Existence as the Value

I recently came accross this online critique of Objectivism. One of the points it raises is this:

"The claim is that all things other than humans automatically act for their own survival. This is a false claim. Take the male mantis, which is eaten by the female as part of mating. Many other examples exist in nature where it is not existence that is the value, but rather reproductive success.

Survival is a means to reproductive success - most of the time things are trying to survive. However, salmon that put survival above everything else would never go back to spawn, and thus would have no descendants to be used as evidence for its objective existence."

In "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" by Leonard Peikoff, Rand is quoted saying "the functions of all living organisms, from the simplest to the most complex--from the nutritive function in the single cell of an amoeba to the blood circulation in the body of a man--are actions generated by the organism itself and directed to a single goal: the maintenance of the organism's life."

So, my question is: If all organisms' actions are consistently aimed at one goal--i.e., the preservation of the organism's life, then how is it that some organisms (the male mantis and the salmon in the above example) choose to act towards their own destruction?

Post 1

Thursday, October 9, 2003 - 12:55pm

I was unaware of that statement by Peikoff, whether it is an error of interpretation by Peikoff or a flaw in Objectivist philosophy I can't say as my knowlege of Objectivism is limited. However it seems self evident to me that all species must act to maximise their survival and reproduction. Species that does not do so will soon become extinct.

Post 2

Thursday, October 9, 2003 - 7:01pm

Before people start saying Objectivism is flawed, it always helps to ask yourself what this statement means to Objectivism. What's this argument for or against? How does it fit into Objectivist theory, if it does at all.

First, the statement says that the non-human actions are automatic, meaning non-volitional. If you're dog gets hungry, and you put some tasty food in front of it, it'll eat. It won't think "well, I am on a diet" or "How can I eat so much when my owners are so poor?". It doesn't have evaluate this goal based on a standard of morality. The animal is wired to act, and does.

The implication of an automatic method of choosing is that the goals aren't really a matter of choice. The mantis doesn't choose which goals to act towards. He acts by instinct. The outcomes are based on the instincts.

So sometimes the actions will lead to its death. You can think of a moth and fire. It's not that the moth is suicidal. It's just acting automatically.

Now both of you understand evolution enough to know that reproduction is one of the key factors in species propogation. But so is survival. The male mantis has to live and grow to maturity, evading predators, finding food, and eventually finding a mate. The fact that it dies at the end is not a choice it makes. It's just acting according to its own rules.

Renee, you asked how some animals can choose to act towards their own destruction. The answer is that they don't choose that. They automatically act in ways that may lead to that, but they're not choosing that goal. Man can choose to pursue death, but only because they have volition.

So how does this fit into Objectivism? The point is that animals have an automatic approach to decision making. People don't. Animals have no need for a value system, people do. Animals survive by an automatic process, while people survive by a volitional process.

To my knowledge, this is the real point trying to be made, and whether you take into account reproduction or not, the point is still valid. It's the automatic process that's important, and that they live by that automatic process. That's how animals live. They may also die because of it, but that's not important in this context.

I think Peikoff's statement is taken out of the context it was made in. I doubt he meant this literally. Even the idea of "directed to a single goal" is nonsensical when the animal isn't really choosing life as a goal. It automatically chooses particular actions, and those actions are generally aimed at life through the process of evolution, but you can never say they all are objectively geared towards life. Some habits or instincts could develop in one environment and when the environment changes, the instincts fail (i.e., moths heading towards the light).

So I say, don't take it literally, but understand the point that's really trying to be made. If you understand that, I don't think you'll have any problem rejecting this as a "proof" that Objectivism is wrong.

Post 3

Friday, October 10, 2003 - 9:07am

Yes, I should've provided some more context for that quote. Peikoff was explaining the essential differences between living and non-living entities. This is what he was basically saying: "The actions of a living organism are self-generated and goal-directed. They are actions initiated by the organism for the sake of achieving an end. (...) An animal, for example, pursues food, water, shelter; a desk or a pebble pursues nothing. The latter kind of thing either remains inert or, when it moves, does so randomly, without any end of its own, simply by reaction to whatever external forces impinge upon it ..."

Actually, the site that was arguing against Objectivism didn't even use *that* specific quote in setting up their argument. They used this one: "An animal ... . But so long as it lives, ... it is unable to ignore its own good, unable to decide to choose the evil and act as its own destroyer." But they didn't even say if it was Ayn Rand being quoted, or where it was taken from, so I just substituted the one from "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand." Maybe I should've just stuck with the one that was mentioned on the site then. >.<''

Anyway, thank you both for your answers. :)

Post 4

Friday, October 10, 2003 - 11:47am

Hi Renee,

Glad to help. Even using the quote you did is fine. It was a legitimate question. The two are related in that in both cases, it's the automatic, non-volitional process that's important. If you forget that, which the critique you mentioned sounded like it was doing, then you can get confused by talking about "goals" and what-not.

