A modest proposal

"I am 98% sure that certainty is impossible." As Linz points out, how are you sure you're 98% sure? You're left in a position from which you can't escape. You're assuming that which you're claiming does not exist (or might not exist).

I could hit Linz and Cameron with exactly the same 'infinite regress' objection!  I could ask:

'How can you be sure that contextual certainty is possible?'

Suppose you answer you are sure because of *whatever*.   Then I could ask:

'But how can you be sure that *whatever* is true?', and so on ad infinitum.

The very fact that you can't explain to infinity shows that the Objectivist claim that you can have contextual certainty is highly suspect to say the least.

Going back to my '98% sure' argument, the infinite regress argument does not invalidate my claim, precisely because I don't claim to be certain of it!  The probability itself would come from rationally weighing up the evidence based on my knowledge of philosophy.  For instance the Bayes probability Theorem could be used to estimate a figure based on everything I know about philosophy.  But of course if certainty is impossible, the 98% figure is itself uncertain.  But I don't need an infinite chain to get probabilities, only a finite network of self-referential beliefs.  Suppose my rational mind contained a million different beliefs.  To each of these beliefs a probability could be assigned.  This probability would be justified by reference to some of the other beliefs in the network.  The whole thing would loop around on itself.  To greatly simplify let's imagine a 'belief network' with only 2 beliefs: belief 1 and belief 2.  What justified belief 1?  Belief 2 does.  And what would justify belief 2?  Belief 1.  A loop.  This is not circular provided we only use probabilities.

Keep practicing your ameuter philosophy Linz and Cameron!    Who knows at this rate you might just qualify for a remedial course at night school.  And lay off the androids.  Don't you know a practical joke when you see one?  The only way androids will take over the world is if everyone became an Objectivist... or should I say Randroid?  Get it?  Android, Randroid?

And what is the world really?  What does match reality?  I'd love to know how you know, since apparently 2% of your ability to hold strong convictions has been paralyzed by some mysterious "unknowable".

You seem to have mis-interpreted probabilistic reasoning.  When I say I'm '98% sure' of something, this doesn't mean I think that 2% of reality is unknowable.  I think Rand was correct when she argued that reason can fully know reality.  But knowledge and the degree of confidence we can have about that knowledge are two separate things.  I can fully know something but at the same time I can have some doubt that in fact my mind properly knows it. 

There is nothing unknowable in reality.  The probabilities are assessments about the degree of confidence I have that I know reality.  The probabilities will change as I obtain new information.  For instance when I say:

'I am 98% sure that certainty is impossible'

that is based on my current knowledge about philosophy.  As I learn more I might have reasons for being more confident.  Then I could change that the probability to say 99%.  There is no 'unknowability' gap.  Or, suppose that after arguing with Objectivists I grew less confident that I was right.  In fact, suppose that I am wrong.  Then, after I am proved wrong I will simply adjust the probability to read as follows:

'I am 100% sure that certainty is possible'    

Either certainty is, or is not possible.  I think it is very likely that it's impossible.  But I could be wrong.  In that case I will simply have been shown to be mistaken, and I could then adjust the probability to 100%.  So you see there is nothing inconsistent about probabilistic reasoning, nor does it mean that I can't know reality.

Are there varying levels of "Context" that pertain to a rubber ball that preclude any factual evaluation of said ball?

Let's take the rubber ball example you gave:  Suppose I have a mental model of a rubber ball which is 100% accurate.  I agree this is possible.  So then my mind can be said to 'fully know' or fully grasp the reality of the ball.  However the degree of confidence I can have in the hypothesis that in fact my mind DOES fully grasp the ball is a separate issue.  For instance I may be only 78% sure that I know the ball (even though I do in fact fully know it).  Of course there is some factual fact of the matter, and of course we can fully know it.  But not with certainty. 

