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Post 20

Friday, August 22, 2008 - 1:05pmSanction this postReply
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Ben,

I suspect that I'll say this rather awkwardly, but here goes.

My concern is that science had specifically chosen to view cause-effect as mechanical rather than cause being identity and that science had split with normative and that these two changes plus a general turn away from anything that didn't fit the materialistic and deterministic mold, resulted in a science that moved ahead rapidly in those areas that don't have anything to do with humans and less so to the degree that humans are the subject. Physics and Chemistry are going great guns, but psychology, morality, political science, etc. - are in dismal shape.

I am convinced, at this point, that statements coming from scientists regarding the mechanisms of consciousness aren't worth much. I can see the flaws in motivational psychology and in the philosophy of psychology but I don't know enough about neurology or the issue of free-will/volition to see the less obvious flaws in the arguments.

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Post 21

Friday, August 22, 2008 - 1:42pmSanction this postReply
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It's probably more fun for some to thrash this topic out again in real time, but if you are interested in bringing yourself up to speed on what has been discussed before, here is the link to the previous discussion titled Is Free Will Incredible? which ran from March 6th through April 26th, 2007. 154 posts of pure RoR nirvana. Enjoy!

Regards,
--
Jeff

P.S.: And if you want to see that Joe Rolands has a sense of humor, try this link!

Post 22

Friday, August 22, 2008 - 3:28pmSanction this postReply
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Steve Wolfer,

Objectivism is the scientific method applied to philosophy combined with ethics rooted at an individual's goal to live and flourish. Or at least that is how I've developed my philosophy, which is very similar to Objectivism.

Have you given much though to how I've described how I think the human brain works? I know I've not yet pieced it together into a nice article yet.

Post 23

Friday, August 22, 2008 - 5:23pmSanction this postReply
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You said, "The "first cause" of the choice to think is the child's original desire to understand." Was that because it was the first, as earliest, in that chain, or was it a unique kind of event.
No, earliest in that chain, not unique. A choice to think that is based on the desire to understand something more clearly can exist at any stage of one's life.
What about this: When I read what you have written, I have to think about it. And how hard I think, within a certain range of effort, seems to be a choice that isn't 'determined' by anything prior. I would concede that the range represents a combination of my current situation (how much time do I have right now, how mentally awake am I, where does this kind of issue stand relative to what I'm interested in now) and my values (at this point, relative to you and this subject am I valuing combativeness, expressiveness, learning, deeper understanding of volition, etc.) - that is, the range seems to be determined by prior values, but the effort within the range seems free of that.
Why should it be any different for the effort? The degree of effort is governed by these selfsame values -- by how well it appears to serve the intended goals of the valuer.

I wrote, "You chose the option, because you valued it." To which Ed replied,
That is a shallow ... no, hollow ... view of "value." Besides that hollow view of it -- a hollow view which even explains the actions of growing or semi-mobile plants and both the higher and lower animals -- there's a uniquely human view, and use, of value. It's a view / use of value which leads to objective values; something otherwise-absent in nature or the nature of necessarily-subjective animals.
Why is it hollow? There is no attempt here to explain in detail the many processes involved in human valuation. The point is only to state a fundamental truth at the most general level of causation. The statement is true, notwithstanding the fact that all living organisms engage in a goal-directed action because they value it. As for the issue of objective versus subjective values, I fail to see its relevance in this context. I am certainly not saying that every chosen action is determined by that which the actor recognizes as objectively valuable, if that's what you're suggesting.

- Bill

Post 24

Friday, August 22, 2008 - 6:36pmSanction this postReply
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Bill,

Then the desire to think, whenever it occurs, is a first cause? (To think, or to evade?)

And this happens for each of every day, many times a day?

Is there a relationship between what we think of as will or volition between the ego and that desire to think?

Post 25

Friday, August 22, 2008 - 6:54pmSanction this postReply
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Dean,

Are you referring to post 6 in this thread? Or is there a link to where you've written those thoughts that you can supply me?