And of course, that kind of critique comes off as nit-picking, since even if you concede that Peikoff believed that, it is in no way connected to the philosophy of Objectivism. In other words, there are no conclusions drawn from that particular premise (the premise that survival is the goal of animals).

Post 5

Saturday, October 11, 2003 - 5:40pm

�In other words, there are no conclusions drawn from that particular premise (the premise that survival is the goal of animals).�

Joseph, this is just the premise that Rand uses to establish her ethics, her connection between fact and value.

Her factual premise is that all living organisms do as a matter of fact pursue a specific end: their own survival. Her ethical conclusion is that human beings should pursue this end.

The obvious question is how the factual premise can lead to the ethical conclusion.

Brendan,

Post 6

Saturday, October 11, 2003 - 6:09pm

I disagree, Brendan. It would be absurd to think that animals always magically acted to maximize their lives. What possible means could they employ to ensure their actions are consistent with their lives?

And it would be equally absurd to model human life on that of animals. No, this comment only contrasts the automatic nature of animals decisions with the volitional process of man.

I'm curious what exactly you think her argument is on that matter. How do you think she get from point A to point B? How does she get from animals act towards their own lives, to an ethical system of rational self-interest?

Post 7

Sunday, October 12, 2003 - 4:41am

�I'm curious what exactly you think her argument is on that matter. How do you think she get from point A to point B? How does she get from animals act towards their own lives, to an ethical system of rational self-interest?�

I would also like to know. As I understand it, Rand is trying to establish an ethic that integrates fact and value. Going by the quotes cited by the original poster, both Rand and Peikoff seem to be trying to establish survival as the primary fact for all living organisms.

And SOLO�s own Objectivism 101 seems to agree: �To every living thing, there is one primary choice, and that is to live or not -- to engage in the action required to further its own life or to engage in action that destroys its own life.�

�Every living thing� presumably covers humans as well as plants and animals. In that case, the organism�s survival is presumably the primary fact, which would be the premise to Rand�s ethical argument, from which she attempts to derive her values.

As to how she justifies this derivation, I was hoping you might enlighten me. I may be mistaken, but I had thought Rand based her ethic on the claimed fact of the individual organism�s drive for survival. If her ethic is not based on that fact, presumably it is based on some other fact, or possibly no fact at all. The Objectivism 101 section is not very helpful on this matter.

Brendan

Post 8

Sunday, October 12, 2003 - 11:06pm

Brendan,

I've had this kind of conversation with you before. You start off making some claim about what Objectivism is all about, and then you argue against that straw man. You just said "Joseph, this is just the premise that Rand uses to establish her ethics, her connection between fact and value." And now you can't explain the connection between this statement and her ethics. In other words, you start off hostile to the philosophy for reasons you can't even explain, and you expect positive treatment.

If someone else feels like humoring you, they can, but I'm not going to while you claim to know what premises are important in a proof you can't even describe. I suggest that in the future if you want answers, you don't start off by telling me that I'm wrong.

Post 9

Monday, October 13, 2003 - 10:26am

"Her factual premise is that all living organisms do as a matter of fact pursue a specific end: their own survival. Her ethical conclusion is that human beings should pursue this end.

The obvious question is how the factual premise can lead to the ethical conclusion."

Wait a sec! I don't remember reading *that* anywhere. Are you actually saying that Rand's conclusion that human beings should pursue their own survival is based on the premise that *all other* living organisms pursue *their* own survival?

It is obvious that all living organisms do not "pursue their own survival" in the same sense that humans do. In "The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" Peikoff explains why he uses the term "goal-directed":

" 'Goal' is not synonymous with 'purpose' (the latter term applies only to the goals of conscious beings, who are aware of and desire the objects they pursue). [...] 'Goal-directed' in this context, Ayn Rand explains, 'designates the fact that the automatic functions of living organisms are actions whose nature is such that they result in the preservation of an organism's life.' "

Every other living thing acts automatically, so it is difficult to see how Rand could've developed her ethics based on the nature of other living organisms. Her ethics are based on the volitional nature of *man*--the fact that he needs a code of ethics because his actions do *not* automatically result in the preservation of his own survival.

Is this not what Objectivism is?

