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Post 40

Friday, June 26, 2009 - 9:29pmSanction this postReply
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Sorry for entering this discussion so late, but to address the original question, I've always countered such an argument by pointing out that the government doesn't own the country.

Sure, if one of your tenants doesn't want to pay the rent, he's free to leave your apartment and go elsewhere. Requiring him to pay rent on the condition of his remaining there does not constitute the initiation of force because you own the property, and he has no right to live there without your consent.

However, since the government doesn't own the country, it cannot demand payment (i.e., taxes) for allowing you to live in the country in the same way that a landlord can demand payment (i.e. rent) for allowing you to live in his apartment building.

- Bill



Post 41

Friday, June 26, 2009 - 9:49pmSanction this postReply
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Bill,

It is definitely a case of better late than never. I sanctioned your post for its wonderful clarity (it made me smile).



Post 42

Friday, June 26, 2009 - 9:51pmSanction this postReply
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Well said, Bill...

[but I think ye opened a can of worms here - many would dispute...]
(Edited by robert malcom on 6/26, 9:53pm)




Post 43

Friday, June 26, 2009 - 10:19pmSanction this postReply
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At the risk of being seen as "piling on" (praise):

Very well put, Bill.

Ed




Post 44

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 9:11amSanction this postReply
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Hi Bill,

Modern governments tax more like service providers than like landlords. It's more like paying for a subscription than an apartment. People shouldn't read the magazine unless they're willing to pay for it. The magazine should be allowed to collect.

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 6/27, 9:12am)




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Post 45

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 9:13amSanction this postReply
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Bill,

Your answer is just what I was looking for in my original question.

Because I mistitled the thread, a wonderful discussion ensued centering on taxation itself. But the real issue my opponent was talking about wasn't taxation per se, but force.

It didn't even need to be about taxation. It could have concerned the military draft. If I were to say that conscription is initiating force against citizens, my friend would say I was wrong, because we are always free to leave. Nothing is an initiation of force, in his view, if the victim has an alternative.

And underlying his point is the mistaken premise you pointed out, Bill, that the government is like the landlord of an apartment building, rather than the night security guard. Yes, the landlord can make demands from you and that is not an initiation of force because it's his building. But if the security guard points his gun at me and asks for money...that is most definitely an initiation of force. Seems so clear and simple now. Thanks!







Post 46

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 9:37amSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

Your last post was strange. You say that government should be able to collect - no mention of any moral issues in regards to what the services are, what amount is chosen, what choice was permitted, what individual rights were involved... Just, it's government - you pay.

If I enroll you in my magazine, without your permission, and send you a bill, that's okay? I should collect, even at gun point? I could address it to "occupant" - and if you don't like it, you could leave that address.

Your post doesn't invalidate Bill's argument since there is no way to refuse the services (not read the magazine) since the services apply to the entire nation, which, as Bill pointed out, the government still doesn't own.



Post 47

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 11:22amSanction this postReply
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Hi Steve,

I figured the first point of order was to justify the principle of tax collection. I didn't think we were to the point of discussing the the principles of whom and how much to tax.  Are we?
If I enroll you in my magazine, without your permission, and send you a bill, that's okay?
If I keep reading the magazine, again and again without paying, is that okay? I'd be unjustly enriched. Reading the magazine is akin to availing myself of the benefits of a jurisdiction. You could just not read it,  i.e., leave the jurisdiction (or, I suppose, you could at least avoid those activities that give rise to the jurisdiction's tax liabilities).  But one way or other, you don't need to own the place where I keep reading your magazine in order to be justified in charging me for it. 

Jordan




Post 48

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 12:01pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

You said, "I figured the first point of order was to justify the principle of tax collection. I didn't think we were to the point of discussing the the principles of whom and how much to tax. Are we?"

I don't think you can separate the nature of tax collection from its justification or lack thereof. Can you think of a way to do that that isn't rendered as aa floating abstraction? The only approach that I know of is to focus on the taking of another's property without their permission. That separates the principles of tax collection from specifics of "whom" and "how much" - but you appear to support the taking of another's property without their permission if it done as the 'fee' for a service they used, even if there is no way to avoid the use of that service.

Perhaps you are thinking of implied contracts, like common law marriage, where acceptance is implied by repeatedly choosing to act in a certain way. That doesn't apply where coercion is present.
---------------

You said, "If I keep reading the magazine, again and again without paying, is that okay? I'd be unjustly enriched. Reading the magazine is akin to availing myself of the benefits of a jurisdiction. You could just not read it, i.e., leave the jurisdiction (or, I suppose, you could at least avoid those activities that give rise to the jurisdiction's tax liabilities)."

