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Post 20

Thursday, June 22, 2006 - 10:55amSanction this postReply
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Cal, Joel, and Wolf,

Before addressing your counter-points, I will quote Eric Mack on the matter -- as he busted the is/ought dichotomy sky-high in The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand (p 130-) ...

After an analogy involving aliens first becoming aware that humans have a strange-structure inside of them (hearts), and wondering what a "good" heart would be ...

===============
... the notion of function seems to be the natural bridge between is and ought. That things of a given kind have a particular function, that there is some need to which we must refer to explain the existence of things of this kind, is a factual matter. Whether things of a given kind have a particular function is a matter of how the world is. Yet if things of a given kind do have a particular function, then those things can be evaluated. We can judge whether this or that thing is as things of its kind ought to be.

[break]

Since the function of a type of thing is the satisfaction of the need that explains it, the function of valuation is the satisfaction of the life needs of the valuing organism. We have, then, a standard for evaluating goal-directed activity. When that activity actually satisfies the life needs of an organism, it is good. As valuation it is fulfilling its function.

[break]

Rather, it is simply a matter of our seeing valuation as a reflection of and response to the fundamental challenge that is posed for any living entity in virtue of its being a living being.

[break]

In one respect, the analogy between hearts and human goal-directed activity may be misleading. Hearts characteristically fulfill their function. They have no choice in the matter. Hearts do, unfortunately, malfunction--but not through intellectual or moral error on their part. The same is true, according to Rand, of goal-directed activity by organisms below the human level. Such activity automatically tends toward the preservation of the acting organism (pp 18-19), although the mechanism of such activity can, of course, miscarry.

Thus, if in attempting to understand valuation, ethical theorists had focused upon goal-directed activity below the human level, they would have more readily concluded that the function of goal-directed activity was the satisfaction of the life needs of the acting organism. And, therefore, they would have tended to conclude that within any organism the satisfaction of its life needs is the criterion for evaluating its actions.

But in the context of human activity, an additional complication appears. Human action, according to Rand, is not programmed. We survive and prosper by choosing the best alternatives among the many avenues for action available to us. It is the freedom of choice in the case of human action that, according to Rand, makes the evaluation of these actions moral evaluation.

But this freedom of choice carries with it the possibility of choosing activities that are less than optimally life satisfying. This is especially true because of the great number and variety of cues that confront us--the sensorial pain or pleasure of an act, its many emotionally felt qualities, our anticipation of its consequences, its felt conformity with past or possible future actions, and so on.

Indeed, since we may guide our choices in particular situations by general rules or strategies about how to choose and since these rules or strategies may themselves not be optimally life satisfying, we may end up systematically acting in ways that frustrate life needs. Such actions may, at the same time, be thought of as enlightened and right. So, in the case of human goal-directed activity, we should not expect to arrive at a correct identification of its function simply by observing what characteristically results from human action.

Neither should we focus on existing opinion about what constitutes right action. In very traditional philosophical language, the point is that, because human beings have freedom of choice, the natural end of man's activity (that which fulfills its function) may be neither the characteristic nor the characteristically endorsed end of human action. This is not paradoxical. There is nothing inconceivable about such divergence between a natural (i.e., function-satisfying) end and a characteristic result.

[break]

The sort of surface inspection and disorganized collection of data that results from not wondering why such things exist does not yield an adequate conception of hearts or an adequate standard for evaluating them. Rand claims that, in parallel fashion, ethical theorists have taken the existence of valuation for granted.

[break]

... the presumption of the rhetorical question "Why does man need a code of values?" is that there is a genuine and valid need for some code of values, i.e., that there is some worthwhile end for the attainment of which guided action is necessary. Given this presumption, the rest of the argument follows quickly. If man's worthwhile goal were death, then no code of values would be needed, for inaction or mere random activity would be causally sufficient for death. Hence, death cannot be man's worthwhile goal. But there are only two fundamental alternatives, viz, death and life (OE, p. 15). So it must be life that is the goal worth being guided to.

[break]

If there is human survival and subhuman survival, one's preference for the former must be in terms of the greater value of humanness over subhumanness. There is need to appeal to a principle--humanness is better than subhumanness--which is quite independent of the endorsement of survival.

