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Post 40

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 3:00pmSanction this postReply
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Bill writes:
    Why do you shift your focus? For what purpose? Whatever the purpose, it is that which determines your choice. And if you say that there is no purpose, then you're saying that the act of shifting your focus isn't a choice, since a choice is a goal-directed action.

Bill:

I have long ago agreed with you that there is a cause and effect relationship between our values and our subsequent actions, so in a sense you can say, as you do, that our values "determine" our actions. But it is also true that there is a cause and effect relationship between our actions and our values, since we must act (focus our mind, engage our reasoning ability, form judgments about right and wrong, etc.) in order to determine what is and is not of value to us. So in another sense you can say that our actions "determine" our values. And round and round it goes. From an individual human perspective, which is the more fundamental: an initial value to kick off the process or an initial action? The next question is whether that chain of value-action events could, in principle, be traced back to a cause that lies totally outside of ourselves (i.e., determinism) or whether there is another mechanism - an emergent attribute of our particular form of human consciousness - that gives us internal control over this give and take between our values and actions; an attribute that is not dependent upon external factors, but which resides in a meta-relationship to both action and value and is responsible for both (i.e., freewill).

You look at the scientific evidence and find that no entity or mechanism (no ghost in the machine) has yet been identified that could be responsible for this sort of entirely self-generated action, and lacking such evidence, you find the theory of determinism to be the most likely explanation.

I, on the other hand, look at my internal state and clearly see freewill in action. I know with a certainty that I am in control of my mental machinery. And while I admit that neither I nor anyone else as yet understands exactly how this freewill manifests itself in scientific terms, that lack of understanding does not negate my direct perception of the events taking place. You argue that my "sense" of freewill is just an illusion, but this is just an assertion, as there is no compelling argument for that position.

If you haven't read Godel, Escher Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid by Douglas Hofstadter, you might find the sections on freewill and getting control of infinite recursion of some interest.

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 41

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 3:04pmSanction this postReply
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Bill writes:
    To be sure, none of this is a proof that (classical) free will doesn't exist. It may exist, but if it does, it is curious faculty and one which would seem to have little if any survival value.

Bill:

That's a curious statement. I can only make sense of it by applying your definition of "freewill". Did you mean that you do not actually see any survival value in the standard model of freewill? if so, could you elaborate? Thanks.

Regards,
--
Jeff


(Edited by C. Jeffery Small on 8/23, 5:39pm)


Post 42

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 4:22pmSanction this postReply
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Steve,

I guess I haven't written much here (at least all in one place) on how I think the human mind works. I know there are bits and pieces here and there. I'm not sure how much I'd like to divulge since I'm working on an AI project myself. It includes concepts that may only make sense to a person who is familiar with modern CPU architectures (MIPS is good), neural nets, evolution (genetics), information theory, economics, the scientific method, machine learning, and basic artificial intelligence.

===========

Dean writes:
    "Oh, your behavior includes perfectly random thoughts and choices, since perfectly random things happen. You couldn't help or control what you did."
    or
    "Oh, your behavior is completely determined by what you are, what the rest of reality is, and how reality works because reality is deterministic. You couldn't help or do anything different than what you did."

    Which do you prefer?


Jeff says: "Are you suggesting that these are the only two possible alternatives for our behavior?"

Can you think of a different alternative? Might I suggest that whether we are destined to do what we will do is irrelevant? That whether there are perfectly random events, or that reality is deterministic, is irrelevant?

We as individuals generate/create plans, simulate their effects on our future, decide/choose out of the plans using various metrics, and then perform the chosen plans. I don't know how more "self generated" you can get than that! And this is possible in either case being true: that reality has perfectly random events or that reality is deterministic with only practically random events. Why is it terrible that we are following the laws of reality's physics as we are doing our "free will"?

=======

One cannot "help" or "control" or "do anything different" then what is consistent with how reality works (its laws of physics). You can't change how reality works by mere thought. "You are what you are" as in you are stuck with starting with what you started with. Now, you can focus on that aspect, or you can focus on...

That at the same time you can change yourself, change what you think, change what you do. Of course you are always limited by what you are at the moment and what you are capable of at the moment. Yet there are infinite possibilities as to what you can come up with, what you can do, and how wonderful you can become. You can improve yourself and your capabilities. Hell, you can even redefine yourself: "I am both my physical body and mind and my 3GHz Core 2 Duo powered computer." Off on a tangent?