Post 26

Friday, August 22, 2008 - 8:03pmSanction this postReply
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Dean:
Having parallel processes or complex processes does not imply or support that determinism is false. I'm a software developer, I make complex parallel processes that are deterministic.


Dean, can you explain this a bit better. When I speak of parallel processes as it relates to the biological I may have something a little different in mind. For instance if there is a state "A" the next state may be "B" or "C" because at its most basic level life is a type of molecular logic. We don't know if the next state will be "B" or "C" - or maybe even reversed.

My thinking on this was influenced by a book called "The Genius Within - Discovering the Intelligence of Every Living Thing. I found this a fascinating read. Here is a pretty good synopsis of the book by a reader on Amazon.

"The Genius Within" is a must read for the non-specialist interested in science. It is a thought provoking work; very speculative, but grounded in mainstream scientific fact and theory. I thoroughly enjoyed reading it...twice. It's a bit technical at times, so some familiarity with the science involved is recommended. Also, if you happen to be more interested in "intelligent" animal behavior as such, rather than in its biochemical, microbiological and systemic underpinnings, you may want to look elsewhere.

In this book, the author explores the notion the "networks" underlie the phenomenon we call life, and that life is synonymous with the information processing - intelligence - they architect. We tend to think of intelligence as a unique feature of brains, our conscious ones in particular (he calls this "brain chauvinism"), but he contends that all life is intelligent, or at least as "intelligent as it needs to be", and sets out to prove it.

In simplest terms, he defines intelligence as the ability to solve problems related to survival. This seems to run counter to mainstream evolutionary theory, where the survival of species is basically as matter of, well, "dumb luck". But the author views intelligence as a collective phenomenon firmly embedded within this framework; as an "emergent behavior" of large groups of highly interactive biological entities (Including sub-cellular enzymes) otherwise engaged in a contingency-driven, random struggle for survival. The architecture that endows such groups with "emergent properties" is called, for want of a better word, a "network" by the author.

The details of what the author means by a "network" is closely argued and beyond the scope of this review. In general, a biological "network" is a large collection of "selfish", randomly interacting entities whose components are capable of two or more relatively stable, but reversible, states (more active/less active, faster/slower, stronger/weaker), and whose components can variously enhance or impede each other's status over time, resulting in a collective "energy landscape" patterned by forces impinging on the network. The former allows for basic information storage (the biological equivalent of zeros and ones), and the latter for collective information storage (pattern recognition/memory) concerning the environment, allowing the collective to respond to environmental stimuli in, ultimately, a manner conducive to its survival. Overall, the architecture of a "network" harnesses the random, contingent interactions of its constituents into the directed or, as the author would claim, intelligent actions we associate with life at every level of biological organization.

The author spends much of the book "fleshing out" these and other abstractions, particularly with respects to interacting aggregates composed of things such as cellular enzymes, bacteria and somatic cells, what he calls "party networks" as opposed to "hard wired networks", though he does give ample attention to the latter (he is, after all, a brain surgeon). To assess intelligence from the "outside in", he employs a modified version of the Touring Test throughout these forays. Without making any assumptions about them based on what they are or how they're organized, he queries each system with a problem, and waits for a response. He queries an infectious bacterial species with a new antibiotic and, within months, it develops immunity. He queries the human immune system with the aforementioned bacteria and, within weeks, it develops an effective resistance. In these and other instances, he argues for an "intelligent" response from each based on their participation in network architecture, no more or less effective for the overall survival of its hosts than the quickened responses of "hard wired" brains.




----

This has been a very interesting...

Post 27

Friday, August 22, 2008 - 9:26pmSanction this postReply
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Tim,

I define intelligence as the ability to achieve goals in various situations. There are tons of goals (infinite actually) and tons of situations (infinite actually). For different kinds of goals and situations there are different kinds of intelligence. The more goals one can achieve and the more situations one can achieve them in, the greater the intelligence. So Frank Vertosick Jr has focused on a subset of the kinds of intelligence, the kinds related to the goal of survival.