[break]

The argument for pleasure and satisfaction being constitutive of the ultimate good of beings capable of these experiences turns on the structure of the concept of benefit.

[break]

... it is because the capacity for pleasure and pain introduces benefits and costs not previously present and these benefits and costs influence the behavior of the entities subject to them.

[break]

But to say that the pleasure and/or the satisfaction work by being new benefits and that the pain and/or dissatisfaction work by being new costs is to go beyond the claim that the pleasure and/or the satisfaction are signs of life-preserving activity and that the pain and/or dissatisfaction are signs of life-hindering activity. It is to accept that the pleasure and/or satisfaction is a part of the good of the entity and that the pain and/or dissatisfaction is constitutive of disvalue for that entity.

[break]

A standard and decisive philosophical criticism of hedonism is that if one had only a desire for happiness as a source of one's actions, one would achieve little happiness. Since happiness is the product of valued actions and achievements, before the actions or achievements can be valued for the happiness they bring, they must be valued on some independent basis. Only under such circumstances will they bring happiness.

[break]

On the validation view, one is not directly concerned with the source of a desire but, rather, with the effects for one's life and well-being of affirming, fostering, and acting upon that desire.

[break]

But at some point in each of these stories we must make reference to natural (i.e., nonpromulgated) desires, interests, capacities, and propensities that I have in common with all or most other people or that distinguish my personality and hopes from those of others.

[break]

Alterations in my desires and interests that on net bring greater safety, riches, or more articulate harmonious experience to my life are to be sought. Passion that are self-destructive or that conflict with the satisfaction of more central goals are to be examined, modified, and, if necessary, overcome.

[break]

For it seems that sometimes we do desire x, because we judge x right or good (and not merely as a means to something already desired). In such cases desire does seem to be based upon, derived from, (purportedly) rational judgment. For example, my judgment that a particular political crusade is right, may itself generate a desire for or interest in joining that crusade.

[break]

Although the ultimate value for each person is his life and (we have argued) happiness, this does not mean that only the desire for life and happiness can be a proper motive. Instead, any desire, interest, or obsession--whether promulgated by reason or not--will be a proper motive if fostering and acting upon it furthers the life and happiness of the agent.

[break]

If Rand the novelist is in this respect right about human nature, rationality and productivity can be welcomed into her ethical scheme--as traits to be valued for the life and happiness they bring.

Hmf!

Ed


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Post 21

Thursday, June 22, 2006 - 11:43amSanction this postReply
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Ah, the deceptive use of selective quoting...

Let me add a few quotes from the passages you omitted:

Rand's arguments that are intended to show rationality and productivity to be constitutive of what is ultimately valuable to humans are unconvincing.

and

Do we have natural (i.e. nonpromulgated) interests in being rational and productive, and is the fostering of these interests both a source of satisfaction and an enhancement of one's survival prospects? These are difficult, substantially empirical questions, and answers to them cannot be defended here.

BTW, I found in that article also an interesting quote from Rand:
Man is born with an emotional mechanism, just as he is born with a cognitive mechanism; but, at birth, both are "tabula rasa".
So much for the often repeated claim that Rand's tabula rasa only refers to cognitive content.

Post 22

Thursday, June 22, 2006 - 2:29pmSanction this postReply
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Cal,

==========
Ah, the deceptive use of selective quoting...
==========

In order for you to justify deceptiveness, you have to show how my snippets provide a different picture to that which is in the book (otherwise your claim is arbitrary). Here you apparently try to show this ...

==============
Let me add a few quotes from the passages you omitted:
Rand's arguments that are intended to show rationality and productivity to be constitutive of what is ultimately valuable to humans are unconvincing.
==============

... and let's see this contrasted against what I DID quote ...
If Rand the novelist is in this respect right about human nature, rationality and productivity can be welcomed into her ethical scheme--as traits to be valued for the life and happiness they bring.
You show Mack saying that Rand did not convince him that the virtues are a constituent of what is ultimately valuable (note how this would make a virtue an end in itself -- ie. it would make a virtue it's own reward). Something which is intellectual uncontroversial. Big deal.