Of course in reality, there could be some point at which I know with 100% accuracy everything that there is to know about the ball.  But I can't KNOW that I know.  That is, I can't know when I have reached this point..  The reason is that a finite being (like a human) can never know everything about the whole of the universe at once.  We are always operating off incomplete information (relative to the entire universe).  Rand said that we could fix the problem by specifying a 'context'.  But how do we know that there isn’t something outside this context which is screwing with our reasoning faculties?  (Remember, brains are physical objects, existing in the physical universe like everything else).  We don't.  So a confidence level of 100% can't be justified.

Linz, Cameron and yourself have tried to hit me with the 'infinite regress' argument.  To my claim:

'I am 98% sure that certainty is impossible'

You now counter with:

Why 98%? Why not 97% or 99%?  Is the latter too certain , and the former not certain enough?  And as Cameron and LP state, how can you be sure you aren't sure?

My answer:  I can't.  But this is exactly my point.  What you've over-looked when talking about a 'Context' is the mind of observer.  To specify a context a need a working rational mind.  But this mind cannot be seperated from that context!  For any given physical context, we could take a 'God's eye' view of it and imagine an observer looking at that context.  The mind of an observer is itself a physical object, and so we need to consider whether or not this mind is working properly.  But this would create a new context (physical context + mind of observer).  But then we could imagine a second observer looking at this new context - a watcher watching the watcher ;)  And this in turn would create yet another new context (physical context +mind of observer 1 + mind of observer 2) and so ad infinitum.  And that is precisely why specifying a context doesn't escape from uncertainty.

What do you mean by exploit?  Using force or fraud against them?  That certainly makes it clear, if you're familiar with Objectivist ethics.  Or exploit by way of superior intellect or knowledge, without force or fraud?  (fraud seems a sketchy term in business right now, I know, but try to generalize if you can't handle it)  Using the advantages you possess in order to make your life better is not evil exploitation, so long as the rights of others aren't tread upon.  It's in your rational self-interest.  Clear yet?

By 'exploitation' I meant violation of individual rights.  Of course the Libertarian/Objectivist injunction against force and fraud would prevent that, but is it really consistent with 'rational self-interest'?  These are two quite different principles you see:

*Don't commit force or fraud and

*Rational self-interest

are two different things, and it's not clear that one follows from the other.  As I understand it, Rand claimed that her political theory of individual rights was derived from her ethical theory (rational self-interest).  I don't doubt that respect for individual rights (Libertarianism) is the correct politics; it's the ethical theory of rational self-interest I'm doubting here.  And I fail to see why 'don't commit force or fraud' follows from 'rational self-interest' at all.  In fact I fear that the two principles contradict each other.  Individual rights, as I think Rand correctly pointed out, are based on the idea that each person is an end in themselves (NOT a means to an end).  Trouble is, if we follow the ethical principle of rational self-interest, we can only ever regard other people as the means to help us get what we want.  So Rand seems to have contradicted herself.

Whether Rand's definition matched those is up to whomever enjoys deciphering phrasing.  Whatever their evaluation though, Rand was describing a reality of human existence:  There are ideologies that preach and practice self-immolation, and she sought to expose them for the death-cults they all are.  Call it altruism, or whatever you like, but call it something.  Give it a name at least, because it is real.

Rand did a good job of rebutting a very destructive form of altruism, I agree with you there.  Let me call the kind of altruism that Rand was arguing against 'irrational altruism' O.K?  And we can both agree that that kind of altruism is evil.  But just because you can prove that one kind of altruism is the wrong ethics, doesn't enable you to jump to the conclusion that rational self-interest is the right ethics.  Let me give an analogy:  Suppose you prove that an object is not red.  Does this enable you to then conclude that the object is green?  Of course not!  The fact that Rand disproved one kind of altruism does not prove rational self-interest.  There are other kinds of altruism (like the definition I gave) which Rand did not consider.

