| | Glenn,
Thank you for the quote from Atlas Shrugged, on moral perfection as "unbreached rationality."
Everyone,
Here's the passage I had in mind from "The Objectivist Ethics" (it's from p. 27 in the paperback edition of The Virtue of Selfishness):
The virtue of Pride can best be described by the term "moral ambitiousness." It means that one must earn the right to hold oneself as one's own highest value by achieving one's own moral perfection--which one achieves by never accepting any code of irrational virtues impossible to practice and by never failing to practice the virtues one knows to be rational--by never accepting an unearned guilt and never earning any, or, if one has earned it, never leaving it uncorrected--by never resigning oneself passively to any flaws in one's character--by never placing any concern, wish, fear or mood of the moment above the reality of one's own self-esteem. And, above all, it means the rejection of the role of a sacrificial animal... [Bold added by me]
This is a good deal fuller than the Atlas Shrugged passage. But there is also some question as to how it all hangs together.
There are multiple versions of the "unbreached rationality" standard within it (e.g., "never placing any concern, wish, fear or mood of the moment above the reality of one's self-esteem").
Before anyone can properly be proud, Rand requies unflagging practice of all of the other virtues ("never failing to practice the virtues one knows to be rational"), which of course would include perfect integrity.
The Ancient philosophers were fond of assuming "the unity of the virtues": each virtue is internally related to the others, so if you've attained one, you've attained them all. You can't be honest without being courageous, because sometimes it requires courage to express one's judgment honestly, etc. etc. (It would be fair to call this assumption Platonic, at least in a broad sense.) The Stoics were so taken with it that they made Virtue one single global thing (and practical wisdom one single global thing). Aristotle accepted it at times, and made some dubious arguments that presuppose it, though I would argue that much of his ethical system does not depend on it.
But Aristotle's presentation of pride ("greatness of soul," etc.) declares that no one can be proud without possessing all of the other virtues. Rand seems to be following him closely, for when you read the fine print you discern that to be proud, a person must always practice rationality, independence, integrity, honesty, justice, and productiveness in any context in which any of them is called for.
The unity of the virtues is a nonstarter, psychologically. No major theory of personality is consistent with it; nor is any serious account of the self, goals, and values. The manner in which we human beings develop provides many opportunities for conflict among the goals and values that we pursue. And our adoption of high-level standards (such as those put forward in the Objectivist ethics) does not, in and of itself, make all of our previously adopted goals and values comply with our high-level standards.
So in response to Casey... Rand's notion of moral perfection is residually Platonic, insofar as it clings to that old assumption of the unity of the virtues.
Robert Campbell
PS. What partly compensates in this passage, from a psychological standpoint, is Rand's allowance for acting badly and making amends ("never leaving [any earned guilt] uncorrected"), or for having flaws in one's character and correcting them. Here she offers a distinct improvement over her previous flat statement about unbreached rationality. But she also leaves it mysterious how one could practice the virtues unflaggingly and have any earned guilt--unless the guilt dates from a period in one's life before one decided to practice all of the virtues. (Do those in the ARI orbit who believe in Rand's moral perfection include instances of Rand making amends for wrongs that she did, or of acknowledging flaws in her character and improving on them? Or do they assume that she never did wrong, and never had any character flaws, so could never have needed to make amends, or change her character for the better?)
(Edited by Robert Campbell on 10/05, 5:05pm)
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