I show Mack saying how it is that the virtues ACTUALLY DO relate to the twin (or "married") ultimate values of life and happiness (or "happy living"). You bring up something uninformative and inconsequential, I actually say something relevant to the original theme (the is/ought dichotomy). So much for "the deceptive use of selective quoting."

Ed


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Post 23

Thursday, June 22, 2006 - 3:48pmSanction this postReply
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Ed:
I show Mack saying how it is that the virtues ACTUALLY DO relate to the twin (or "married") ultimate values of life and happiness (or "happy living").
No, he doesn't. First he writes: "If Rand the novelist is in this respect right..", and not that she is right. From the context of the article it is clear that he is not convinced that Rand shows that rationality and productivity are a source of satisfaction and enhance one's survival prospects (see my second quote, which you conveniently ignore). And that is exactly the core of the Rand's "is to ought" argument via "survival of man qua man". Further he continues with: "Similarly, the more specific concerns and fascinations that help define our individual personalities and aspirations also enter her scheme - as proper motives for those whose fostering of these concerns and fascinations will bring life and happiness." Here he explicitly introduces a subjective element, and that opens of course the door to all kinds of motives which may be quite contrary to the Objectivist ideal, so finally there is nothing left of the "is to ought" argument.

Post 24

Thursday, June 22, 2006 - 6:46pmSanction this postReply
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Of course no philosophy is a "magic 'formula'" for life. We know that life is tough, so disagreements can't come from the toughness of life.
I think you misunderstood the point I was trying to make.  Objectivists seem incredibly surprised when they don't agree with each other, and they seem to disagree all the time.  The history of these sites has been one of bitter quarrels, denounciations and excommunications. In Galt's Gulch the blood must have been running in the streets. Odd that Dagny never noticed.


Post 25

Thursday, June 22, 2006 - 7:49pmSanction this postReply
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There are no conflicts in the interests of rational men.

I've never met a truly rational person in my life.

Post 26

Thursday, June 22, 2006 - 11:47pmSanction this postReply
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Cal,

My words (in the quote box (and your response) ...
===============
I show Mack saying how it is that the virtues ACTUALLY DO relate to the twin (or "married") ultimate values of life and happiness (or "happy living").
No, he doesn't. First he writes: "If Rand the novelist is in this respect right..", and not that she is right. From the context of the article it is clear that he is not convinced that Rand shows that rationality and productivity are a source of satisfaction and enhance one's survival prospects ...
===============

You are saying that Mack doesn't relate rationality and productiveness to life and happiness. Well, here's the FULL context (p 149-) ...

===============
Do we have natural (i.e., nonpromulgated) interests in being rational and productive, and is the fostering of these interests both a source of satisfaction and an enhancement of one's survival prospects? These are difficult, substantially empirical questions, and answers to them cannot be defended here.

But, clearly, Rand the novelist would want to answer them in the affirmative; and such answers are plausible when we recall that rationality is simply the way of interacting with the world that renders it intelligible and predictable and that gives us confidence in our beliefs, inquiries, and plans. Productivity is simply the way of interacting with the world that places us in active and creative control of our environment and makes us reliable patrons of our own lives and values.

If Rand the novelist is in this respect right about human nature, rationality and productivity can be welcomed into her ethical scheme--as traits to be valued for the life and happiness they bring. Similarly, the more specific concerns and fascinations that help define our individual personalities and aspirations also enter her scheme ...

[break]

Rand can and should hold that ... these common and uncommon desires determine (at least in part) the content of an individual's proper motivation.
===============

So, you write that Mack doesn't show how rationality and productiveness relate to life and happiness AND what the actual context shows -- in black and white above -- is that he does, indeed, show this (though not conclusively). Mack wants room for natural (non-rationally-promulgated) desires -- and your thinking error here is to fail to integrate that this does not take away from (rationally) promulgated desires.

You can have both, Cal. Indeed, THAT was Mack's very theme. Congratulations on knocking down a straw man.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 6/22, 11:48pm)


Post 27

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 4:29amSanction this postReply
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Mr. Woodward, you wrote:
There are no conflicts in the interests of rational men.
This is another incorrect Objectivist quote. 