When talking about processes, "parallel" to me means "happening at the same time". For example if a computer adds 5+1 and 3+2 at the same time and comes up with the values 6 and 5 at the same time. Your Intel or AMD processor does this through instruction level parallelism and multi-threading with multiple Von Neumann architecture based CPU cores.

"Complex" means lots of different sub-operations/processes may exist in an entire processing system. Even more complex is when some processes follow others (serial), and some run in parallel. Even more complex is when some sub processes run or do not run depending on what has been computed so far.

What you name as "parallel" is more known as "random". "Random" means unpredictable-- but there are various degrees of how unpredictable a thing is.

Practically random is where one cannot predict an outcome because the outcome is too complex to be able to compute. An example of practically random might be a free electron's next position. A free electron is influenced by all of the magnetic and gravitational forces in the universe. Solar systems yet to be discovered light years away have an influence on the electron's next position, which we could not possibly factor into our predictive formula of where exactly the electron will be next. We could give probabilities for different spots where the electron will be next, but we can not be exactly sure. So the electron's next exact position is practically random.

Less random might be some dice thrown. If you have a high speed camera and a powerful computer, you could actually predict what side dice will land on using physics. For many cases (such as casinos where high speed cameras and powerful computer are banned) the throw of dice is practically random. Or if you had to call the bet before letting go of the dice for the camera to see...

Anyways, like I was saying in Post 6, even though there are some extremely practically random things, I don't think there are perfectly random events. Where if you could rewind reality in entirety to a previous state and see if the same thing will happen, I think the same thing will happen (the electron's next location will be at the same location no matter how many times you rewind and resume).

==========

So... what I'm saying is that I think reality is deterministic. I think if reality wasn't deterministic, then we'd see all sorts of weird things like Ben Mann suggested: a river turning to blood. Or light bending without reason.

Mmm... and even if there were perfectly random events (such as the electron's next position being different if you rewind reality and resume)... even if there were perfectly random events, how does that make one have more control over one's will? Or make the control one has over one's will better than in the possible case that reality is deterministic? Consider these two cases:
"Oh, your behavior includes perfectly random thoughts and choices, since perfectly random things happen. You couldn't help or control what you did."
or
"Oh, your behavior is completely determined by what you are, what the rest of reality is, and how reality works because reality is deterministic. You couldn't help or do anything different than what you did."
Which do you prefer?

In the second case, there are still practically random events in our mental processes, so a person does not have complete logical control over their own thoughts, random thoughts and diversions occur, mistakes are made along with great discoveries. There are practically random events, which are an important part of some of our mental abilities like creativity (creating new thoughts/plans/actions). Practically random events have also helped create the genetic diversity of the organisms in the world today, and through natural selection over an incredible number of generations of minor modifications to DNA we are the lucky ones who were born from the genetic lineage that has been selected for the most intelligence.

Steve, Tomorrow I'll look into finding my notes/writing. I'd kind of like to put together my thoughts for my own work on my AI project.

Post 28

Friday, August 22, 2008 - 10:13pmSanction this postReply
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Dean writes:
    "Oh, your behavior includes perfectly random thoughts and choices, since perfectly random things happen. You couldn't help or control what you did."

    or

    "Oh, your behavior is completely determined by what you are, what the rest of reality is, and how reality works because reality is deterministic. You couldn't help or do anything different than what you did."

    Which do you prefer?


Dean:

Are you suggesting that these are the only two possible alternatives for our behavior?

Regards,
--
Jeff



(Edited by C. Jeffery Small on 8/22, 10:15pm)


Post 29

Friday, August 22, 2008 - 10:18pmSanction this postReply
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Then the desire to think, whenever it occurs, is a first cause? (To think, or to evade?)
What do you mean by a first cause? First relative to what? It's not the first choice to think, which occurred somewhere in the early years of one's life, as we discussed. I think that by "first" in this context, you mean that the choice had no antecedent cause, which is the very thing I'm denying.