I can claim that the service you are receiving is the subscription and it doesn't matter if you read it, or use it to start fires, or give it away. I can claim that your are enriched just by the opportunity. I don't give you the opportunity to cancel your subscription - it is addressed to occupant - you can always abandon your home :-) - just like you are saying a person can just leave the country. That is much more like taxes. The government says the services are for your benefit, they say you have enjoyed them, they don't give you a choice, and you have to pay.
---------------

Let me ask these questions:
  • In your opinion, does the service have to be objectively beneficial to justify the tax for it?
  • If there is no way to choose not to accept the services (short of leaving the country), can it still be justificed?
  • If the so-called service actually results in a violation of your rights, for example, regulating the business you are in, can it still be justified to tax you for that service?




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Post 49

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 12:50pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

If my neighbor installs a floodlight to deter prowlers, the fact that the light illuminates my property, allowing me to benefit as well, does not mean that I am being unjustly enriched, unless I pay part of his cost. I didn't ask him to install the light and agree to pay part of the cost if he did. So, while I am being "enriched," I am not being enriched unjustly and cannot properly be billed for the benefits that I receive.

If my neighbor demanded payment from me at the point of a gun on the grounds that I benefit from his floodlight, he would be guilty of armed robbery. The fact that I am free to leave the neighborhood if I don't want to pay what he's demanding does not make his action any less criminal.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 6/27, 12:54pm)




Post 50

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 3:55pmSanction this postReply
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 Hi Steve,

 

It's okay to start with justifying that something should exist before moving on to justifying nhow it should exist. For example, Objectivists may justify first that each of us should live for our own sakes, then move on to justifying how we might go about doing that. 

 

. . .but you appear to support the taking of another's property without their permission if it done as the 'fee' for a service they used, even if there is no way to avoid the use of that service. 

 

Well, I'm contending that there is a way to avoid the benefits of a jurisdiction, that there is a way for the taxpayer to leave the marriage**: Leave or go Amish. (**Yes, my bit resembles a theory of implied contracts.) 

 

Back to the magazine analogy. I'm as good as reading the magazine, not just subscribing to it, but actually reading it, once I'm in the jurisdiction. Once I'm in, I'm getting the protections of the jurisdiction, like it or not, just as I'm gleaning the words off the page of my magazine. And you ought to be able to collect if I keep on reading it. 

  • In your opinion, does the service have to be objectively beneficial to justify the tax for it?

To be justifiable, a government service needs to fall within the government's proper purview. I hope we can assume, at least for the sake of argument, that a proper government activity is objectively beneficial. Taxes shouldn't be spent on improper government activity. So if a tax existed specifically for such an improper activity, then that tax would lack justification. (I should mention that I don't think a tax needs to be pre-allocated to any particular government activity for the tax to be justified. A general tax can be okay, which is what I've been considering during this discussion.) 

  • If there is no way to choose not to accept the services (short of leaving the country), can it still be justificed?

If a country (like North Korea, for example) traps you in its borders, then the country has initiated force against you, and they aren't justified in forcing you pay up. It's like false imprisonment.   

  • If the so-called service actually results in a violation of your rights, for example, regulating the business you are in, can it still be justified to tax you for that service?

I think my answer to your first question should suffice for this one.

 

Now let me re-ask a question from my post 30:  How can one justify the existence of  (minarchist) governance but not the means (i.e., the taxes) to run it?

 

Jordan

 

P.S. Something went wonky with the RoR site. I'll post a reply to Bill soon. 

(Edited by Jordan on 6/27, 4:19pm)




Post 51

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 4:44pmSanction this postReply
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As I've been pointing out recently, ownership is simply a function of justice.  You rightfully own what you produce, or what you can trade for with what you produced.  However, most of the value of the actual goods that any one person produces is due to their inherited common wealth - the language, infrastructure, knowledge base - of their society.  Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that justice implies that most of what a person produces contains that implicit element.

The government doesn't own the land; the people of the planet do collectively, until they lease it out to all the individuals or groups that want to do something private with it, such as farm or build a factory.  Then the leasors rightfully own the rights that are incorporated in their lease agreement.

That seems fair to me. 




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Post 52

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 5:38pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Bill,

 

There are plenty of times where you benefit from others expenditures without incurring an obligation to pay them. Your floodlight example is onesuch case. Not only is it not a case of unjust enrichment, but it's too far removed from government-taxpayer relations to be instructive. Government services, at least under Objectivism, are a necessity. Floodlights aren't. Your neighbor put up the floodlight for himself. The government put up services for you. The floodlight would keep shining due to the neighbor's expenditure of his own funds. The government doesn't have its own funds, save what it collects in taxes. Without taxes, there's no government services. Now to be sure, actual cases of unjust enrichment aren't exactly terrific parallels to the government-taxpayer relation either. But they do hold some notable similarities.