Again, due to the naturalistic fallacy. In example, Hitler was a wicked, yet deeply smart and analytical, individual.

 
I've never met a truly rational person in my life.
Sir, be aware that reason and emotion can be complementary.

Joel Català


Post 28

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 4:36amSanction this postReply
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Bob, you say:
Objectivists seem incredibly surprised when they don't agree with each other, and they seem to disagree all the time. The history of these sites has been one of bitter quarrels, denounciations and excommunications.
Ok Wolf, now understood.

Objectivism promotes this surprise you mention, as orthodox Objectivists can't accept that indeed there can be conflict of interests between rational individuals.

Rationality is independent from morality. Additionally, eventual scarcity of resources or ignorance also leave room to conflict between rational and moral individuals.

Again, that pervasive "fact/value dichotomy" Cal and myself are exposing over and over on this forum.

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/23, 6:41am)


Post 29

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 7:09amSanction this postReply
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Jack,

There are no conflicts in the interests of rational men.
With all due respect, this is wrong.  If it were true, there would be no need for courts. 


 
 I've never met a truly rational person in my life.
I would prefer completely rational, but neither did Rand or she would not have prescribed courts as part of her ideal government.


Post 30

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 7:21amSanction this postReply
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In general, I think the is/ought debate as it relates to Rand is taken too seriously, or rather more seriously than she intended.

When Rand talks about 'writing about man not as he is, but as he ought to be' she is describing her approach to Romantic fiction, nothing more.


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Post 31

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 6:41amSanction this postReply
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By the standards of a philosophy that promotes life, life is the standard of "good." Why would anyone be concerned with a philosophy that did not promote life? A philosophy is a code of values for living on earth.

You are dwelling purely in the inductive reasoning of it. As David Hume, who you seem to be so fond of, proved, induction can't prove anything conclusively. Accordingly, you either have to rely entirely on deduction--which is impossible--or you have to use abduction and examine the effects of the philosophy you are examining.

Human progress is the effect of a philosophy that uses life as it's standard of "good." The fact that you have internet access to argue these points is the result of that philosophy. Any technology that makes your life easier and more enjoyable is a result of that philosophy, though not always fully, because most people choose to accept a mix of philosophies, which slows their progress.
____________________________________________________________________________

What does Hitler have to do with being rational? Yes, he was deeply smart and analytical, but that does not make him rational. Hitler was subject to the blind fury of his emotions much of the time and his empire in the end crumbled because of it. I do not consider any man who thinks that a particular race is less worthy an another race to be rational.

You are the type of person who paved the way for such a man to commit massacres. While Hitler was rolling across Europe in tanks, people like you came to the conclusions "How can we know anything" and/or "We must pray to god to save us."

God did not save them. Men who knew something did. The most rational country in the world, the United States, saved them.

Post 32

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 7:47amSanction this postReply
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    Mr. Woodward wrote:
I do not consider any man who thinks that a particular race is less worthy an another race to be rational.
Of course, racial supremacism is both an irrational & immoral concept. Hitler's immorality was outrageously inhumane.

In spite of this, Hitler was more smart and rational than the average leaders of his time. Just think about Neville Chamberlain.

You are the type of person who paved the way for such a man to commit massacres.
 A baseless accusation.

Your thin-skinned Objectivist sensibility does not help your argument, as resorting to personal attack is an invalid method for rational inquiry.


The most rational country in the world, the United States, saved them.
America was --and perhaps still is-- the most moral country in the world.

But there is no correlation between morality and rationality. The worse enemies of freedom are not idiots.

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/23, 8:28am)


Post 33

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 7:55amSanction this postReply
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Jack,

You are the type of person who paved the way for such a man to commit massacres. While Hitler was rolling across Europe in tanks, people like you came to the conclusions "How can we know anything" and/or "We must pray to god to save us."
Whoa.  I abhor this on behalf of my friend Joel.  Talk about irrationality, you don't even know him.


Post 34

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 8:02amSanction this postReply
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Joel,

But there is no correlation between morality and rationality.
No correlation? 


