Can Animals Empathize? Maybe Not.

Marcus writes:

"Barbara did post once that Rand said to her that she would have liked to have found some justification for Animal Rights."

Ya, this is a sticky issue, due to the nature of "rights"....I actually was hoping that BB might comment on the thread.

But, I think it is still quite reasonable (even without a cohesive doctrine of "animal rights") to claim that it is "wrong" to treat animals with undue cruelty.

[Blargh! Where is Gayle Dean when you need her! ;-)]

In other words, I don't think I need "animal rights" to rationally object to someone kicking the dog...

RCR

Post 21

Sunday, June 12, 2005 - 7:29pm

Ed:

Nathan, empathy is NOT about someone having deep feelings FOR others--it is about someone having the ability to understand the feelings OF others.

re: Koko & the cat
We only have evidence supporting the notion that Koko mourned KOKO's loss of that cat--not evidence that Koko understood what the cat was going through.

Don't pull my comments out of context, Ed.

I was responding specifically to Marcus': "... can you really conceive that animals are able to think and feel the same way about each other as we do?" That was feeling "about" other animals, not empathy.

You consistently bemoan the bear not dancing the waltz when the marvel is that the bear can dance at all.

To me, it's a marvel that animals even feel grief.

Nathan, you seem emotionally-compelled to slant interpretation of this evidence in a manner that confirms your intuition--the intuition that your catchy, anecdotal "anyone who owns a dog" phrase speaks toward.

Anecdotes and personal experience are not always science, but they are often a starting point.

But my "empathy" ought to be shelved during a logical discussion of interpretation of the evidence. And Nathan, you haven't made it clear to me that you have shelved your lightning-quick value-judgments, when you argue for animal cognition. In fact, from my view, what you've displayed is just the opposite.

My motives and style are not the issue, Ed. Look at the evidence, not me.

I fear that you'll respond--like the mystic--that, if I don't get it now, then I won't ever get it (ie. that you can't "teach" it to me). Is that true Nathan (have I missed the revelation--the one that you didn't)? Do you have a sound syllogism taking premises from research--and leading to a conclusion of animal cognition? Or are we supposed to "see" it like you say you do?

Ed, I told you I was done arguing armchair syllogistic philosophy on this subject for now. You don't need me and my syllogisms to research this and draw your own conclusions.

When I present my findings on this issue in a more formal and organized way, I'm sure you'll hear about it, and we can discuss it further then.

Nathan Hawking

Post 22

Monday, June 13, 2005 - 12:42am

I have to ask: How do you suppose that an animal (or human for that matter), might form an emotion as complex as empathy? I say complex because it involves (I think) concept formation. This is something I am not yet convinced that animals are capable of, while humans clearly are. And when I say concept formation, in this context at least, I mean that they must first be able to recognize their own emotion, then be able to extrapolate what either 1) causes such an emotion and/or 2) how they exhibit this emotion. After which, they must be able to observe the subtle (or not-so-subtle) indicators of the emotional response in others. This might demonstrate that animals are able to be in the [emotional] minds of other animals (not necessarily of their own species).

One might also consider the idea that when a dog puts his head in your lap when you are crying or whatever, that they might view these corresponding actions as another emotion. Perhaps they consider it as anger or dissapointment, which I have seen dogs respond to in a similar fashion. Following this, it could be argued that when a dog barks at a shouting match between you and your signifigant other, they are 'feeling' the same thing as when another dog trots into their territory and reacts in the same way.

Of course, there is also the problem that since we can only speculate on the emotional state of another animal, we could be discussing a point that has absolutely no bearing on human beings whatsoever.

Oh, and I could just be full of crap. :)

Joe

Post 23

Monday, June 13, 2005 - 6:56am

There's an issue involved in the discussion of what animals "think" or "feel" that is very relevant to Objectivism. Many Objectivists tend to ignore their emotions; they have learned that emotions are not tools of perception, and they have concluded that they may therefore legitimately be ignored in the pursuit of knowledge. . But emotions ARE tools of perception in one important sense: they tell us about ourselves, they tell us what we value and love and hate and desire. We will never understand ourselves if we don't understand our emotions. And more: they should be respected; that is, if we have an emotion that appears to conflict with our judgment, it is important to check both the emotion AND the judgment; one or the other might be leading us astray, and we cannot know which one unless we treat them both as legitimate avenues to understanding. Our emotions are telling us something, and they should be listened to.

