RoR: Forum

James asked,
"It's not a question of Linz being right or wrong about any intentionally unnamed Person X, is it?"

It's about trying to get an opportunity to directly check one of Linz's judgments about art and artists. Linz cries wolf a lot, and, actually, I'd love to see him be right for once.

"I wonder if you've ever met any pomo wankers at all."

Sure I have. I avoided enrolling in certain art programs because the professors were hostile pomos and very wankerish.

But I've also seen Linz and other Objectivists negatively judge art and music before they've seen or heard it, comically misinterpret the art that they've taken the time to experience, and refuse to accept the positive "sense of life" reasons that others have given for creating or enjoying it.

Having witnessed some of Linz's rants, I suspect it's quite likely that any "resentment" that his artist pal may have expressed toward him had nothing to do with knowing "his world to be depraved" and blaming Linz for "opening his eyes to its depravity." It's much more likely that he merely bridled at receiving unsolicited advice from a frantic amateur aesthete on what or how to create.

But, as I said, I'd love to be wrong. It would be very refreshing to discover that Linz's judgments of art and artists aren't always distorted by his angry brand of Objectivist zealotry.

J

Post 41

Wednesday, October 5, 2005 - 6:57pm

James, "post-learning errors" then preclude or exclude the possibility of moral perfection in a particular person, say like losing your virginity precludes getting it back? If so, where is the perfection or the possibility of perfection going to come from? Are human beings supposed to bat 1000 or are we idiots to approach this subject this way? I say, if the house is perfect except the electrical needs fixing, fix the damn electrical and call it perfect!

--Brant

Post 42

Wednesday, October 5, 2005 - 7:11pm

James, children commit moral breeches all the time--post-learning. It seems that some interpretations of Objectivism have replaced original sin with an almost-inevitable, not-to-be-lost sin. Moral perfectionism means pretend you are someone you are not, for sinners don't belong in Objectivism. (Hope nobody notices I'm not John Galt.) One's life then becomes a big lie, with hypocrisy rife. Orthodox Objectivism thus becomes a cult, with its morally perfect leader(s). This can make Objectivism into something of a religion with people pretending they don't need to be saved, except by the superior Objectivist knowledge.

--Brant

Post 43

Wednesday, October 5, 2005 - 10:57pm

Robert Campbell,

You just wrote (amended by me):

... I doubt the credibility or applicability of any moral system that...
claims that basic human emotions can be transcended, as opposed to being repressed.

That is one of the most critical issues in applying Objectivist ethics, if not the most downright important one. The metaphysical nature of human beings (including their emotional spectrum) is a reality that provides the context for value choices. It is a huge relief to see another person state this so simply.

I am enjoying your posts tremendously.

Michael

Post 44

Wednesday, October 5, 2005 - 11:11pm

MSK wrote to RC:
>I am enjoying your posts tremendously.

Ditto. Hell's turning into a damn skating rink...;-)

- Daniel

Post 45

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 1:35am

> your statement suggests that no one is EVER [emphasis added] in a position to pass moral judgment on another. [Jeff P]

I didn't saw EVER. Not in this post or in any post. Can you quote where you think I did?

> This is a theme you have been sounding for months.

In fact it is -not- a theme I've been sounding for months, because it is not my view. Please pay attention: I do not believe that no one can ever pronounce moral judgment.

> nor anywhere near as difficult as your posts on the topic suggest.

Once again, do you have some specific argument or post of mine in mind?

> It doesn't take 3 PhDs in philosophy, psychology, and criminology and years of intimate personal knowledge of someone to make a well-founded ethical estimate of a person's actions and indeed of the person.

1. It is not a fair tactic to overstate or exaggerate or drop the qualifications or nuances of someone's position to make it easier to rebut.

2. more importantly, you switched the discussion to judging someone's *actions* and therefore the person. I thought the context of my last two posts was mistaken *ideas*, and I thought my two examples suggested this: (i) confusions in the humanities and (ii) learning something and years later realizing a simple mistake.

Phil

PS, Jeff, I really hate this kind of exchange where someone has to point out an overstatement, an oversimplification, or a dropping of context of his views. It's enough effort just to discuss the differences in regard to one's -actual- views.