Post 35

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 8:06amSanction this postReply
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 I abhor this on behalf of my friend Joel.  Talk about irrationality, you don't even know him.
Thank you, Bob.

Mr. Woodward could not bring any sound argument, and then tried to discredit my dissent.

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/23, 8:22am)


Post 36

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 8:11amSanction this postReply
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Bob, you wrote:
Joel,
But there is no correlation between morality and rationality.
No correlation?
Yes, a priori, no correlation. In the same way that a pencil is a tool to write, reasoning is a method to gain knowledge.

Morality involves the use of what you wrote with the pencil (or the use of the knowledge you attained with reasoning), which a priori can be used to pursue moral or immoral ends.

To provide you an extreme example: given the context --a posteriori--, even the use of the atomic bomb against Imperial Japan was moral.

Did that help Bob?

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/23, 8:26am)


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Post 37

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 8:28amSanction this postReply
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Ed quotes Mack:
Similarly, the more specific concerns and fascinations that help define our individual personalities and aspirations also enter her scheme ...
The quote continues:
"... - as proper motives for those whose fostering of these concerns and fascinations will bring life and happiness."
And what if these concerns and fascinations are about living like a parasite? On these terms they should also belong to Rand's ethics scheme.

Now we should distinguish Rand's own ideas and those of Mack himself. The central question is whether Rand's derivation of "ought" from "is" valid. If you read the Mack article, it's clear that he's not very impressed by her argument, as we also can see in another quote from the article:
Since almost every ethical theory, including Rand's, can be seen as advocating the fulfillment of human nature, it is not surprising that Rand's substantial denial of human nature is accompanied by an inability to find justification for her own specific contentful prescriptions to individuals.
What Mack in the article does is to think along with Rand, how she might have formulated her theory differently, but nowhere he pretends to offer an alternate proof. The point is of course not whether productivity and rationality may help to bring a person happiness and fulfillment, there is little doubt that it is possible, but whether this is a universal need, like the need to eat to be able to survive. There is no proof that this is true (while there is a lot of evidence that it is not true). Another point is that even if you could prove that rationality is essential, this doesn't imply that it is rationality in the Randian sense - namely behavior that is directed at pursuing goals deemed worthwile by Objectivism. Someone can pursue a life as a parasite and do this in a highly rational way. Rand's argument would no doubt be that pursuing such a goal in itself wouldn't be rational, but that is of course begging the question. She can't derive the "ought" (to be productive, behave according the the Objectivist ideas) from the "is" (like "man needs to try to survive" or even "man needs to behave in a rational way"). No matter how you try, at some point you have to smuggle the desired answer into the argument.


Post 38

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 8:48amSanction this postReply
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Cal, you accurately wrote: 
Someone can pursue a life as a parasite and do this in a highly rational way. Rand's argument would no doubt be that pursuing such a goal in itself wouldn't be rational, but that is of course begging the question. She can't derive the "ought" (to be productive, behave according the the Objectivist ideas) from the "is" (like "man needs to try to survive" or even "man needs to behave in a rational way"). No matter how you try, at some point you have to smuggle the desired answer into the argument.
Excellent description of the problem. No matter how hard you try, ethics can't be inferred from epistemology.

Ayn Rand desperately tried to get her desired answer, which was to get rid of any metaphysical concept smacking of Theism.

Of course, to start with any dogma --in this case, a desired answer-- is wrong. Her anti-Theistic dogma corrupted her philosophy, and her appeals to emotion could eventually dazzle some gullible minds looking for the same answer.

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 6/23, 8:56am)


Post 39

Friday, June 23, 2006 - 7:58amSanction this postReply
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I agree with you about Neville Chamberlain. He chose to appease Hitler. I'll quote your buddy Ayn Rand as to why:

"There are two sides to every issue: one side is right and the other is wrong, but the middle is always evil. The man who is wrong still maintains some respect for truth, if only by accepting the responsibility of choice. But the man in the middle is the knave who blanks out over the truth in order to pretend that no choice or values exist, who is willing to sit out the course of any battle, willing to cash in on the blood of the innocent or to crawl on his belly to the guilty..."

-Galt's Speech

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