You all probably have had the following experience or its equivalent: You meet someone -- and feel an almost instant dislike for the person. You spend some time talking with him because you've been thrown together, and you discover in him qualities you admire. You tell yourself your emotional reaction was invalid, and you suppress it. But as time goes by and you continue to see the person, you begin to see other qualities that make you increasingly uneasy -- until the day when he takes an action you consider deeply immoral and indicative of a character you cannot respect or like. In fact, you should not have suppressed your initial reaction without examining it carefully; it may have been a response to subtleties that your conscious mind had not yet perceived, and it could have served as a warning -- not as a reason to act on the feeling of dislike without reasons, but to stop, look, and listen with regard to the man.

What does this have to do with animals? Only this: We ought not to ignore our emotional reactions to our pets -- our sense that they respond to us, that they react emotionally to us, that they in some sense understand us. We do not know what these emotions mean, we do not know that our pets understand in the same sense that human beings do, that they empathize in the same sense that human beings do -- but we should not be quick to conclude that our emotions are irrational and that that we somehow know that our pets and other animals are non-conceptual beings Perhaps their ability to conceptualize is at an infinitely lower level than ours is, as well as their power to emphasize -- but we must look both at the very limited knowledge we possess in this area as well as at our emotions, before coming to a decision. WHY do we feel as we do? Is it simply anthropomorphism? Perhaps -- and perhaps not. We must continue to look, and to read, and to introspect until we can find answers that will unite our mind and our emotions.

Barbara

Post 24

Monday, June 13, 2005 - 2:05pm

Everyone,

My big issue with Nathan's stance (and he is the most verbally staunch defender for a positive position on animal cognition), is that his hypothesis -- which he treats as if it were already a thesis -- is not empirically falsifiable. Because that would involve proving a negative (ie. proving not just that we haven't found positive evidence for rationality or conceptual prowess -- but that we won't ever find it).

Nathan's conclusion ought to be dealt with from the armchair -- because it is that kind of a conclusion, an armchair conclusion (one that is not empirically falsifiable -- though it is still rationally falsifiable).

Ed

Post 25

Monday, June 13, 2005 - 3:02pm

Barbara:

... We will never understand ourselves if we don't understand our emotions. And more: they should be respected; that is, if we have an emotion that appears to conflict with our judgment, it is important to check both the emotion AND the judgment ...

I couldn't agree more.

You all probably have had the following experience or its equivalent: You meet someone -- and feel an almost instant dislike for the person. ... In fact, you should not have suppressed your initial reaction without examining it carefully; it may have been a response to subtleties that your conscious mind had not yet perceived, and it could have served as a warning -- not as a reason to act on the feeling of dislike without reasons, but to stop, look, and listen with regard to the man.

Yes. I learned a long time ago that for me, the first few minutes are an almost inerrant guide to what a person is like.

But that raises an interesting question. Is that true because I'm perceiving and confirming reality, or does it just seem true because my subsequent impressions are now biased and self-affirming?

For me, I honestly think it's the former--I can and do change my mind, presented with sufficient evidence. I think most people do this, eventually.

What does this have to do with animals? ... we should not be quick to conclude that our emotions are irrational and that that we somehow know that our pets and other animals are non-conceptual beings. ...

I agree. Our intuitions are not scientific studies, but why should we not respect them in the absense of further evidence? Particularly when they prove reliable in so many other ways.

Nathan Hawking

Post 26

Monday, June 13, 2005 - 3:25pm

Ed:

Everyone,

My big issue with Nathan's stance (and he is the most verbally staunch defender for a positive position on animal cognition), is that his hypothesis -- which he treats as if it were already a thesis -- is not empirically falsifiable.

That is mistaken, Ed.

I've said on a number of occasions: Apply fairly whatever tests for cognitive abilities you would use to test cognition in young children, and you will find that many animals pass those tests rather well.

Researchers are, in fact, doing that very thing. You have only to review the evidence and decide for yourself.

Nathan's conclusion ought to be dealt with from the armchair -- because it is that kind of a conclusion, an armchair conclusion (one that is not empirically falsifiable -- though it is still rationally falsifiable).

I've offered several specific examples of animal behavior that can be explained, to my knowledge, in no other way than rational abstract thought. I'm forced to wonder why you wish me to present you with a formal syllogism, when one is fairly obvious:

Beings which do X seem to be thinking rationally;
Being ________ is doing X;
Therefore being ________ seems to be thinking rationally.

For ________ insert any being, human or animal. For X, use the cognitive tests I mentioned above.

Nathan Hawking

Post 27

Monday, June 13, 2005 - 3:29pm

Ed writes:
>My big issue with Nathan's stance (and he is the most verbally staunch defender for a positive position on animal cognition), is that his hypothesis -- which he treats as if it were already a thesis -- is not empirically falsifiable.