Enough for now. Please let me know if you have any further questions or comments.

Post 43

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 7:22pmSanction this postReply
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Dean wrote in post #6:
    I think reality is deterministic. I think we make choices, mainly due to our own thinking and feelings. I agree with compaibilism.

and then in post #42:
    We as individuals generate/create plans, simulate their effects on our future, decide/choose out of the plans using various metrics, and then perform the chosen plans. I don't know how more "self generated" you can get than that!

Dean:

I'm afraid I'm a bit confused as to how to reconcile these two quotes. When you say that you agree with compatibilism, are you agreeing with the Wikipedia entry I quoted in post #31 that states that compatibilists "would not deny that whatever choice you make will have been predetermined since the beginning of time"? If so, then I don't really understand what you are saying in the second quote. Can you point me in the right direction? Thanks.

Regards,
--
Jeff

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Post 44

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 8:15pmSanction this postReply
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Bill,

Thank you for hanging in there. My last post, reading it now, was kind of sloppy. From what you said in reply to my first block of quotes I can see we are dealing with both purpose and values.

Any 'choice' I make has a purpose. And the assumption is that a value explains the purpose. You said, "You decide based on your values." The 'deciding' being the selection of the values and/or the examining of the alternative choices relative to a given value, for the purpose of gaining or keeping the most significant value. If I have that right, then I can make a minor correction to one of your sentences: "I chose the right answer based on my desire to pass the test." That should be, "I chose the right answer based on the purpose of passing the course, because the course has a value to me in meeting my degree requirements."

So, the choosing is the process and purposefulness is built in. We have to act and that requires making a choice between alternative actions and that is the purpose in general and the context determines the purpose in particular. If I am sufficiently aware, I can identify my purpose (before choosing, during choosing or after the fact). A purpose is always there as the connection between the value and the choice made. That would be so even if I identify it incorrectly, or identify what I intend to be my purpose, but act on another purpose. (Like if I tell myself that my purpose in responding to some post is to be informative, but it really is to show-off :-)

Likewise, the value is built in. It is the goal being sought which is presumed to be a value. Because I can err in judging the facts, and because I can hold 'values' that really aren't, it will always be the goal of the choice, but it may not be beneficial to me. It is value in that strict Randian sense of 'that which we act to gain or keep.' And I or may not be aware of, or accurate in, identifying the value - just like with 'purpose.'

You say, "If you have conflicting goals, then you have to resolve the conflict by deciding which goal is more important. If you can't determine which is more important but have to make a decision within a certain period of time, then, again, you'll choose to pursue whichever goal you happen to be focused on at the time that you need to make the choice. But all of this is goal-directed, including the goal of arriving at a timely decision." I agree that all of this is goal-directed - that seems to be the structure of the thing - the very heart of it. But I believe this is where some complexity is built in. We can sense the differences between an irrational purpose and a rational purpose (to varying degrees based upon the individual, his values, his introspective skills, etc.) I'm not saying we 'sense' the truth of a proposition, but rather we sense our inner process as being an honest effort to reason, versus evading or acting on a whim. No one fools themselves totally in that regard without being psychotic.

We can also sense the difference between going with a short-term goal of pleasure now, versus a longer-term goal of greater happiness or well-being in the future.

I maintain that the process of choosing often has multiple conflicting goals and that sometimes the 'resolution' is part of the choosing process. I believe that a property of each of the goals is that goal's source as 'I was being mostly rational" or "I was being somewhat irrational," and a time-frame for the goal (short-term, long-term).

There is a third thing that is relevant for goals - their context. The choosing mechansim is capable of throwing out goals that are entirely out of context for a purpose. For example, some of the words in a multiple choice question could be about health. And I have health related values and health related goals. But the choosing process will disregard those as goals because they don't fit the context of passing the test (my purpose). So, I could end up with two goals that both match the context of passing the test - one is to answer quickly, get out of here, I'm hungry, pass with an adequate score. The other is take your time and answer correctly to get the best score possible.