Nothing personal, but since I write pretty clearly, I have limited time and close to zero patience for this sort of thing. You have now just wasted a half hour of my time and some irreplaceable brain cells to rebut something I never said. And a position I do not actually hold.

Post 46

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 1:53am

> The idea that I am chronically unable to judge people, morally, because of alleged ignorance of personal context has been overstated. [James V]

Well, 'chronically unable', would certainly be untrue. The best discussion of when to pronounce moral judgment (and how much) was given by Leonard Peikoff in a lecture he gave on this subject in 1994: To the best of my recollection, it went like this: It requires a certain minimal degree of evidence to conclude that someone performed an action that you consider wrong or irrational. It requires more evidence to make a conclusion about intent or evasion or moral lapse in that same action, so that you can label that as an immoral rather than mistaken action (e.g., someone hits someone at night with a car and drives off..the issue of whether they saw the person or not). It requires still more evidence to make a conclusion that the person is characteristically unethical in a particular area (e.g., not only didn't make an effort to understand in a certain area of knowledge but characteristically evades in that area). It requires the most evidence of all to thoroughly condemn the person as a total human being. He is not only immoral on X but he is immoral as a total person...either because he is so in many spheres or X is so fundamental that it trumps any areas where the person might be good.

So it is a series of concentric epistemic circles.

It is unfortunate that Peikoff in that very same lecture -applied- his brilliant theory improperly, condemning George Reisman and Edith Packer as immoral, or at least not worthy of having a continued relationship with them. If that proves anything, it is that it is easier to have a good principle than to always apply it correctly.

This is ten years ago, so I hope I have recapitulated it correctly. [He didn't mention G & E by name but spoke of it at the end as the 'hard case' of applying moral judgment to two friends you had allegations of immorality against from two other friends. I asked him a tough question about it in the Q&A. He answered me with a high degree of irritation. I don't think he answered the logic of my question satisfactorily...If people are interested I can post the question.]

Phil

Post 47

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 3:08am

Egregious drivel merchant?????

I was making a tongue in cheek comment on the strength of Lindsay's commentary.

I think you need to wake up to yourself Derek.

Post 48

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 3:29am

He's preoccupied, I think, with wanting to wake up with somebody else.

--
I think you need to wake up to yourself Derek.

Post 49

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 4:08am

Phil,

I share your pain.

Robert C.

Please reference the passage where Rand says what you claim she says about moral perfection.

Tom

Post 50

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 4:29am

Phil,

Last post was re: 45

Now re: 46 Regarding the Reismanns, are you saying that it is wrong (immoral or any shade you like) to cut off a relationship with someone unless one can say that they are through and through immoral? I would say that there is a big range between "immoral" and "not worthy of having a continued relationship with them," which includes the possibility of ending a relationship at any of the stages. My goodness, romantic relationships are broken off daily which include no moral judgment at all.

And yes, I would like to know the question you asked and LPs answer.

Thanks,

Tom

(Edited by Tom Rowland on 10/06, 7:24am)

Post 51

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 4:39am

Re -
"...emotions being transcended rather than being repressed..."

Either of these seem to be indicating one being 'at war' with the other, rather than recognising that the human organism, like all other organisms, is integrated - not inherantly at conflict... it would seem a better choice of concept is 'directing' the emotions, channeling them, so to speak, to specific and proper outlets via cognitive application - emotions are a given, but what one emotes about is determined by whether or not one thinks or thinks properly, eg. non-contradictorally...

Post 52

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 4:57am

I just noticed this thread and the article. Could I have done a better job of exposing the lack of empathic thinking that pervades Objectivism than this article does?

Thanks to those who took the time to respond seriously to this article, as I will not. Forever a social metaphysician, I find the support of others fairly comforting in the battle of public opinion, especially when the responses are made with such classical proverbs and wit as many of you did.

To all those who sanctioned this article, shame on you. (You see, I can confer unequivocal moral judgments too! Now all I have to do is call you all Objectocultists, rave and rant, talk about your unspeakable evil and insult you all, and I have shown that your actions are TOTALLY shameful, not just shameful, TOTALLY shameful and OBJECTIVELY shameful).