Hey, neither is Rand's theory of concept formation apparently (although I am very keen to hear of any empirical experiments you might suggest that could test it). Do you likewise have a problem with that theory?

>Nathan's conclusion ought to be dealt with from the armchair -- because it is that kind of a conclusion, an armchair conclusion (one that is not empirically falsifiable -- though it is still rationally falsifiable)?

Ed, there are few things that are more "armchair" than *Rand's* view of human cognition. She knew literally nothing about empirical neurological or psychological research, even that which was available in her day, and cared even less. Her theories of cognition and concept formation - basically the same thing - are all the result of her introspection, with a bit of deduction and a huge chunk of sheer guesswork thrown in. They have no empirical foundation (although some retrospective efforts have been made).

My hypothesis is that this is what forced her to "sit on the fence" regarding evolution - an uncomfortable place to be for an atheist intellectual! Because evolution meant that human cognition *had to come from somewhere*, and that somewhere had to be *close by* ie the animal kingdom. In other words, as research is increasingly showing, the difference between humans and animals is increasingly blurry. We're unique, but not as much as we might wish we were. Exactly the same sort of disbelief you're expressing arose when Darwin first suggested we descended from the apes, and were not God's unique handiwork. And this is the point I think Nathan is trying to make a hundred and fifty years later, except this time about our cognition, not our DNA.

- Daniel

Post 28

Monday, June 13, 2005 - 6:26pm

Daniel:

... In other words, as research is increasingly showing, the difference between humans and animals is increasingly blurry. We're unique, but not as much as we might wish we were. Exactly the same sort of disbelief you're expressing arose when Darwin first suggested we descended from the apes, and were not God's unique handiwork. And this is the point I think Nathan is trying to make a hundred and fifty years later, except this time about our cognition, not our DNA.

Well put.

NH

Post 29

Monday, June 13, 2005 - 9:07pm

Nathan, I will answer Daniel first, as my answers to his specific inquiries may well answer your specific challenge to me. Just follow up if my answer to him doesn't satisfy your understanding of my position on the matter.

Daniel,

------------------
-- is not empirically falsifiable.

Hey, neither is Rand's theory of concept formation apparently (although I am very keen to hear of any empirical experiments you might suggest that could test it). Do you likewise have a problem with that theory?
------------------

No I don't have a problem with that theory -- as it has been offered (in a specific means and with a specific objective -- ie. explaining that which is irreducible --ie. explain that which empirical science cannot). I have trouble with the "anything goes" pragmatism that vulgar empiricists display.

I mean geez, at that rate, you might as well lament all day about how the axioms are not EMPIRICALLY falsifiable! Philosophy provides the framework on which science can build bodies of knowledge -- ie. the skeleton that supports the musculature of science.

Rand's theory addressed that which was not addressable via strictly 3rd-person empirical methods.

This speaks to the problem that I have with Dennett. He has become guilty of his own notion of "greedy reductionism" in taking the 3rd-person view to be the objective view of consciousness. That is wrong. The 1st-person view is the objective view of consciousness (though it is the subjective view of all else). It's damn counter-intuitive, but correct nonetheless. Nagel and Searle are more "on the money" here.

------------------
Ed, there are few things that are more "armchair" than *Rand's* view of human cognition ... Her theories of cognition and concept formation - basically the same thing - are all the result of her introspection, with a bit of deduction ...
------------------

See above.

------------------
My hypothesis is that this is what forced her to "sit on the fence" regarding evolution - an uncomfortable place to be for an atheist intellectual! Because evolution meant that human cognition *had to come from somewhere*, and that somewhere had to be *close by* ie the animal kingdom.
------------------

Daniel, Rand was working with limited scientific knowledge regarding evolution. To be sure, an objective philosophy will, by definition, remain consonant with the empirical data (Rand just didn't have enough data back then).

For example, this issue is largely (if not completely) cleared up upon integration of some of the newest findings (from a New Scientist article on how the human brain evolved from animal brains). Marcus had quoted from the article (in the SOLO Science forum) on April 9. As I'm not sure that you have access to said forum, I re-quote the relevant excerpts (along with my responses) below:

---------------------------------
Excerpt 1:
So why don't our close evolutionary relatives, chimps and other primates, have similar abilities? The answer, recent analysis seems to suggest, lies in the fact that while humans and chimps have many genes in common, the versions expressed in human brains are more active than those in chimps.

My Response 1:
Marcus, this is perhaps the most highly-plausible account for the evolution of humans to which I've come across. Basically, the genes (for our Big Brains) were always there in primates--but have always been switched off, in all of the sub-human varieties of such.