Jordan




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Post 53

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 6:02pmSanction this postReply
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Phil,

I don't think people can own the land collectively. What would that mean? Who, for example, would have the right to determine its use and disposal? The majority? Why?

Doesn't land have to be improved in some way in order to be considered property? If someone farms a plot of land, for example, thereby using it for a productive, life-serving purpose, it makes sense to assign property rights to the producer. Otherwise, someone else could interfere with his use of the land for that purpose.

But to say that land is collectively owned -- owned by everyone --doesn't make sense and wouldn't serve any meaningful purpose, since unanimous agreement would then be required before any decision could be arrived at on how the land is to be used -- which, for all practical purposes, would make it virtually unusable.

Before a section of land has been appropriated to serve a useful purpose, it should be regarded as unowned by anyone -- not as being owned by everyone collectively.

- Bill



Post 54

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 6:06pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

I'll jump right to your question, "How can one justify the existence of (minarchist) governance but not the means (i.e., the taxes) to run it?"

You can justify it - that is it would be completely moral. What you are asking is can one justify taxes if they are solely for the support of a minarchist government - correct?

I maintain that minarchy can be supported by solely voluntary fees. But to get from here to there the only practical plan is one that reduces spending and taxes while dismantling the parts of government that are not a proper part of an minarchist government. So, judging what can be justified between now and then is more a case of what direction are we going, and, if it is in the right directions, is it as fast as we can go?
--------------

Your use of North Korea and the false imprisonment doesn't work for me. After all chasing someone out of their home, their city, and their country - at gun point - then confiscating their property would be an odious crime if committed by a private citizen.

I assume your choice of North Korea means that you think it is justified to collect for services, at gun point, even if the person cannot refuse (apart from leaving the country)?
--------------

You hint at a theory: "I'm contending that there is a way to avoid the benefits of a jurisdiction, that there is a way for the taxpayer to leave the marriage**: Leave or go Amish. (**Yes, my bit resembles a theory of implied contracts.)" But you don't explain it. Please elaborate.



Post 55

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 6:20pmSanction this postReply
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Phil, in #51, you said that “you rightfully own what you produce, or what you can trade for with what you produced.”

That is certainly one salient, sensible, and just criterion: production. All of those adjectives I just put in front of criterion truly go there, but there is another one that belongs right there in the sequence: conventional.

Previously

David Kelley correctly observes that although the non-consensual taking of another’s rightful possessions is coercive, an elementary notion of coercion will not suffice to mark off which takings are not rightful nor which possessions are rightful (1984). It remains true that no one has the right to initiate the use of force, but how do we identify the presence of force in takings that entail neither direct attack nor confinement of persons? I say as follows.

Direct coercion is clear because the boundary of a person’s body is (generally) clear. To identify property rights, we must know the boundaries of possessions and the history of their possession.

When a cigarette comes into existence, it is a possession with plain boundaries. One can stand in a strong possessive relation to the object within those boundaries over the entire history of its existence. The boundaries of the land from which the cigarette was produced, the boundaries of land use, are also objective boundaries.

One can use unowned land in various ways, and those ways can then confer various kinds of possession—all of them weak—up to the boundaries of use. Until we draw up boundaries for land to forestall use by others, we cannot possess the land in the clear way that we can possess chattel. Possession is always an incident of ownership, but in the case of land, it cannot arrive before ownership.

What Thomas Schelling said of the role of national boundaries for the process of limiting war also applies to limiting violent conflict between A and B over the use of land. A property line is useful as a stopping place. It is useful to both A and B “in default of any plainly recognizable alternative since both sides have an interest in finding some limit. . . . The rationale behind the limit is legalistic and casuistic, not legal, moral, or physical. The limits may correspond to legal and physical differences or to moral distinctions; indeed, they usually have to correspond to something that gives them a unique and qualitative character and that provides some focus for expectations to converge on. But the authority is in the expectations themselves, and not in the thing that the expectations have attached themselves to” (1960, 259–61).

The convention that a first user of land be accorded ownership of that land is a rule on which A and B can easily converge in many circumstances. There is usually enough land such that production and exchange will better the conditions of both A and B (Nozick 1974, 174–82; Rothbard 1962, 504, 522–28). It can be economically better than non-interaction. It can be far better, economically and morally, than violent conflict.