Also, evasion is not the only alternative to thinking, if by "thinking" you mean focusing one's attention on a given subject. One may have no legitimate reason to focus one's attention, in which case, one's failure to do so would not constitute evasion. Evasion is the active suppression of one's awareness in order to avoid acknowledging unpleasant facts. Obviously, this is not something that one should be doing, as it constitutes a form of intellectual dishonesty.
And this happens for each of every day, many times a day?
Choosing to focus one's mind on what one is doing presumably does occur many times a day. Choosing to evade unpleasant facts may occur infrequently, if at all, depending on the situation and the person's character.
Is there a relationship between what we think of as will or volition between the ego and that desire to think?
I don't understand this sentence, Steve. I think you left something out. Could you clarify it?

Thanks.

- Bill



(Edited by William Dwyer on 8/22, 10:28pm)


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Post 30

Friday, August 22, 2008 - 10:42pmSanction this postReply
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Bill,

You said, "I think that by "first" in this context, you mean that the choice had no antecedent cause, which is the very thing I'm denying."

Yes, you understood me correctly. I'm working to understand your position and to compare it to mine which is that of volition as a recurring, first cause but which would be using the word cause in the sense of a property of humans as opposed to cause as an antecedent event. There would be no prior event that was sufficient to explain the result without volition as a property. But this is an area I haven't spent much time working on and it is difficult to work with (for me).
----

"Is there a relationship between what we think of as will or volition between the ego and that desire to think?"

By 'ego' I was referring to the "I", to the agent that is presumed to be making a choice. When I said "desire to think" I was referring to your sentence where you said that the desire to think is cause of thinking.

When people referred to a "ghost in the machine" it was something like that - a way to speak of the driver, the little man behind the facade of the wizard of Oz. Is there a level at which you see a person as making decisions as opposed to automatically reaching decisions because of a chain of antecedent events?

If not then it is inaccurate to say, "I choose to have another cup of coffee" - to be accurate one would need to say, "I have to have another cup of coffee" - since we would be determined. After all, if it was only childhood desire to think that started the chain, then saying, "my childhood desire to think has, through a long chain of events, forced me to have another cup of coffee" really wouldn't be different.


(Edited by Steve Wolfer on 8/22, 10:53pm)


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Post 31

Friday, August 22, 2008 - 11:04pmSanction this postReply
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Just to help clarify some of these issues, from Wikipedia under the subject of Compatibilism:
    Determinists argue that all acts that take place are predetermined by prior causes, including human actions. [...] A compatibilist, or soft determinist, in contrast, will define a free act in a way that does not hinge on the presence or absence of prior causes. For example, one could define a free act as one that involves no compulsion by another person. [...] For example, you could choose to keep or delete this page; while a compatibilist determinist would not deny that whatever choice you make will have been predetermined since the beginning of time, they will argue that this choice that you make is an example of free will because no one is forcing you to make whatever choice you make. In contrast, someone could be holding a gun to your head and telling you that unless you delete the page, he/she will kill you; to a compatibilist, that is an example of a lack of free will.

I think Steve is confused (just as I once was) by the way Bill writes on this subject combined with our lack of understanding of the compatibilist's vocabulary. As you can see from the above excerpt from Wikipedia, a compatibilist such as Bill or Dean believe that all of our actions "have been predetermined since the beginning of time". They are, in fact, basically plain old determinists.

What sets a compatiblist apart from a typical determinist is their redefinition of what freewill or a "free act" means. When Bill speaks of our "freedom" to choose to think, or speaks about having to accept "responsibility" for our actions, I hope that you can see that these terms mean something completely different from their normal usage.