So, if we have more than one goal for the same purpose, I have to stop the choosing process and perform some sort of evaluation that will rank the goals in importance, then when I resume the choosing process that more important goal will arise by itself and the process will direct my action accordingly. But if the two goals that arise are marked as both valid in context, but one is rational and the other is irrational, it can be a different process. At this point, I imagine you would point to a value of rationality being measured versus a desire or value of some other sort (representing the irrational goal). And I agree. But it is right here that I believe that an effort can be exerted to shift the focus of awareness to, in effect, make the rational goal be more in the forefront of awareness and the irrational goal more in the background. Or, not make the effort, or even let a strong desire to evade that is like a standing order in the particular context do the opposite - pushing the rational goal into the background. I believe that this is a uniquely human capacity that is needed to be rational. That it isn't undetermined as in without cause, but that cause is not the same as the way cause is spoken of when event A causes event B.

I would agree that the value of rationality, and habit of being rational or lack thereof, are important in influencing this shift. But without this ability I see no way we can have a difference between rational and irrational as knowledge. There would be no mind that could process that. It would remain 'true' that poison would kill us but we could not reason that poison is a disvalue and we could not know that it is true.

I said, "The question becomes, how could that view of free-will, which matches how we 'feel' it works, and matches our common sense, and suits the use of the words 'choice' and 'decision' and much more closely matches the concept of responsibility be disproved." That was pretty sloppy. You replied, "Well, not everyone "feels" that it works that way, and you can't use your feelings as a justification for your conclusions. As for matching our "common sense," it is the "common sense" view of a lot of people that the soul exists independently of the body, that God created the universe, that naive realism is true, the latter being the view that colors are out there in the object independently of the perceiver. As Rand observes, "common sense is not enough where theoretical knowledge is required: it can make simple, concrete-bound connections -- it cannot integrate complex issues, or deal with wide abstractions . . ." You may feel as though you make arbitrary, unmotivated choices, but this kind of choice is at odds with the fact that the actions of living organisms are not arbitrary, but are goal-directed. Why should it be any different for human choice?"

I agree with almost everything you said. I don't believe that we make "arbitrary, unmotivated choices" but I do believe that the choices are arbitrary in the sense that they aren't determined outside of a willed shift in focus which is a first cause for the following chain of events. It will always be goal-directed, but could be directed at a rational goal or an irrational goal, a short-term or a longer-term goal. The key sense in which it is NOT arbitrary is that being able to choose, to initiate a first cause at a decision point is the uniquely human form of goal-directedness which is part of the rational faculty. Other animals make 'choices' but on a lower level that is automatic. The dog trotting down the sidewalk decides to pass to the left or right of an obstacle. I believe that the dog chooses but that the choice isn't arbitrary and is goal-directed, but the dog can't initiate a first-cause shift between alternatives. His mechanism is simpler and he will always resolve in favor of one goal with out any such shifting.

You said, "To be sure, none of this is a proof that (classical) free will doesn't exist. It may exist, but if it does, it is curious faculty and one which would seem to have little if any survival value." I think that this capacity IS the nature of rationality, which lets us make mistakes, but also lets us conceptualize, to envision that which has never existed, to make choices that aren't automatic. And those are our unique form of survival.

Post 45

Sunday, August 24, 2008 - 9:04amSanction this postReply
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Jeff,

What we do is inevitable, but we still exercise our free will to make the inevitable happen.

Lets say that right now you have the choice to either sit there and want nothing and do nothing and die (the greatest moral achievement in Buddhism) or to clean the house to meet up with some good friends before another productive week of work (some virtues in Objectivism).

Why is it that you think it is a contradiction that you yourself both by self direction and by the deterministic processes of reality go through the mental operations to create/consider such options and decide what you will do next?

Because you think that one is not really choosing if the decision you make is inevitable? I do not see what the problem is. Why would you want to choose something other than what you choose? If that were the case, then wouldn't you be choosing something else? Doesn't it make more sense that you will only end up choosing what you determine is the choice you want? What do you want instead? Do you want your decisions be be random?

Cheers,
Dean
Your favorite rapidly self-adapting rational emotional living machine

Post 46

Sunday, August 24, 2008 - 10:56amSanction this postReply
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Dean writes:
    What we do is inevitable, but we still exercise our free will to make the inevitable happen. [...] Why is it that you think it is a contradiction that you yourself both by self direction and by the deterministic processes of reality go through the mental operations to create/consider such options and decide what you will do next?

Dean:

The simple answer is that I do not accept that the choices I make are inevitable - for reasons I have explored in detail in the previous discussion on this topic.