In such circumstances, it will be right for each to respect the convention, and it will be wrong to breach it. A breach will be reasonably seen as an attack. Taking care not to drop the context, we may say that a first user has a right to appropriate land and defend it.

Imperfect Rights in Land

There is a conventional element to property rights in land. We saw in the preceding section that the rule that a first user of land be accorded ownership of land first used is a rule to which two possible claimants, having available other useful land, might converge without violent conflict. David Hume’s analogies are appropriate to the circumstance: “Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho’ they have never given promises to each other. . . . In like manner are languages gradually establish’d by human conventions without any promise” (1737, 490). No explicit contract between the parties is necessary to establish ownership in land. What Russell Hardin called contract by convention is sufficient (1982, 155–72, 208–11).

Like Thomas Schelling’s prominence solutions for certain coordination games played with restrictions on communication (1960, 54–58), a rule must possess a psychological prominence to peacefully found a convention (Hardin 1982, 141–42; Sugden 1986, 47–52). Furthermore, particularly for large groups, the rule must be simple (Hardin 1982, 188–200). The first-use rule is simple, and it remains a prominent solution for the drawing of ownership boundaries on land, however large the community.

The first-use rule is, however, not the only plausibly just rule that appears natural and obvious. Furthermore, what should count as a use is not always clear. Mere declaration of intent to use is surely not a use. Murray Rothbard maintained that first preparation of a site for use should confer ownership. As title-conferring first preparations, he would count the activities of draining, filling, clearing, tilling, or paving (Rothbard 1970, 131; 1962, 147–49; see also Becker 1977, 32–56). His focus, like Locke’s, is on productive uses.

What about the reservation of virgin land for esthetic enjoyment or ecological study? Are not those uses? What about occupation, the use of land for a place to be?

Ellen Frankel Paul offers a somewhat different rule for initial appropriation: Title should go to the one who has, through purposive activity, transformed matter into something valuable to humans (Paul 1987, 224–36; cf. Kirzner 1978, 394–406). Richard Epstein adheres to a third rule, the rule of first possession. This is the standard rule at common law. This rule, too, is natural. In addition, like the others, it has some ambiguity. What if A’s occupation is prior to B’s, but B first fenced the land? (Epstein 1985, 10–11, 23–24, 61; see also Becker 1977, 24–31, 75–80).

Even if a just rule for appropriation of parcels of surface land could be settled upon by all the possible claimants (say, Rothbard, Paul, and Epstein), there would remain the questions of the extent of ownership to be recognized above and below the surface parcel. Consider only space above the land. One obvious solution would be the ad coelum doctrine of the common law. Under that rule, ownership would extend to all space directly above the land.

Rothbard would object. He would insist that the landowner only have rights in the space above to the extent that use by someone else can be excluded if it interferes with the landowner’s own health or his use and enjoyment of the land. Furthermore, if noise from aircraft were already a regular presence when the land was acquired, the landowner should have no complaint; the aircraft owner would already own the air for her limited purposes. Epstein would object. Paul would rejoin. (Rothbard 1982, 76–81; Epstein 1985, 117–21; Paul 1987, 89–90, 128–29, 217, 258).

Conflicting reasonable rules arise also for the transfer or conveyances of land titles. Consider the future interest in land known as the possibility of reverter. Thus, A, owner of Blackacre in fee simple absolute, conveys it “to B and his heirs so ling as the premises are not used for the sale of liquor, and if the premises are so used, they shall revert to A and his heirs” (Moynihan 1962, 98). Should such a future interest be recognized? Should such an estate be recognized only for some definite period of years after its creation? (ibid., 97–103).

Consider also a simple conveyance of A’s entire estate in Blackacre to B. What conventional signs of the transfer should be recognized? If B claims, upon the death of A in this case, that Blackacre was given to him, what conventional device should be accepted by C? If B’s claims were false, C might have had a rightful chance to appropriate the land as the next “first possessor” (or user, etc.).

Conventions are social. It is not reasonable to suppose that there exists some unique and complete set of rules for just land ownership that is so natural and obvious (once discovered) that it could be a set of universally accepted conventions upon which a universal contract by convention could be based. That a particular set would be just, if only everyone would buy into it, is not, on this earth, a completely adequate basis for anyone’s particular rights to property in specific land. Justifying private property in only a general way is all too easy (Becker 1977, 23).

The general problem is this: What is required for a would-be landowner to gain a just land title that is good against the world? The solution is this: alliance.

—End Previously—

Phil, there is no ultimate default of ownership in which it is vaguely owned by the remaining people on the planet (and their descendants, say). Before people migrated onto the American continents (I allude to the ancestors of my ancestors who were here to greet the Mayflower), no one owned any of it.





