is another thing that has been on my mind alot lately.

Post 24

Thursday, October 23, 2003 - 1:46pm

R: “Do you mean that happiness will contribute to or cause wellbeing? Or do you mean that they are the same? You say it coincides with other positive qualities - but how? Is it a side effect, cause, means or purpose of these other qualities?”

B: Happiness is an effect. It’s a consequence of one’s actions, and one’s actions are judged according to the degree they produce happiness. The positive qualities I mentioned can be seen as causes of this state of wellbeing. “Coincide” is probably a rather loose term. (And please don’t assume I am a utilitarian. I was merely offering happiness as an example of another standard.)

R: “Wow! Since question begging is a fallacy, you’ve just tossed out induction! This had been apparent in the nature of your argument - one that continually complains that Objectivism fails to deduce ethics owing to the point Hume makes: if a normative statement is absent in the premise, it can’t be supported in the conclusion.”

B: Rick, you flatter me. I didn’t toss out induction. As you say, Hume did. I am a mere plagiarist. But you concisely make the point. If the inductive principle is to be logically validated, it needs to be deduced. It can’t be induced without begging the question.

R: “Human existence (as opposed to vegetable existence) means functioning as a rational being… I assumed it and expected that you’d share such a viewpoint.”

B: I’m happy to assume that human beings can act rationally. But since Rand uses the claim of human rationality as a basis for her ethics, such an assumption functions as a component of her argument. If one desires to inductively ground one’s philosophy in the “facts of reality”, such an assumption would require a justification based on some observations of real human beings.

R: “I sense we might agree on important descriptive aspects of living well, even if we don’t agree on the epistemological structure and logical foundation.”

B: Rick, I appreciate your gracious response to my posts. I think that the notion of life as a standard has some real possibilities as an end in ethics, especially for western agnostics and atheists.

That said, on a day-to-day basis, I find the golden rule to be a reasonable guide to living. The beauty of the golden rule – treat others as you would like to be treated – is that it nicely integrates egoism and altruism, without sacrificing one to the other.

Many thanks for the discussion.

Brendan

Post 25

Friday, October 24, 2003 - 6:03am

Hi, Renee. I’m pleased to see you back. I hope others are reading as well. Brendan raises questions that are not at all esoteric. As a result of our discussion, I read an essay by Charles King in “The Philosophical Thought of Ayn Rand” edited by Den Uyl and Rasmussen. He has similar objections to the kind we are addressing here.

Hi, Brendan. Thanks for a respectful discussion.

Let me return to Renee’s request about happiness and its relation to wellbeing. (There is also a question about whether happiness or life is the goal of ethics.) Wellbeing, like health in medicine, is what life requires if we are to enhance the possibility of long-term survival and increase our capacity to withstand a broad range of challenges. I see Rand as following Aristotle’s virtue ethics in regards to developing character and capacities to actively live a self-actualized life.

Now, if we use the common notion of happiness, then whether it contributes to wellbeing or not will depend of what it is that makes you happy. If healthy things make you happy, wellbeing is enhanced. Here it is important to cultivate character so that achieving pro-life values facilitate happiness. If we pick happiness as the standard of value we can fall into hedonism. Objectivism rejects any inherent conflict between character, virtue, and happiness.

Last night I re-read several Objectivist authors to see what they had to say on happiness. I wasn’t completely satisfied with any particular presentation. I thought Peikoff’s discussion in the “Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand” was the weakest. He seemed to imply that happiness was an extra bonus for living according to the standard of life – almost an epiphenomenon. I found Tara Smith’s discussion, in “Viable Values”, wonderful – especially her chapter on flourishing.

Then I re-read the lead essay in the Virtue of Selfishness. I thought Rand summed it up well (but it is a terse essay). When living life according to a rational standard, happiness (non-contradictory joy) is the emotional experience of that fact. She reviews the roles of emotions and why we need such manifestations that result from our thoughts and evaluations. Pursuing the right kind of happiness is the same as living a life according to the standard of value appropriate to human living.

There was only one thing missing from that essay. It’s a notion that Nathaniel Brandan discusses with regard to self-esteem: the idea of reciprocal causation. Achieving our values brings the rewards of happiness and happiness (and passion) gives us the emotion fuel for acting to achieve further values. Happiness has value for survival and living fully. I think it’s obvious that Rand agrees with the passionate pursuit of values. It is certainly appreciated here on the SOLO website.

These are some of my thoughts. Comments?

Rick

Post 26

Friday, October 24, 2003 - 6:06pm

Rick Zuma, Renee Katz, Brendan, Jeremy

The concept of values presumes goals or purposes. Those who have no goals or purposes have no need of values. It really doesn't matter what a person does or how they live if they themselves have no particular purpose or goal.

Goals and purposes pertain to only one class of existents, living volitional beings. So far, the only examples of these we have found in this world are human beings.

The purpose of values, for those who do have goals and purposes, is to enable us to know what kinds of actions will help us achieve those goals and purposes, and which will fail to achieve them, or even prevent us from achieving them. Without values our actions relative to any goals or purposes would be random and unlikely to achieve any intended purpose, except fortuitously.

So much for the human need of values.

The remaining question is, what kinds of values are "ethical" values and what kinds of goals or purposes are they needed for?

I think Rick Zuma was very close to the answer when he mentioned, "there is also a question about whether happiness or life is the goal of ethics."

I present without argument the assertion that, the purpose or our lives is our enjoyment of them. (The argument is long. I will gladly entertain any arguments against it however. This is the only argument I will make here: if we can choose our own goals and purposes, there does not seem to be any reason to choose any other.)

If the purpose of our life is our enjoyment of it, we must discover two things to fulfill that purpose. We must know exactly what kind of creature we are, and what it will take for that kind of creature to enjoy its life. This is the meaning of "is" determining "ought" in objectivism. To fulfill the purpose of human life, what a human being is determines what he ought to do.

Regi

Post 27

Sunday, October 26, 2003 - 5:16am

Hi Rick,

To tell the truth, I haven’t given much thought to happiness as an ethical goal. My upbringing was religious, so ethics was seen more as a matter of duty than wellbeing, although religious people do include wellbeing as a sort of by-product of doing the right thing.

I agree that Rand is basically following Aristotle’s notion of the good life, with the addition that she seems to be trying to ground her ethics in biological life. Her comment about happiness being the emotional experience of living life well shows real insight. Which is why the “pursuit of happiness” is in some ways a chimera.

And I’m sure that happiness does have real survival value. The reciprocal causation idea is a good one. Happiness then becomes part of a virtuous loop.

I have to cut this short. I’m in transit for the next few weeks. Again, thanks for the discussion.

Brendan

Post 28

Sunday, December 7, 2003 - 4:14am