Post 10

Tuesday, October 14, 2003 - 12:27am

Joseph,

I�ll give a brief outline of the way I think Rand justifies her ethical standard. As I understand it, Rand�s major ethical claim is that man�s life is its standard of value. But this claim raises the obvious question: why should life be the standard of value, rather than some other standard, such as happiness, duty, wisdom etc?

Since Rand claims that her ethics integrates the is/ought, facts and values, she needs to establish a fact-based rationale for her value claim regarding man�s life.

As far as I can see, it�s not possible to derive this fact-based rationale by considering the lives of men, because their actual lives are many and varied, and often at odds with the Objectivist ethics. So in order to establish her fact-based premise, Rand appeals to the claimed survival drive of all living things.

Since human beings are a sub-set of all living things, this drive would also presumably apply to them. At this point Rand introduces a valid distinction between the automatic survival drive of animals and the volitional survival drive of humans.

Thus she appears to integrate fact and value as it applies to humans. Sure, the passages in question do distinguish between the automatic nature of animals and the volitional nature of man, but Rand retains and carries over from her fact-based premise the claim of survival. Hence the standard is �man�s life�, not his volition.

As I say, I could be wrong, but that does seem to be the way Rand establishes the factual part of the is/ought integration.

Brendan

Post 11

Tuesday, October 14, 2003 - 2:27am

�Are you actually saying that Rand's conclusion that human beings should pursue their own
survival is based on the premise that *all other* living organisms pursue *their* own survival?�

Hi Renee,

One way to explore this question is to review a summary provided on this website. The links are Objectivism; Objectivism 101; Ethics; Life as the standard of value. I assume this is a fair summary of Rand�s ethical views. And presumably, the passage in question forms a philosophical argument. That is, certain ideas are presented, and these are used to support subsequent ideas, and so on.

It also pays to keep in mind that Rand is attempting to establish a fact/value integration, that is, that values must be grounded in the facts of reality. The passage begins:

�To every living thing, there is one primary choice, and that is to live or not -- to engage in the action required to further its own life or to engage in action that destroys its own life. The only other alternative is death.�

I understand �every living thing� to mean just that, the gamut of living organisms from the amoeba to humans. Therefore, the claim is that all living things, including humans, are faced with this choice. So, yes, Rand does seem to be basing her claim that human beings should pursue their own survival on the premise that other living organisms pursue their own survival. The passage proceeds:

�Choosing life as your standard of value is a pre-moral choice. It cannot be judged as right or wrong; but once chosen, it is the role of morality to help man to live the best life possible.�

This passage contains several important points. First, it moves from all living things to the individual human life, but the choice to survive remains the common factor.

Second, the argument moves from a claimed fact, the choice for survival, to a moral conclusion: life as the standard of value. But no reason is given as to why we should choose this particular standard, so we can only assume that humans should choose it because all living things do.

Third, note that this choice is a pre-moral choice. As such, no moral considerations can be brought to bear on this choice. Therefore, it has no moral dimension, and is on a par with the amoral choices made by animals. One chooses life because, well, one just does.

That�s enough for now. I think I�ve presented some relevant evidence to back my claim that Rand�s life premise is based on claims about animal life.

Brendan

Post 12

Tuesday, October 14, 2003 - 10:23am

Let�s me jump in here on this technical point. Objectivism does hold the �Life� is that standard of value. This puts it in a special relation to the rest of morality that requires that it be viewed in some ways the same as other values but in some ways different. I�ll explain shortly.

Roughly speaking, being the standard of value means �Life� is the context for evaluating where a proposed value is indeed a real value. Does X further life or hinder it? Is Y pro-life or anti-life? Obviously life itself is trivially pro-life. It�s a value, of course, but more importantly, it is the standard of value: it�s what we must use to bring to bear on the evaluation of all other things.

First, notice that life is not just another value. Let�s say we make a list of 10 things to do on Saturday where number 7 is �Live�. We decide our list is too long so we delete number 7! Obviously not! Life is not just another value. �Life is what makes other values possible.� Rand discusses this, as does Tara Smith in her book �Viable Values�.

Second, living is not guaranteed � it requires achieving values. Thus �life makes values necessary�. Obviously any value has it requirements. Life�s requirements are those relevant to what is needed for life�s success. By itself, life is not unique in this regard as a value.

These two ideas must be considered together. Life is not an arbitrary starting point for ethics because it is the precondition and it has requirements. This makes it a special value that is exempt from several criticisms. For example, other values have a purpose beyond themselves (for what?), which �Life� is exempt. This is not arbitrary because life is a precondition: it makes values possible. Most other candidates would be arbitrary if they were advocated as a primary value. Life requires values and like all living organisms, this is a condition of major implications. I believe Objectivism holds that it pre-empts all other value criteria by its power.