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Post 56

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 6:28pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan wrote,
There are plenty of times where you benefit from others expenditures without incurring an obligation to pay them. Your floodlight example is onesuch case. Not only is it not a case of unjust enrichment, but it's too far removed from government-taxpayer relations to be instructive. Government services, at least under Objectivism, are a necessity.
So is food; so is housing; so are clothes. Are you saying that if something is a necessity, people can be forced to buy it?
Your neighbor put up the floodlight for himself. The government put up services for you.
Suppose that my neighbor, without asking me, put up the floodlight for both of us. Does that mean that I'm required to share the expense with him?
The floodlight would keep shining due to the neighbor's expenditure of his own funds. The government doesn't have its own funds, save what it collects in taxes.
So? Suppose that my neighbor doesn't have his own funds save what he collects from robbing other people. Does that give him a right to rob me? I don't think so!
Without taxes, there's no government services.
Not true. Taxes are a coerced payment; the government can gain the money for its services in other ways, through various voluntary and contractual means.

- Bill





Post 57

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 9:36pmSanction this postReply
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Steve,
What you are asking is can one justify taxes if they are solely for the support of a minarchist government - correct?
Yes.
I maintain that minarchy can be supported by solely voluntary fees.
We part ways here. Voluntary fees in lieu of taxes is untentable. A discussion on this would warrant a new thread.
I assume your choice of North Korea means that you think it is justified to collect for services, at gun point, even if the person cannot refuse (apart from leaving the country)?
If a person chooses to stay, the government is justified in collecting from him. I don't think they're justified in shooting tax evaders, but they could put a lien on his wages, assuming it's an income tax at issue.

The theory of implied contracts that I hinted at is probably the best I can do, in an Objectivist forum**, to justify taxation. A contract is deemed implied where someone confers a service on another with reasonable expectation of compensation; the recipient knowingly accepts the service; and it would unjust for the recipient not to pay up. "Unjust" is the tricky term here. It's often used synonymously with "unfair" or "inequitable" or "unreasonable." As I mention to Bill below, examples might prove useful here. (**Outside an Objectivist forum, I would couch my argument much more heavily in economic terms, rather than legal and moral terms. In my experience, that's just not how Objectivists roll.)

Bill,

Unlike food and shelter, the necessity of government can be satisfied only via a relationship with others. That relationship is not free. Trying to get away with it for free is unjust.
Suppose that my neighbor, without asking me, put up the floodlight for both of us. Does that mean that I'm required to share the expense with him?
Your elaboration on the floodlight example just extends a case not dealing with unjust enrichment. Maybe I should provide some actual examples of unjust enrichment -- or better, implied contract -- so we can evaluate the difference.

Jordan




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Post 58

Saturday, June 27, 2009 - 10:42pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

Since you state that you believe it can be justifiable to collect taxes, even at gun point, for services that a person did not choose to receive, it is up to you to explain the moral basis for drawing a line. At one extreme is the tyranny that takes all that it can squeeze out of the populace and at the other end is the minarchy with a tiny tax load that is used only to defend individual rights. Where between those two do you draw the line? What is the basis for deciding what level and what form of taxation is wrong, and which is right?



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Post 59

Sunday, June 28, 2009 - 12:16amSanction this postReply
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Jordan wrote,
Unlike food and shelter, the necessity of government can be satisfied only via a relationship with others. That relationship is not free.
Not true. I am not presently able to satisfy my need for food and shelter without relying on others. But that doesn't mean that I must be forced to pay for food or shelter that I don't want at a price that I don't consider acceptable. Granted, these services aren't free, but I should still have the right to decide whether or not they're worth the price and to purchase them or not, as I choose.
Trying to get away with it for free is unjust.
It's not unjust if I didn't agree to purchase it for an agreed upon price and didn't have the option of accepting or refusing the service. If the service is provided without my requesting it and an arbitrary sum is demanded that I didn't agree to pay, then forcing me to pay it is unjust.
A contract is deemed implied where someone confers a service on another with reasonable expectation of compensation; the recipient knowingly accepts the service; and it would be unjust for the recipient not to pay up.
That's true only if the beneficiary has the option of accepting or refusing the service and, through his behavior, implies a willingness to accept it. Otherwise, there is no implied contract nor any obligation to pay for the service.

For example, suppose that while you are on vacation, I paint your house without notifying you or contracting for the service. Then after you return, I bill you an arbitrary amount and demand that you pay it. Are you obligated to pay it, since you benefited from the service? No, because you weren't given the option of refusing the service or of agreeing to the price that you would be charged.

- Bill



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