| | MKS: I also learned that your right to life is inalienable. That also applies to the kid.
Michael, what does this mean? You put it out there like your meaning is self-evident, however, I have no real idea of what you are talking about. What, specifically, do you think inalienable means in this context, how does it apply to the child in your example and how does that support your thesis? Do you even have a thesis that you could summarize for us in 25 words (while standing on one foot)?
And while you're at it, maybe you could also answer my previous question where I asked:
"Please define exactly what child's rights you are speaking of. I addressed this in my post by pointing out that there are no special rights accorded to children. They get the same rights as all other humans - no more, no less. It seems to me that your entire thread of arguments is based upon some sort of special rights, but you have never outlined them in any specific manner."
You brushed this off as having already been answered. I have carefully read your postings and I do not see this answered. Does the child in you example have special rights not accorded to adults or to others that do not share his situation, or does he possess the same set of rights as all of us? Just sticking in the word inalienable doesn't make things any clearer for me.
MKS: I'm not sure how your right to life extends to allowing a strange kid starve to death in an emergency.
Well, we finally agree about something! You almost certainly DO NOT have the required knowledge and proper context concerning the life of most other people, including me, to be in a position to categorically and absolutely state how someone else should act in various situations, including emergency situations when they arise. This is certainly one powerful justification for leaving this type of decision-making to the individual themselves, as they are in the best position to know what is the best course of action for themselves depending upon their circumstances.
You have constructed this improbable scenario regarding an abandoned child and I could counter with ten equally improbable scenarios where it would be appropriate for an adult to find and then leave a child without offering aid. I already attempted to show one example of how this game works by recounting the MASH episode. Try watching the television show 24 if you want four or five additional examples each week of moral dilemmas that require actions that almost everyone would have categorically objected to until they see the hero have to make a tough choice in a specific situation. To put it simply, it is pointless to declare that you know with absolute certainty what everyone SHOULD do in you little passion play. You can't know, because life is too complex to begin to conceive of all the variable factors that can arise, even in what at first glace seem to be simple situations.
MKS: What are the values in an emergency? [...] Isn't survival the basic value for an emergency?
Well, it depends on what you mean by "survival", but based upon how I think you mean it, then my answer would be: No, not necessarily. Maybe that's what you don't understand or cannot comprehend. I addressed this issue in a post I made to the old Objectivism-L list back on January 26, 1999 and I will include it here because I believe it expands on things I said previously and addresses some other related concerns. I should edit it for this particular discussion, but I am growing weary of expending so much energy on this topic.
Regards,
--
Jeff
Group: Objectivism-L
Subject: The Ethics of Emergencies
Date: January 26, 1999
It has always been a troubling point with me that Rand brushed away the discussion of the practical application of Objectivist Ethics to emergency situations. This has left what I have always considered to be a substantial area of confusion for students of Objectivism as well as providing an effective opening against which the critics of the Ethics could leverage their arguments.
While I agree with Rand in her article "The Ethics of Emergencies" (quoted by Eyal Mozes in his posting), that emergency situations are not the proper psychological context to use when formulating an ethical theory, I do believe that emergency situations provide a good testing ground to check the validity of of one's ethical framework. I would argue that a proper, fully developed ethics, while providing guidance in the choices one makes during normal daily life, should also provide similar guidance during the abnormal and unexpected emergencies one occasionally may encounter.
Since, within an emergency situation there is so little time to evaluate and decide upon a proper course of action, it is particularly useful to have a well integrated ethical system which can be called upon to help one quickly decide the appropriate steps to take. An ethics which doesn't address emergency situations cannot come into play under these circumstances, and I believe that this would put an individual at a severe disadvantage. If I understood her correctly, this is one of the excellent points Marsha was raising.