But what still confuses me is how you can believe that all of our actions are inevitable and then still use "free will" to describe them. Somehow I don't think you are using that term here in the same sense as Bill or the Wikepedia article, so I'm really not sure what exactly you mean. From my viewpoint, if my actions are predetermined and inevitable, then there is no such thing as freewill and no more moral accountability for our actions than could be ascribed to a bolder breaking free and rolling down a hillside. What ever consequences occur as a result of the boulder's or my actions, they simply "are" and can not be judged in moral terms.

The compatibilist's attempt to have it both ways makes absolutely no sense to me. Of course, it's a perfect catch-22 because, from this view a compatibilist's nature was predetermined, so they have no choice but to believe and assert what they do. I'm being serious here. I don't see how one can believe in determinism and then have any faith in their own viewpoint. If we are all predetermined, then a compatiblist has to believe in determination, while an Objectivist has to believe in freewill, a Catholic has to believe in the existence of God, and so on. They are all in the state they are in due to antecedent factors that predate their birth and cannot exert any true independent control over the verification of the validity of their views, as that verification process and the conclusions drawn from it were also predetermined. Knowing this, why does the compatibilist believe that their predetermined view is more correct than any other?

Regards,
--
Jeff


Post 47

Sunday, August 24, 2008 - 12:07pmSanction this postReply
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Without an intelligent living being making judgments, and at the most basic sub-atomic level, I'd agree that a boulder is much like a human. Yet of course you must agree that even if reality is deterministic, humans are very different than boulders.

You claim that in the case that reality is deterministic that:
we cannot What ever consequences occur as a result of the boulder's or my actions, they simply "are" and can not be judged in moral terms.
I disagree. If a boulder falls and crushes my leg, I'll judge that is very bad for my goals... morality still holds. I can still consider how my actions will influence my goals... morality still holds. Reality being deterministic is irrelevant.
I don't see how one can believe in determinism and then have any faith in their own viewpoint. If we are all predetermined, then a compatiblist has to believe in determination, while an Objectivist has to believe in freewill, a Catholic has to believe in the existence of God, and so on
I'm sure you mean confidence, I can't say I like the word "faith". I'd say I believe in free will and that reality is deterministic, my philosophy is very similar to Objectivism. A person of course can change their viewpoints.
Knowing this, why does the compatibilist believe that their predetermined view is more correct than any other?
From all of my experiences, my knowledge of physics, I've come to the conclusion that reality being deterministic is the best for predicting the future, because it is repeatedly/consistently proven to correctly predict the future. Of course we are limited to using probabilistic physics equations and models for sub-atomic predictions and other practically random events. There being perfectly random events just doesn't seem to make sense, like saying a is not a. And I'm a seeker of truth, where truth is information that is consistent with what is and what happens. I am not interested in holding invalid beliefs, for any reason, including the reason to merely to feel better. (Edit: not suggesting that you are evading)
(Edited by Dean Michael Gores on 8/24, 2:20pm)


Post 48

Sunday, August 24, 2008 - 1:30pmSanction this postReply
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Bill,

=========
I chose to mark the correct answer on the multiple-choice test, because I valued the result -- getting an A on the test. What's not to understand?
=========

Sure, with a frozen (read: floating) hierarchy of value. But human valuation is so complex that besides background values there are "spurious" values which arise and fall with one's chosen change in focus.

This is how you could be in the exact same external situation, have the exact same "philosophical" hierarchy of value -- and choose differently. There's an independent intellectual process going on in the foreground of that background -- that background composed of the external context and our internal value hierarchy.

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 8/24, 1:32pm)


Post 49

Sunday, August 24, 2008 - 2:47pmSanction this postReply
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Dean writes:
    I'm sure you mean confidence, I can't say I like the word "faith". I'd say I believe in free will and that reality is deterministic, my philosophy is very similar to Objectivism. A person of course can change their viewpoints.

Dean:

I agree, "confidence" is a much better and more accurate word and is what I meant.