Excerpt 2:
What's more, the brains of newborn humans are far less developed than those of newborn chimps, which means that our neural networks are shaped over many years of development immersed in a linguistic environment.

My Response 2:
Excellent point indicating the unique "plasticity" of human brains! This point also resonates quite well with the principles of Objectivism.

It also highlights the importance of development (a real-life "jungle boy"--artificially mentally retarded--may not ever conceptually "leave" the jungle!)

Excerpt 3:
In a sense, language is the last word in biological evolution. That's because this particular evolutionary innovation allows those who possess it to move beyond the realms of the purely biological. With language, our ancestors were able to create their own environment - we now call it culture - and adapt to it without the need for genetic changes.

My Response 3:
Rand would be smiling.
---------------------------------

Daniel, another indirect confirmation of the unique potentiality of H. sapiens, is the recent economical explanation for the abrupt extinction of the physically superior H. neanderthalensis -- we were better traders and environment re-makers (ie. mind over muscle).

Ed

Post 30

Monday, June 13, 2005 - 9:33pm

This speaks to the problem that I have with Dennett. He has become guilty of his own notion of "greedy reductionism" in taking the 3rd-person view to be the objective view of consciousness. That is wrong. The 1st-person view is the objective view of consciousness (though it is the subjective view of all else). It's damn counter-intuitive, but correct nonetheless. Nagel and Searle are more "on the money" here.

Really?

Since I don't want to disrupt the thread, anyone interested in understanding why Dennett doesn't accept the infallibility of the first person view of consciousness can read these articles/papers:

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/JCSarticle.pdf

A fine paper in PDF for understanding the whole philosophy behind Dennett's defense of a third person view of consciousness. In the end, it is the only way we will gain scientific insight into mental processes.

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm

"The Fantasy of First Person Science", culled from a debate with Chalmers. This illuminates some of the problems with Chalmers's criticisms of Dennett. Sadly, Chalmer's speech is not provided.

The question is always the same: how do Searle and Nagel illuminate scientific research?

The papers are only for people who want to get into details and who are, at the very least, serious amateur students of the mind-body problem.

Cheers,

Laj

Post 31

Monday, June 13, 2005 - 10:10pm

Ed:
>Rand's theory addressed that which was not addressable via strictly 3rd-person empirical methods.

I take this to mean that Rand's theory cannot be considered remotely scientific...;-)

>Daniel, Rand was working with limited scientific knowledge regarding evolution.

Dude, you make it sound like she was working in the *1860s*, not the 1960s! "Limited scientific knowledge regarding evolution"? Even the Scopes monkey trial was conducted in the mid 20s, the US fundamentalists regarded as a retarded laughingstock by Europe. Thus any "ignorance" she might have had of the topic in the 1940s, 50s and 60s could only have been willful. Of course, I don't think she was really ignorant of it. I just think it created potential difficulties for her philosophy of the ideal man.

Quoted New Scientist Excerpt:
>With language, our ancestors were able to create their own environment - we now call it culture - and adapt to it without the need for genetic changes.

>My Response 3:
>Rand would be smiling.

So would plenty of theorists. Old man Popper would be laughing his head off. His entire epistemology is evolutionary, with language developments like the argumentative function and descriptive function accounting for our rapid progress. He says"...unlike others animals, who must express their theories with their bodies and live or die with them, *our theories can die on our place*".

- Daniel

Post 32

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 1:26am

Daniel,

--------------------
>Rand's theory addressed that which was not addressable via strictly 3rd-person empirical methods.

I take this to mean that Rand's theory cannot be considered remotely scientific...;-)
--------------------

Yes Daniel, she was engaging in something called philosophy, the necessary pre-condition of science ... ;-)

--------------------
>Daniel, Rand was working with limited scientific knowledge regarding evolution.

Dude, you make it sound like she was working in the *1860s*, not the 1960s!
--------------------

Oops, I'm sorry to misrepresent that aspect of reality. But Daniel, doesn't this new finding of an "unused" portion -- of a shared genome -- compel you to reinterpret previous views in a new light (I think that you have missed my point here)?

--------------------
Quoted New Scientist Excerpt:
>With language, our ancestors were able to create their own environment - we now call it culture - and adapt to it without the need for genetic changes.
>My Response 3:
>Rand would be smiling.

So would plenty of theorists. Old man Popper would be laughing his head off. His entire epistemology is evolutionary, with language developments like the argumentative function and descriptive function accounting for our rapid progress.
--------------------

Daniel, Popper's big contribution was to show that empirical falsification is an instance of contextually-absolute knowledge (even if he didn't mean to show this aspect of reality). Once we know that one swan is not white -- then we know that the proposition that 'All swans are white' has been decisively and absolutely falsified -- independently of space, time, and observer bias (ie. the thickets where subjectivity gains ground). Think Thales here: are we certain that 'Everything is [not] water? Yes, absolutely!