What a load of crock!

(Edited by Abolaji Ogunshola on 10/06, 4:59am)

Post 53

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 7:15am

Robert,

Rand's moral perfection does not follow from the the fact that the Brandens are very much less than perfect reporters. This is not something I'm trying to prove, but the very idea seems to generate lots of curiously strong emotions. I don't read anyone here as saying anything like this, however.

Brant,

A moral failure isn't necessarily the end of the road. One can recover. Calm down, no one is sending you to the dungeon. An 8 year old's willfulness isn't in the same category as 28 year old's willfulness. Moral education does count for something and willfulness is an element of moral imperfection.

Jonathan,

Being one of those who does not always agree with Linz on music, I would urge you to develop some thickness of skin. That he really thinks our music is "caterwaul" is something I, for one, can endure.

(Edited by James S. Valliant
on 10/06, 8:08am)

Post 54

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 8:27am

Laj,

You just wrote:

What a load of crock!

Dayaamm! I didn't think you had it in you.

There might be hope after all...

//;-)

Michael

Post 55

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 9:34am

... I doubt the credibility or applicability of any moral system that...
claims that basic human emotions can be transcended, as opposed to being repressed.

This is it. Transcend or repress, both end up doing equally nothing for us anyway.

Where it points to is integration, which will increase awareness.

Post 56

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 10:21am

Hi Tom,

> Regarding the Reismanns, are you saying that it is wrong ... to cut off a relationship with someone unless one can say that they are through and through immoral? [Tom R]

Obviously not. (Why do people keep putting words in my mouth or drawing implications that defy common sense?)

> I would say that there is a big range between "immoral" and "not worthy of having a continued relationship with them," which includes the possibility of ending a relationship at any of the stages.

Of course, but the case of George and Edith was somewhat different. Here is my best recollection (anyone who has listened to the tapes and wants to correct me on something substantive as opposed to a nitpick, please chime in):

Leonard in the 'moral judgment' lecture, after laying out the degrees of evidence needed sought to apply his principles to the "hard case" of "two friends" who had been accused by two other friends of acting immorally, unfairly, demeaning their reputation, assassinating their character without cause, etc.

He said what do you do when the first two friends [me: he didn't mention any names, but let's call them Harry Binswanger and Peter Schwartz] have broken with the latter two. You've known all four for years and you can't be certain about all the accusations. But the first friends ask you to break with the latter, to come to a judgment and not be a moral 'agnostic'. So you have to choose between the two groups. What do you do? He then said you have to go with your best (even if imperfect) assessment of the evidence and decide who to break with.

In my question, I totally challenged his underlying premise and asked him this: Why should you make a choice? Shouldn't you simply say to both: "Look you are putting me in an impossible position. I can't make heads or tails of this. I'm sorry if you want me to judge but I can't yet on this evidence. I wasn't there and can't tell who said what to whom. If you want to break with me, that is your choice. But I will not break with any of you on these charges and countercharges."

He was visibly angry with me and told me to sit down, there would be no follow up question, and said, you can't just be there like Phil Coates and say this is all a tempest in a teapot. I was so rattled (( he'd never used my name in all the questions I'd asked him over the years, or taken any question of mine with anger in years - plus I didn't ask about George and Edith but more broadly about any "two friends" that might fit his example ))that I'm not sure I got his response clearly. It seemed to be just saying in this case, in this context, you -must- pass judgment. But I don't recall getting from him a clear answer to my question which explained why it was mandatory in this kind of situation.

It sort of reminds me of a couple both of whom you like, having a nasty divorce and one or both insists, since you are a friend, you must condemn the other person based on their say-so...Or you are under pressure to choose a side or pass judgment and the evidence does not clearly warrant it.

I would simply refuse to do so. (But I would try if I could to explain it to them when they had cooled down and were more capable of objectivity.)

If you lose a friend (or ally) for a reason like this (or are shunned by one side of an Objectivist schism), my view is the friends (or allies) were not worth having in the first place.