Again, as I mentioned above, the Objectivist idea that each person is an end in themselves (which I agree with) is, in fact, not consistent with rational self-interest at all.  (Because by definition rational self-interest means only treating others as means to your own ends).

Objectivists can't have it both ways.  Either the Objectivist politics is wrong or the Objectivist ethics is wrong.  Since I'm fairly sure the Objectivist politics is right, I can only conclude that the Objectivist ethics is wrong.

Your justification for Capitalism, of individual liberty you define as "that people should [be] free to do what they want, as long as they not hurting anyone else" is too open ended. You leave the definition of "hurting anyone else" up for interpretation

If I define Liberty to mean respect for each individuals volition (or free will), then this is sufficient to prove the Objectivist/Libertarian politics.  Each person should be free to do what they want, so long as they don't interfere with the free will of others.  The 'rational self-interest' idea isn't needed (Free will is just as compatible with voluntary altruism as self-interest).    Remember Rand was claiming that the politics followed from the ethics of rational self-interest.  But my point is, it just isn’t so.  So again, there's no reason to believe the Objectivist ethical theory.

Marc offers an odd contradiction.  I've seen him agree with the laws of logic (he said he agreed with them)  but then state that logic needs no foundational laws; and then reject logic entirely on the basis of not being an omniscient god ("incomplete information").

How many times do I have to tell you:  probabalistic reasoning is not a rejection of logic!  See what I said about it above, and also I'll post some additional stuff in the other thread.

You don't need foundational laws of logic if reasoning is not hierarchical.  As an analogy, think of the Internet, with each computer representing a belief and the net as a whole representing your brain.  Are there any 'foundational' computers on the Internet, computers which are the 'Master Servers' or 'Root' of the net?  Answer:  No.  You instead have a distributed network with no Master Server.  And so it can be with reason.  You could have a network of self-referential beliefs, none of which are 'foundational' - each belief can rely on the others for support.  As another analogy, clasp the fingers of your two hands together to form a pyramid shape - which hand is 'foundational' to the pyramid shape?  Answer:  Neither.  Each hand supports the other  (Also see my rebuttal of the 'infinite regress' objection to my '98% sure' claim).

The laws of logic might be rules that we need in order to reason with, but this certainly wouldn't make them 'a core of foundational certainty', as Objectivists naively seem to think.    

So you don't have a problem with Objectivist metaphysics or Objectivist epistemology--you just have doubts.  Doubts are psychological conditions--not always bad, but certainly not philosophical postulations in opposition to Objectivism.

Jeremy, you still mis-understand.  Bayesian epistemology (probabilistic reasoning) is definitely different from Objectivist epistemology.  As a Bayesian I don't think certainty is possible.  I think that the best we can ever do is assign probabilities to things.  Clearly this is different from Objectivism, which makes the claim that you can reason your way to conclusions which are certain within context. 

In Bayesian reasoning, the degree of certainty about a piece of knowledge is a separate issue from the accuracy of that knowledge.  This is not 'a matter of psychology'.  The probabilities are determined in a rational way, using something known as Bayes Theorem.  Here are the two epistemic issues again:

(1)  Degree of certainty about a piece of knowledge and

(2)  Accuracy of a piece of knowledge

Two quite different things.  When I say: 'We can fully know reality’, I am referring to (2), not (1).  I take it that we 'know' something if our knowledge about it is fully accurate and we have good enough reasons to be fairly sure.  But I don't require that we be certain.  I take it we fully 'know' something when our answer is fully accurate and supported by reason, even when reason leads to a less than 100% degree of certainty.  So no, I don't believe that we can ever be certain of anything.

Marc, I disagree that you can really know something without knowing that you know it (your definition of "knowledge" is what I call "opinion"). "Knowing that you know" is the unique capability that separates the information processing of an intellectual being (ie. humans) from the information processing of a purely sensitive being (ie. dogs, cats, etc). A dog can know that the cat is on the mat - but a dog cannot know that he knows this.