If you interpret it the way that you insist on doing, yes; what I'm disputing is that that is the only valid interpretation.
Formal logic is not a matter of “interpretation.” You may, of course, cite professional logicians who claim that “All S is not P” can sometimes mean, if one feels like it and so wishes to interpret it, “No S is P”.
As for your syllogism (sorry I misquoted it earlier) it is still invalid. In Aristotelian logic – that is to say, logic – you cannot quantify the predicate. A proposition like “Tom, Dick, & Harry are (all) people” is invalid for syllogistic reasoning. The predicate term never takes any particle of quantification such as “all” or “some.”
The reason it is invalid is that “Tom, Dick, & Harry are all people” makes two assertions; in Aristotelian logic – that is to say, logic – a proposition makes one assertion.
Properties are only in principle completely deducible from the nature of the substance in which they inhere. Gravity is a property of mass, but not completely deducible from the nature of mass.
According to general relativity, gravity is not a property of mass at all.
As for Newtonian models, “mass”, “length”, “time”, and “angle” are fundamental dimensions of measurement. They can be defined in terms of other things (i.e., mass can be defined as “a body’s resistance to a change in its motion”) but aside from that, they are not entities and don’t have properties.
Gravity correlates with mass – vary the latter, the former varies as well – but that in no way proves that the relation is one of effect to its cause, or property to its underlying substance.
There's no mechanistic explanation of gravity, even if you say that there has got to be (in order for gravity to exist or to be true).
I don’t know what you mean by a “mechanistic explanation” of gravity. If you mean a purely material “particle” explanation of gravity, then you’d be right. More proof, therefore, that gravity and matter correlate with each other but that the former is not a property of the latter. They are simply two different, if correlative, things.
Same with mind and brain.
You're just saying that everything is a something (that everything's got identity).
There’s nothing in the physical nature of brain tissue (or any matter) that translates into any experience of mind, such as express, conceive, consider, think, ponder, wonder, obsess, delight, disgust, good, bad, right, wrong, etc.
But there's no "wetness" in a molecule of water, even if wetness emerges when several of these non-wet molecules coalesce.
“Wetness” never emerges irrespective of how many molecules associate with one another unless a perceiving mind happens to be there. “Wetness” is not a property of water; it’s a subjective experience. As such, “wetness” is an epiphenomenon; nothing further can be explained by a concept like “wetness” that can’t be explained more precisely by reference to the concept “water molecules.” Not so with terms referring to mind and terms referring to brain tissue. No reference to any aspect of brain tissue will explain (let alone clarify) a concept like “awe”, “surprise”, “joy”, “concentration”, etc.
In the same manner there isn't "mental-ness" somewhere in an inactive physical brain -- even if mental-ness emerges from an active one.
I never said anything about “mentalness” – a very odd, very un-Randian term that you’ve coined to cover what is a very simple thing: mind. I’m claiming the existence of a non-material entity called “mind” that correlates (“interpenetrates” is a better word) with “brain” and that is obviously distinct from it.
All attempts to deny that “property dualism” amounts to anything other than “brain tissue determines thoughts – or is the ‘cause’ of thoughts -- because “thoughts” are a property of “brain tissue” unintelligible. If you wish to call the only intelligible version of property dualism “physical reductionism”, that’s fine. Then you can make even bigger fools of yourselves by claiming “we agree with property dualism [which is unintelligible] when we claim that thoughts are properties of brain tissue but have characteristics completely unexplainable by reference to brain tissue (or anything else that’s physical), but we disagree with physical reductionism [which may be invalid but at least it’s intelligible]. So much for Objectivists on the Dissent board getting practice in arguing their philosophy.
Did you even bother to read the short link that Merlin provided (where epiphenomenalism was merely one of many theories about property dualism, and not necessarily the correct one)?
Yes, I did. I don’t take anything on Wikipedia at face value. I guess you and merlin do.
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