Let me make a few points in response to the other posts:

1. Now, I believe that Objectivism implies that Life is pre-moral because life is the context for morality. All other values are for something: life. Life is not a means to another end. That�s all. It is self-consistent to say that life is pro-life. And Objectivism is passionate about life! (No news to readers of SOLO.) It is a supreme value. But a special value that makes all others possible and required.

2. Human life requires reason: a volitional process of concept formation and context integration. Thus, reason is a tool for survival. Thus, the following question would be invalid: why life? (I�m assuming the questioner is implying a need to move beyond life.) Life is the source of meaning. Life is what gives rise to the need to ask: why?

3. Rand�s extensive discussion about life in general is a prelude to her discussion of ethics. Its purpose is to show how life is the central principle of � well � living things! It is the essence which the key to understanding the interplay of biological organization � including human beings. The added fact that man�s essential means of survival is conceptual (which implies volitional), gives man a need for an explicit code of ethical principles that have to be chosen successfully if life - as a man - is achieved.

Post 13

Tuesday, October 14, 2003 - 10:28am

Let me correct that typo in paragraph two. It should read: Roughly speaking, being the standard of value means �Life� is the context for evaluating whether a proposed value is indeed a real value. ....

Post 14

Tuesday, October 14, 2003 - 7:46pm

Rick Zuma, you are absolutely right. Ethics can be seen even in chimpanzees, but the end goal of those ethics is the political survival (and therefore the REAL survival) of the chimp inside the group. Humans must do the same thing.

Post 15

Friday, October 17, 2003 - 4:41am

Hi Rick,

I�m not sure whether your post is in reply to my previous ones, but I would like to comment on a couple of points you have raised.

1) I am arguing about the derivation of the standard of value, whereas you seem to be speaking of its application. That said, you make the claim that life makes all other values possible, and I can agree with that. But that doesn�t necessarily make life the primary value. By way of analogy, if I want to get from point A to point B, I necessarily need to employ some form of transport. But the form of transport is not my primary value; it is a necessary means to the end I am seeking: to reach point B. One can equally view life as a necessary means towards other ends, rather than as an end in itself.

2) You say: �The added fact that man�s essential means of survival is conceptual (which implies volitional), gives man a need for an explicit code of ethical principles that have to be chosen successfully if life - as a man - is achieved.�

This passage nicely illustrates my argument. You rightly claim that man is a creature of reason and volition. I assume that volition in this case refers to moral choice. You then go on to say that man needs to choose a code of ethical principles in order to achieve life as a man.

But if man is by nature a being of moral choice, and if all his actions are informed by moral choice, what type of creature is making the pre-moral choice to live? (It�s clear enough why Rand wants to make the choice to live pre-moral. If it were a moral choice, not only would it have to be made against some standard other than life, but such a choice would also undercut Rand�s attempt to ground her ethics in facts -- the claimed drive for survival of every living thing.)

How could this creature of pre-moral choice in fact recognise that it needs to choose life as its standard of moral value? How could a being that lacks a moral faculty even recognise the necessity for such a choice?

It might be argued that the phrase you use -- �life makes values necessary� � shows how values are grounded in the facts of reality. But a brief analysis of this phrase reveals fatal flaws. First, animals have life, but they don�t need moral values. The life that needs values is man�s life, but of course �man�s life� is already a normative standard, so not only does the phrase beg the question, it also disconnects fact and value.

Secondly, if life makes values necessary, this implies that one must choose some value to achieve life as a man. But Rand constrains the so-called choice to one: life. If one must as a matter of necessity choose life as the moral standard, this cannot be a choice. Choice presents one with a menu of options, not just a single course that must be taken.

One of the major problems with Rand�s ethics is that her brute facts of reality cannot be translated into human value; but neither can her human values be grounded in fact.

Brendan

Post 16

Friday, October 17, 2003 - 5:59am

That�s a long post, Brenden. I�m not sure I should use the forum to comment on its entirety.

B: �One can equally view life as a necessary means towards other ends, rather than as an end in itself.�

But we are trying to avoid being arbitrary. Life is not an arbitrary ultimate end. Can you see why?

B:�But if man is by nature a being of moral choice, and if all his actions are informed by moral choice, what type of creature is making the pre-moral choice to live?�

Man - the only being capable of choice.