So Steve, stop looking for that "first causation" that you think might be lurking somewhere in Bill's explanations. For the compatibilist, the only first cause in this universe was the Big Bang. Everything, and I do mean everything, has and will continue to simply unfold like clockwork from that pivotal moment and we are just so many pawns being shoved along our own complex pathways, inevitably wasting time writing our sad little hearts out on Objectivist forums, with no ability to do otherwise. Oh crap!!! :-(

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 32

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 8:22amSanction this postReply
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Steve,

Thanks for your explanation. You asked,
Is there a level at which you see a person as making decisions as opposed to automatically reaching decisions because of a chain of antecedent events?
I would characterize this as a false alternative. In my view, the person himself makes decisions, even though his decisions are due to a chain of antecedent causes. One of the causes in that chain is the thinking that he does in order to arrive at those decisions. For example, suppose that I'm trying to decide whether to take a job that is closer to home but which offers slightly less pay versus one that is further away but pays slightly more? I would evaluate the various pluses and minuses of the two jobs, and upon concluding (say) that the job with the higher salary is a better deal, decide to accept that one over the job with the lower salary.

Observe that my decision is not arbitrary; it is determined by my evaluation of the respective merits of the two jobs. Given that evaluation, I could not have decided in favor of the alternative. My thinking determined my decision. But what determined my thinking? It was my recognition that I needed to find work and that the two jobs I was considering were my two best alternatives.
If not then it is inaccurate to say, "I choose to have another cup of coffee" - to be accurate one would need to say, "I have to have another cup of coffee" - since we would be determined. After all, if it was only childhood desire to think that started the chain, then saying, "my childhood desire to think has, through a long chain of events, forced me to have another cup of coffee" really wouldn't be different.
Recall my example of the multiple choice test. Would you say that because I could not have chosen an answer that I recognized as wrong (given my desire to pass the test), my choosing the right answer was not really a choice? Or would you say that despite my having to choose what I recognized as the right answer, I could still be said to have chosen it -- could still be said to bear responsibility for my answer? If you wouldn't, then how could you hold me responsible for my performance on the test? You couldn't. But that would mean that no student who ever takes a multiple-choice test is responsible for his answers, which is absurd! Clearly, a choice that is necessitated by one's value judgments is still a choice. It still represents a decision that one is responsible for.

- Bill

Post 33

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 9:00amSanction this postReply
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Bill,

You said, "One of the causes in that chain is the thinking that he does in order to arrive at those decisions. For example, suppose that I'm trying to decide whether to take a job that is closer to home but which offers slightly less pay versus one that is further away but pays slightly more? I would evaluate the various pluses and minuses of the two jobs, and upon concluding (say) that the job with the higher salary is a better deal, decide to accept that one over the job with the lower salary."

In software I can create what is called a decision tree. I could make one that would automatically 'think' through the process of deciding which job to take. Now, in that case, when I ran the software, it would be a process of events, one after another, where the variables were analyzed and a logic chain followed. Definitely a case of determinism.

But when I think about the job myself, I raise or lower the level of intensity of focus, I shape the kind of focus, say from opening up more to how I feel on the inside about the drive to work, to an external analytic focus on the relation of the money to my goals. I can feel satisfied at some point and let go of the topic, or I can feel tired and postpone the decision, or I can feel frustrated at being undecided and raise the level of the focus. These all feel like things I control, that I'm an initiator of. To me, this is volition and it can act like a first cause, breaking a previous antecedent chain of events and shift the next event to being different than it would other wise have been. I couldn't decide to fly in the face of major values, but that isn't the case. Like when I steer a car, I make it turn, and not magically make it go where turning the steering wheel wouldn't take it. The previous antecedent chain gets me to a decision point, and my volition can only shift it little from that point.

Where you were talking about holding a person responsible for their answers on the multiple choice test, I know that the degree of intensity I put into taking a test - the control over my focus will shift the results (up to a point). If it were all a matter of antecedent events I would say that the person has some kind of responsibility, but not for the test answer but for some of the thinking that went on earlier in life.