When you say that a person can change their mind, I'm still a bit confused. For a boulder on a hill, there are many possibilities that could occur. It could remain lodged in place. it could come loose at many different moments. Rolling down the hill it could deflect in many different directions during it's travel. Let's say that this particular boulder breaks loose at a particular moment, travels down the hill on a path that ultimately intersects the path of a crawling baby that has been abandoned in the woods and has been ignored by all passing adults! :-)* According to determinism, the location of the baby and the location of that rock were long ago preordained to end up in the same place at the same time, and no one is arguing that the boulder could have done anything to change the outcome. So, isn't the same thing true of human behavior? When you say that a person "can change their viewpoint", wasn't that change in viewpoint long ago preordained exactly like the course of the boulder. We observe that some people do change their minds on occasion while others do not. But, according to determinism, there is no volition involved in that change or lack of change any more than there is for the boulder. Am I missing something in your view?

    If a boulder falls and crushes my leg, I'll judge that is very bad for my goals... morality still holds.

Usually, when we discuss morality, we are judging the rightness or wrongness of human actions, not the actions of inanimate objects. In this case, it is true that getting one's leg crushed is generally bad, but we do not speak of holding the boulder "responsible" because the boulder in not in control of its actions. So what about when Tanya Harding's husband takes a pipe and smacks Nancy Kerrigan's shins? How can we hold him responsible for that act if he was just as preordained to that action as the boulder was in crushing your leg? If a person does not have some mechanism within themselves that gives them the freedom to choose an alternate course of action, then it makes no sense to get morally outraged at their actions than it does to get upset at the boulder.

Regards,
--
Jeff


* I was going to have the rock hit an adult, but why pass up the opportunity to push a few buttons and inject a bit more angst into the discussion! And borrowing from Flip Wilson, my excuse is that the debil Big Bang made me do it! :-)

Post 50

Sunday, August 24, 2008 - 3:40pmSanction this postReply
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Jeff,

Thanks for your entertaining response, haha.

But, according to determinism, there is no volition involved in that change or lack of change any more than there is for the boulder. Am I missing something in your view?
Yes, you are missing that my view includes that volition is involved.
So what about when Tanya Harding's husband takes a pipe and smacks Nancy Kerrigan's shins? How can we hold him responsible for that act if he was just as preordained to that action as the boulder was in crushing your leg? If a person does not have some mechanism within themselves that gives them the freedom to choose an alternate course of action, then it makes no sense to get morally outraged at their actions than it does to get upset at the boulder.
Morality is not just about holding others responsible for their actions, morality is about judging every thing's influence on our goal attainment. For your goal attainment, you must make decisions based on what you are capable of and the context: both boulders and people (non-volitional and volitional).

If you don't hold Tanya Harding "responsible", then you can expect that more people will be like Tanya Harding... because they will conclude that their losses (gain a pacifist enemy how scary!) outweigh their gains (Tanya didn't really gain anything did she?). So in my opinion, punishment or holding people "responsible" should not be about retribution, but about maximizing gains and minimizing losses over the long term.

Hold back the boulders with guard rails. Enslave/kill the murderers. Fine the vandals and thieves to pay for the damages, losses, and detective and legal work. Etc., strive to make it economically the best choice for everyone to be negative rights respecting.

Anger is useful for passion to identify and deal with threats. After understanding how they think, and figuring out what to do, anger is not any more useful vs Tanya Harding than the boulder.

Post 51

Sunday, August 24, 2008 - 9:30pmSanction this postReply
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Dean wrote:
    Yes, you are missing that my view includes that volition is involved.

Dean:

I thought that predetermination and volition were antonyms? Sorry, but I'm still confused.

Regards,
--
Jeff


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Post 52

Sunday, August 24, 2008 - 10:31pmSanction this postReply
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"So in my opinion, punishment or holding people "responsible" should not be about retribution, but about maximizing gains and minimizing losses over the long term."

So, if we can make some plausible claim that allowing, say, Bill Clinton to get away with lying, because its only about sex, and he's a good president otherwise, or O J Simpson to get away with murder, because it will teach racists cops a lesson, then since a greater good is achieved, certain crimes should go unpunished? Even if you don't like those specific examples, that seems the sort of calculation you are allowing. The only possible result, since future benefits are incalculable, is the effective sanctioning of corruption, anarchy, and the principle that might or expediency makes right.

Ultimately, the options are the rule of law or the rule of men - i.e., of the whim of those in power.

Post 53

Monday, August 25, 2008 - 5:08amSanction this postReply
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Dean,

=========
Anger is useful for passion to identify and deal with threats. After understanding how they think, and figuring out what to do, anger is not any more useful vs Tanya Harding than the boulder.
=========

I can see your point about having only your own anger to protect you when you don't understand another's transgressions -- but then appearing to not benefit from your own anger after understanding.