Popper's contribution (falsification of the universal affirmatives about which we make conjecture) then becomes an instance of absolute and objective knowledge, for all observers, everywhere, and for all time. Popper showed (whether he meant to, or not) that empirical falsification affords absolute certainty. And that concludes Popper's contribution to objective philosophy. Enter Rand.

recap: Popper's falsificationism was a great step in objective thinking -- but his rubber primarily hits the road in science (ie. new discoveries) rather than in philosophy (ie. thinking straight about values and reality).

Ed

Post 33

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 12:34pm

Ross,

Okay. When I get a chance, I'll tell you what Wise says. Oh, and I don't know what happened to the link. It's broken, and I can't find another e-copy of Gallup's Can Animals Empathize? Yes. But I'll keep looking.

Jordan

Post 34

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 7:59pm

Has anyone thought of this? I was reading some of the things in the section on evolution vs creationism or ID, specifically that nasty description of all the bad stuff in nature (and yes, it was nasty!). However, it became very clear that extremely distinct biological structures are evident from various types of living things - all the way back. It includes the fact that many are "adapted" in a non-perfect way (i.e. implying that mutation is more likely than design) - one example being back problems because the human rib cage was originally best suited to a 4-legged animal.

Ok, where am I going? Basically, intelligence/consciousness residing in some fashion in the brain and nervous system came to be what it is today in humans via this process. Why, then, is it so hard to believe that the same exact things take place in animals, albeit at a less developed level? It is actually a matter more of the simplest and most likely explanation, not a result of our interest in making animals seem more human. In other words, my proposal is that if you accept that humans evolved, and that therefore human consciousness is a product of said evolution, it follows that similar structures of consciousness should exist in animals.

What does the evidence support? It supports this view strongly! Animals closer to humans in evolution also exhibit a spectrum of response closer to that of humans.

Now, this does not support other possible consciousnesses that we as of now do not know of, but without evidence of any such (we have not encountered any non-living or non-earth consciousnesses as of yet) it is mere speculation.

(Edited by Kurt Eichert on 6/14, 8:01pm)

Post 35

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 11:19pm

Kurt:

Has anyone thought of this? ...

Yes, I think we covered the idea either earlier in this thread or, more likely, later in the Concept/Percepts thread.

Ok, where am I going? Basically, intelligence/consciousness residing in some fashion in the brain and nervous system came to be what it is today in humans via this process. Why, then, is it so hard to believe that the same exact things take place in animals, albeit at a less developed level?

Jeff Perrin and I discussed the likelihood that cognitive abilities developed earlier, given the evolutionary evidence for gradual mental development. Complex structures tend to develop with relative slowness.

It is actually a matter more of the simplest and most likely explanation, not a result of our interest in making animals seem more human.

In other words, my proposal is that if you accept that humans evolved, and that therefore human consciousness is a product of said evolution, it follows that similar structures of consciousness should exist in animals.

Exactly.

Nathan Hawking

Post 36

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 6:33am

Kurt,

Your post is mainstream neo-Darwinism. Most evolutionary biologists believe something like it - the devil is in the details.

Cheers,

Laj.

Post 37

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 6:51am

I know I made my last post sound like a "new idea" when it wasn't really, but it was late at night and I guess I am an egoist :)

Consciousness itself is an incredibly complex issue that seems to me something we have only the barest inkling of an understanding of yet. The conceot of an artificial consciousness intrigues me, but I am unsure if it will be possible outside of a biological construct (in other words, creating one via computers vs. biol-engineering).

Post 38

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 6:02pm

Kurt:

I know I made my last post sound like a "new idea" when it wasn't really, but it was late at night and I guess I am an egoist :)

That's not a problem. I'm not territorial in the least, and make no claims to any originality on anything, as I'm not a historian. I just wanted you to know it had been discussed.

Consciousness itself is an incredibly complex issue that seems to me something we have only the barest inkling of an understanding of yet. The concept of an artificial consciousness intrigues me, but I am unsure if it will be possible outside of a biological construct (in other words, creating one via computers vs. biol-engineering).

I'm convinced that consciousness is virtually ubiquitous, and see no reason why machines won't continue to exhibit more and more evidence of consciousness, until it's obvious (to all but the rigid biologicalists) that if we're conscious, they are as well.

Nathan Hawking

Post 39

Sunday, June 19, 2005 - 10:20am