It seems to me as I review the various positions presented by people on this list regarding "lifeboat" situations, that the differences in the responses may be due (to a good extent anyway) to differing contexts with respect to what is meant by the "life" one is trying to preserve. In some cases, it appears that responses are driven by a context where one's "life" is seen (i.e., is being defined for the duration of the emergency) in very narrow terms as simply sustaining biological functioning and avoiding death, while for others, I sense a more expansive contextual view of one's "life" which includes a much wider range of personal values requiring preservation (e.g., rationality and/or integrity and/or honesty and/or compassion and/or justice, etc.) in addition to basic physical survival. The further apart two individuals are with respect to this contextual definition of "life", the harder they will find it to comprehend one another's responses to theoretical emergency situations. I believe that is what is happening in this discussion.
Rand laid out a detailed view of the development of personal character within the context of a "benevolent universe" as the norm rather than the exception. Under these normal conditions, I believe that most people would have a hard time seeing themselves distinct from a comprehensive set of personally valued attributes. When viewing myself introspectively, I don't see a being who happens to have the attribute of rationality; instead I see a "rational being". My rationality is an integral part of who I am and I couldn't imagine "myself" separate from it. The same applies to a wide range of other characteristics (some of the important ones I mentioned in the previous paragraph). When I consider "my life", I am considering a context which includes "me" and thus all of the characteristics which I value as integral components, applied to the achievement of personal goals. I believe that this is true for most people. Whether they recognize it explicitly or not, a person's identity is much more than just an "animal", and their "life" means considerably more than simply "surviving".
To summarize, "life" is "identity" in pursuit of "goals".
Let's consider emergency situations in contrast to normal day-to-day events and their meaning to our "life". Most discussion on this subject appears to focus on the "goals" component of the equation. In normal life we choose our goals from a typically broad range of possibilities and pursue them with whatever amount of time energy and enthusiasm we wish to invest. At any time, we may set aside one or more goals and pursue others. In contrast, an emergency situation circumscribes our range of goals, and in the case of "lifeboat" scenarios, the primary goal may well be simple "survival". Emergency situations restrict our goals and focus our attention on activities which may well be dangerous, but is this a difference of degree or kind (to borrow a distinction from Mortimer Adler)? I suggest that it is only a matter of degree. The activity of normal life requires our survival be addressed. We work to shelter, cloth and feed ourselves; we take care to not use tools and appliances improperly to avoid injury; we learn to swim so we won't drown; we take corrective measures when we do become hurt or ill. All of these types of action are directed at the goal of our survival. An emergency situation simply causes us to temporarily focus exclusively on this subset of goals which are otherwise a part of normal life. I can see nothing here that would require a different ethics for emergencies which would not be applicable to normal day-to-day activity.
Now, let's examine the "identity" component of the equation. This seems to rarely be discussed, but I believe it is the crux of what Marsha was driving at in her posting. If one adopts a broad view of themselves and consequently their "life", then what is one preserving when they act as a predator (prudent or otherwise) with respect to others in an emergency situation? Can one preserve one's "identity" by violating it? If we value our honesty, can we use dishonesty in service of it? If we value acting justly, can injustice be employed without undermining it? Insert your own values and ask the same questions. As Rand pointed out, man is a being of self-made soul (identity). We each decide what type of person we are to be and we then decide how we are to conduct ourselves in a social setting with respect to others. If we find ourselves in an emergency situation, can we abandon our "identity", even temporarily? If we do, whose "life" are we then acting in service of and what are we preserving?
Death is not a value, but sometimes it is preferable to the alternatives. Galt is prepared to kill himself rather than live in a world where he allowed himself to see Dagny tortured. Many people have risked their lives in battle to defend their freedom, preferring death to enslavement. A parent may put themselves in grave danger to protect their child. Is the maintenance of one's own identity important enough to die for?
In an emergency situation, I suggest that a rational person requires an ethical framework that has integrated an understanding of their identity so thoroughly that it is capable of defining the proper boundaries for choices of actions so that one does not undermine oneself. But you can say the same thing about normal life as well. Therefore, I see nothing to justify a separate "ethics of emergencies".
If Objectivist philosophers were to tackle the task of extending the Ethics into the realm of emergency situations and show how it provides guidance in these "tough" situations as well as for everyday life, I believe the foundations of the philosophy would be significantly strengthened.
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