I keep coming back to the difference between a software program 'deciding' and me 'deciding' - I am undecided in the sense that I could go either way before the moment I announce. The program can't - I can tell you exactly what it will do in each and every possible variation of the variables. If I pause the program just before the decision statement, I can predict the result. For some decisions, if you checked with me just before the moment of deciding, I would know, because my values leave very little margin - they do decide. But other decisions the values trade-offs are close enough that I can shift it one way or another depending upon how I focus.



Post 34

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 9:43amSanction this postReply
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Steve,

The intensity of your focus is also a matter of how important it is to you. If the test you are taking is very important, if a lot depends on it, then your focus will be more intense. But if you're taking a multiple-choice test in which the right answer is obvious to you, then (given your desire to ace the test), you will necessarily choose that answer. Does that mean that you're not responsible for your answer -- that you didn't choose it? Of course not. A choice doesn't require the ability to choose the alternative (under precisely the same conditions); all it requires is the ability to choose the alternative, if you were to value choosing it. If you couldn't choose the alternative even if you were to value choosing it (which would occur if someone were preventing you), then it would not be a choice, and you couldn't be held responsible for it.

For example, suppose that you are voting in a rigged election in which there are no secret ballots and in which you are forced to vote a certain way under pain of punishment. In that case, your vote would not represent a choice, because you couldn't have voted otherwise, even if you had wanted to. But in the case of the multiple-choice test, you could have chosen a wrong answer if you had wanted to. It's just that you didn't want to; you wanted to choose the right answer. So, in that case, your answer would represent a choice, even though it was necessitated by your value judgments.
I keep coming back to the difference between a software program 'deciding' and me 'deciding' - I am undecided in the sense that I could go either way before the moment I announce. The program can't - I can tell you exactly what it will do in each and every possible variation of the variables. If I pause the program just before the decision statement, I can predict the result. For some decisions, if you checked with me just before the moment of deciding, I would know, because my values leave very little margin - they do decide. But other decisions the values trade-offs are close enough that I can shift it one way or another depending upon how I focus.
Yes, but what motivates your focus? You seem to be saying that you can focus or unfocus arbitrarily in the absence of any motive or reason for doing so. But that would mean that there is no point to your choosing to focus or unfocus -- that it's not something you do for any reason, value or purpose. Do you really believe that?

Also, I would call the actions of a software program "decisions" only in the most metaphorical sense of the term. A software program doesn't weigh the alternatives and come to a conscious choice or decision. The program isn't conscious, to begin with; it is simply a mechanical operation. Nor is it goal-directed, for it does not make decisions for the sake of any end, value or purpose. Human beings do. The difference between your decisions and those of a software program is not that yours are free, whereas the software program's is determined. The difference is that your decisions are conscious choices that are made for the sake of an end or goal, whereas the software program is simply a mechanical process reflecting the decisions of its designer.

Of course, you can't always predict exactly what choice you will make, because often you are simply weighing alternatives and deciding at the last second which you think is the best or most valuable under the circumstances. There are many subtle psychological factors operating that your own introspection can't immediately identify, but that doesn't mean that these factors are not at work motivating your decisions.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 8/23, 9:56am)

(Edited by William Dwyer on 8/23, 9:57am)


Post 35

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 10:43amSanction this postReply
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Bill,

I have at least a rough idea of your understanding of the free-will issue. I'd like to see the arguments that you would use against my understanding.

What if I were to tell you that I actually can decide to choose job A or decide to choose job B (as long as the values I hold for the money and drive distance come close to supporting either decision).

The way that I do this is by shifting my focus so that I see one value from a perspective that makes it more desirable or less valuable than the other. I focus more on the dis-value of a long drive to work, the wasted time, etc. and I end up choosing that job.

I would liken this to trying on clothes before buying them... you get to make up your mind as you go. The purpose is to look good, within a certain style and purpose for dress (casual, sports, winter, summer, etc.) If two pieces of clothing are close to meeting the desired purpose then you actually decide instead of the values. It can be an emotional decision, or it could be an intellectual decision, but rational, irrational, or emotional - you initiate a first cause. That is how I see it. If your shift is against the grain of the relative values, I suspect that you take on a balancing amount of cognitive dissonance when you are going against reason or values.