Find better ones.

Phil

(Edited by Philip Coates
on 10/06, 10:27am)

Post 57

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 1:03pm

Phil,

WARNING: The following is my original impulse, not my considered opinion:

I wasn't putting words in your mouth. Rather I, dumb cluck that I am, was confused, and was asking for clarification. It wasn't all that obvious at least to me, idiot that I am. I know some that, given the "'why do people put words in my mouth" and "obviously, not" mantras might think you were an Ayn Rand clone. But not me, no sir, not me. I sincerely felt a certain kinship with your complaint given Robert C's post about me in another thread, and so my "I feel your pain" was a sincere effort to be cordial. Sorry, it won't happen again.

Having mutually vented, maybe we can actually talk about this.

First, do you see any similarity between what I just did, what you did in your post to me, and what Leonard did in his response to you? We all assumed that something was 'Obvious' that wasn't. It is, I've concluded in my old age, part of the human condition. Perhaps it's an unfortunate by-product of the fact that our time is limited and we don't want to take the time to explain what appears obvious to us (that Rand did this on occasion seems pretty clear on the evidence) but isn't to others. Forums like this are particularly susceptible to the by-products of this: 1) we don't really give well thought out answers to honest questions, 2) we don't always ask well thought out questions (so they appear dishonest), and 3) we don't read carefully the responses we do get, particularly if they are well-thought-out and therefore, looong.

In any case, Leonard appears to have thought that your question amounted to trivializing this very hard and very recent (?) decision he had (or thought he had) to make. Instead of thinking in the abstract about 'wounds' in general, you may have hit on a very open wound (in fact, I'm inclined to say it's obvious that you did) and Leonard over-concretized your question so that it became caught in the "very hard" decision he had made. Perhaps he felt pushed into making a decision. His anger was taken out on you.

Is this meant to excuse Peikoff's behavior? Only in part. For there are a couple of questions that need to be answered objectively (not intrinsically and not subjectively, as a reminder to any newbies reading this thread).

1. Did your question trivialize his dilemma?
2. Did he act appropriately? (applies to you, as well as the four friends)
3. What is the proper approach to such issues?

I use the word "proper" instead of "moral" because I don't think this is a moral issue. One of my own principles is to make every effort not to judge a person outside his context (which is different than judging the context itself).

This is a good example of that principle, as are your further comments.

The bottom line is, I don't think there is any universal answer to any of those questions. This is an area where you have to say that "''trivialize", "appropriately" and "proper approach" depend so much on personal context that any universal answer is impossible and, itself, inappropriate. The objective answer to the above questions, for us on the outside, is that each person acted within his/her context and the result was X.

The much more difficult question is: what if you, Phil Coates or Tom Rowland, are asked to take sides between Peikoff and the Riesmanns? Here again, the choice of what to do depends on your context. Given my current context (not being close to or contractually involved with either) I have a copy of Riesmann's book on my shelf and recommend it to anyone who wants a brilliant economics reference.

Were I pressed, I don't think it's quite as simple as "get new friends" That's just my experience with Fred speaking -- my context. The difficulty of that break and the pain and sadness I still feel on occasion (and am feeling as I write) and the absence of any substitute male love in my life leads me to not dismiss such hard choices very easily. "Getting new friends" can be just as difficult as the original choice.

Tom

PS Lest anyone fail to understand, none of this is intended to give any purchase to the cult of moral grayness.

Post 58

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 2:08pm

Abolaji: “Could I have done a better job of exposing the lack of empathic thinking that pervades Objectivism than this article does?”

The cult thread obviously touched a raw nerve, but the real slime here is the use of the bully pulpit to smear an opponent rather than engage him on the ground.

As for notions such as “total”, “absolute”, “perfect”, these terms are expressive, not descriptive. They are used to express heartfelt approval or disapproval -- whether moral or otherwise. And on Objectivist grounds, they are quite meaningless, since they are immeasurable.

When it suits them, Objectivists are quite happy to deal in greys – often at great and painstaking length. They just call it “context”.

Brendan

Post 59

Thursday, October 6, 2005 - 2:42pm