| | Steven:
There was no way for the U.S. to employ the surge strategy without first waging a fast shock-and-awe military campaign to topple Saddam's government and demolish it to the ground, only to build it back up later with a pro-western government and American trained Iraqi police and military.
Not true. The original thought was that the shock and awe campaign was going to be enough to cow any and all resistance to the subsequent occupation of the country. You'll note that IED casualties are very, very small (almost nonexistent) in the first stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. One of our greatest operational mistakes in that area was, in fact, "demolishing Saddam's government to the ground". There were entire divisions worth of low-level grunts, NCOs and officers who were not necessarily loyal to the Ba'athist regime. However, the decision of "de-Ba'athification" was made and no former member of the Iraqi military was allowed to be a part of the new military or government. This led to a lot of these trained military men taking to the streets with rockets and IEDs. It was a massive error.
Steven, de-Baathification happened after the existing Hussein regime was toppled, which would not have happened had America not demonstrated overwhelming military superiority. Iraq had a standing army in the way of rebuilding Iraq. I disagree that the shock and awe strategy was failure. It wasn't, it was rather a resounding success as it's goal was the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime, which it accomplished. What happened afterward I agree was not the most optimal strategy, but don't confuse the strategy used to orchestrate the initial invasion of Iraq with the subsequent strategies employed during its subsequent occupation.
America is in a far different position with Iraq. It is seen as the leader for international operations, it is occupying a country that was completely ruined by a Stalinistic regime, it doesn't share a border with Iraq, etc.
I do not see them as conceptually all that different. First, you keep mentioning that Hamas wants to destroy Israel. That is so. What you do not mention is that it is laughable to the point of insanity to straight-facedly suggest that Hamas has anywhere close to the capability to fulfill that goal. They do not.
But that's not the point. Hamas rather has or had the capability of exacting terror on the Israeli civilian population. Because of it's proximity to Israel proper, it is very easy to launch rockets into and send terrorists into Israel proper. What is laughable is to suggest that is remotely the same as an Iraqi insurgency carrying out attacks on a standing foreign army located half a world away from American soil. Just imagine if America was situated right next to Iraq, we would have been flooded with Iraqi terrorists blowing up schools and buses. How the civilian population of America would react to that would be far different than what actually happened.
Frankly, Hamas's attitudes and the insurgents attitudes are exactly the same: Hamas views Israel as an "invader" on Palestinian lands, and will fight a war of attrition such to the point that international sympathies are raised and Israel folds. I say again, this is the exact mindset of the insurgency in Iraq.
Whether the mindsets are similar or not it makes no difference. The geopolitics of the two situations is what makes it so different.
I'm not sure if it has the support of the Palestinian civilians to pull off that kind of a successful reconstruction.
That is correct; they have to build that support. Look, here are the bare facts, people: Israel has three choices:
1. Do nothing in the face of attacks
2. Fight these "total wars" in the face of these attacks or
3. Accept that the Palestinians are here to stay and start engaging them. The only long-term way that rockets are going to stop coming over the border is if Israel builds enough support among the Palestinians that no one wants to shoot rockets at Israel any more.
Obviously 1. is unacceptable. 2. is better than 1. But how do you propose Israel do 3. when it is constantly criticized internationally for occupying Palestinian land and when it does, it receives attacks on their own soil for doing so? Not one Iraqi has blown up a bus in America, not one Iraqi has bombed a subway in London. Those facts alone drastically change the dynamics of the situation.
And Jon, you should note that Fallujah was the exception, not the rule.
What about Basra and pockets of Baghdad? The point is you said America did not fight any out-and-out warfare in the city streets. In fact it did do this.
I can testify first hand that, more often than not, United States forces did not initiate massive counterbattery fire when some yokel launched some half-assed rocket onto our camp.
Well since you're not in the IDF, you can't testify to the facts of what Israeli military forces do in response to a rocket attack. So who cares what you personally saw in Iraq? Not to mention, some yokel launching a rocket attack into a foreign military encampment half a world away from their country is laughable to equate to a rocket attack landing into say downtown Cincinnati.
Trust me when I tell you, Israel's strategy here will not end the violence.
Probably not but simply "ending the violence" is probably an unrealistic goal. It will I guarantee you at least mitigate the violence for the time being and take away the terror Israeli civilians are experiencing. The violence won't end until the Palestinians embrace western ideals. Until that the only hope is to mitigate the threat, not completely eliminate it.
|
|
Some geopolitical conflicts are morally complicated. The Israel-Gaza war is not. It possesses a moral clarity not only rare but excruciating. ...For Hamas the only thing more prized than dead Jews are dead Palestinians.