I disagree that, as your body of knowledge (or information set) grows, that your emotions, even emotions of anger, become less "useful." Rand's ghost might even say that emotions are MORE useful with more KNOWLEDGE behind them!

Ed

Post 54

Monday, August 25, 2008 - 5:16amSanction this postReply
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Jeff, I don't think I can help explain this further. I'll just repeat. Whether perfectly random events happen is irrelevant. Whether reality is deterministic is irrelevant when considering whether there is free will/volition.

Ted,

Sounds like we have a contradiction here, like maybe letting certain crimes go unpunished is either better for your goal achievement but for some crazy reason you still decide to punish, or that punishing is actually better for your goal achievement but for some crazy reason you claim that not punishing is better?

"The only possible result, since future benefits are incalculable..." If we let murderers murder without stopping them, I think murderers will continue to murder. Oh, are you saying that the elite should not be punished to the same degree as the poor? I would disagree. Yet an elite would be much less effected by a fine than a poor person. I do think its a considerably greater crime to kill Bill Gates than a jobless thieving drug addict. Why not include consideration of the value of the individual in your ethics?

"Ultimately, the options are the rule of law or the rule of men - i.e., of the whim of those in power." I don't follow what you are trying to say here.

Ed, I agree, my main goal was to try to identify what anger is and what its for. My first statement was more correct, that "Anger is useful for passion to identify and deal with threats." If there are no threats to deal with, then whats the use of anger, what is there to be angry about?
(Edited by Dean Michael Gores on 8/25, 5:22am)


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Post 55

Monday, August 25, 2008 - 12:48pmSanction this postReply
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On free will, I think the problem isn't whether or not values can be treated as first cause of an action, but rather how do these values form in the first place? What is the 'glue' that binds a value to something in the real world either from formation or from resultant action? I believe that is the fundamental draw back to 'epistemological' determinism in that it has no means to really bridge that gap (even if you take a Naturalistic position of identity).


For me, it goes further in that the internal 'values' we contain are not just simply if-then statements, but a complex arrangement of principles by which one can produce a wide array of results from an equally wide array of inputs.And that each of these values can be specified to exacting detail in one instance for one possible set of parameters, then suddenly condensed/generalized for another set of parameters.

A deterministic model like what you find in a Turing Machine model could not handle nor represent to the full satisfaction of any decent computer scientist or mathematician all the possible inputs and resultant states as you cannot make such a model that can create its own states or go back and change the previous states to fit the new inputs (then some how remember and go back to keep the old parameters as well).

Human thought and learning are the sort of things that really proves that the only way such a creature that exhibits them is by a means that is not wholly deterministic, but that is still sufficiently deterministic in its components to retain a degree of predictable (and repeatable) behavior(s) [as not to get caught in it's own version of a recursion problem]. I think it follows that values, once instantiated, are deterministic, but when considering how they are formed and how they get instantiated in the first place pretty much is a tough problem to solve for any determinist or indeterminist (worse for the indeterminist as there's no means to model the system that is indeterministic able to produce repeatable and predictable behaviors).


None the less, I still stand by my old conclusion from months ago in another thread about free will: it is the freedom to think otherwise, otherwise we could not think at all.


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Post 56

Tuesday, November 4, 2008 - 10:06amSanction this postReply
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Today's Dilbert Comic Strip comments on the origins of determinism. :-)

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 57

Tuesday, November 4, 2008 - 11:59amSanction this postReply
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"Freewill Vs. the Programmed Brain".  Exactly.  Sometimes freewill wins.  Sometimes the programmed brain wins.

Post 58

Tuesday, November 4, 2008 - 1:37pmSanction this postReply
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"...free will: it is the freedom to think otherwise, otherwise we could not think at all."

Well said.

My metaphor is that the formation of a value is like the creation of an automated 'voice' that can join the many other existing 'voices,' triggered by circumstances, and all clamoring to the 'self' (the deciding mechanism). We 'think,' and volition is involved in that, and the thinking results in an automated (deterministic) voice when it is a valuation decision.