You seem to have some problem with this curious phrase: pre-moral. I discussed this above. It refers to the fact that life, being the standard, is the only value that is an end in itself. It is logically prior to the specific values and virtues that aim to achieve the ultimate value. It is not separate from the specific values. You choose life by choosing other actions that life comprises. Life is the living. Life is a process of �self generating, self sustaining action� (if I remember the quote from the Virtue of Selfishness (VOS)).

B:�One of the major problems with Rand�s ethics is that her brute facts of reality cannot be translated into human value; but neither can her human values be grounded in fact.�

You continue to treat Life like other values. Life is exempt from certain requirements of specific values because Life is the context that makes values possible and necessary. To use the concept Value without it�s root in Life is �worse than a contradiction� (VOS) � it is the stolen concept fallacy.

Post 17

Friday, October 17, 2003 - 9:48am

"One can equally view life as a necessary means towards other ends, rather than as an end in itself."

What other ends? (If you mean the enjoyments of life, then as Rick says you are knee-deep in Stolen Concept territory.)

"How could this creature of pre-moral choice in fact recognise that it needs to choose life as its standard of moral value? How could a being that lacks a moral faculty even recognise the necessity for such a choice?"

I'm guessing you mean pre-moral as amoral. In that case, the "pre-moral" creature doesn't require that a moral purpose or choice be given to them. Lesser animals are capable of performing the tasks required to live by instinctual rote, and are protected from the ecosystems they inhabit by their bodily attributes, such as camouflage, dense fur, feathers, sharp teeth, long claws, speed, agility, burrowing instincts, etc. These things are all values to lesser creatures, values that don't have to be recognized by the creature utilizing them. They will continue to work until the creature ages and dies, and have only one requirement to keep them going: food.

Humans are at a big disadvantage when it comes to bare-bones survival. So we make tools, and shelters, and weapons to hunt and defend ourselves, and clothing to protect us from rain and wind, etc. And a correct morality implies one will also not cause harm to other humans, as this certainly doesn't benefit a man's existence--except in self-defense.

These things are values to humans, and are values that must be regenerated by conscious thought and conscious action. A moral faculty (guided by rational morality) simply allows men to make a single, ~conscious~ choice: "Will this benefit my life, or not?" After that, they can do whatever they like, whether it benefits men or not. A lesser animal can only perform the actions prescribed to it by instinct, and is only capable of acting towards its own benefit, win or lose.

The "pre-moral" creature need not make a moral choice, even if it could. Its instincts--normally--give it a higher chance for success in competition with other animals, except humans.

Humans have moved beyond the instincts granted to us by nature, and are capable of abstract thought; which means we can make things that didn't previously exist or were undiscovered, on a vast scale, with rapidly increasing value as technology advances.

"But Rand constrains the so-called choice to one: life. If one must as a matter of necessity choose life as the moral standard, this cannot be a choice. Choice presents one with a menu of options, not just a single course that must be taken..."

Here's your menu of options:
1) Life
2) Death

Now that there's more than one option presented, you can make the ~choice~.

J

Post 18

Sunday, October 19, 2003 - 5:00am

R: �But we are trying to avoid being arbitrary. Life is not an arbitrary ultimate end.�

The choice of happiness, duty, wisdom etc as a standard is not necessarily arbitrary. One can see some worth in making such choices. An arbitrary standard would be one selected on the throw of a dice.

R: �It [pre-moral] refers to the fact that life, being the standard, is the only value that is an end in itself.�

B: You seem to be saying that one can make a value judgement in the absence of a standard. As I mentioned previously, if the decision for life is pre-moral, it cannot be taken in the context of a standard of morality. Therefore the choice does not support this value claim.

R: �You continue to treat Life like other values�To use the concept Value without it�s root in Life ��

B: Rick, the context of my argument is Rand�s claimed fact/value integration: values are derived from facts. The argument you appear to be making here is: life is the ground for human values (factual premise); therefore life is the standard of value (normative conclusion).

At face value, the conclusion might follow from the premise, until one considers the meaning of the term life. If life refers to �man�s life�, the argument merely begs the question � the conclusion is contained in the premise. Your phrasing above illustrates this: you say that life is a value. You then go on to say that value must be rooted in life. In other words, value must be rooted in value, which is to beg the question. And since �man�s life� is a normative claim, the fact/value integration fails.

On the other hand, if the premise refers to life in general -- �every living thing� -- this could constitute a factual premise. But it does so at the cost of failing to support the normative conclusion, since generic life includes plants and animals as well as humans, and non-human life cannot act as a moral standard for human life. Again, the fact/value integration fails.

Brendan

Post 19

Monday, October 20, 2003 - 2:13am