Talking about the computer program, you said, "Nor is it goal-directed, for it does not make decisions for the sake of any end, value or purpose. Human beings do. Humans frequently, actually all most always, hold conflicting goals - goals that exist in hierarchy, subconscious goals, goals that are contingent, hypothetical goals that we try on for size, etc. If we shift our focus to an alternate goal, then we put that goal-directed mechanism in a different direction - like turning the car's steering wheel.

You said, "There are many subtle psychological factors operating that your own introspection can't immediately identify, but that doesn't mean that these factors are not at work motivating your decisions. And I think that at least one of these factors is volition. Like we will a muscle to contract, we will the focus of our awareness and we learn how to do it to shift between values of similar weight when making a decision.

The question becomes, how could that view of free-will, which matches how we 'feel' it works, and matches our common sense, and suits the use of the words 'choice' and 'decision' and much more closely matches the concept of responsibility be disproved.

Post 36

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 11:12amSanction this postReply
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Bill,

=========
Why is it hollow? There is no attempt here to explain in detail the many processes involved in human valuation. The point is only to state a fundamental truth at the most general level of causation. The statement is true, ...
=========

The problem is that using "value" generically -- like using "thought" generically -- is a floating abstraction. It's precisely because you don't attempt to explain (or to integrate) in detail the many processes involved in human valuation that makes your theory about value-determinism weak.

Stating a fundamental truth can be misleading when it doesn't apply to the specific context. As such, a literal and illuminating interpretation of value-determinism would be this statement:

"You act to gain or keep what you act to gain or keep (i.e., your action will be determined by your values)."

Ed

Post 37

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 11:34amSanction this postReply
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Bill,

=========
As for the issue of objective versus subjective values, I fail to see its relevance in this context. I am certainly not saying that every chosen action is determined by that which the actor recognizes as objectively valuable, if that's what you're suggesting.
=========

I was just using the unique existence of objective values to prove that human valuation is different in kind from animal valuation -- not merely in degree. Being unique creates a special context where general truths become irrelevant to the debate (they become floating abstractions).

Here's an analogy:

Let's say that I ask you "What is the most effective way to get to China?" All of the following answers are true, so mere truth isn't sufficient to pick between them.

a) by airplane (rather than boat)
b) by heading west (rather than east)
c) by digging (rather than spanning the extra miles of traveling halfway around the globe)
d) by burning Chinese flags (rather than something less symbolic)
e) by adopting communism (so that they will let us in without question)
f) by missle (rather than creeping up on them)

We can't rely on the mere truth of the above propositions when we're trying to understand a specific process. It depends on the process we're trying to understand. Are we trying to travel there? Are we trying to instigate conflict with them? Etc.

The process we're trying to understand dictates the relevance of the evidence we are in a position to find. You don't search in a jungle for skyscrapers, because of the necessarily-human component of them. In the same way, you don't use a generic definition of value (acting to gain/keep) when trying to understand/explain human behavior.

Ed

Post 38

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 12:08pmSanction this postReply
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Stating a fundamental truth can be misleading when it doesn't apply to the specific context. As such, a literal and illuminating interpretation of value-determinism would be this statement:

"You act to gain or keep what you act to gain or keep (i.e., your action will be determined by your values)."
Ed, these two statements are not synonymous. To say that your choice of action is determined by your values is not simply to say that you act to gain or keep what you act to gain or keep. It is to say that your choice of action is determined by its object -- by its end or goal. To say that a value is that which one acts to gain or keep is simply another way of saying that a value is an object of an action. It is that for the sake of which the action is chosen. I chose to mark the correct answer on the multiple-choice test, because I valued the result -- getting an A on the test. What's not to understand?