Our volition is a capacity to act in which one of the following is the type of action: 1) the automatic acting upon the loudest of 'voices,' or, 2) doing nothing, where none of the voices are very loud, or 3) raising, or lowering, our consciousness when hearing many different 'voices' calling us in different directions. Volition, free will, IS that mechanism of shifting between these options.

That last, that raising or lowering of consciousness is the move between active reasoning versus automatic acting on an emotion. It is the mechanism that can discriminate between 'voices' so that we can act on a 'voice' that is not as loud. An example would be acting against a voice of fear that is telling us to freeze or to flee, and we raise the level of consciousness - reasoning - and in doing so we can act on a 'voice' telling us to do the right thing instead of freezing or fleeing.

Post 59

Tuesday, November 4, 2008 - 7:22pmSanction this postReply
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Steve,

An example would be acting against a voice of fear that is telling us to freeze or to flee, and we raise the level of consciousness - reasoning - and in doing so we can act on a 'voice' telling us to do the right thing instead of freezing or fleeing.
What a telling example!

I can't even count how many times I've been put into "freeze or flee" (or "fight or flight"), only to make use of my executive mental functioning in order to choose what to process and how to process it -- which led me to do something (something more rational) which I hadn't expected to do. I had expected to freeze or flee, and I fought. Or, I had expected to freeze or flee, and I reasoned with my opponent/oppressor. Countless, countless times. Let me give you an example ...

When I was age 18, I took it upon myself to flee from a police car. It was a split-second decision. I was cruising down a 30-mph road at 150% of the speed limit and, lo and behold, I zoomed right past a parked squad. Piggy was parked behind bushes so that traffic couldn't see him -- until it was too late. I was on a 350cc two-stroke screamer at the time (a stock Kenny Roberts race bike).

Upon seeing myself blow by the parked cop, I dropped down a gear or two, got crouched into position, and flicked my right wrist back while popping my left grip loose. Just a moment later, I was at 300% of the speed limit. I could hear the cop car's engine roar and it was like his sirens were trying to overpower my 11,000-rpm whine. I knew that a straight line would get me one of two places:

1) a coffin (if someone inadvertently blocked an intersection)
2) a jail cell (if "Five-O" got on his cb radio for back up)

I took right turns. I think cops expect you to take right turns (when you're on the run from them). I went down a few blocks, took a right turn, went down a block, and took a right turn again -- to try to double-back and lose him. This cop wasn't having any of that. When he saw me take a right turn, this sucker took his turn one block early! He knew I'd be doubling back, and then he'd be there waiting for me -- to cut me off at the pass.

He underestimated my bike. I went two full city blocks (one over and one back) before he could even go one block over -- to the planned cut-off point. I was more than twice as fast as he was. But I was scared out of my wits that I might do something stupid and spill the bike (or get myself killed on the run). I got back to my house and, once safely in the alley way, I spilled the bike! I was unaware how lucky that was.

Still living with my family, I rushed into the house while shaking and red in the face, and I found an empty room to sit down and try to calm down so that I wouldn't get busted for running from the cops by my dad (a man the whole neighborhood feared for good reason). I tried to sit down and sit still, but my heart was going as fast as my tachometer. There's something to be said for almost going out in a blaze of glory. Not knowing if the next second a won't car pull out in front of you making you slam into 4000-lbs of steel, at 90+mph. Then my dad walked in the room.

"What in the hell is wrong with you?! You're shaking!", he said.

I mustered: "Dad! I ... I ... (this was almost scarier for me than the near-death ride) ... Dad ... I just spilled my brand new bike in the driveway! Waaaaaaaaaagggggggggggggghhhhhhh!"

He consoles me: "Oh, it's all right, son. We'll buff out the scratches."

All of a sudden my dad looks up and turns his head and in response utters: "Hey, why in the hell are all of those sirens going on out there?!"

Okay, now this has got me scared! If this guy finds out that the cops are after me, I'll soon be begging to go with the cops instead of staying home (IF you know what I mean).

"Dad! Dad, I don't know about the sirens but I just spilled my brand-new bike in the driveway! Waaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaggggggggggggggggghhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh!"

I got away (for the second time).

Then, a few years later, I got a faster bike (because that's what you do, you get faster ones). Cruising at 150% of the speed limit, the same damn thing happens (but this time in a different suburb). What do I do?

I pulled over and took the ticket -- which proves that free will exists.

:-)

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 11/04, 7:32pm)


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