True Believers, Agnostics, and Atheists
Person A believes in X which has no logical evidence for it, and much evidence against it. This is a True believer who makes use of denial, rationalization and emotonalism to maintain the irrational in their minds even though it has no logical connection with reality.
Person B Believes in X which has no logical evidence for it, but no evidence against it. This is a fearful soul who grants primacy of imagined fantasies over reality... unless someone can prove them wrong. And doesn't want to commit to being a 'true believer' on one hand, or giving up the particular fantasy on the other hand... not yet. This is a kind of having your cake and eating it kind of epistemology. And they might imagine that they are safe from logical attack with this irrational position. They aren't. Reality is still reality and they are still not logically connected to it. But the real cost is in adopting a psychoepsitemology that makes it more likely they will be comfortable with floating abstractions in any given area. To some degree they have set their mind to find and support compromises between knowledge or reality and fantasies - not the kind of programming one should set up in their mind.
Person C does not believe in X which has no logical evidence for it, and some evidence against it. This is just simple reasoning based upon the primacy of reality. If later, the evidence against it is shown to be false, or evidence for it comes into being in the future, then this person's mind opens itself to a reevaluation to best eliminate any contradictions. But this person doesn't adopt a "maybe" position in advance by saying "maybe there will be new evidence in the FUTURE, so I'll leave my thinking open NOW."
Person D does not believe in X despite there being no evidence against it, because there is no evidence for it. This is a recognition that people mistake an agnostics argument for reason, that it is mixing up the notion of a 'possibility' that is based upon nothing, with a 'possibility' based upon something - and sound reasoning doesn't grant ontological status to that for which no such evidence exists. This person might say, "There were once frogs in Newton county, and there is no evidence that would preclude them from coming back, so there might someday be frogs in Newton County." That is a valid possibility based upon valid evidence from the past. He would not say, "There are things we don't know, so one day we may well discover a real unicorn, or omnipotent god, so I'll remain neutral on these issues."
Marotta said, "There may well be a God."
Really? Why not say, "There may well be unicorns and leprechauns."
Marotta went to say, "Nothing anyone has said so far makes sense. No one has offered any proof. From that, it is easy to say that there is no God (as far as we know)."
[Notice that there is no way to logicfally reconcile this with either the "there may well be a god" statement just before it, or with the implications of his "(as far as we know)" that it ends with!]
Why not just say "there are no unicorns and leprechauns (as far as we know)"? But how could one say, "There may well be unicorns and leprechauns, but there is no evidence, nothing but nonsense, so there are no unicorns or leprechauns..... well, there might be but we just don't know of them yet."
Marotta: "That said, I personally doubt that the chain of being stops with us as the crown of creation."
And we might say: "That said, I personally doubt that the creatures in existence stops with those we know of."
Marotta: So, it is easy to imagine that if you extend the chain of being up and out in space and time and whatever else, well, maybe there are many such beings far more extensive, powerful, and et cetera than we are or than we can imagine.
Why not say: "So, it is easy to imagine that if you extend the list of creatures up and out in space and time and whatever else, well, maybe there are many such beings far more interesting, almost magical, and et cetera than we are or than we can imagine - like leprechauns and unicorns."
Marotta states that there may be many god-like creatures that exist somewhere "out in space and time and whatever else" - he believes this despite any evidence - as either an act of faith, or emotionalism dressed up to look like reasoning, or logically flawed reasoning. And he goes on to state that he doubts that they "care much about who rules at Jersusalem."
And then he ends this strange post by attacking those who are a kind of irrational fellow believers, but clearly inferior by his reckoinging when he says, "So, for me, people who do care about that because they think that God cares are really very wrongheaded."
Well, I guess imagining a non-existent god-like being that doesn't care, is one way, although a bit strange, to criticize those who believe in a non-existent god that does care. But I don't see much more than a fig-leaf of difference in wrongheadedness between the two.