- Bill

Post 39

Saturday, August 23, 2008 - 1:53pmSanction this postReply
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What if I were to tell you that I actually can decide to choose job A or decide to choose job B (as long as the values I hold for the money and drive distance come close to supporting either decision).

The way that I do this is by shifting my focus so that I see one value from a perspective that makes it more desirable or less valuable than the other. I focus more on the dis-value of a long drive to work, the wasted time, etc. and I end up choosing that job.
Why do you shift your focus? For what purpose? Whatever the purpose, it is that which determines your choice. And if you say that there is no purpose, then you're saying that the act of shifting your focus isn't a choice, since a choice is a goal-directed action.
I would liken this to trying on clothes before buying them... you get to make up your mind as you go. The purpose is to look good, within a certain style and purpose for dress (casual, sports, winter, summer, etc.) If two pieces of clothing are close to meeting the desired purpose then you actually decide instead of the values.
Again, the values don't decide. You decide based on your values. My desire to pass the test didn't choose the right answer; I chose the right answer based on my desire to pass the test. Now in deciding between two roughly equivalent values, what is the value motivating your decision? You're saying that there isn't one, but I would say that the value is your desire to reach a decision within a certain period of time, so you choose whichever value you happen to be focused on at the time you want to make your decision.
Talking about the computer program, you said, "Nor is it goal-directed, for it does not make decisions for the sake of any end, value or purpose. Human beings do. Humans frequently, actually all most always, hold conflicting goals - goals that exist in hierarchy, subconscious goals, goals that are contingent, hypothetical goals that we try on for size, etc. If we shift our focus to an alternate goal, then we put that goal-directed mechanism in a different direction - like turning the car's steering wheel.
If you have conflicting goals, then you have to resolve the conflict by deciding which goal is more important. If you can't determine which is more important but have to make a decision within a certain period of time, then, again, you'll choose to pursue whichever goal you happen to be focused on at the time that you need to make the choice. But all of this is goal-directed, including the goal of arriving at a timely decision.

I wrote, "There are many subtle psychological factors operating that your own introspection can't immediately identify, but that doesn't mean that these factors are not at work motivating your decisions."
And I think that at least one of these factors is volition. Like we will a muscle to contract, we will the focus of our awareness and we learn how to do it to shift between values of similar weight when making a decision.
Volition isn't a factor motivating your choice; volition is the process of choice itself. Yes, we will a muscle to contract and we choose to focus our awareness, but we always do so for a reason. We don't make purposeless or pointless choices.
The question becomes, how could that view of free-will, which matches how we 'feel' it works, and matches our common sense, and suits the use of the words 'choice' and 'decision' and much more closely matches the concept of responsibility be disproved.
Well, not everyone "feels" that it works that way, and you can't use your feelings as a justification for your conclusions. As for matching our "common sense," it is the "common sense" view of a lot of people that the soul exists independently of the body, that God created the universe, that naive realism is true, the latter being the view that colors are out there in the object independently of the perceiver. As Rand observes, "common sense is not enough where theoretical knowledge is required: it can make simple, concrete-bound connections -- it cannot integrate complex issues, or deal with wide abstractions . . ." You may feel as though you make arbitrary, unmotivated choices, but this kind of choice is at odds with the fact that the actions of living organisms are not arbitrary, but are goal-directed. Why should it be any different for human choice?

As for our concept of responsibility, we are quite willing to hold people responsible for choices that are not arbitrary in the way you've suggested, but are clearly determined by their deepest convictions and most strongly held values. Moreover, the very fact that we endorse punishments and rewards suggests that we believe that people's choices are not arbitrary but are motivated by their values.

Finally, the law of causality states that the same thing must act the same way under the same conditions. Why should it be any different for human actions? Why should the actions of everything else, including those of the higher mammals, be determined by causal necessity, with human beings an exception to this principle?

To be sure, none of this is a proof that (classical) free will doesn't exist. It may exist, but if it does, it is curious faculty and one which would seem to have little if any survival value.

- Bill

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